2
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering
from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun “spikes of activity” to put pressure on the regime.
No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was
January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had
made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam
was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.
We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would
also help with the legal justifi cation for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were
three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation.
The fi rst and second
could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be diffi
cult. The situation
might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in
the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was produc-
ing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right,
people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether
we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the fi rst, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing
to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse
and urban warfi ghting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added
the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a
winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK
differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play
hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of mili-
tary action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to
decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It
would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a
fuller picture of US planning before we could take any fi rm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we
were considering a range of options.