On the cladistic equalization of difference with similarity

The approach in biological systematics called “cladistics” is difficult to straighten out conceptually. However, what it actually does is revert differences between classes in a first classification (ie, of biological species), via its so-called “coding of characters and character states”, and assessment of the characters as hypothesized evolutionary transformations between their character states, into similarities between the same classes (ie, the biological species) in the character states in a second classification. It thus turns the differences between the classes of the first classification into similarities between the same classes in the second classification, that is, produces two orthogonal classifications using differences and the same differences as similarities, respectively, between the same classes.

This reversion may appear “natural”, as cladists claim, but it is none-the-less inconsistent (ie, contradictory). The  inconsistency does not reside in the reversion of differences into similarities per se, but in the simultaneous reversion of similarities into differences. The inconsistency can be understood by the following example: assume that A and B are biological species that differ in the possession of ”long legs” and “short legs”, respectively, in the similarity ”possessing legs”. The difference between “long legs” and “short legs” can then indeed be consistently reverted into the similarity “possessing legs”, but the similarity “possessing legs” cannot be consistently reverted into the same difference between possessing ”long legs” and “short legs”, but instead consistently has to be reverted into the difference between “possessing legs” and “not possessing legs”, which is the orthogonal difference direction from the similarity “possessing legs”. With respect to the species, this reasoning can be expressed as that species A (possessing “long legs”) indeed consistently can be similar to species B (possessing “short legs”) in “possessing legs”, but none of them consistently can be different from one another in the similarity “possessing legs”. Instead, reverting this similarity consistently into a difference requires additional species that “not possess legs”. The reversion of the similarity “possessing legs” thus requires an additional set of entities to that which the reversion starts with, ie, including species ”not possessing legs”. In the absence of this additional set, the similarity “not possessing legs” (ie, the difference between “not possessing legs” and “possessing legs”, that is, the evolutionary transformation from no legs to legs, or vice versa) is practically unreachable, whereas in the presence of this additional set, the reversion instead includes an additional similarity that can’t consistently be reverted into a difference in this extended set. That is, every possible set of entities points to another set of entities in the reversion of differences into similarities by the impossibility to revert similarities into differences consistently in any possible set, ie, every possible cladistic production of two orthogonal classifications points at two other orthogonal classifications for every possible set of entities.

The example above illustrates (1) how reversion of differences into similarities is inconsistent, (2) that classification actually traverses different sets of entities infinitely and (3) that difference and similarity thus are orthogonal within any particular set of entities, and (4) thus reveals that reversion of difference into similarity is inconsistent for every possible set of entities by that the simultaneous reversion of similarity into difference is inconsistent for every possible set of entities. It means that differences and similarities instead have to be consistently kept apart within every particular set of entities to avoid entering inconsistency (ie, contradiction), ie, that differences can’t consistently be reverted into similarities in any possible set of entities (as cladistics claim they can).

Cladistics is thus classification into a primary classification and transfomation of this primary classification into an orthogonal classification by reversion of differences into similarities, which is inconsistent (ie, contradictory) per definition for every possible set of classes, because similarities can’t be consistently reverted into differences, and, since this inconsistency moreover is infinite among sets, it is, in practice, an infinite recursion between different orthogonal reversions of different differences into similarities.

This inconsistency of cladistics is difficult to understand, and its consistent contradiction in every particular solution may thus instead appear mysterious. The contradiction can, however, be consistently understood as that although concepts can be conflated, not all entities that the concepts join can consistently be joined, and that although difference and similarity (as concepts) can be conflated, no set of entities can consistently be joined into clades, or put orthogonally, all sets of entities are incompatible with clades.

This also means that the cladistic idea of a single “True Tree of Life” is a practical impossibility, that is, the opposite to what cladistics assumes as an axiom.

The example of cladistics shows that you have to be intelligent to screw up matters, but that it is not intelligent to screw up matters. This is actually the difference between intelligence and wisdom. Wisdom does not screw up matters.

Another contribution to understanding of conceptualization http://menvall.wordpress.com/

Read more at Menvall’s Blog: change on different levels