On the fundamental problem for conceptualization (and Linnean and cladistic classification)

The fundamental problem for conceptualization is that process (ie, change) is in the middle in the reality we observe, whereas pattern (ie, type) is in the middle in our conceptualization of it, since process is orthogonal to pattern, because it means that the middle in the reality we observe is orthogonal to the middle in our conceptualization of it.

This fact means that conceptualization can’t conceptualize reality unambiguously, but only ambiguously or contradictory. A special case of contradiction is the paradoxical contradiction that arises when we try to conceptualize process as pattern (ie, naive set theory, see Russell’s paradox).

This fundamental problem can’t be solved, but can only be bypassed using an orthogonal system of classification, like Linnean systematics. Such system works by operating at two levels, whereof the first level is orthogonal to reality and the second level is orthogonal to the first level. It means that the two levels both mimics the relation between the reality we observe and our conceptualization of it, and keeps the orthogonal levels consistently apart. This bypass makes conceptualization ambiguous and does thus avoid contradiction, most importantly the special case of paradoxical contradiction (ie, Russell’s paradox).

The kind of classification that is called “cladistics”, ie, trying to classify entities into only “clades”, actually collapses the Linnean systematics into Russell’s paradox by simply conflating its orthogonal levels. It is thus both the route into, and Russell’s paradox at the same time. In this classification, however, cladists do not appear to be aware of the fact that they actually classify, but instead appear to believe that they have found “the natural groups”. This belief is not wrong in itself, but not in question, since the problem for conceptualization is not whether such entities are “the natural groups” or not, but instead that such groups, ie, this concept, is paradoxically contradictory. Cladists do thus not solve the problem, but merely states a truism. Yes, we all agree that such entities are “the natural groups”, but our problem is not whether they are or not, but that the concept (ie, clades) is paradoxically contradictory. Cladists haven’t found the solution of the (insoluble) problem for conceptualization, but have merely accepted a paradoxically contradictory concept.

By this, cladists have actually drawn conceptualization in biological systematics into a vain search for an infinite recursion, since a paradoxically contradictory concept is an infinite recursion when searching for the entities of it. Cladists have thus tilted biological systematics from a scientific approach into what in practice is pure subjectivity, because clades are whichever set we say they are, but always pointing at another set. This would never have happened if Willi Hennig had been aware of and understood the findings of Cantor and Russell before him, but unfortunately neither he nor his successors was or is.

It means that biological systematics once again has to climb up from pure subjectivity to the orthogonal (objective) Linnean system. The question is if it takes 2,000 years this time too?

Another contribution to understanding of conceptualization http://menvall.wordpress.com/