An inspection report of staff operations in the U.S Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan last month has found huge staff turnover, overworked staff, and financial inconsistencies. 

The report notes 89 formal recommendations and 42 “informal” ones for the future success of the embassy.

“Even with the able leadership of Kabul’s senior officers, the best of intentions, and the most dedicated efforts, Embassy Kabul faces serious challenges in meeting the Administration’s deadline for “success” in Afghanistan,” the report said.

The report was undertaken by the United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General.

Some Key Judgements:

• The Ambassador and his leadership team in their first six months in Kabul have made impressive progress implementing the Administration’s plans for a massive civilian plus up to support the large increases in assistance programs. This progress took place at the same time that the Embassy experienced virtually 100 percent turnover of American staff, supported international facilitation of the Afghan presidential elections, and participated in the Administration’s Afghanistan policy review.

• Even with the able leadership of Kabul’s senior officers, the best of intentions, and the most dedicated efforts, Embassy Kabul faces serious challenges in meeting the Administration’s deadline for “success” in Afghanistan. The unprecedented pace and scope of the civilian buildup, the need for these new officers to arrive in Kabul before support infrastructure expansions have been completed, and the complexity of establishing arrangements to equip the new subject matter experts for success in the field will constrain the ability of these new officers in the short-term to promote stability, good governance, and rule of law (ROL) in Afghanistan.

• The number of U.S. executive branch staff assigned to the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan will have grown from 320 to approximately 900 by early 2010. The Embassy, at the direction of the Administration, used a process outside of the Mission Strategic Plan (MSP) to justify these new positions and to plan for the increased life support and security costs involved in hosting so many new officers. These costs have not yet been captured in the Department’s International Cooperative Administrative Support System (ICASS) planning procedures.

• Embassy Kabul has a detailed, multiphase plan to expand its administrative support infrastructure to accommodate these new employees. The management section is remarkably adaptable and responsive in an atmosphere of massive personnel surges, constant reinvention, and multiple construction and infrastructure projects.

• The performance of Embassy Kabul’s management section, however, has been adversely affected by lapses in oversight that have resulted in significant management control weaknesses, particularly in the travel program, voucher review, and contracting. Not all designations of duties have been properly assigned.

• The Embassy’s prodigious official visitor support workload taxes the same military and civilian assets that would otherwise be deployed in the vital counterinsurgency and reconstruction efforts that the visitors seek to evaluate.

• The cost of supporting temporary duty (TDY) officers who are assisting U.S. mission operations in Afghanistan is being drawn from funds provided for Embassy Kabul, rather than being charged back to the originating agency via ICASS.

• Embassy oversight of contracts and grants is seriously inhibited by the dangerous security conditions that preclude onsite visits outside of Kabul as well as by the shortage of qualified contract officer representatives in Kabul. The ability of embassy sections, such as the public affairs section (PAS) and the political section, to support proposed new and or expanded grant programs will be limited until additional qualified grants officers are in place and local staff have been trained in grants management.

• One-year assignments coupled with multiple rest and recuperation (R&R) breaks limit the development of expertise, contribute to a lack of continuity, and require a higher number of officers to achieve the Administration’s strategic goals.

• Staffing in the PAS is inadequate to handle the huge increase in public diplomacy funding approved for Afghanistan. A planning team from Washington has traveled to Kabul to develop an operational plan to specify the staffing and resources that will be needed for the new programs.

Read the full report here.