FDR Was a Communist Agent

“Democracy” is a a charade designed to pacify

the sheeple.  Government is run by the Illuminati

Jewish banking cartel.

FDR claimed he was not a Communist

but, as Dave Martin shows, his actions belied his words.

by Dave Martin

Was Franklin Roosevelt a Communist?

(Excerpt and edited by henrymakow.com)

FDR must have been a Communist. Consider what FDR told
Rep. Martin Dies in 1940:

I
do not regard the Communists as any present or future threat to our
country, in fact I look upon Russia as our strongest ally in the
years to come. As I told you when you began your investigation, you
should confine yourself to Nazis and Fascists. While I do not
believe in Communism, Russia is far better off and the world is safer
with Russia under Communism than under the Czars. Stalin is a great
leader, and although I deplore some of his methods, it is the only
way he can safeguard his government.

His
protestation of a lack of belief in Communism is completely belied by
his words here and in many, many ways by his actions. Dies notes
that those pro-Soviet, pro-Stalin views match what he told Cardinal
Spellman in 1943:

His
aide memoire is completely in accord with the opinions Roosevelt
expressed to me over the years. Specifically, the President had said
that Russia was our natural ally; that the Russian people were much
better off than they had been under the czars; and that he thought
that the Russians would get about forty percent of the world, and the
capitalist regimes would retain sixty percent.

(Allied leaders were all Illuminati Jews. So was Hitler.)

Unfortunately,
Roosevelt’s policies seemed to have been designed to make sure that
this prediction would come true. The Yalta
Conference near the end of the war was just the capper on a global
war strategy that from beginning to end could hardly have been better
crafted to further the interests of Joseph Stalin and world
Communism. Having been attacked by the Japanese, the American public
along with many of the country’s military leaders wanted a greater
emphasis upon the Pacific theater and defeat of the Japanese and less
upon the war with the Germans, but Stalin wanted it otherwise and
that’s what he got from Roosevelt.

In
the battle against the Germans, our British allies favored an attack
in the Eastern Mediterranean and up through the Balkans, but, again,
Stalin wanted a different strategy from us. He feared that we would
occupy Eastern Europe and dictate the peace in that area before his
troops could arrive.

Stalin,
therefore, pushed for us to attack across the English Channel at the
earliest possible date to take German pressure off the Soviet Union
while keeping non-Communist allied forces as far away from his sphere
of interest as possible. Only fierce British resistance probably
prevented the allies from making a premature attack across the
channel, but we finally did carry out Stalin’s wishes.

From
the beginning we lavished supplies and equipment upon the Soviet
Union far beyond the requirements of military necessity. Worst of
all was Roosevelt’s unilateral declaration at the Casablanca
Conference early in 1943 that we would only accept unconditional
surrender to conclude the war.

( A slice of FDR’s Cabalist Jewish Administration)

Our
rigid adherence to that policy virtually to the very end* undercut
the strong anti-Nazi elements within Germany, assuring that there
would not be a separate peace between the non-Communist adversaries
that would in some degree deprive the Soviet Union of the spoils of
victory, and that the Japanese would continue to fight until the
Soviet Union could enter the Pacific war and promote Communism in the
East. This unconditional surrender policy resulted in the Roosevelt
administration spurning a number of serious peace overtures from the
anti-Nazi, anti-Communist military leadership of Germany in 1943.
Later, we were to do the same thing with respect to the Japanese
emperor.

Defenders
of Roosevelt’s complete capitulation to Stalin at Yalta argue that
we were simply accepting facts on the ground achieved through Soviet
military success, and there is some truth to it, but only because of
previous concessions to Stalin at Tehran and through our overall
pro-Soviet military strategy.

The absolute worst things Roosevelt
did at Yalta were to agree to the return of refugees from Russia to
their Soviet oppressors known as Operation Keelhaul and the offering
of inducements to Stalin to enter the war against the Japanese.
George N. Crocker in Roosevelt’s Road to Russia best
captures the folly of that last position:

[In
Honolulu] on July 27 and 28, 1944, [FDR] had discussed the war in the
Pacific for many hours with General Douglas MacArthur, who had flown
up from Australia, and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the
naval forces in the Pacific. MacArthur and Nimitz, in the presence
of Admiral William D. Leahy, had told him that “Japan could be
forced to accept our terms of surrender by the use of sea and air
power without an invasion of the Japanese homeland.”

Since
then, what was left of the Japanese fleet had been crushed in the
Battle of Leyte Gulf in October, the Philippines had been retaken,
B-29′s were bombing Japan from Guam, Tinian, and Saipan, and
Japanese peace feelers had been put out.

When
Roosevelt went to Yalta, he kept MacArthur and Nimitz far away. He
asked them nothing, told them nothing. In view of what he did at
Yalta, this would seem an incomprehensible neglect on his part to
avail himself of the counsel of the two men most qualified to give
it. The only explanation that makes any sense is that he already
knew what their advice would be, that it was not compatible with his
plans, and that he did not welcome having their
opinions–overwhelmingly authoritative as they would be–presented.

At this stage, elementary statesmanship, for the security of
American interests in the Far East, required that the Soviet Union
be, at almost any cost, dissuaded, discouraged, and forestalled from
entering the war with Japan. Roosevelt went to Yalta and secretly
did just the opposite. (pp. 242-243).