Bundy Supporters - Permits? We Don't Need No Stinkin' Permits at Camp Liberty, Pahrump, NV - Stop Prison Abuse!

Just me is spot on. And hiring BAR attorneys who work for the Crown and the state will never step outside their safe places.

Someone needs to require the executive administrator who calls them self a judge which is fraud to produce a copy of her oat to office as required.

Acting judge/executive administrator will be required to produce a certified copy of their constitutional oath of office, as required by Article VI, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution and 5 USC 3331, a copy of his/her identification, and a copy of their “Bar Membership Card”.

Why is this important? Because none of them have swore a proper office and is why they ignore the Constitution and won’t allow it in their pseudo corporate fake courts.

Read this on going case and get the information to the Bundys. This information could end the fake judge and call out the massive fraud being perpetrated against sovereign Americans everyday.

Fatal defect in every federal case since March 1, 1991; all such decisions and judgments void
January 16, 2017supremecourtcase

As shown herein below with conclusive evidence, the above headline is not an exaggeration but an accurate assessment of the situation.

“The judicial Power of the United States”

That certain constitution ordained and established September 17, 1787, and implemented March 4, 1789, Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (the “Constitution”), at Art. III, § 1 provides, in pertinent part, that “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,” and at § 2, cl. 1 thereof the limited types of cases and controversies to which the judicial power shall extend.

The Constitution at Art. VI, cl. 3 provides in pertinent part for the prevention of arbitrary exercise or abuse of “The judicial Power of the United States,” id., by way of requirement that all justices and judges of the United States be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution; to wit:

“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; . . .”

Justices and Judges’ Oath of Office

In respect of the above requirement of Art. VI, cl. 3 of the Constitution, Congress on September 24, 1789, in “An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States,” 1 Stat. 73 (the “Judiciary Act”), at 76 supply the oath or affirmation needed for federal justices and judges to be authorized to exercise the judicial power of the United States; to wit:

“Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That the justices of the Supreme Court, and the district judges, before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices, shall take the following oath or affirmation, to wit : ‘I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as , according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’”

Congress 159 years later on June 25, 1948, at 28 U.S.C. § 453 Oath of justices and judges of the United States, 62 Stat. 907, amend the language of the preamble to the oath provided in Section 8 of the Judiciary Act and, cosmetically, the text of said oath; to wit:

“Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office : ‘I, _____ _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm), that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as _____ according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’”

For the next 42+ years justices and judges of the United States who take the 28 U.S.C. § 453, 62 Stat. 907, oath are “bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution,” Judiciary Act at 76 (just like all other federal jurists who came before them), and therefore authorized to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, and discharge and perform the duties of their respective offices.

Congress Alter Materially the Oath of Justices and Judges

Congress on December 1, 1990, however, in Public Law 101–650, at section 404 thereof, 104 Stat. 5124—effective 90 days later, March 1, 1991 (104 Stat. 5124 at § 407)—alter materially by way of amendment, the oath at 28 U.S.C. § 453, 62 Stat. 907, so as to relieve all justices and judges of the United States of any duty of fidelity to the Constitution; to wit:

“Sec. 404. Amendment to Oath of Justices and Judges.
“Section 453 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking out ‘according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to’ and inserting ‘under’”. Pub. L. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5124, December 1, 1990.

Upon amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 453 Oath of justices and judges of the United States, 104 Stat. 5124, provides:

“Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I, ___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’
“(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 907; Pub. L. 101–650, title IV, § 404, Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5124.)”

The only duties incumbent upon justices and judges of the United States to discharge or perform are provided in the statutes of Congress, i.e., the laws of the United States; the Constitution provides none.

Because there is no provision of the Constitution that requires a justice or judge of the United States to discharge or perform any duties, there are no duties under the Constitution incumbent upon any such justice or judge to discharge or perform; meaning: Mention of the Constitution in the 1990 amended oath, 28 U.S.C. § 453, 104 Stat. 5124, supra, is superfluous and may be omitted from said oath without changing its meaning.

This is why, in the Lufkin Action at Law (infra), the United States Attorney went silent for the duration of the case (five and half months) when Petitioner demanded the provision of the Constitution that gives the Court (judge) the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgment in Tyler County, Texas: There is no such constitutional authority and neither the Court nor the United States Attorney is bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution (for the United States Attorney’s oath of office, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 80 Stat. 618; no mention of the word “Constitution,” contrary to the requirements of Art. VI, cl. 3 of the Constitution).

To prevent the fracturing of the federal judicial system were one set of justices and judges to discharge and perform their respective duties agreeably to the Constitution and the other not: Between December 1, 1990, and February 28, 1991, all sitting and newly commissioned justices and judges of the United States take the new oath of office, 104 Stat. 5124, leaving, on March 1, 1991, no justice or judge of the United States bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution—only the laws of the United States, i.e., the statutes of Congress.

“The emperor has no clothes”

The 1990 oath, 104 Stat. 5124, severs the connection between the federal judiciary and the Constitution; meaning: As of March 1, 1991, officers of the federal judiciary have no obligation to discharge or perform the duties of their respective offices “agreeably to the Constitution” (62 Stat. 907), and the former judicial-branch officers are now legislative-branch officers under the exclusive control of Congress.

“Plus peccat auctor quam actor. The instigator of a crime is worse than he who perpetrates it” (John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 2153)—and the instigators of the takeover of the federal courts of limited jurisdiction by municipal judges masquerading as Article III judges and usurping exercise of general jurisdiction throughout the Union, are the Members of Congress.

The jurisdiction of federal courts of limited jurisdiction and the original (de jure) Department of Justice, 16 Stat. 162, is co-extensive with the legislative powers of Congress; to wit:

“Those who framed the constitution [sic], intended to establish a government complete for its own purposes, supreme within its sphere, and capable of acting by its own proper powers. They intended it to consist of three co-ordinate branches, legislative, executive, and judicial. In the construction of such a government, it is an obvious maxim, ‘that the judicial power should be competent to give efficacy to the constitutional laws of the Legislature.’ [Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. Rep. 414] The judicial authority, therefore, must be co-extensive with the legislative power. . . . [The Federalist, No. 80; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. Rep. 384]” Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat., 738, 808 (1824).

Because Congress enjoy only limited legislative power (subject-matter legislative power only) throughout the Union, the federal courts and Department of Justice are authorized to exercise only limited jurisdiction (subject-matter jurisdiction only) throughout the Union; to wit:

“As we have repeatedly said: ‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . .’” Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 611 U. S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted)).

The above is why Petitioner is so persistent: Justices and judges ensconced in federal courts of limited jurisdiction are usurping exercise of territorial jurisdiction (an aspect of general jurisdiction) and entering judgment against, directing the disposition of, and committing theft under color of authority of, Petitioner’s property in Montgomery and Tyler County, Texas—geographic area in which Texas possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over property located there; to wit:

“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).

Notwithstanding that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, Rasul, supra, they are populated by municipal judges of the so-called “United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), “a Federal corporation,” id., by the name of District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, who are usurping exercise of general jurisdiction in Montgomery and Tyler County, Texas, and elsewhere throughout the Union.

Justices and judges of the United States have used their position of trust to betray their creators, the American People, by overriding their will as declared at Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, that all judicial officers of the United States shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, and thereby legislating the Constitution out of the legal process; to wit:

“The Congress as the instrumentality of sovereignty is endowed with certain powers to be exerted on behalf of the people in the manner and with the effect the Constitution ordains. The Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the people to override their will as thus declared.” Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935).

Bearing of the 1990 Oath on Every Federal Case since March 1, 1991

Whereas, as of March 1, 1991, no federal justice or judge is bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution: As of that date, every justice and judge of the United States is barred by Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution from exercising “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, or entering a decision or judgment in any federal court case.

There being no constitutional authority for any Supreme Court decision or civil or criminal judgment in any federal court: Every such decision or judgment since March 1, 1991, is void.

Due Process of Law and Void Judgments

The essence of due process of law is constitutional authority; to wit:

“Due process of law is process according to the law of the land. . . . “. . . Due process of law in the latter [the Fifth Article of Amendment to the Constitution] refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed and interpreted according to the principles of the common law. . . .” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 3 Sup. Ct. 111, 292, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884).

Any justice or judge of the United States who enters a decision or judgment in a federal case without the authority to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1—and this includes every Supreme Court decision and United States District Court judgment since March 1, 1991—does so without the authority of the Constitution and thereby denies the litigants due process of law and manufactures a void judgment.

A void judgment is an utter nullity, of no legal force or effect, and anyone who is concerned with the execution of a void judgment is considered in law as a trespasser; to wit:

“A void judgment which includes judgment entered by a court which . . . lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment . . . can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally . . .” Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7 Ill. 1999).

“Where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide any question which occurs in the cause, and whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgments, until reversed, are regarded as binding in every other court. But if it act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a remedy sought in opposition to them, even prior to a reversal. They constitute no justification, and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered in law as trespassers.” Elliott v. Peirsol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 329 (1828).

“A judgment is void if the court that rendered it . . . acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909, 102 S.Ct. 1256, 71 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982); In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034, 95 S.Ct. 516, 42 L.Ed.2d 309 (1975). Mere error does not render the judgment void unless the error is of constitutional dimension. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, sub nom Simer v. United States, 456 U.S. 917, 102 S.Ct. 1773, 72 L.Ed.2d 177 (1982).” Klugh v. United States, 620 F.Supp. 892 (1985).

“We believe that a judgment, whether in a civil or criminal case, reached without due process of law is without jurisdiction and void . . . because the United States is forbidden by the fundamental law to take either life, liberty or property without due process of law, and its courts are included in this prohibition. . . .” Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816, 70 S.Ct. 57, 94 L.Ed. 494 (1949).

“[I]f a ‘judgment is void, it is a per se abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a movant’s motion to vacate the judgment.’ United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip. from High Tech Indoor Garden Supply, 55 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir.1995). A judgment is void and should be vacated pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) if ‘the court that rendered the judgment acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.’ Id. at 1316 (citations omitted) . . .” Price v. Wyeth Holdings Corp., 505 F.3d 624 (7th Cir., 2007).

“[D]enying a motion to vacate a void judgment is a per se abuse of discretion.” Burrell v. Henderson, et al, 434 F.3d, 826, 831 (6th Cir., 2006).

Ironically, the above post-March 1, 1991, judgments addressing the subject of void judgments, are themselves void for failure of the judge entering his respective judgment to bind himself by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, as required by the Constitution at Art. III, § 1, a denial of due process of law.

as if prison abuse wasn’t a thing before bundy…

Oh right… it is now about white people