Hariri Risks Setting Off Sectarian Violence Across Lebanon

Wednesday, June 30, 2021

Paul Antonopoulos, independent geopolitical analyst

Lebanese Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri visited Turkey for the second time in 2021 to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Bilateral ties between the two countries are growing stronger and Ankara continues to use those ideologically allied to them as soft power agents to influence Lebanese Sunnis, something which could come at the expense of French policy and interests.

After earlier trips to Paris, Cairo, Moscow, Istanbul and the Gulf, the Lebanese Prime Minister-designate visited the Turkish capital of Ankara on June 26 and 27 to meet with Erdoğan. The meeting took place against the backdrop of an unprecedented political crisis in Lebanon, which has been without a government for more than 10 months due to blockades by the various political parties amidst the collapse of the Lebanese economy and pound.

By increasing his trips abroad, Hariri hoped to put pressure on President Michel Aoun, with whom he is in personal and political conflict to form a new government. “It is not by traveling that he will restore his popularity,” said Alain Aoun, deputy of the Free Patriotic Movement (CPL), the main Christian party in Lebanon and opposed to the Hariri family. “Hariri is traveling more than he is in Lebanon. He wants to show that he is active in diplomacy but is absent from most ministerial meetings. The country is deteriorating day by day and instead of solving the crisis, he is regionalizing it.”

Shunned by Saudi Arabia because they believe Hariri is complacent towards Hezbollah, he visited Istanbul for the first time in January. During this meeting with Erdoğan, the pair discussed ways to “deepen and strengthen” relations between Ankara and Beirut “in all areas”. In search of strong Sunni support, Hariri seems to be setting his sights on Turkey, something that would allow Erdoğan to penetrate his influence strongly into Lebanon.

Only a day after the August 4, 2020 Port of Beirut blast, Turkey immediately showed its solidarity by dispatching rescue teams and numerous humanitarian convoys. The spokesperson for the Turkish Foreign Minister also visited the country, a demonstration that Ankara views Lebanon as part of its orbit.

Turkish influence is beginning to be felt in Sunni-majority cities like Tripoli and Sidon. Turkey provides financing for educational, theological and humanitarian projects in Lebanon for the Turkmen minority and the Sunni population. However, the Turkmen only number 10,000 in Lebanon, an extremely small minority in a country of about seven million citizens. Ankara has traditionally used Turkish-speaking minorities to justify intervention or interference in other countries – such as Cyprus and Greece, and to a more limited extent Libya and Syria. However, Erdoğan often proclaims that his country will “protect” Turkish-speaking minorities wherever they may exist.

As the Turkmen of Lebanon are extremely small in number, Turkey is attempting to artificially boost the minority by offering Turkish passports to any Lebanese person declaring themselves a Turk – a prospect that many Sunni Arabs in Lebanon would be contemplating when considering that the Lebanese economy is in even more dire straits compared to Turkey. As French Member of the European Parliament Thierry Mariani stated on March 26, 2021: “In August 2020, the Turkish Foreign Minister announced that he was making Turkish nationality available to individuals of Turkmen origin or who claimed such descent. This decision risks upsetting the fragile balances in northern Lebanon.”

Turkey however enjoys a certain historical prestige among the Sunni populations of Lebanon because of the Ottoman Empire, but for now it does not have any real influence on the country’s domestic politics. However, this does not prevent Ankara from having ideas and plans for the future.

Ankara is also positioning itself for the reconstruction of the Port of Beirut. Turkey is not alone though and several countries have already shown interest in financing the project, such as France, Germany, Russia and China. The Turkish government is also reportedly targeting the Port of Tripoli, especially since trade with the port in Lebanon’s second city has increased since the Syrian War and the destruction of the Port of Beirut. 

While Hariri was considered someone who could represent French interests in Lebanon, Paris is said to have now distanced itself from him due to the lack of political reforms. By constitution, the Prime Minister of Lebanon must be Sunni and the President Maronite Christian. In this jigsaw of competing religious groups in Lebanon, France historically supported the Maronites, but by reaching out to Hariri it suggests that Paris is attempting to diversify its support and influence over other sects and groups in the country. Given Hariri’s lack of political reform and deepening relations with Ankara, in which Paris has major geopolitical issues with, France could revert back to its traditional support for the Maronites.

By allowing Turkey to become the regional power representing the Sunnis of the country, Hariri is deepening sectarian divisions in Lebanon, especially given Turkey’s track record of intervention and interference using Turkish-speaking minorities as justification. Given Turkey’s occupation of large areas of Libya, Syria and Iraq, Hariri is opening the gates for future Turkish intervention or interference in Lebanon. With Iran already strongly backing the Shi’ites, Turkey with the Sunnis, France potentially with the Maronites, and even Greece who in the past year have made strong soft power efforts to connect with the 300,000 Greek Orthodox in the country, Lebanon appears to be a powder keg ready to explode into sectarian violence again if the political and economic crisis continues.

Source: InfoBrics