The ISKP-BLA Nexus: Cross-Border Terror Threat and Its Implications for Pakistan

Recent events have again highlighted the intricate and sinister connection between the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). A recent statement issued by ISKP accused the BLA of duplicity, inadvertently affirming the operational nexus between the two entities. This partnership allows terrorism to flow from Pakistan into Afghanistan, using Afghanistan’s unstable security context as a staging ground and safe haven to carry out attacks against Pakistan. In order to understand the significance of this partnership, it is important to look at the connections between ISKP and BLA, tactics, and wider consequences for regional stability.

On the surface, ISKP and BLA have occasionally appeared as adversaries, engaging in public disputes and infighting. However, a deeper analysis reveals that these confrontations are less about ideological differences and more about competition for dominance within the militant landscape. Both groups share a common goal: destabilizing Pakistan. Their tactical rivalry serves as a smokescreen designed to confuse observers and obscure their ongoing collaboration.

The operational procedures followed by ISKP and BLA bear remarkable resemblance to one another, such as the practice of suicide bombings and joint high-profile media campaign to synergize their terror activities. The common tactics indicate a converged approach instead of parallel or divergent strategies. Irrespective of the media-driven impression of competition, the two organizations continue to be on the same page in their overall goals of destabilizing Pakistan’s security and global reputation.

Afghanistan’s existing security void is rich terrain for militant organizations to grow and plan on. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border, porous and at times uncontrolled, is an important point of passage for these organizations. The ISKP release clearly states that it has a presence in Mastung, a part of Pakistan’s Balochistan province. ISKP’s penetration into Mastung, it should be noted, was impossible without the acquiescence or complicity of the BLA, which suggests a functional coalition based on self-interest.

This trend indicates the larger issue of using Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists. Individuals like General Safiullah Safi, an organizer associated with groups such as FAK and ISKP, illustrate the way Afghan territory is used as a center for training, planning, and organizing militant activity targeting Pakistan. Whereas some Afghan accounts try to deflect suspicion by blaming Pakistan for sheltering militants, the truth is that terrorist networks actively use Afghan land as a safe haven to plan their operations and to mount attacks across the border.

Inside Pakistan, ISKP does not have a mass independent footprint. Rather, it functions in cooperation with the BLA, drawing massively on Afghan safe havens and shelter provided by the Taliban to carry out cross-border terrorism. The alliance facilitates both organizations’ easy crossing of the border, planning attacks, and amplifying their subversive reach in sensitive areas such as Balochistan.

Afghan government’s loose grip on its own territory worsens this issue, empowering these terrorist organizations to act with impunity. Afghanistan, in this way, becomes unwittingly a kindling point for militancy directed against Pakistan. Without increased Afghan control and cooperation, Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts are subject to constant and considerable obstacles.

The recent conflicts between ISKP and BLA are best explained as a battle for dominance within the militant environment and not an abandonment of their pact. Their conflicts are motivated by personal agendas and tactical rivalry for resources and sway, not existential ideological contradictions.

In spite of their internal conflicts, both organizations continue to be strongly invested in their joint objective of destabilizing Pakistan. This dualism—cooperation with competition—illustrates the intricacy of militant organizations’ alliances and problems for the security forces.

Like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and similar outfits, ISKP and BLA act as proxies in a larger campaign that seeks to destabilize Pakistan through clandestine and insurgent means. There are charges that foreign intelligence services, including India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Pakistan’s own Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), control these outfits to further geopolitical agendas.

This proxy conflict makes it harder for Pakistan to pursue counterterrorism policies, as it is dealing with a complex network of militant groups with differing levels of external support. The ongoing insurgency perpetrated by these groups illustrates the severity and complexity of the threats facing Pakistan.

Addressing the Cross-Border Terrorism Challenge
In short, the ISKP-BLA nexus poses a great threat to Pakistan’s security, dependent to a great extent on Afghanistan’s uncontrolled and unstable situation. Their alliance highlights the pressing need for regional collaboration and improved Afghan governance to contain the crossing of terrorism.

Although public bickering between militant groups can give the impression of division, the reality on the ground is one of cooperation with the objective of undermining Pakistan. Addressing this problem requires a multifaceted approach—a one that attacks the havens, financing, and cross-border mobility making it possible for these groups to survive.

In the absence of coordinated regional action, especially involving the commitment of Afghanistan to denying safe havens to terrorists, Pakistan will continue to suffer from the chronic threat of terrorism nurtured on Afghan soil.