Q: Why The Russian Submarine Secrecy? Losharik Class Splicing Encrypted Command & Control Cables via Florida Maquis

Seeing the sub was on the Russian side, the only explantion was ops in Japan, but we have this problem in that conceptually though you may splice a cable to intercept you need to have tetrabytes of storage capacity for long term intercepts because you do not have another cable to take that information to Russia. So you would tap, lay a cable to your territorial waters and have a base station there do tne intercepts and record. By and large this will pick up unecrypted civillain traffic of packets sent by the lowest latency route, which means you get partial data because you are not the man in the middle and cannot ask for a resend. Its not live monitoring of DHS emails, its Japan & Korea and civillian traffic which can be decrypted easily, if it is so. Myself, I see the sub mostly laying sonar buoys to pick up acousic signatures of Naval traffic to which it is feared it would lay drone mines.