Weapons of Mass Destruction - Part 2

The New Terrorist Threat: Weapons of Mass Destruction

The proliferation of WMDs into the hands of rogue dictators and terrorists has brought a sea change in strategic international relations. It is accelerating the necessity of public international law to protect humanity. Traditional balances of power have little force left to deter WMDs. Major world powers must seriously revamp and proactively exploit public international law and, to that end, bolster multilateral institutions to marshal an action plan to leash this unacceptable risk (Donlan, 2005).

What are WMDs? Weapons of mass destruction include Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) or Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) weapons:

• Nuclear Warfare (NW) – nuclear bombs and/or weapons including suitcase nuclear weapons that produce flash and heat from the blast, flying debris, and residual radioactivity
• Biological Warfare (BW) – rapid spreading of deadly diseases, spores, and germs. We also call this germ warfare.
• Chemical Warfare (CW) – deadly poisonous gases, sprays, liquids, and gels
• Radiological Warfare (RW) – “dirty bombs” using nuclear waste material for its enduring radiation effects

Seeing is Believing. When nuclear mushroom clouds appear over our large cities and millions die from poison gas and deadly diseases, maybe, then and only then, dissenters will understand what former President George Bush had talked about regarding WMDs. Cindy Combs (2006) says that there is growing concern among many who study terrorism that the use of WMDs may become more common in the near future. Because access to such weapons is clearly growing and groups are already training in the more easily accessed materials, the likelihood of a threat by terrorists of a WMD seems credible. The difficulty in generating and appropriately dispersing NBC weapons remains high. However, once they achieve this capability, terrorists would willingly use NBC weapons (Combs, 2006).

Securing the Bomb

A Real and Urgent Danger. Nuclear terrorism remains a real and urgent danger. Terrorists are actively seeking nuclear weapons and the materials to make them. With enough plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU), a sophisticated and well-organized terrorist group could potentially make at least a crude nuclear bomb that could incinerate the heart of any major city. Yet, the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons exist in over 40 countries. There are scores of sites that are not secure enough to defeat the capabilities that terrorists and criminals have demonstrated. Improved security for nuclear stockpiles in Russia and elsewhere as well as the disruption of al-Qaeda’s centrally-controlled structure after 9/11 have reduced the risk. However, far more remains to be done. Nuclear theft is an ongoing reality as demonstrated by the stolen HEU seized in Georgia in early 2006 (Bunn, 2007).

Trafficking of Radioactive Material. Additionally, the vast majority of materials involved in documented trafficking transactions have no application in a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb, and their value is typically overestimated. Fifty percent of trafficking incidents between 2001 and 2006 concerned radioactive orphan sources, contaminated scrap metal, and radioactive isotopes. Accounts of these incidents rarely indicate the exact quantity or quality of the radioactive material, making it difficult to evaluate the significance of the incident. The analysis of these cases showed, however, that most of them involve industrial instruments that typically contain small quantities of radioactive material. Among the 10 reported incidents involving HEU, only 3 involved weapons-grade materials enriched to 80 percent or more. In these cases, the total material amounted to gram-quantities (5 grams, 170 grams, and 100 grams), hardly enough material for a weapon, which requires at least 10 to 15 kilograms of HEU (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007).

A Threat to Everyone. In the aftermath of a terrorist mushroom cloud over the cinders of a major city, America and the world would be changed forever. The economic and foreign policy repercussions would be global, potentially pushing millions into poverty. Nor is the United States the only possible target. Al Qaeda-linked or inspired attacks intended to cause mass casualties have occurred throughout the world. In short, this is not just an American problem. Unsecured nuclear material anywhere is a threat to everyone, everywhere (Bunn, 2007).

Risk of Nuclear Terrorism. With sufficient and sustained leadership, the probability of such a catastrophe could be reduced to a small fraction of its current level by the end of the next United States presidential term. Every presidential candidate should be asked a central question: What is your plan to prevent terrorists from incinerating the heart of a United States city with a nuclear bomb? That risk can never be reduced to zero. However, the goal must be to get as close to zero as possible as quickly as possible. Keeping nuclear weapons or materials from being stolen is the most direct and reliable tool for preventing nuclear terrorism. Once such items have disappeared, the problem of finding them or stopping terrorists from using them multiplies enormously. The myriad routes across the world’s scantily protected borders make nuclear smuggling almost impossible to stop (Bunn, 2007).

Safeguarding Nuclear Materials. The September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States and subsequent bombings in Madrid, Bali, London, and Moscow vividly demonstrate the determination of terrorist groups to strike fear and inflict mass destruction. Hence, keeping nuclear materials and weapons safe and secure is imperative. Nowhere has the challenge of protecting these materials been greater than in the former Soviet Union. The security system for protecting vast stockpiles of nuclear warheads and materials fell into disarray when the Soviet Union split into individual states in 1991. With the Russian government in transition, financial support for nuclear sites was chaotic at best. A social and economic malaise set in. Scientists and other nuclear workers were not paid for months, and the infrastructure at nuclear facilities began to crumble (Walter, 2007).

Keeping Nuclear Materials from the Terrorists. This situation was ripe for clandestine operations by rogue nations or terrorists who wanted to acquire these extremely dangerous materials. Reports of stolen nuclear material began to surface. Poverty-stricken nuclear scientists with their weapons know-how became targets for bribery. Sixteen years later, the Russians have markedly improved their security, thanks in part to several programs implemented by the Department of Energy (DoE) in the early 1990s. One such program is called International Material Protection and Cooperation (IMPC). Now managed by DoE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the IMPC Program focuses on upgrading protection, control, and accountability systems to safeguard nuclear materials (Walter, 2007).

Out of Harm’s Way. Through IMPC, Russian facilities are now equipped with alarmed fences, electronic access control and delay systems, vehicle inspection facilities, and alarm control and display consoles. Accounting and control systems also measure, track, and monitor nuclear material inventories. Additionally, new regulations and procedures help protect Russia’s civilian and military nuclear sites (Walter, 2007).

Dirty Bombs. Radiological weapons are thought by many to be the likely choices for terrorists. Unlike nuclear weapons, they spread radioactive material, which contaminates equipment, facilities, land and acts as a toxic chemical, which can be harmful, and in some cases fatal. A “dirty bomb” is the likely choice for terrorists and can kill or injure people by exposing them to radioactive materials, such as cesium-137, iridium-192, or cobalt-60. Atomic experts say the explosion of a dirty bomb containing one kilogram of plutonium in the center of Munich, Germany, could ultimately lead to 120 cancer cases attributable to the blast (Porteus, 2006).

Detonation Methods. Methods of detonating a dirty bomb include devices—such as bombs or artillery shells—used to disperse harmful radioactive material. This weapon can be used to contaminate livestock, fish, and food crops. Most radioactive material is not soluble in water, so that virtually rules it out as a way for terrorists to contaminate reservoirs or other water supplies. Terrorists could launch a systemic attack on a nuclear power plant by venting or overloading a reactor so it acts as a radiological weapon (Porteus, 2006).

Responding to a Dirty Bomb Attack. One has to work under the assumption that a dirty bomb will be used by terrorists in the future. In the event of an attack using a dirty bomb, the speed at which authorities respond to the incident will be vital in order to prevent mass hysteria. For this purpose, professional crisis communication and a rapid and robust response by suitably equipped specialists will be key in containing the event and returning to normalcy as quickly as possible, thus reducing the psychological and economic impact (Worcester, 2008).

Response to a Weapon of Mass Disruption. The worst time to work out a response strategy is during an emergency. This strategy has to be developed and exercised well in advance. We should be aware that such a weapon is not so much a weapon of mass destruction, but rather a weapon of mass disruption and plan our strategy accordingly. The better the population and authorities are prepared, the lower the impact will be. This strategy ensures that the terrorists do not achieve their aim to intimidate the population and create lasting economic damage (Worcester, 2008).

References

Bunn, M. (2007, September). Securing the Bomb 2007. Project on Managing the Atom Commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University. Retrieved from http://www.nti.org/securingthebomb.

Combs, C.C. (2006). Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice-Hall, pp. 300-301.

Donlan, M.F. (2005). Weapons of Mass Destruction & Public International Law. New England Journal of Public Policy, 19(2), Winter 2005, p. 189.

Ouagrham-Gormley, S. B. (2007, October 22). Nuclear terrorism’s fatal assumptions. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Retrieved from http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/nuclear-terrorisms-fatal-assumptions.

Porteus, L. (2006, June 20). Weapons of mass destruction handbook. FOXNews.com. Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,76887,00.html.

Walter, K. (2007, December). Out of harm’s way: International collaboration helps keep nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists. S&TR, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 10 pp. Retrieved from https://www.llnl.gov/str/Dec07/pdfs/12.07.1.pdf.

Worcester, M. (2008, January 25). International terrorism and the threat of a dirty bomb. Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW), Berlin. Retrieved from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=46567.

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