More Zionist propaganda to get the U.S. behind the genocidal Zionist regime in Israel.

These are all lies and will be repeated ad infinitum to justify the Israeli war of aggression.

Here is the truth about the Iranian nuclear program.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/rozeff/rozeff62.html

To become stronger and more independent, Iran wants its own nuclear power plants. The U.S. vigorously supported the Shah’s ambitious plan to have nuclear power plants. But ever since his overthrow, the U.S. has tried to derail Iran’s nuclear program (and its government.)

Iran’s oil production has fallen dramatically while its population has risen. Every barrel of oil Iran uses domestically sacrifices the receipt of export dollars. The oil that Iran uses costs Iran just as much as it costs to an outside buyer. This is one reason why it wants nuclear power. The U.S. leadership has propagandized that Iran is awash in oil and does not need nuclear power plants. This myth has been repeated in the American press.

As a further step toward independence and power, Iran also wants to control each stage of the uranium production process. This is allowable under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It allows a low degree of uranium enrichment, and Iran wants to do this processing itself.

The U.S. doesn’t want Iran to have nuclear power plants, and it does not want Iran to have nuclear weapons. The U.S. views an allowable nuclear power program under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision as a precursor to an Iranian threat of nuclear weapons being developed. This is consistent with the U.S. goal of keeping Iran politically weak. Had the U.S. not blundered into the region, the whole nuclear issue would not have been a problem for it, real or imagined.

Actually, Iran has no nuclear weapons. It is a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and the IAEA inspects its nuclear program. Iran has consistently denied ambitions for nuclear weapons. It has verbally guaranteed that it is against them and will not produce them. This could change if threats or pressures against Iran rise to a high enough level.

Since an Iranian nuclear program is legal, the U.S. uses other means to browbeat and undermine Iran’s ambitions such as influencing Russia to slow down its work, instituting sanctions to slow down Iran’s progress, and influencing European countries who deal with Iran.

Exaggerated U.S. fears of Iranian nuclear potential are deeply embedded in the American psyche. They permeate U.S. thinking and policy. The U.S. has for over 25 years persistently raised the spectre of Iranian nuclear weapons even though Iran has none. In 1985 the military was considering reports of Iran attempting to develop nuclear weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. In 1992, military thinkers spoke of Iraq, Iran, and Libya luring Russian scientists to work on their nuclear programs. In 1996 the Congress of the United States passed The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. Rep. Gilman (N.Y.), for example, at that time spoke of the clandestine nuclear programs of both Iran and Iraq as if they were real. None of this has ever panned out.

IAEA inspectors have been inspecting Iran for years. They haven’t found any nuclear weapons program going on in Iran much less actual weaponry. The IAEA now is beginning to act as Bush did with Saddam Hussein. The IAEA has demanded that Iran somehow prove a negative, that it does not have nuclear ambitions or weapons.

Iran for many years conducted allowable small-scale experiments on the enrichment of uranium but it failed to disclose them as it was obliged to. These were lab or bench experiments. Their sophistication level was not high. Producing various uranium compounds in the lab is a very long way from creating concentrated uranium and a workable bomb that can be placed on a missile. After these experiments were revealed in late 2003, Iran moved to a policy of full disclosure and additional voluntary inspections. This backfired on Iran. It produced increased Western and IAEA suspicions, demands, and pressure accompanied by long negotiations that recently halted or have failed when Iran ended its voluntary suspension of enrichment activity. Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of IAEA, seems to have taken each voluntary or other concession as reason to demand another and another. As the saying goes “Give an inch and he’ll take a mile.” He gave an interview to Newsweek in which he vented his righteous indignation publicly against Iran for stopping what it volunteered to do over and above its legal requirement two years ago. This took him out of a supposedly objective mode into a powerful political mode. In 2005 President Khatami expressed disappointment with the ongoing talks with the EU-3 and hinted that Iran would end its voluntary halt of uranium enrichment if the other side did not live up to its promises. This has now happened. Iran’s side of it is presented in detail here. The whole issue now appears headed for some sort of U.N. process, but only time will tell.

Why would Iran, despite their high cost, want nuclear weapons? A country with nuclear weapons can’t use them against another country that also has them for fear of retaliation. If both Israel and Iran have nuclear weapons, the chances are neither will ever use them on each other. The country that has nuclear weapons can intimidate and/or deter the country that does not have them. Israel can deter Iran, for example. However, this one-sided balance of power is an inducement for Iran to get nuclear weapons. If it got them, it couldn’t use them. Therefore, Iran (rationally) seeks to get Israel to give up its nuclear weapons and join the nuclear non-proliferation club. But if Iran thinks that the U.S. and/or Israel are a big enough threat to its existence, then it becomes rational for Iran to get nuclear weapons so as to neutralize the threat.

In the end, has Iran so far accumulated fissile material and conducted the experiments needed to produce an atomic bomb (never mind a hydrogen bomb)? No, it has not. Is it a few months away from building a bomb? No, it is not. Perhaps the Clinton Administration gave them atomic secrets, as some accounts suggest. This sounds quite far-fetched but we do not know. If so, where is the evidence of weapons production? There isn’t any, and the IAEA looked hard.

It is rational for Iran to do the initial research on nuclear weapons, especially if it keeps it within legal bounds. What this does is provide Iran with the option later on to produce weapons if the need arises. This option is valuable. It strengthens Iran. This is why the U.S. is against even this step. This is one reason Iran will not accept the Russian suggestion that it enrich uranium and ship it to Iran. On the other hand, a viable course of action might be for a joint Russian-Iranian company to enrich uranium in Iran. The Russians could make sure that the enrichment was low-level, and the Iranians could increase their technological skill.