Not a parody: proposal of unilateral Israeli withdrawal relying on

Dr. Aaron Lerner – IMRA: Buried inside this article by Kobi Michael we hav=
e =

the following:

“In addition, it seems that to enable the establishment of a viable =

Palestinian state, additional consideration should be given to the =

limitations of the bilateral track and the logic and reconsideration of a =

multilateral regional track, in which especially Jordan and Egypt will =

become full and responsible partners in the process, or alternatively a =

unilateral Israeli measure with the support of the international community.”

That’s right.

After he presents all kinds of requirements for arrangements with the =

Palestinians he turns around and suggest we prepare to retreat (aka =

“unilateral Israeli measure”) in an arrangement that apparently relies on =

Jordan and Egypt.

A suggestion to Kobi Michael and all the others who apparently are so fixed =

on our pulling out of the West Bank come-what-may: follow the news.

In all due respect to Jordan and Egypt, neither of them are in a position =

today that it is a safe bet as to who will be in charge there in another =

decade and what ramifications this will have for Israel.

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
Security Arrangements: A 4-Level Game
INSS Insight No. 519, February 20, 2014
Kobi Michael .

http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=3D4538&articleid=3D6632

SUMARY: In recent weeks, efforts by US Secretary of State Kerry to achieve =

an Israeli-Palestinian framework agreement have focused on an attempt to =

have the parties agree on security arrangements in the Jordan Valley. =

Secretary Kerry apparently presumes that Israel=92s concerns about security =

issues are the main obstacle to progress, and that once Israel=92s concerns =

are met, further progress on the political process toward an agreement will =

be possible. What is troubling about this attitude is its rather =

one-dimensional view of the security question. The US paradigm is military =

in substance, and does not address other aspects, certainly not adequately. =

In fact, it is important to achieve security for Israel through a =

combination of four elements: the military element; the element of =

Palestinian governance and the statehood (political) logic guiding the =

future Palestinian state; the element of regional cooperation; and the =

element of international legitimacy.

In recent weeks, efforts by US Secretary of State Kerry to achieve an =

Israeli-Palestinian framework agreement have focused on an attempt to have =

the parties agree on security arrangements in the Jordan Valley. The major =

issues at hand pertain to the scope of the Israeli military force in the =

region, the duration of its stay, and the nature of its activity. Secretary =

Kerry apparently presumes that Israel=92s concerns about security issues ar=
e =

the main obstacle to progress, and that once Israel=92s concerns are met, =

further progress on the political process toward an agreement will be =

possible. What is troubling about this attitude is its rather =

one-dimensional view of the security question. The US paradigm is military =

in substance, and does not address other aspects, certainly not adequately. =

In fact, it is important to achieve security for Israel through a =

combination of four elements: the military element; the element of =

Palestinian governance and the statehood (political) logic guiding the =

future Palestinian state; the element of regional cooperation; and the =

element of international legitimacy.

Taken together, these four components represent a whole of sorts, with the =

relative weight of each element necessarily derived from the prevailing =

circumstances. The weight of each element can therefore change according to =

the circumstances. Moreover, a system of reciprocal relations exists betwee=
n =

the elements: strengthening and enhancing one element makes it possible to =

change/weaken the importance of another element. Approaching the security =

question as a dynamic combination of elements that interface and exert =

mutual influence creates room for maneuver and flexibility in formulating a=
n =

agreement between the parties and an understanding of the possible changes =

over time. Necessary, then, is an analysis of the issue on four levels. It =

appears that particularly the discussion of Palestinian governance and its =

political theory vis-=E0-vis the adoption of statehood rationale is neglect=
ed =

in the context of security.

From the perspective of Israel=92s interests, a viable Palestinian state th=
at =

takes governmental responsibility and exercises a monopoly on the use of =

force is an essential condition for ensuring stability and security. A =

Palestinian state that falls into the pattern of a failed state is liable t=
o =

become a subversive and hostile entity and develop into a grave security =

threat to Israel. The transition from a sub-state entity with a questionabl=
e =

performance level to a viable, vital, and functioning state can take place =

through a gradual and responsible state building process with the support o=
f =

the international community and Israel.

A viable state is one that exercises effective sovereignty through an =

effective central government free of (violent) subversion and has the =

capacity to:

a. Exercise its authority/impose its sovereignty over the population in =

its area of responsibility Including a monopoly on the use of force while =

complying with the principles of law and order;

b. Supply the needs of the population for which it is responsible, along =

with the population=92s human security;

c. Be acknowledged by the population as the responsible element;

d. Recognize the right of the neighboring countries to exist, respect =

their right to self-determination, and fulfill its responsibility to these =

countries and the international community in a manner that serves and =

supports regional stability and security.

It therefore follows that a viable state is one that effectively and =

consistently exercises sovereignty over its citizens and conducts reciproca=
l =

relations with its neighbors, the region, and the international community =

with responsibility and accountability. An important condition for ensuring =

that a country is viable is its ability to exist independently, which is =

linked to its ability to survive and adapt to a complex and dynamic reality =

as a function of its degree of (in)dependence on external parties =96 the l=
ess =

dependence, the more viability.

The more the Palestinian Authority (PA) resembles a viable state that =

behaves according to political reasoning, the easier it will be for Israel =

to show more flexibility on security arrangements and increase the =

Palestinian areas of responsibility in place of the physical presence of =

Israeli forces. On the other hand, any evidence that the PA is acting in a =

divided and chaotic environment without political reasoning, which first an=
d =

foremost means a monopoly on the use of organized force, or evidence that =

the Palestinian institutional system continues to demonstrate functional =

weakness and that the Palestinian state is unable to act as a viable state, =

means that Israel will be less willing to forego some of its security =

demands or to show more flexibility.

The international community, especially the US, the moderate Arab countries=
, =

and Israel, have an important role in increasing the chances that a viable =

Palestinian state will arise. To this end, the international community =

cannot continue adhering to its familiar format for activity and support fo=
r =

the PA. Rather, targets, milestones, and especially benchmarks for =

performance and success should be defined in a controlled process that =

accompanies and guides the Palestinians.

In addition, it seems that to enable the establishment of a viable =

Palestinian state, additional consideration should be given to the =

limitations of the bilateral track and the logic and reconsideration of a =

multilateral regional track, in which especially Jordan and Egypt will =

become full and responsible partners in the process, or alternatively a =

unilateral Israeli measure with the support of the international community. =

Both alternatives require the greatest possible international legitimacy fo=
r =

Israel, which is precisely the incentive for Israel to cooperate with the =

international community in order to achieve one of two goals: either a =

responsible Palestinian entity acting in accordance with political logic, o=
r =

a unilateral Israeli convergence measure that will make it possible to =

withdraw from territory while maintaining Israel=92s ability to take securi=
ty =

action in the evacuated territories if necessary with broad international =

support.

The distress of the moderate Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and =

Egypt, and their concern about deterioration in the regional theater =

resulting from domestic unrest, the spread of radical Islamic terrorism, th=
e =

escalation of the Sunni-Shiite conflict, and Iran=92s growth as a regional =

power, combined with the perceived weakness of the US as a leading power, =

heightens the common interests of Israel and important countries in the =

region. This time, however, Israel must take advantage of the concern of th=
e =

moderate countries in the Arab world, and taking the initiative, demand =

responsibility from the Arab world in exchange for Israel=92s consent to th=
e =

establishment of a viable Palestinian state. In a certain sense, this is a =

case of historic justice, because the Arab world bears real responsibility =

for the creation of the refugee problem and hence also for solving it.

It appears that Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt can lead the Arab axis and =

take upon themselves the necessary obligations once an agreement is =

achieved. The Arab world will presumably have a more significant and =

restraining influence on the Palestinians, due to their clear interest in =

ensuring regional stability. The main incentive for the success of the =

negotiations should be the strengthening of the regional standing of the =

three leading Arab states and the entire moderate axis, and the weakening o=
f =

Iran=92s regional influence.

Israel=92s willingness to make concessions for an overall regional agreemen=
t =

should be given as a deposit not to the Palestinians, but to the Arab world=
, =

led by the three regional leaders, with guarantees from the international =

community. In exchange, the Arab world and the international community will =

be responsible for implementation of the agreement and the Palestinian =

responsibility to meet its obligations.

Assuming that a new paradigm is adopted that includes the four elements, an=
d =

assuming that the paradigm will also be based on the agreement that a =

Palestinian state must be built gradually and responsibly, based on =

milestones and measures of success as well as a meticulous process of =

support and guidance led by the international community and the moderate =

Arab countries, it may be possible to devise an alternative to the deadlock.
________________________________________
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Source: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=63270