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Poll of Palestinians finds attribute high value to access to Israel

Saturday, February 18, 2017 15:47
% of readers think this story is Fact. Add your two cents.

(Before It's News)

Dr. Aaron Lerner – IMRA: This poll found that Palestinians highly value the
possibility of working in Israel and having access to Israel. It is
noteworthy that such “incentives” could most certainly be components of an
arrangement that does NOT include a sovereign Palestinian state.
========================
Palestinian-Israeli Pulse
February 16, 2017

http://pcpsr.org/en/node/678

A majority of Israelis and just under half of Palestinians still support the
two state solution in principle, but under half on both sides support the
detailed framework for its implementation. However, despite mutual fear,
distrust and pessimism regarding the likelihood and feasibility of the
two-state solution, a majority of Palestinians and Israelis may support
comprehensive peace agreement that ends the conflict if offered additional
symbolic or concrete incentives

PressRelease

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted
by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC), Tel Aviv University
and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah,
with funding from the European Union (EU).

MAIN HIGHLIGHTS

A majority of Israelis (55%) and a large minority of Palestinians (44%)
support the two-state solution. By contrast, support for a one-state
solution stands at 36% among Palestinians, 19% among Israeli Jews and 56%
among Israeli Arabs.
Support for a detailed permanent agreement package, one based on previous
rounds of negotiations, is lower than the support for the two-state
solution. Only 42% of Palestinians, 41% of Israeli Jews, and 88% of Israeli
Arabs support a peace agreement package that comprises: a de-militarized
Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal
territorial exchange, a family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian
refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the
capital of Palestine, the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli
sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al
Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, and the end of the
conflict and claims.

A quarter to one-third of Israelis and Palestinians who oppose the
permanent agreement package are willing to reconsider their opposition to
the peace deal if it was accompanied by a peace agreement with all Arab
states according to the Arab Initiative’s principles (for the Israeli
public), and an Israeli acceptance of that initiative (for the Palestinian
public). This incentive alone increases the overall support for the
combined package on both sides, up to 57% to 59%, when those who changed
their minds are added to the original supporters. While some of the
incentives presented to those who opposed the package manage to change the
attitude of fewer people, others, including non-zero sum ones, presented
separately to each side, are able to change the attitude of many more
people, 40% and above of the opposition, thereby considerably increasing the
support to the combined package to much higher levels, up to 65% on both
sides.
In selecting between bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral approaches to
peacemaking, Palestinians prefer the multilateral (51%) while the Israelis
prefer the bilateral (61%). Of various multilateral forums, an Arab forum,
in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate, is the least rejected
by the two sides. All other multilateral forums – an American-led, an
EU-led, a US-Russian led, or an UN-led forum – are acceptable to one side
while unacceptable to the other.
Two-thirds of the Israelis and more than three quarters of the Palestinians
view US President Donald Trump as pro-Israel. Moreover, a minority on both
sides, 28% of Israeli Jews and 10% of Palestinians, think he will seek to
renew peace negotiations
Large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians estimate as low the chances
that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five
years.

The Palestinian sample size was 1,270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the
West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations
between December 8 and 10, 2016. Number of interviewees in the West Bank
(including East Jerusalem) is 830 and in the Gaza Strip 440. The margin of
error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 1,207 adult Israelis interviewed by
phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between December 19 and 30, 2016. The
number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 727, West Bank settlers 300, and
Israeli Arabs 180. Size of Israeli settlers and Israeli Arabs was
deliberately increased in order to allow for detailed analysis of their
attitudes. But the combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect
the exact proportionate size of these two groups in the Israeli society. The
data file was further reweighted to reflect current societal
religious-secular division. The margin of error is 3%. The following
summary has been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki and Walid Ladadwa from PSR,
and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin together with the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace
Research and its director, Dr. Ephraim Lavie.

MAIN FINDINGS

The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian
and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences,
mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs, or between Israeli Jews living inside
the Green Line and settlers living in the West Bank, or between Palestinians
living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also
provided the respective findings for these sub groups.

(1) Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Two-state solution, one-state solution, and two-state confederation: Today,
a majority of Israelis and a large minority of Palestinians– 55% of Israelis
(50% among Jews and 82% among Arabs) and 44% of Palestinians – support what
is known as the two-state solution in a general question testing the
concept, but without giving specific details about an agreement. Six months
ago, in June 2016, 59% of Israelis (53% among Jews and 87% among Arabs) and
51% of Palestinians supported that solution. We asked Palestinians and
Israelis to assess the majority view on their side and on the other side
regarding this solution. Findings indicate that that the Israelis
underestimate and incorrectly assess the level of support for this solution
on their side while the Palestinians correctly estimate the level of support
on their side: only 26% of the Israelis said the majority of their own
public supports while 63% of the Israelis said the majority opposes it;
among the Palestinians, 41% said a majority supports and 53% said a majority
opposes it. But while the Israelis correctly estimate the level of support
for the concept of the two-state solution on the other side, the
Palestinians underestimate the level of support for that solution among the
Israelis: only 33% of the Palestinians believe the majority of Israelis
supports that solution and 38% of the Israelis believe the majority of
Palestinians supports it. However, wide majorities are skeptical about the
implementation of such a solution. Over 80% of Israeli Jews and 72% of
Palestinians do not believe a Palestinian state will be established in the
next five years.

The joint poll sought to ascertain the current level of support for the idea
of a one-state solution “by which Palestinians and Jews will be citizens of
the same state and enjoy equal rights.” Support for the idea is highest
among Israeli Arabs (standing at 56%). Only a minority among Palestinians
(36%) and among Israeli Jews (19%) support this option (although 26% of
settlers supported the one-state solution). When we asked Israeli Jews if
they are for or against the annexation of the West Bank without granting the
Palestinians their full citizen rights, two thirds said they are against it
and only 31% said they support it. Forty-six percent of settlers supported
annexation without full rights for Palestinians (almost precisely the same
portion, 45%, of settlers are opposed).

We also sought to assess the level of support for the idea of a
confederation between the state of Israel and the state of Palestine whereby
citizens of one country would be free to reside in the territory of the
other and live under its own laws and where two the states jointly decide on
matters of political, security and economic policy. As the case in the
one-state solution, support for the confederation idea is highest among
Israeli Arabs (standing at 74%, significantly higher than Israeli Arab
support for a one-state solution). But only a minority of Palestinians (34%)
and Israeli Jews (20%) support the idea.

Permanent status package: For the second time in six months, we presented
Palestinians and Israelis with a detailed combined package of a permanent
settlement, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli
negotiations, and asked them if they would support or oppose each of its
components and the combined package. Findings show that the level of support
for the package has increased slightly on both sides: 48% of the Israelis
(41% among Israeli Jews and 88% among Israeli Arabs) and 42% of the
Palestinians (40% among West Bankers and 46% among Gazans) support the
combined package. Six months ago, only 39% of Israeli Jews and 39% of
Palestinians supported the package. Current findings indicate that the
majority on both sides, 56% of Israeli Jews and 55% of Palestinians,
continue to oppose the combined package, if offered to them without any
other additional incentives (see below the section on incentives).

A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the nine components of the
package follows:

1. Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their
respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the
Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis and Israel will fight
terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either
side: a minority among the Palestinians (43%) and a majority among the
Israelis (69%; 66% among Israeli Jews and 84% among Israeli Arabs) supported
this item.

2. A demilitarized independent Palestinian state will be established in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip: a minority of Palestinians (22%; 29% in the
Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) and a majority (56%) among Israelis
supported this item.

3. A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian
state to ensure the security and safety of both sides: among the
Palestinians, a minority (42%) supported it, and among the Israelis, a
majority (53%) supported it.

4. The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its air space, its land,
and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations
in the West Bank for 15 years: on both sides only a minority supported this
item: on the Palestinian side 35% (29% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza
Strip) and among the Israelis, 44% (42% among Israeli Jews and 57% among
Israeli Arabs).

5. The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank
and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlements, which will be
annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other
settlements: a minority (37%) among the Palestinians (33% in the West Bank
and 45% in the Gaza Strip), and 50% among the Israelis supported it (among
the Israeli Jews 48% supported it).

6. The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to
the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel: minorities
on both sides (31%) among the Palestinians (34% in the Gaza Strip and 29% in
the West Bank) and 47% of Israelis supported it. (The Israeli Jews were
split: 45% supported it while 48% opposed it).

7. West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the
capital of a Palestinian state: again, minorities – among the Palestinian
27% and among the Israelis 36% (29% among Israeli Jews and 76% among Israeli
Arabs) supported it.

8. In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Western Wall
will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters
and Temple Mount/al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty:
a minority (28%) among Palestinians and a similar minority (37%) among
Israelis (33% among Israeli Jews and 63% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

9. Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland
whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in
it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a
of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated: among
the Palestinians, 52% (50% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip)
supported it and among the Israelis, 30% (20% among Israeli Jews and 81%
among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

It is worth noting that among Israeli Jews, support for the combined package
among settlers stands at 16% compared to 42% among non-settlers. Support is
much higher among Israeli Jews who define themselves as secular, standing at
61% compared to 34% among traditionalists (masortim), 9% among the
religious, and 10% among the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox). Secular people make
up the plurality of Israeli Jews, with roughly 45%; about one-third of Jews
are traditional, and under one-quarter are religious (orthodox) or Haredi.
Among Israelis, support also varies depending on where respondents place
themselves on the right-left political continuum: Among Jews, 89% of the
left, 47% of the center, and 18% of the right support the package.

Among the Palestinians, as we saw six months ago, support for the combined
package is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. But it is worth
pointing out however that the findings show no difference in support between
refugees and non-refugees (43% and 42% respectively). Nonetheless, residents
of refugee camps (estimated to be less than 60% of all refugees) are the
least supportive of the combined package, standing at 38% compared to 42%
among residents of cities and 49% in rural areas. Moreover, support for the
package is higher among those who define themselves as “not religious” and
“somewhat religious” (64% and 47%) compared to those who define themselves
as religious (35%); and among Fatah voters (64%) compared to Hamas voters
(21%).

Beyond this regular demographic and political differences that typically
signify support or opposition to peace, background attitudes also affect
support. Among Israelis who believe that a majority of Palestinians support
the two-state solution, support for the combined package is higher than
among those who believe that a majority of Palestinians opposes that
solution (53% to 33%). These comparisons are closely similar to those found
in our previous joint poll six months ago. As in the Israeli case, support
for the combined package is significantly higher among those Palestinians
who believe that a majority of Israelis supports the two-state solution
compared to those who believe that an Israeli majority is opposed to that
solution (52% vs. 34%).

Peace Incentives: Our joint poll sought to explore the extent to which the
opposition to the combined package was “firm” or “flexible.” For this end,
we offered those who opposed the package various incentives in an attempt to
understand the source of their opposition and the extent to which change was
possible. Israeli Jews opposed to the package (56% of the total Jewish
sample) were offered eight different incentives and Palestinians and Israeli
Arabs opposed to the package (55% of all Palestinians, and 9% of the Israeli
Arabs) were offered seven incentives in total. Only three of the incentives
offered to the two sides were identical or almost identical. The remaining
incentives sought to address either presumed Palestinian or Israeli
concerns. In this regard, it should be noted that Israeli Arabs were
offered the same four distinct incentives offered to the Palestinian
respondents. Below is a detailed breakdown of the responses to the various
incentives:

Israeli Incentives (offered only to those Israeli Jews and Arabs who
expressed opposition to the combined package):

1. And if the Jews who left their homes and property in the Arab countries
when they had to leave following the 1948 War and the establishment of the
state of Israel will be compensated for the lost assets left behind? 40% of
Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined
package if it included this amendment.

2. And if the Palestinians acknowledge the historic and religious links
between Jews and historic Palestine? 34% of Israeli Jews were willing to
change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this
amendment.

3. What if the agreement includes recognition by the Palestinian state of
Israel as a Jewish state? 32% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their
mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

4. And if the agreement would include peace with all Arab states according
to the Arab Peace Initiative? 30% of Israeli Jews and 13% of Israeli Arabs
were willing to change their mind and accept package if it included this
amendment.

5. And if free movement for both sides throughout the other side’s state was
assured? 24% of Israeli Jews and 50% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change
their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

6. And if the agreement guarantees that Israelis are guaranteed free access
to holy sites in Jerusalem and other places? 23% of Israeli Jews were
willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included
this amendment.

7. And if settlers are allowed to choose to stay in their homes after the
Israeli withdrawal, to keep their Israeli citizenship and at the same time
have their safety guaranteed by the Palestinian state? 21% of Israeli Jews
were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it
included this amendment.

8. And if the holy sites are not under Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty
but are placed under the custody of a multi-national committee made up of
Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the US? 10% of Israeli Jews and
31% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the
combined package if it included this amendment.

In short, on the Israeli Jewish side a minority ranging between 10% and 40%
of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds
and accept it were certain conditions to be met. On the Israeli Arab side,
13% to 50% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change
their minds and accept it based on the incentives offered to both Jews and
Arab Israelis.

Palestinian incentives in addition to the combined package (offered only to
Palestinians/Israeli Arabs who expressed opposition to the combined
package):

1. And if Palestinian laborers can freely work in Israel after the
establishment of the Palestinian state? 44% of Palestinians and 47% of the
Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined
package if it included this amendment.

2. And if the state of Israel acknowledges the historic and religious links
between Palestinians and historic Palestine? 44% of Palestinians and 38% of
the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined
package if it included this amendment.

3. And if refugees in camps in the Palestinian state are compensated and
provided with homes and land in which they can be settled and rehabilitated?
42% of Palestinians and 56% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change
their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

4. And if free movement for both sides throughout the other side’s state was
assured? 40% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept
the combined package if it included this amendment.

5. And if the peace agreement between the state of Palestine and the state
of Israel is based on a long term hudna between the two sides? 34% of
Palestinians and 31% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind
and accept the combined package if it included this amendment;.

6. If Israel agreed to accept the Arab peace initiative and in return all
Arab countries supported this peace treaty? 28% of Palestinians were
willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included
this amendment.

7. And if the holy sites are not under Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty
but are placed under the custody of a multi-national committee made up of
Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the US? 19% of Palestinians
were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it
included this amendment.

In short, on the Palestinian side, a minority ranging between 19% and 44% of
those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds
and accept it. On the Israeli Arab side, 31% to 56% of those who opposed the
combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it.

As the findings detailed above indicate, of the three identical or almost
identical incentives, a broader regional peace involving the Arab World and
Israel is the least mutually opposed, as 30% of Israeli Jews and 28% of
Palestinians who opposed the combined package were willing to change their
minds and accept a package with this amendment. This incentive alone
increases the level of support for it among Palestinians from the initial
42% to 57% and among Israeli Jews from the initial 41% to 58%.

Of the distinct Palestinian incentives, three proved highly effective
leading 42% to 44% of the opposition to change its view and accept the
package: access to Israeli labor market for Palestinian laborers, an Israeli
acknowledgement of the historic and religious links between Palestinians and
historic Palestine, and granting refugees homes and land in the Palestinian
state. On the Israeli side, the most effective incentive, reversing the
attitude of 40% of the opposition, proved to be the compensation of Jews
from Arab countries for the lost assets left behind. On both sides, gestures
of symbolic recognition of their historical attachment, identity and
experience are among the more powerful motivator for changing attitudes in
support of the package.

(2) Approaches to Conflict Resolution

Bilateral vs. multilateral approaches: We explored issues related to the
process of peacemaking, specifically the most effective or “most promising”
approaches to reviving Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the role of
outside actors. In selecting between two possible approaches, bilateral and
multilateral, findings show that Palestinians and Israeli Arabs prefer the
multilateral, while the Israeli Jews prefer bilateral between the Israeli
government and the Palestinians.

Among the Palestinians (51%) and among the Israeli Arabs (52%) preferred a
multilateral forum in which major powers sponsor the negotiations, while
only 27% of the Israelis Jews preferred this approach. Only 29% of the
Palestinians preferred bilateral negotiations while 61% of the Israeli Jews
preferred this approach.

We also sought a deeper understanding of Israeli and Palestinian views of
the multilateral approach. Five models of this approach were presented to
the two publics: 1) an Arab forum in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan
participate; 2) an American-led peace process; 3) an EU-led peace process;
4) a UN-led peace process; 5) and finally, a US-Russian-led peace process.
Findings show that Palestinians are most receptive to the first, or Arab
regional, approach (31%) followed by a UN and an EU approaches (14% and 13%
respectively); 7% selected the US-Russian peace process. Only 4% preferred a
US-led effort. Israeli Jews preferred a US-led peace process (32%) followed
by the regional approach and a US-Russian approach (18% each). The two other
approaches, a UN-led process and EU-led process were selected by 5% and 4%
of the Israeli Jewish public, respectively. Among Israelis Arabs, equal
support (17%) went to an EU-led process, a UN-led process, and a regional
process.

The Trump Administration: Our findings show that two thirds of the Israeli
Jews (69%) and more than three quarters of Palestinians (77%) believe that
Donald Trump is pro-Israel; 18% of the Israeli Jews and 8% of the
Palestinians think he is neutral. We asked the two sides to tell us what
they expect Trump to do about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Only 28% of
Israeli Jews (still a plurality, with the highest score relative to other
options offered) and 10% of Palestinians think the new US president will
seek to renew peace negotiations and smaller percentages (16% of Israeli
Jews and 8% of the Palestinians) think he will seek to impose a solution on
both sides. But almost half of the Palestinians (47%) and a quarter of all
Israelis (27%) think he will side with one side against the other while 19%
of the Israelis and 30% of the Palestinians think he will do nothing.

Role of Israeli Arabs in the peace process: In assessing the role of Israeli
Arabs in the peace process, we asked the two sides to tell us how they view
them: as Israelis or Palestinians, or both. While 63% of the Palestinians
view them as Palestinians, only 23% of Israeli Jews view them as such. Among
Israeli Arabs, 31% said they view themselves as Palestinians. Only 10% of
Palestinians compared to 41% of Israeli Jews and 27% of Israeli Arabs view
them as Israelis. About one quarter (24%) of the Palestinians and 34% of
Israeli Jews, and 37% of Israeli Arabs view them as both (Palestinians and
Israelis). We also asked both sides to speculate about the manner in which
Israeli Arabs view the PLO and its role in the peace process: do Israeli
Arabs see it as representing them and all other Palestinians or do they see
it as representing other Palestinians only? About half the Palestinians
(49%) think that Israeli Arabs view the PLO as their representative as well
as the representative of all Palestinians with only 41% thinking that they
view it as representing other Palestinians only. By contrast, about half of
the Israeli Jews (49%) think that Israeli Arabs view the PLO as representing
other Palestinians only; 32% of Israeli Jews think Israeli Arabs view the
PLO as their representative. Israeli Arabs think the same as Israeli Jews:
63% believe that Israeli Arabs see the PLO as representing other
Palestinians only; 21% believe that they see it as their representative.

Bottom-up peace efforts: We asked the two sides for their assessment of the
effectiveness of grassroots movements and religious leaders in putting
pressure on leaders to pursue peace. Over two-thirds of the Israeli Jewish
respondents (69%) think that groups such as “Women Wage Peace” are not
effective but 53% think religious leaders are. Israeli Arabs think
differently when it comes to groups such as “Women Wage Peace”: 68% think
they are effective. But they think the same as the Israeli Jews when it
comes to religious leaders: 61% think they are effective. Among the
Palestinians 49% think peace groups are not effective and 41% think they
are; and 47% think men of religion are not effective and 46% think they are.

Violence and countering violence: We asked Palestinians if they support or
oppose attacks, such as stabbings, on Israeli civilians: 49% opposed such
attacks and 47% supported them. Opposition to such attacks in the West Bank
(60%) is twice as much as it is in the Gaza Strip (30%). Although the
difference could be partly explained by the fact that West Bank residents
experience Israeli retaliatory measures, Palestinians are likely to deny the
effects. When Palestinian respondents were asked about the deterrent effect
of the Israeli measures, such as home demolitions, used against the families
of the attackers, more than three quarters (78%; 84% among West Bankers and
69% among Gazans) answered that such measures do not deter potential
attackers. We asked Palestinians and Israelis to assess the majority view
among the Palestinians regarding such attacks. Findings indicate that a
majority on both sides (53% among the Palestinians and 52% among Israeli
Jews) think a majority of Palestinians support them. We asked Israeli Jews
if they support harsh policies (such as prolonged closures or curfews)
against all residents of a village of town from which Palestinians attacked
with knives or committed other violent acts against Israelis. A majority of
Israeli Jews (58%) support such harsh measures and 38% oppose them.

(3) How Israelis and Palestinians View Each Other:

We asked the two sides whether they have met or talked to each other and how
they view the other. Issues raised included wanting peace, trust, fear, and
how good or bad their current conditions are. But we also asked them how
they view the nature of the conflict, in zero sum terms, or with some
openness towards the other side. While the picture that emerges is
discouraging, there are nonetheless, a few glimmers of hope.

Talking to each other: Palestinians and Israelis were asked if they have
talked with each other during the past few months: 12% of Palestinians said
they have talked to Israelis, other than soldiers and settlers, and 23% of
Israeli Jews and 78% of Israeli Arabs said that they have talked to
Palestinians. Among the Palestinians, 71% said the talk with the Israelis
was pleasant and 95% of the Israeli Jews and the Israeli Arabs indicated the
same.

Want Peace: 38% of the Palestinians and 41% of the Israeli Jews agree with a
statement that the other side wants peace; 79% among Israeli Arabs agree
that Palestinians want peace and 53% agree that Israeli Jews want peace.

Trust/Zero-Sum Conflict: The most disturbing, but not surprising, finding
relates to the question of trust. Among Palestinians a solid majority (86%)
feel Israeli Jews are untrustworthy. On the Israeli Jewish side, a somewhat
smaller majority (71%) also indicated that Palestinians cannot be trusted.
Among Israeli Arabs, two-thirds (67%) indicated that Palestinians can be
trusted. Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides
that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum
relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good
for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 51% of Israeli
Jews, 48% of Israeli Arabs, and 68% of Palestinians agree with this dismal
zero-sum characterization. As with various other questions in the survey,
young Israeli Jews show higher levels of hardline thinking and distrust than
other groups: among 18-34 year old Jews, 59% agree with the zero-sum
statement, compared to 43% among Jews aged 35-54.

Fear: We asked Palestinians and Israeli Jews about fear of each other. Among
Israeli Jews, 66% indicate they feel fear toward the Palestinians but among
the Palestinians, only 43% indicate that they fear Israeli Jews. When asked
about fear of Israeli soldiers and armed settlers 52% of Palestinians
replied in the affirmative. We also asked Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs
about fear of each other: 48% of the Jews feel fear toward Israeli Arabs
while 82% of Israeli Arabs do not feel fear toward Israeli Jews. Jews living
as settlers in the West Bank are more fearful of both Palestinians and of
Israeli Arabs, relative to Jews inside Israel – 72% of settlers are afraid
of Palestinians, and 60% are afraid of Israeli Arabs.

General Conditions of the two sides: 54% of the Palestinians describe
conditions in the Palestinian territories as bad or very bad while only 22%
of Israeli Jews and 34% of Israeli Arabs describe conditions in Israel in
general as bad or very bad.

(4) Values and Goals

Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy
of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve. Among Israeli
Jews, Jewish majority is seen as the most important value (34%), followed by
democracy (27%), peace (23%), and Greater Israel (14%). Among the
Palestinians, Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment
of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East
Jerusalem as its capital was seen as the most important value (46%),
followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns
and villages (30%), building a pious or moral individual and a religious
society (13%) and building a democratic political system (11%).

العربية |
Center

Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR)
Off Irsal street, P.O.Box 76, Ramallah , Palestine , Tel: +970-2-2964933
Fax:+970-2-2964934
email: pcpsr@pcpsr.org



Source: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=72198

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