Hezbollah's Radwan unit is capable of carrying out an invasion of the Galilee at any given moment

Hezbollah’s Radwan unit is capable of carrying out an invasion of the
Galilee at any given moment
Tal Beeri, Director of the Research Department, Alma Research and Education
Center November 29, 2023

https://israel-alma.org/2023/11/29/the-radwan-unit-is-capable-of-carrying-ou
t-an-invasion-of-the-galilee-at-any-given-moment/

For the past two years, it seems that Hezbollah has been preparing for a
confrontation in the north. We have written and published quite a bit about
it. In the summer of 2022, in the final stages of negotiations between
Israel and Lebanon on the maritime agreement, the name of the Radwan unit
made headlines, since its operatives were put on alert and deployed, openly
and unusually, in static positions along the border with Israel under the
familiar cover of the “Green Without Borders” association. Radwan Unit
operatives joined operatives of Hezbollah’s geographic units “Nasser” and
“Aziz,” which are permanently stationed adjacent to the border with Israel.

After the attack tunnels were discovered in December 2018 and Israel built a
ground-physical barrier, the Radwan unit recalculated its route and
continued to train in preparation for its main mission: to infiltrate
Israeli territory and take over Israeli territories, bases, and communities
in the Galilee.

In our assessment, since the beginning of the summer of 2022, the Radwan
unit has reached the operational capability to fulfill its mission to invade
Galilee. In light of the accumulation of incidents on the northern border up
until October 2023, we assess that Hezbollah was on the verge of deciding to
authorize the invasion. The Radwan unit, Hezbollah’s aerial unit, and
geographic units in southern Lebanon were awaiting the order.

How did Hezbollah plan to invade the Galilee?

Stage 1 (Nasser/Aziz Geographical Units) – The geographic units in southern
Lebanon are responsible for opening fire by means of massive rocket and
mortar fire along the entire border, including firing into Israeli
territory. In addition, they are responsible for neutralizing surveillance
devices along the border by means of sniper fire, exploding UAVs, suicide
UAVs (under the responsibility of the air unit), and anti-tank fire.

Stage 2 (Radwan unit) – Simulatively, along with the above attack and the
neutralization of the surveillance devices, Radwan Unit operatives are
expected to storm the barrier throughout the entire sector, breach the
barrier at various points and by various means (powerful IEDs, and possibly
even booby-trapped tunnels dug under the barrier).

Stage 3 (Radwan unit) – Radwan operatives will cross on foot and with
vehicles (mainly motorcycles and ATVs) above ground into Israeli territory
and move towards the communities and military bases near the border. It is
possible that some of the operatives, according to advance planning, will
try to reach targets deep inside the territory of the State of Israel.

***Note: The working assumption must take into account that there are still
attack tunnels that the IDF has not yet exposed, and if so, they will be
utilized at this stage.

Stage 4 (Radwan unit) – Gaining control of bases and communities, executing
killings, and taking hostages as bargaining chips. In addition, the transfer
of abductees to Lebanese territory, with an emphasis on soldiers.

Stage 5 (Radwan unit) – Barricading, deploying and waiting for IDF forces
while positioning anti-tank and light anti-aircraft squads and snipers.

The role of Hezbollah’s aerial unit is to accompany the entire operation by
using UAVs for intelligence gathering and attacks (suicide UAVs). Operatives
from the geographic units (Nasser/Aziz) will serve as reinforcements as
needed throughout the above stages.

October 7, 2023 – Hamas attack postponed Hezbollah’s campaign.

In this article, we do not intend to analyze whether the Hamas operation on
October 7 was coordinated with the Iranians and Hezbollah, and if it was
coordinated, whether only in principle or was it also coordinated
specifically in terms of the time of its execution. In practice, on October
7, Hamas effectively copied the invasion plan of the Radwan unit and
implemented it, through its Nukhba units (and its naval unit), on the
southern border with the Gaza Strip.

In effect, Hamas’ action postponed the timing of Hezbollah’s invasion plan.
Hezbollah is not interested in being dragged after the Palestinians.
However, it is our assessment that as far as Hezbollah is concerned, it is
not a question of if. In light of the circumstances, Hezbollah will have to
make a new decision on the timing – when?

Is such a scenario relevant these days on the northern border? Can the
Radwan unit implement its attack plan today?

The events of October 7 proved again that any physical or technological
obstacle will inevitably be breached. It should be remembered that, unlike
the Gaza Strip, along the border with Lebanon there are sections where the
barrier has not yet been upgraded, which could make it even easier to
penetrate. The mostly mountainous terrain on the Lebanese border is more
difficult to maneuver than the flat terrain on the border with the Gaza
Strip, on the other hand, it allows for more concealed movement. Hezbollah
is well acquainted with the terrain and knows how to take advantage of it.

There is no doubt that the large concentration of Israeli forces along the
border with Lebanon and the readiness of the IDF’s operational and
intelligence forces since October 7 greatly undermines the element of
surprise, which is a very important component of Hezbollah’s plan of action.

Nonetheless, it is our assessment that even today, at any given time, if it
so desires, Hezbollah can implement its operational plan to invade Israeli
territory with a smaller Radwan unit force and into a more limited area. In
light of the existing limitations, we estimate that Hezbollah is able to do
so with a smaller force of a few dozen to a few hundred Radwan operatives
(100-200), compared to the original plan, which in our assessment, included
hundreds to two thousand operatives. A lower signature will make it
difficult to monitor intelligence and provide an early warning.

In light of the fact that most of the Israeli population living near the
border has been evacuated, in our assessment, Hezbollah can focus on a
limited area, with an emphasis on military zones and/or taking over the
territory of a small number of communities.

Radwan’s unit’s competence has not been affected.

Even if most of the Radwan operatives have distanced themselves from the
border since the beginning of the war, in our assessment this does not
neutralize their ability to fulfill their main objective. It is our
assessment that the Radwan unit is continuing to collect intelligence near
the border and is making adjustments to its operational plans. As of this
writing, around 90 Hezbollah operatives have been killed since October 7. It
seems that some of those killed were operatives and commanders in the Radwan
unit. The number of operatives killed has no bearing on Hezbollah’s overall
competence or the Radwan unit in particular.

The capability of the rocket and mortar arrays has not been affected.

According to our assessment, Hezbollah’s short-range rocket and mortar
arrays, which are a critical component in carrying out the first stage of
the invasion into Israeli territory, are fully capable and ready for
operation in the immediate future. In view of the large scale (deployment
and arsenal) of these arrays, it is our assessment that the IDF attacks only
damaged them in a particular area.

In conclusion, the Radwan unit still poses a significant challenge for the
IDF and still poses a clear and present danger. As time passes and the war
ends, the scope of IDF forces in the north will probably decrease
significantly. The main mission of the Radwan unit was and still remains to
penetrate into Israeli territory and take over communities and geographical
areas. This threat to Israel has not passed and is relevant at any given
time. Hezbollah only needs to decide when.

Israel must act to neutralize the threat posed by the Radwan unit. Even
removing Radwan operatives from the border will not neutralize this threat.
In our assessment, given Hezbollah’s decision, the Radwan unit will now be
able to prepare an infiltration operation into Israeli territory, with a low
signature and will be able to carry out this operation in a focused and
swift manner. Even more so, when the scope of the IDF deployment is diluted
and civilians return to their homes.

In light of this, we believe that the IDF must act and cause direct and
extensive damage to the infrastructure of the Radwan unit and its
operatives.

Note – we intend to publish an article on the subject: Why the current
reality on the Lebanese-Israeli border is unsustainable – Possible
scenarios for the day after the war.