The Hollowing of the U.S. Military

Lt. Bill Conner / Canada Free Press

“This is the most uncertain time I’ve seen in our national security since I’ve been in uniform. … [Yet] in the summer of 2013, only 10 percent of the [understrength] Army was ready to deploy.” – Gen. Raymond Odierno, chief of staff of the Army

For the past four decades, the military has experienced the challenges of drawdowns and war, but now stands “hollow.” Though the drawdowns of the post-Vietnam period were difficult, the post-Iraq and Afghanistan drawdown is dangerous and something we must fix. As an Army officer for the past quarter century (both active duty and Reserve) who was born in the 1960s to a career Army officer and Vietnam veteran, and having grown up on military bases, I would like to offer some perspective. Though I speak to the U.S. Army, the other military branches have followed parallel experiences.

The post-Vietnam drawdown period was a traumatic period for the Army and the military overall. The size of the Army went from over 1.5 million in 1968, to just over 750,000 by 1974. This was after eight years of war, in which the junior leadership of the Army had been decimated. Adding to that challenge, the Army went from the draftee force of the 1950s and 1960s to the all-volunteer force at the end of Vietnam in 1973.

Unfortunately, pay and benefits commensurate with ensuring a quality force of volunteers was not forthcoming in the 1970s. Public respect for the military after Vietnam was reprehensible and added to the resulting morale problems in the force.  Drug use, discipline problems, and lowered standards became commonplace in the 1970s Army. By 1980, Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. “Shy” Meyers, referred to the Army as “hollow” when testifying about the paltry 1981 defense budget being proposed by Jimmy Carter.

The results were tragic: The Iranian hostage crisis and subsequent failed “Desert One” mission to free the American hostages in Iran. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  Cheating and ethics scandals among military leaders. The list is sad and long.

Fortunately, the “Hollow Army” was rebuilt after the election of Ronald Reagan and his decision to win the Cold War. Reagan brought optimism, leadership, and a renewed focus on national defense to his budget proposals. He was intent on crafting a military which would eventually win the Cold War. Importantly, Reagan demanded higher pay and increased standards necessary to recruit and retain high-quality volunteers. The National Training Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, Top Gun, the “Air-Land Battle Doctrine,” and the new systems of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the M1 Tank, and the Apache Helicopter were but a few of the means to achieve the end. The public respect for the military rebounded, and those in the military felt the support of the nation they loved and served.

After the Cold War and the overwhelming victory of Desert Storm by “Reagan’s military,” the services went through another substantial drawdown. This was not as drastic as post-Vietnam, but it involved cuts of around 300K Army troops down to 10 active duty divisions (from 16 division) and around half a million Army troops.  Despite some relatively minor problems of a “zero defects” mentality resulting from the 1990s drawdown, emphasis on warfighting continued as in the 1980s. At the time of the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks, around 75 percent of the Army was trained, equipped and ready to deploy.

Following 9/11, the U.S. moved to wartime footing. But the wartime footing did not include the decision to make any significant troop increases. We started the war at around a half-million troops, but only increased to around 570,000 with the same 10 divisions. As the war dragged on, and went from Afghanistan to include the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the same troops were making all the sacrifices. A major sacrifice was the same people making multiple, long duration (12-15 months).