The problem with the notion of “natural groups” in biology

The notion of “natural groups” pops up regularly in the minds of humans, especially in biology. It is thought of as some kind of group which really is a kind of group independently of our conceptualization. The most well-known example is the notion of “biological species”, and its later spin-off “clades”.

The problem with this notion is that it is a contradiction in terms – is it a kind of group or a group of a kind? Groups can’t form kinds, because kinds are ambiguous between infinite and finite kinds (ie, kinds and categories), and that it thus requires the impossible fusion of infinity and finity.

This problem means that belief in any such “natural groups”, like cladistics, in practice is acceptance of contradiction. Such acceptance is, of course, possible, but can’t, just as of course, avoid contradiction. Much is possible, but not to avoid what one believes in.

Linné avoided this contradiction by organizing kinds (of organisms) in categories, and kinds of categories in categories of a higher level, and so on, calling kinds of organisms “species”, categories of these kinds “genera”, and categories of kinds of these categories ”families”, and so on. The system braids infinity and finity in the form of kinds and categories orthogonally, ending in the category “organisms” (ie, all organisms), thus keeping “infinity” and “finity” consistently apart both along and across the system. It was and is ingenious!

Another contribution to understanding of conceptualization http://menvall.wordpress.com/