Are “species” real or artificial?

The problem with the notion of ”species” in biological systematics is that there can’t be a species consisting of species, because it would mean that this species would contain itself among all other species, and one entity can’t be a part of itself.

This problem did Linné avoid by allocating species to genera, and genera to families, and families to orders, and so on.

Linné’s solution of this problem did not, however, appeal to those biological systematists that are called cladists, since they assume that species are real, instead of an artificial construction, and instead claimed that there indeed can be a species consisting of species in the form of a single true tree of life.

The question is thus if cladists’ claim can repeal the fact that one entity can’t be a part of itself. Can a species indeed be a part of itself? Obvious is that this species can’t be distinguished by a single apomorphy, since the whole of this species does not equal the part of this species. Obvious is also that this species is not a single entity, since the whole of it is more numerous than the part of it. Obvious is thus that this species cannot be unambiguous in neither properties nor number, but instead is ambiguous in both properties and number. The species is thus ambiguous in both properties and number, leaving it as a paradox (ie, Russell’s paradox).

Cladists’ claim that there indeed can be a species consisting of species in the form of a single true tree of life is thus obviously wrong. So, wherein does the error of this apparently self-evident claim reside? Well, the error resides in the fundamental assumption (ie, axiom) that species are real, which they thus obviously can’t be. Cladists claim is thus correct if species are real, but which they, obviously, can’t be.

It means that cladistics puffs like an empty dragon by resting on an inconsistent axiom. Species are simply not real, but a human construction, meaning that cladistics is just a dream. Yes, it would have been fantastic if cladistics would have been consistent, but unfortunately it isn’t. Fact is, instead, that there can’t be a species consisting of species, like a single true tree of life.

Another contribution to understanding of conceptualization http://menvall.wordpress.com/