Is a reptile that loses its scales a reptile or not?

If we distinguish a kind of organism by possesssion of scales calling it ”reptiles”, then reptiles are those organisms that possess scales.

If, however, one reptile loses its scales, then we might ask whether this organism is a reptile or not. The question emerges because we contradict ourselves by calling this organism a reptile although it does not fit our definition of reptiles. and does thereby imply that we think there is a “true” solution of this (our) contradiction to be found. The answer (ie, the sought for solution of the contradiction) is, however, that it IS neither a reptile nor not a reptile, but that it is WHAT WE DECIDE it is. The organism is just an organism (if it fits our definition of “organisms”).

The problem with this question is, however, that among the two dichotomous yes- and no-answers, the no-answer that the organism is not a reptile appears stupid, since the yes-answer that it continues to be a reptile although it loses its scales appears self-evident. The problem with the yes-answer is, however, that it leads us into consistent contradiction called Russell’s paradox, because kinds are ultimately paradoxical. The consistent answer of the yes- and no-answers is thus the no-answer that the organism is not a reptile, although it appears stupid.

Although the claim that a reptile that loses its scales is not a reptile appears stupid, this is exactly the claim we have to raise to avoid Russell’s paradox. The problem with this hypothetical situation is not, however, whether the organism IS a reptile or not, but whether the kind “reptiles” is real or not, and kinds simply aren’t (can’t be) real. We have to keep in mind that our classification is just an artificial construction invented to discuss reality. So, no organism IS a reptile, not even IS an organism, but IS just a part of reality that we have classified as an organism of the kind ”reptile”, and if it does not possess scales, then it is not a reptile.

The consistent solution of this problem is instead to add an additional kind of reptiles, for example called ”reptiles version 2″ (ie, reptiles that have lost their scales), where “reptiles version 1″ are those reptiles that haven’t lost their scales. This solution distinguishes the particular organism from reptiles in general without conflating kinds with reality, but instead keeps kinds and reality consistently apart. It does in a generic sense avoid entering Russell’s paradox by adding kinds of kinds indefinitely, and can also be consistently combined with categories of categories, like in the Linnean systematics.

The answer to the question of whether a reptile that loses its scales is a reptile or not is thus that it is neither a reptile nor not a reptile, but a kind of reptile. Single objects (like organisms) are always prior to kinds. If we want to be “natural”, like cladists, we ought not classify.

Another contribution to understanding of conceptualization http://menvall.wordpress.com/