Bertrand Russell actually falsified both cladistics and particle physics before they originated

When we discuss reality, we can fundamentally only assume that reality either is changing (ie, nominalism) or not changing (ie, class-realism), ie, that reality is process or pattern.

Assuming that reality is changing means that reality is ambiguous relative to our discussions about it depending on which perspective on it we choose. Assuming that reality is not changing means that we are paradoxically contradictory, as Bertrand Russell demonstrated with his paradox, meaning that we’re doomed to infinite change, that is, that we instead are changing (infinitely).

The infinite change of the latter option, ie, class-realism, is due to that the option logically ultimately arrives to a conclusion that some impossible thing, actually a paradox, like “the true tree of life” and “Higgs particle”, must be real. The belief in this “thing” is thus the driving force for the infinite change of this option, because this thing is thus a paradox per definition (as Bertrand Russell demonstrated), and paradoxes are infinite orthogonal circles per definition. This option thus leads into some infinite orthogonal circle logically. The problem with the option is thus not that it is illogical, but that it rests on the inconsistent (actually paradoxically contradictory) premise that classes are real. This option was thus actually falsified by Bertrand Russell’s demonstration before cladistics and particle physics (or rather “elementary particles”) originated.

What this fact says is that there are always at least two equally true descriptions of reality (or any part of it). This does not mean that all propositions about reality are equally true, but that different such propositions are differently true. Truth is simply not a matter of white or black, but of a gray-scale. Logic gives an impression that truth is a matter of white and black, but the fact that there are two orthogonal entrances to logic means that the truth of propositions relative to reality actually is a matter of gray-scale. In this sense, propositions can just be more or less true.

Leaving nominalism in the form of traditional empirical science and Linnean systematics for class-realism in the form of cladistics and particle physics is thus not a good idea. On the contrary, this step is nothing but a step back to the confusion of different beliefs that traditional empirical science and Linnean systematics saved us from.