On the dilemma for particle physicists

Particle physicists (like cladists) represent the approach called (class-)realism, ie, axiomatically assuming that classes are real, as opposed to nominalism, instead axiomatically assuming that objects are real. (Class-realism is an ancient remnant from before the origin of science, whereas nominalism is the foundation of science).

This approach led particle physicists into a search for something that can’t be found (ie, Higgs particle), as being just a mind-ghost, like God. This search, in turn, led particle physicists into the dilemma that if they claim to have found this mind-ghost, then their (re-)search is over, whereas if they don’t find it, then their (re-)search will be questioned.

So, how do you think particle physicists decided to solve this dilemma? Yes, of course, they decided to first claim to have found the mind-ghost and then, after a while, withdraw the claim! In the meantime they ought to get the Nobel Prize for the fake finding. The plan appeared safe secure. However, surpringly, they did not get the Nobel Prize, but Peter Higgs did.

So, now particle physicists are thus left with the problem to retreat from their claim trustworthy (without the expected a Nobel Prize. After all, Peter Higgs did not claim to have found the mind-ghost, but just invented it. The Nobel Prize was thus not awarded to the fake finding of the mind-ghost, but to the invention of it). All scientists (including me) thus eagerly await particle physicists’ solution to this problem. How will they perform this Houdini act? How will they retreat from their claim without losing credibility for their (re-)search? Their problem does thus not concern how we shall describe reality, but how they shall handle their inconsistency.