WMD Threat al-Qaeda Poses to the U.S. - Part 1 of 3

Terrorism has a deep history with instances of terrorist-type activities recorded even in The Holy Bible.  Terrorism touches many of the world’s countries where all continents but Antarctica records one or more al-Qaeda-backed terrorist attacks in the past two years.  Presently, the United States is al-Qaeda’s top target in the world and is likely to remain so indefinitely.  Hence, the United States must know about the perpetrators and their goals, the targets, the weapons, the events, and the effects of these events.  Al-Qaeda is the premier terrorist organizational network that intends to use lethal weapons to produce severe damage to the United States (Kondrasuk, Bailey, & Sheeks, 2005).

This piece analyzes the threat that al-Qaeda poses to the United States and its desire to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).  A review of the literature identified the potential WMD threats, which contributed to the analysis of these threats.  Al-Qaeda’s quest to obtain these WMD sheds light on what confronts the United States. I identify approaches for deterring a major WMD attack and how the United States must prepare for such an attack and its aftermath.  I cover each topic in sufficient detail to present a clear understanding of the current state of al-Qaeda’s plans and our approach to counter them.

Threat Analysis of al-Qaeda

Top Terrorist Threats. Forecast International (FI) surveyed military specialists, hospitality industry professionals, and futurists to assess the most-probable and highest-impact terrorist threats.  Four of the eight most likely high-probability threats include (1) commit coordinated suicide bombings in Washington, DC, (2) attack commuter trains going into New York City (NYC) or other major cities, (3) bomb one or more oil pipelines, and (4) take out the vehicle and train tunnels in and around NYC.  Four of the seven most likely high-impact threats include (1) place a suitcase nuclear device at any target, (2) pack stolen radiological medical waste around conventional explosive and explode it in a populated area (i.e., a “dirty bomb”), (3) detonate a tanker full of liquefied natural gas (LNG) at a terminal in Boston Harbor, and (4) inject nerve gas into the air intakes of large public buildings such as sports arenas or major office towers (Cetron, 2007).  These are formidable threats that should not surprise us.

WMD Defined. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) includes weapons capable of great destruction and/or killing many people.  WMDs can be chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons but exclude the means to transport or propel the weapons where such means are a separable/divisible part of the weapon.  Chemical and biological weapons must be a certain size to be considered WMDs.  Due to the limited damage that they could produce, experts do not consider single chemical or biological artillery rounds as WMDs (Anonymous, 2004).

CBRN Weapons. In the 9/11 attacks, terrorists used ordinary airplanes as WMDs.  However, it remains quite difficult to generate and disperse CBRN weapons.  Nevertheless, those attacks reshaped how the world perceives today’s terrorists.  The suicidal zealotry, malevolence, and determination of those who flew the airplanes into high-rise buildings; their willingness to spend years preparing for the attacks; and their desire to cause mass casualties confirm that today’s terrorists would willingly use CBRN weapons in their attacks (Combs, 2006).

Potential CBRN Attacks. Traditional reasons why terrorist groups do not attempt CBRN attacks do not apply to al-Qaeda.  From past behavior, al-Qaeda clearly demonstrates its willingness to engage in massive, indiscriminate killing without fear of losing its followers’ support.  Al-Qaeda also shows willingness to overcome the requisite technical challenges.  For example, al-Qaeda has experienced a modicum of success in developing lethal materials.  Some of these materials include cyanide, anthrax, and the mubtakkar improvised chemical device (ICD).  To our detriment, this combination of continuing interest, growing capability, and demonstrated patience may one day pay off for al-Qaeda (Quillen, 2007).

Most Insidious Danger. Airport security officials must understand that international policymakers and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are not the only ones concerned with CBRN threats.  Specifically, the silent partner of the CBRN quadrumvirate, “biological” agents, could become the most insidious danger of the four.  In March 1996, the President of the International Association of Fire Chiefs informed the U.S. Senate that local firefighting, police, and emergency personnel are responsible to deal with any attack using biological weapons and that they, unfortunately, were not up to the task (Sweet, 2004).  In the past decade since that report, things have no doubt improved in our major cities.  However, have we improved enough in our medium-to-smaller cities to meet the impending challenge?  The next paragraph addresses this issue.

Prepared for Bio-Chem Attack. Biological and chemical weapons pose a different problem for our community and health care providers because it may take hours or days to determine an attack has occurred.  When the first sign of attack is the occurrence of human illness or injury, the public health disease detectives, physicians, microbiologists, and paramedics comprise the first line of defense.  For a chemical or biological attack, local public health and safety officials will provide instructions on personal protection, decontamination, and health warnings by Emergency Alert System (EAS) broadcasts over radio, television, and print media.  For example, San Diego, California’s public health services, health care, and emergency medical systems have years of experience and a collaborative relationship, which ensures the highest level of services in the event of a medical threat (Anonymous, n.d.).

CBRN Scenario. The thought of dirty bombs, i.e., radiological weapons, detonated in our cities must be nightmarish for municipal officials and emergency planners.  Because average police officers are not technical experts on how to disarm weapons dispersing poisonous gases, pandemic agents, or long-lasting radiological contamination, the city must train them to recognize the threat quickly and take appropriate actions to save citizens’ lives.  Most police officers know how to confront tangible threats, i.e., deadly things that they can see, hear, and feel such as a terrorist incendiary bomb.  It is human nature to be scared of an invisible threat and perfectly normal for police officers to be afraid of it too.  Fear of the unknown is often the greatest level of fear.  No matter how terrible it may seem, CBRN destruction and injuries are easy to visualize.  However, first responders must be prepared to respond effectively to the aftermath of CBRN attacks (Dowle, 2007).

Enemy Sleepers in Our Midst. Al-Qaeda reportedly had 42 operatives as part of its 9/11 attacks, and some 23 remain as “sleepers” within the United States (Williams, 2007; Anonymous, 2007).  According to Paul Williams’ sources, al-Qaeda has deployed thousands of sleeper agents throughout the United States to carry out their individual roles in the coming “American Hiroshima” plan (Williams, 2005; Farah, 2005).  Williams (2005) makes a huge leap from 23 to “thousands” of sleeper agents.  The “thousands” apparently came from Williams’ sources, i.e., statements made by captured al-Qaeda agents and seized documents.  Apparently, al-Qaeda paid the notorious MS-13 street gang between $30,000 and $50,000 for each sleeper agent they smuggled into the United States from Mexico (Williams, 2005; Farah, 2005).

Threat Perception. Because we tend to use past experience to interpret present situations, we intimately link threat perception to learning.  For qualitatively new threats, such learning is dysfunctional.  The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States report includes numerous examples of dysfunctional learning.  The attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, the African embassy bombings in 1998, and the Riyadh attack in 1995 appeared to indicate that likely targets seemed to be non-U.S.-soil oriented.  Therefore, when 9/11 approached and the system blinked red, domestic threats did not appear very likely; hence, most preparatory action to mitigate an al-Qaeda attack on U.S. government facilities took place overseas (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004; Mayntz, 2006).

Consider All WMD Threats. While familiar with the hijacking of aircraft for purposes of extortion, the Pentagon, based on the Iran experience, was concerned mainly with the possibility of hostage-taking.  Except for some isolated, frenzied individuals, nobody imagined that terrorists would use hijacked aircraft as missiles to collapse landmark buildings in NYC.  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in particular, did not visualize the 9/11 kind of threat possible and did not use the State Department’s watch list to prescreen passengers.  If airplanes were to be involved, an attack originating from outside the United States was considered much more likely (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004; Mayntz, 2006).  Hence, we must not allow our scotomas or blind spots keep us from considering all possible WMD threat approaches that al-Qaeda may use.

References

Anonymous (n.d.). Terrorism: A Guide to Domestic Preparedness. A brochure prepared and distributed by the Unified San Diego County Emergency Services Organization in cooperation with the County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency & Office of Disaster Preparedness.

Anonymous (2004). Glossary and acronyms. Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/glossary.html.

Anonymous (2007, May 31). Al Qaeda plans nuclear attacks on 7 US cities. NewsMax.com. Retrieved from http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2007/5/30/222555.shtml.

Cetron, M. J. (2007, May-June). Defeating terror: Is it possible? Is it probable? The Futurist, pp 18-25.

Combs, C.C. (2006). Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice-Hall.

Dowle, J. (2007, February). The CBRN scenario. Law & Order, 55(2), pp 19-21.

Farah, J. (2005, July 11). Al-Qaida nukes already in US: Terrorists, bombs smuggled across Mexico border by MS-13 gangsters. WorldNetDaily. Retrieved from http://www.wnd.com/news/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLE_ID=45203.

Kondrasuk, J. N., Bailey, D., & Sheeks, M. (2005, Summer). Global terrorism: Past, present, & future. The Business Review, 3(2), pp 35-41.

Mayntz, R. (2006). Control of a terrorist network: Lessons from the 9/11 Commission Report. International Public Management Journal, 9(3), pp. 295-311.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (NCTAUUS) (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Quillen, C. (2007, February 15). Three explanations for al Qaeda’s lack of a CBRN attack. TerrorismMonitor, V(3). Retrieved from http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/TM-005-003.pdf.

Sweet, K. M. (2004). Aviation and Airport Security: Terrorism and Safety Concerns. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: PEARSON Prentice Hall.

Williams, P. L. (2005). The Al Qaeda Connection: International Terrorism, Organized Crime, and the Coming Apocalypse. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.

Williams, P. L. (2007). The Day of Islam: The Annihilation of America and the Western World. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.

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