DHS Wants To Upgrade BioWatch, But Admits The System Addresses A Receding Threat

One of the fears the 9/11 terror attacks provoked was that terrorists, or a foreign power, would use unconventional means to attack the United States. The Bush administration launched the BioWatch program – pathogen release sensors deployed in thirty US. Cities — to defend the United States against biological weapons.

In a hearing on the Hill earlier this week, it became clear that DHS no longer believes that a biological attack on the United States is imminent, or even likely.

DHS officials told lawmakers that rather than a massive release of germs in an American city – the kind of attack BioWatch sensors were aimed to detect – the more likely bioterror attacks are small-scale releases of anthrax or other pathogens.

Such small-scale attack would likely not be picked up by BioWatch.

The Los Angeles Times reports that the only DHS official to testify at the hearing, BioWatch Program Manager Michael Walter, said efforts were underway to improve BioWatch’s performance, but that he was unable to address decisions or actions that occurred before he joined the department in 2009. Walter’s testimony did not sit well with the committee’s ranking Democrat, Rep. Henry Waxman (California).

“You’re the head of the program, you ought to know what happened,” Waxman said, indicating that as a manager of a program on which DHS has already spent more than $1 billion, and for which it is now asking for billions more for upgrades, Walter should be more informed.

The upgrade is called Generation 3, and it aims to automate the BioWatch system and allow it to sense germ releases both outdoors and indoors.

Representative Tim Murphy (R-Pennsylvania), the committee chairman, questioned the worthiness of the current system and Generation 3.

“After 10 years of operation, we still don’t know if the current BioWatch technology can detect an aerosolized bioterrorism agent in a real-world environment,” Murphy said.

Last July, the Times published detailed and critical reports about the BioWatch system’s effectiveness, leading to an examination of the system by the oversight and investigations arm of the House Energy and Commerce Committee.

Murphy said that spending billions on Generation 3 would be inconsistent with DHSt’s revised assumptions regarding the likelihood of a large-scale bioterror attack. The updated assumptions are outlined in the department’s bioterrorism risk assessments, which the department conducts every two years.

“This costly approach is unbalanced and misdirected,” Murphy said. “It makes no sense to expand outdoor monitoring for a less likely large-scale attack, while not addressing the declining number of public health responders who are needed in any kind of attack.”

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