VERIFIED PETITION FOR ACTION FOR MANDATE

            Comes now the Plaintiff, Joseph Zrnchik, and prays the Court to award court costs and any other fees as the court deems appropriate and in support of this complaint states the following:

1. The Town of St. John has been in violation of the Indiana Access to Public Records Act (IAPRA) for many years due to a local ordinance passed by the St. John Town Council that established excessive copying fees for public records in violation of the Indiana Acess to Public Records Act. 

2.  While the St. John copying fee was set in violation of IAPRA, Plaintiff sought copies of public records that were subject to IAPRA but was told the price for the records was five dollars for each report, even for reports that were only a single page.  IAPRA mandates that costs for public records not exceed reproductions costs that Indiana Code generally sets at 10 cents per page.  Plaintiff sought records at the price set by IAPRA but was quoted a price that was fifty times the cost above what was mandated by IAPRA.  At that time Plaintiff was unable to pay the amount of money for the documents that officials from St. John had demanded and so was harmed and has standing. 

3.  Plaintiff provided documents to officials from St. John that documented previous decisions issued by the Indiana Public Access Counselor to show that the fees being charged for copies of records Plaintiff sought were excessive and violated state law.  Officials from St. John told Petitioner that the fees were established by St. John ordinance and that was the fee the Town of St. John was going to charge.

4.  Plaintiff called the Town of St. John’s Town Manager, Steve Kil, and explained the violation of the IAPRA to Mr. Kil and threatened a cause of action if Plaintiff could not obtain records at fees consistent with IARPA.  Mr. Kil then provided the requested records free of charge to the Petitioner, but this does not negate the fact that Petitioner has standing due to the Town of St. John still maintaining the excessive fee it has established through Town Ordinance.

5.  Plaintiff asks the Court to recognize that the Town of St. John has a legal obligation to provide copies of documents according to fees proscribed by IAPRA and for years has breached that duty to many hundreds, if not thousands of citizens.  Plaintiff asks the court to recognize that Plaintiff suffered harm from the point that Plaintiff sought to obtain records according to what is proscribed by the Indiana Access to Public Records Act but was unable to do so by virtue of the fact that the Town of St. John was not fulfilling this duty which is mandated by a law made in the public interest to direct performance of an act that is owed to the public at large.  Accordingly, it took a complaint to Steve Kil for Petitioner to obtain the document Petitioner requested and Steve Kil then had to to violate the Town Of St. John’s own ordinance so as to comply with Petitioner’s request for documents.  Previous court decisions held that an individual bringing a cause of action through an Action for Mandate has sufficient standing by virtue of the fact that an act directed by law to be owed to the public by a governmental unit negates issues of standing whereby a plaintiff/petitioner is not required to have been directly harmed and that the plaintiff/petitioner need no more cause to bring suit other than fact that the cause represents an issue in which the general public would hold an interest in the governmental unit performing the duty owed.  The public clearly has an interest in the Town of St. John providing public record copying fees that are in compliance with IAPRA as opposed to charging excessive fees that violate Indiana Code but are illegally mandated by St. John ordinance.  The State of Indiana thought transparency of governmental operations through affordable copying fees important enough issue to create the office of the Public Access Counselor and to mandate these affordable copying fees.

7.  Although IAPRA is the preferred method to obtain documents, it is Petitioner’s objective to not just get documents in this one specific instance as it related to him as the Relator, but to also ensure that the public at large could obtain documents in the future without being forced to pay excessive fees and to prevent taxpayer money from being repeatedly used to defend lawsuits where a governmental unit is at odds with laws made in the public’s interest that provide transparency and accountability through the process of the public being able to obtain copies of governmental documents at reasonable fees.  Citizens of St. John could have to bear the costs to pay for suits over and over as the result of the Town of St. John refusing to abide by IAPRA.  Citizens are also negatively affected by the high record fees and are discouraged from obtaining public documents that to provide greater transparency to the public administration.

8.  In regard to Petitioner having standing, which Petitioner feels will be a one of the key issues in this cause, Plaintiff asks the Court to find that Indiana cases recognize certain situations in which public rather than private rights are at issue and hold that the usual standards for establishing standing need not be met. The Indiana Supreme Court held in those cases that when a case involves enforcement of a public rather than a private right the plaintiff need not have a special interest in the matter nor be a public official.

Schloss, 553 N.E.2d at 1206 n.3 (quoting Higgins, 476 N.E.2d at 101). Specifically, the public standing doctrine eliminates the requirement that the relator have an interest in the outcome of the litigation different from that of the general public. Higgins, 476 N.E.2d at 101.

9.  The public standing doctrine has been recognized in Indiana case law for more than one hundred and fifty years. In Hamilton v. State ex rel. Bates, 3 Ind. 452 (1852), a citizen and taxpayer of Marion County urged that a 15% increase in the county’s land valuation by the State Equalization Board was invalid because it was made in the absence of a representative from the Sixth District. Ordering a peremptory mandamus to issue commanding the Marion County Auditor to disregard the increase, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed the relator’s right to bring the claim:

Were this a case merely for private relief, the relator would have to show some special interest in the subject-matter. But here the case is different. The defendant, who was County Auditor, refused to issue the legal duplicate for the collection of the taxes, and a mandamus was applied for to compel him to discharge this duty of his office. It is a case for the enforcement, not of a private, but of a public right; and it is not necessary, in such cases, that the relator should have a special interest in the matter, or that he should be a public officer. That the defendant should discharge, correctly, the duties of his office, was a matter in which Bates, as a citizen of the county, had a general interest; and that interest was, of itself, sufficient to enable him to obtain the mandamus in question, and have his name inserted as the relator.

10.  Similarly, in Bd. of Comm’rs of Decatur County v. State ex rel. Hamilton, 86 Ind. 8 (1882), the Indiana Supreme Court stated that:

[W]here the question is one of public concern, and the object of the mandate is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the relator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result sought to be accomplished. In such a case it is only necessary that the relator shall be a citizen, and as such interested in the execution of the laws.

11.  In Wampler v. State ex rel. Alexander, 148 Ind. 557, 47 N.E. 1068 (1897), the Indiana Supreme Court expressed the principle as follows:

Where the question involved in a mandamus proceeding is of a public concern, as is the one herein, and the object of the action is to enforce the performance of a public duty or right in which the people in general are interested, the applicant for the writ is not required to show any legal or special interest in the result sought to be obtained.

12.  Id. at 571-72, 47 N.E. at 1072. In determining that “the relators are shown to have the requisite degree of interest to enable them to maintain this action[,]” the Court relied not upon their status as trustees, but as citizens “interested in common with other citizens in the execution of the law.” Id. at 572, 47 N.E. at 1071-72. See also, Brooks v. State, ex rel. Singer, 162 Ind. 568, 70 N.E. 980 (1904); Meyer v. Town of Boonville, 162 Ind. 165, 70 N.E. 146 (1904); Zuelly v. Casper, 160 Ind. 455, 67 N.E. 103 (1903); State ex rel. Cutter v. Kamman, 151 Ind. 407, 51 N.E. 483 (1898); Bd. of Comm’rs of Clarke County v. State ex rel. Lewis, 61 Ind. 75 (1878); Bd. of Comm’rs of Clay County v. Markle, 46 Ind. 96 (1874).

13.  In addition to cases involving the enforcement of a public right or duty, the principles embodied in the public standing doctrine have also frequently been applied in cases challenging the constitutionality of governmental action, statutes, or ordinances. In Bd. of Comm’rs of Clay County v. Markle, 46 Ind. 96 (1874), nine residents, citizens, taxpayers, and voters charged that a statute and county-seat relocation proceedings predicated thereon were unconstitutional. Id. at 100. In response to the defendants’ claims that the plaintiffs’ injuries were in common with other taxpayers, citizens, and voters of the county, the Court analyzed not only Indiana case law, but also that of Iowa, Illinois, Maryland, and New Hampshire, concluding that “remedy may be had by any tax-payer in his own name.” Id. at 104 (citing City of Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38 (1854); Oliver v. Keightley, 24 Ind. 514 (1865)). Similarly, in Brooks v. State, ex rel. Singer, 162 Ind. 568, 70 N.E. 980 (1904), this Court addressed the constitutionality of the legislative apportionment act of 1903 upon the request of a resident, citizen, and voter of Ripley County. Id. at 570, 70 N.E. at 980. The Court stated:
We entertain no doubt of the right of the relator to maintain this action. Every male inhabitant of the State, over the age of twenty-one years at the time the last preceding enumeration of such inhabitants was taken, has a direct interest in the constitutional apportionment of senators and representatives throughout the State, and if, by an apportionment act, his rights in this respect are denied or impaired, he may obtain redress by proper action in the courts.

14.  Id. at 577, 70 N.E. at 983. In Davis Const. Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Boone County, 192 Ind. 144, 132 N.E. 629 (1921), a township resident and taxpayer challenged both a county contract and the act of 1919 upon which it was based. The Court rejected the Board of Commissioners’ argument that the taxpayer had no standing to challenge the statute’s constitutionality and stated:
And a taxpayer clearly has sufficient interest to question the constitutionality of the statute under which it is sought to impose a burden upon the property of a taxing district in which he lives and owns property subject to assessment, where the action seeking to impose a burden under such statute remains otherwise undefended.

15.  Id. at 147, 132 N.E. at 630. The public standing doctrine was also applied to permit constitutional challenges in Graves v. City of Muncie, 255 Ind. 360, 264 N.E.2d 607 (1970), Mitsch v. City of Hammond, 234 Ind. 285, 125 N.E.2d 21 (1955), Zoercher v. Agler, 202 Ind. 214, 172 N.E. 186 (1930), Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1 (1912), Fesler v. Brayton, 145 Ind. 71, 82, 44 N.E. 37, 40 (1896), and Denney v. Balser, 144 Ind. 503, 42 N.E. 929 (1895).
    Public standing principles have also been applied to permit numerous actions challenging various governmental activities or ordinances on grounds other than constitutionality. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Evansville, 244 Ind. 1, 189 N.E.2d 823 (1963); Hamer v. City of Huntington, 215 Ind. 407, 21 N.E.2d 594 (1939); Noble v. Davison, 177 Ind. 19, 96 N.E. 325 (1911); Jordan v. City of Logansport, 171 Ind. 280, 86 N.E. 47 (1908); Meyer v. Town of Boonville, 162 Ind. 165, 70 N.E. 146 (1904); Scott v. City of Laporte, 162 Ind. 34, 68 N.E. 278 (1903); Bd. of Comm’rs of Owen County v. Spangler, 159 Ind. 575, 65 N.E. 743 (1902); Myers v. City of Jeffersonville, 145 Ind. 431, 44 N.E. 452 (1896); Bd. of Comm’rs of Henry County v. Gillies, 138 Ind. 667, 38 N.E. 40 (1894); Town of Winamac v. Huddleston, 132 Ind. 217, 31 N.E. 561 (1892); Gemmil v. Arthur, 125 Ind. 258, 25 N.E. 283 (1890); City of Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1 (1884); City of Madison v. Smith, 83 Ind. 502 (1882); O’Boyle v. Shannon, 80 Ind. 159 (1881); Warren County Agric. Joint Stock Co. v. Barr, 55 Ind. 30 (1876); Rothrock v. Carr, 55 Ind. 334 (1876); Bd. of Comm’rs of Benton County v. Templeton, 51 Ind. 266 (1875); Hurd v. Walters, 48 Ind. 148 (1874); English v. Smock, 34 Ind. 116 (1870); Harney v. The Indianapolis, Crawfordsville, & Danville R.R. Co., 32 Ind. 244 (1869).
 

16.  The public standing doctrine is not unique to Indiana. The Illinois Supreme Court stated in Retail Liquor Dealers Protective Ass’n v. Schreiber, 47 N.E.2d 462 (Ill. 1943): “Where the object is the enforcement of a public right, the people are regarded as the real party, and the relator need not show that he has any legal interest in the result. It is enough that he is interested as a citizen in having the laws properly executed.” Id. at 464. The Florida Supreme Court used nearly identical language in State ex rel. Village of North Palm Beach v. Cochran, 112 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1959). In Tax Equity Alliance for Massachusetts v. Comm’r of Revenue, 672 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. 1996), the Massachusetts Supreme Court said that “[u]nder the public right doctrine, any member of the public may seek relief in the nature of mandamus to compel the performance of a duty required by law.” Id. at 508. In the same year, the South Dakota Supreme Court discussed public standing in Stumes v. Bloomberg: “If the taxpayer or elector seeks to protect a public right, no special injury or special interest need be established.” 551 N.W.2d 590, 592 (S.D. 1996). Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court “has consistently held that the enforcement of a public right may be sought by anyone who shares a common interest in that right with the public at large.” Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v. Comm’n on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar, 326 S.E.2d 705, 707-08 n.2 (W. Va. 1984). In the case of Wells v. Purcell, 592 S.W.2d 100 (Ark. 1979), the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that:
The rule is well settled, that when, in the absence of statutory regulation, the proceedings are for the enforcement of a duty affecting not a private right, but a public one, common to the whole community, it is not necessary that the relator should have a special interest in the matter, or that he should be a public officer.

17.  The public standing doctrine, which applies in cases where public rather than private rights are at issue and in cases which involve the enforcement of a public rather than a private right, continues to be a viable exception to the general standing requirement. The public standing doctrine permits the assertion of all proper legal challenges, including claims that government action is unconstitutional.  However, persons availing themselves of the public standing doctrine nevertheless remain subject to various limitations. Thus, for example, the doctrine does not prevent application of the Indiana Public Lawsuit Act, Ind. Code § 34-13-5-1 through -5-12, or the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, see, e.g., State Bd. of Tax Comm’s v. Ispat Inland, 784 N.E.2d 477, 482 (Ind. 2003); Fratus v. Marion Community Schools Bd. of Trustees, 749 N.E.2d 40, 46-47 (Ind. 2001); Town Council of New Harmony v. Parker, 726 N.E.2d 1217, 1224 (Ind. 2000); Austin Lakes Joint Venture v. Avon Util., Inc., 648 N.E.2d 641, 644-45 (Ind. 1995). Similarly, although the Indiana Declaratory Judgment Act expressly authorizes Indiana courts to “declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed,” Ind. Code § 34-14-1-1, to the extent that persons claiming public standing may be seeking only declaratory relief, they must be persons “whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise . . . .” I.C. § 34-14-1-2. See Town of Munster v. Hluska, 646 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“In order to obtain declaratory relief, the person bringing the action must have a substantial present interest in the relief sought, not merely a theoretical question or controversy but a real or actual controversy, or at least the ‘ripening seeds of such a controversy,’ and that a question has arisen affecting such right which ought to be decided in order to safeguard such right.”) (quoting Morris v. City of Evansville, 180 Ind.App. 620, 622, 390 N.E.2d 184, 186 (1979)).

18.  Because of a problem Petitioner had with the St. John police officers improperly threatening seizing the custody of Petitioner’s relatives as the result of a Department of Child Services conducting a follow-up interview in which the initial abuse complaint had already been deemed false and thereby containing no exigent circumstances that would allow said seizure or even allow DCS to question family members without legal representation, and as police threatened arrest when Petitioner and Petitioner’s family member directed police off the private property and out of the home as police illegally threatened seizure, one can see in this instance that coercion and threats exceeding the officers’ authority and in violation of Petitioner’s rights clearly shows that transparency regarding police procedure and the information contained within public documents must be provided at a cost that allows citizens to correct errors being made, in this instance as a matter of police procedure, that would otherwise remain hidden.  

18.  Plaintiff asks the Court to recognize that Plaintiff had a real and actual controversy and suffered harm the moment he was not able to obtain documents at required cost and all citizens have been harmed and will continue to be harmed every time the Town of St. John requires payment that is in excess of IAPRRA.  Additionally, how does Petitioner then know if records are not regularly being improperly provided free of charge at expense to the taxpayer as was done when Petitioner made his previous request for documents?  Petitioner also argues that this failure to abide by IAPRA costs citizens in litigation and then creates legal causes where Indiana Code has already settled an issue.  This failure to abide by IAPRA has the potential to create hundreds of causes of action  thereby tying up courts and causing expensive litigation that must be paid by the taxpayer.  A taxpayer could also make hundreds of requests for documents and thereby give rise to hundreds of causes of action. 

19.  This issue of Petitioner complaining about IAPRA violations within the Town of St. John is at least six months old and after being promised by Steve Kil that this violation of IAPRA would be corrected through the drafting of a new ordinance, Petitioner has been told by town officials that the Town Attorney has failed to draft such ordinance. 

Wherefore, Plaintiff prays the Court to issue an Action for Mandate and all other relief that is just and proper in the premises. 

Respectfully submitted, 

_________________________                         Dated:_____________

Joseph Zrnchik, Pro Se

9306 Saric Drive

Highland, IN 46322

219-588-8243

I, ________________________________ declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Indiana, that I have read the above complaint and I know it is true of my own knowledge, except as to those things stated upon information and belief, and as to those I believe to be true.

Certificate of Service

I, ______________________________, certify that on the _____ day of _____, service of a true and complete copy of the foregoing pleading or paper was made by depositing the same in the U.S. mail in the enveloped properly addressed with each having sufficient first-class postage affixed upon:

St. John Town Manager, Attn: Steve Kil, 10955, W. 93^rd Avenue, St. John, Indiana 46373