Blagojevich appeal update March 5, 2016, US Supreme Court opposition brief filed by Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr. Feb 19, Petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied, Blagojevich knew he was offering to exchange official actions for money

Blagojevich appeal update March 5, 2016, US Supreme Court opposition brief filed by Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr. Feb 19, Petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied, Blagojevich knew he was offering to exchange
official actions for money

Why did Patrick Fitzgerald and the US Justice Department wait until December 2008 to arrest Rod Blagojevich?”…Citizen Wells

“I believe I’m more pristine on Rezko than him.”…Rod Blagojevich

“Regardless of how this plays out, it benefits Obama. If there is no appeal or the appeal is denied, Blagojevich will be sequestered. If the appeal proceeds, it could drag out beyond impacting the 2012 election cycle. The intent is obvious.”…Citizen Wells, July 19, 2011

The  opposition brief filed by Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr.on  February 19 in the Rod Blagojevich US Supreme Court appeal finally showed up.

“No. 15-664
In the Supreme Court of the United States

ROD BLAGOJEVICH, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR.
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record”

“QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the court of appeals correctly upheld
petitioner’s conviction for extortion under color of
official right where the jury was instructed that the
government must prove that petitioner “agree[d] to
accept money or property believing that it would be
given in exchange for a specific requested exercise of
his official power.”

2. Whether the court of appeals correctly held that
petitioner may not defend against charges of extortion,
honest-services fraud, and bribery by claiming
that he genuinely believed that he could lawfully exchange
his official actions for money.”

“1. As an initial matter, the Court’s review is unwarranted
at this time because the case is still in an
interlocutory posture. The court of appeals vacated
five counts of conviction, vacated petitioner’s sentence,
and remanded to the district court for retrial
and resentencing. Pet. App. 23a. This Court normally
“await[s] final judgment in the lower courts before
exercising [its] certiorari jurisdiction.” VMI v. United
States, 508 U.S. 946 (1993) (Scalia, J., respecting denial
of certiorari); see Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf
Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916) (describing interlocutory
posture as “a fact that of itself alone furnishe[s]
sufficient ground for the denial of” certiorari).
That practice ensures that all of a defendant’s claims
will be consolidated and presented in a single petition.
Here, the interests of judicial economy would be
served best by denying review now and allowing petitioner
to reassert his claims—including any new
claims that might arise following resentencing or
retrial, if one occurs—at the conclusion of the proceedings.
See Major League Baseball Players Ass’n
v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 508 n.1 (2001) (per curiam)
(“[W]e have authority to consider questions determined
in earlier stages of the litigation.”).

2. Petitioner contends (Pet. 17) that this Court’s
review is needed to resolve a disagreement in the
lower courts on whether a jury must be instructed
that Hobbs Act extortion involves an “explicit” exchange
of official actions for campaign contributions.
No such conflict exists; petitioner’s argument is without
merit; and this would be a poor case to address the
argument in any event.”

“Elonis involved a prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
875(c) for communicating threats, and it addressed the
“requirement that a defendant act with a certain mental
state in communicating a threat.” 135 S. Ct. at
2008. Applying background presumptions about the
mens rea required for criminal liability, the Court
concluded that the defendant must be more than negligent
about the threatening nature of the communications.
Id. at 2011. But Elonis did not hold that Section
875(c) requires proof that the defendant knew his
actions were criminal. To the contrary, the Court
rejected the notion “that a defendant must know that
his conduct is illegal before he may be found guilty.”
Id. at 2009; see ibid. (“The familiar maxim ‘ignorance
of the law is no excuse’ typically holds true.”). The
Court thus focused on the defendant’s mental state
with respect to his own actions, while making clear
that knowledge of the legal consequences of his actions
is not required. Ibid. (“[A] defendant generally
must know the facts that make his conduct fit the
definition of the offense, even if he does not know that
those facts give rise to a crime.”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). That same focus applies
here as well: Petitioner could validly be convicted
because he knew that he was offering to exchange
official actions for money—whether or not he also
knew that doing so was illegal.”

“CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.”

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/osg/briefs/2016/03/04/15-664_blagojevich_v._us_opp.pdf