Afghanistan: Negotiation, No; Forced Surrender, Yes!

I totally agree with John Bernard’s comments in his piece below.  In fact, I go a bit further.  Judicious use of tactical nukes would instantaneously send all of them to their 72 virgins each.  We should reduce the Taliban field commanders’ average age to 15.  When are these elitist idiots ever going to realize that the terrorists and insurgents will never negotiate with us in a fair and just manner?  It is all their way or the highway for us.  When you deal with savages, you do not negotiate your way out of an assured decapitation.

Have we discarded carpet-bombing?  Have we discarded the scorched-earth strategy?  Have we discarded massive retaliation?  Have we discarded the use of bunker busters?  Do you ever wonder why the enemy thinks we are wimps?  It is because we don’t kick butts and take names anymore.  They need a swift KITA!  “KITA” stands for “Kick in the A_ _.”  Counter insurgency (COIN) does not work.  “COIN” really stands for “Cowering Over Insignificant Nothings.”  Where in the Hades is General George S. Patton, Jr., when we need him?  I think we should take the Airborne Laser (ABL) over to Afghanistan and Iraq and make minced meat out of the Taliban and al-Qaeda cockroaches.  Then, we can get out of there next July 2011.

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Afghanistan: The Strategy to Entice Negotiation Rather than Forced Surrender

John Bernard

November 17, 2010

London Times Reporter Christina Lamb (2010) wrote that the average age of Taliban field commanders had fallen from 35 to 25. The reason given by unnamed U.S. State Department officials was that the high value target program had taken its toll. This, they suggest, is evidence that counter insurgency (COIN) is on track and the reason why the Taliban is making slow but steady advances toward a table of reconciliation and negotiation.

In the piece, Lamb (2010) also quotes Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), stating,

“The [devastating] truth is that U.S. forces will be fighting in Afghanistan for at least four more years.”

Of course, one has to wonder what he finds devastating about that. Is it that the war itself will continue beyond what presidential hopeful Obama proclaimed to be the drop dead date for combat operations there in 2008; because of his misplaced concern for the enemy or that more American warriors will meet an untimely death at the hands of our misguided political and upper-echelon military ‘leaders’?

While killing off the current crop of leaders is a good thing, there is some concern on the part of these experts that it may in fact prove to be a bad thing. After all, the older leaders are somewhat ‘tired,’ they say, from their exploits to remove the infidels while there younger replacements are likely to be full of vigor.

Lamb (2010) also quotes David Kilcullen who laments:

“There are 6 million [military-aged] men in the Pashtun belt; you can’t kill them all.”

First of all, he discredits every honorable man who has worn a uniform by using the word military to describe these 7th century, demonically possessed thugs.  I, for one, demand two apologies: one for my son who paid the ultimate price serving his country in the finest military organization on the planet and one for me!

So, what we have here is someone described as a counter insurgency expert who does not think the world’s strongest, best-armed military force cannot provide 6 million hardened Islamists their lifelong dream to meet Allah. Or is it that the very notion that it might require exactly that to bring these particular Islamists to their knees is too frightening a prospect for him?

My question to Kilcullen is this: Why can you not kill them all? It is a win/win. They get to meet their deity, and we get to rid the earth of a scourge. Personally, I think Mr. Kilcullen is out of his league. It might look great on a resume to say you are an expert in counter insurgency, but being an expert who touts the wonders of a military philosophy that fails—generally, is not going to look so great in the history books.

Not to beat a dead horse, but why are we coaxing an unrepentant enemy to a table of negotiation and reconciliation before they have in fact conceded the battlefield? All this will do is emboldening an enemy who already believes they have religious precedent to kill indiscriminately. Until such time as they have confessed that sin and professed a willingness to make atonement for their unbridled lust to commit ritual murder, I think the fight—the real fight, one without COIN, should continue. If the 6 million murder-aged men in the Pashtun belt are so motivated to leave this earth; we should accommodate them.

The closing remarks in the piece again quote Mr. Kilcullen who is completely sold on the idea that it is possible to get the Afghan people on board with our ultimate mission (whatever that is):

“There’s definitely military progress, but does that take us where we want to go?” Mr. Kilcullen asked: “We don’t have a viable Afghan partner and we don’t have the buy-in of the Afghan people. Without that, military progress may take us not to war termination but to war continuation.”

Again; since when does the plight of a people who hate us, take precedence over the lives of our warriors—and our citizenry?

Semper Fidelis

Reference

Lamb, C. (2010, November 14). .Slaughter of commanders drives Taliban to the table, suggests NATO strategy working. London Sunday Times. Retrieved from www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/slaughter-of-commanders-drives-taliban-to-the-table-suggests-nato-strategy-working/story-e6frg8yo-1225953386330.

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