KGB HANDBOOK FOR OBAMA ("THE PROFESSIONAL" system). PART 3.Mikhail Kryzhanovsky

PART 3. TOP MILITARY MANAGEMENT.

　

“The law of the strongest is the only international law.” Mikhail Kryzhanovsky

Chapter 1. Commmander-in –Chief.

The president loves war, not peace, because:

a) Successful military engagement enhances presidential popularity. All five Presidents who have run for re-election during a war have won.

b) A quick war improves the electoral fortunes of the president’s political party.

c) War is good business, at least if you win, and at least if it does not drag on too long. It stimulates demand for a variety of manufactured goods and services (even if they are all destined to go down the drain) and is a powerful stimulus to all fields of scientific endeavor.

d) War provides opportunities to direct lucrative contracts to companies and individuals who helped get the President elected, or who can help in the future; and to the constituents of select Senators and Congressmen for the same reasons.

e) War usually pleases the Joint Chiefs (and their full support is important politically).

f) War keeps down the unemployment figures.

g) War is just one detail in a vast ongoing game of international strategy for domination; it is as much a financial operation as anything else.

h) War unifies the country, and keeps the public’s attention away from issues that might be controversial.

i) War provides a rationale for the implementation of tighter legislation and the removal of certain freedoms that would never be tolerated in peacetime America.

At the same time, war is limited by political decisions and by public opinion. Initially the use of US forces spurs a “rally around the flag” effect that lifts the President’s popularity and builds up support for the troops. But the American people are casualty averse and the positive effect lasts only until the number of casualties and the length of the engagement begin to wear on the public. Continued military action will then have a deleterious effect on presidential approval ratings as the war becomes increasingly unpopular.

In the long run, the destruction of such vast quantities of resources, and the diversion of so much of the nation’s productive capacity away from actual goods and services for the real economy, are obviously immensely deleterious. Eventually, these downside effects will begin to dawn on even the best-manipulated electorate.

 

Duties of the Commander-in-Chief

1. As President you are Commander-in-Chief, but your job is political decision making, not war management. You:

- lead all federal and state armed forces

- lead the US defense policy

- suggest a budget for the armed forces

- choose the leaders of the armed forces

- decide where the armed forces will be in the world

- abide by all laws about armed forces

- direct all war efforts

- protect the lives of Americans living in other countries

During wartime you have special powers and Congress must agree to any actions president takes, including:

- placing limits on prices

- limiting the sale of food, clothes and other items

- having a control on war-related businesses

- limiting freedoms for the period of war

SIOP or Presidential nuclear command

The most classified business you will be briefed on about after you’re elected is the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), which contains the possible US nuclear responses to a variety of attacks. Here’s the procedure of Presidential nuclear command:

If the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) detects evidence of a possible nuclear attack against the United States, NORAD, the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center and the Alternative National Military Command Center begin procedural steps to verify the authenticity of the attack. If NORAD and other units determine that the attack is real, you are informed of the attack and its characteristics. Then you have to consult with the Defense Secretary and Joint Chiefs of Staff and consider SIOP options. If a nuclear attack option is chosen, you have to transmit the launch codes that unlock the nuclear weapons and assure the officers in charge of the weapons that the launch order is authentic. You may also give authority to launch nuclear weapons to the Secretary of Defense.

 

Chapter 2. Strategy and Tactics.

2.1 Strategy

Strategy is the planning of campaigns, selecting the aims and solving the logistics problems connected with moving men and resources to their battle positions. Actually, strategy is how you use battles to win a war, while a tactic is how you use troops to win a battle. There’s only one grand strategy — to win the war; and the President is very important here as a politician — he gives the orders to freeze the enemy’s assets in American (and allies’) banks and he builds up the international coalition. American military strategy in the 21st century has to be a global strategy, which means coalition building. We will not discuss nuclear strategy and tactics in depth, because we all hope that for the next 25 years at least the practical use of nuclear weapons will remain a matter of science fiction, something to hint at and suggest as a threat, but not to actually try. Please do not prove me wrong.

2.2 Tactics

Military tactics rest on fourteen elements:

1.Identification or selection and maintenance of aim (ability to define and locate the opponent). Tactics should be directed to achieve a particular outcome such as the capture of a bridge or a hill. Once an aim is identified, time, resources and effort are expended to achieve it; therefore, these are wasted if the aim is frequently changed.

2.Administration (planning and analysis). Ask what (type of operation), when (time), where (the assigned area), how (the use of assigned assets), why (the purpose). Mission analysis includes : mission, enemy(intelligence), terrain (and weather), troops, time available between receiving the mission and the deadline for having completed it (time is the most critical resource, especially during daylight hours), deception, civilian considerations.

3.Concentration of efforts (against the enemy, where he is known to be weakest). Remember, he who defends everything defends nothing, he who attacks everywhere will capture nothing.

4. Security (intelligence and counter-intelligence)

5.Economy of force (to make the best use of all resources and in order to create and maintain a reserve).

6.Force protection (dispersing, camouflage, deception, electronic counter measures, use of fortifications — entrenchments, over head protection, foxholes, revetting, vanguard). Dispersal of force is a very necessary practice in modern warfare where firepower is precise and overwhelming. Camouflage is not just special uniform; outlines have to be broken up, textures disguised and reflective surfaces dulled. Camouflage techniques also extend beyond the visible spectra that the human eye normally uses, as the same principles now need to work in infrared light, against starlight scopes and radar frequencies. Also you have to use terrain, natural (river) and man made obstacles and barriers , like wire anti-vehicle ditches and “berms” (knife edges).

7. Isolation (when the opponent is denied the ability to gain outside resources and assistance).

8. Suppression (the process of denying the opponent the freedom of movement and ultimately maneuver)

9. Maneuver (combination of movement and firepower to achieve a position of advantage which means the placing of strength against an opponent’s weakness)

10. Flexibility (a capability to react to changing circumstances, especially by mobility, the rapid switching of fire-power and arrangement of sufficient resources). Don’t forget to keep about a quarter of the forces back in reserve to exploit new opportunities, or react quickly to reverses and unexpected developments – a battalion might keep a company back, the brigade might keep a battalion back. Here I would also talk about exploiting prevailing weather (bad weather cut down on the chance of detection) and exploiting night using night vision equipment.

11. Cooperation (with allies through secure links)

12. Offensive action (to win the initiative and throw an enemy off balance)

13. Destruction (physical destruction of resources or destruction of the opponent’s will)

14. Troops motivation.

　

2.3 The U.S. principles of military art:

1.Objective (direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. The ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the enmy’s ability and will to fight).

2.Offensive (seize, retain and exploit initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined common objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while mainaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. This is fundamentally true across all levels of war).

3.Mass (concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time. Synchronizing all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is to chieve mass. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results, while limiting exposure to enemy fire).

4.Economy of force ( employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. No part of the force should ever be left without purpose. The allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited ttacks, defense, delays, eception, or even retrograde operations is measured in order to ahieve mass elsewhere at the decisive pont and time of battlefield).

5.Maneuver (place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain positional advantage. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects the force. It is used to exploit successes, to preserve freedom of action, an to reduce vulnerability. It continually poses new problems for the enemy y rendering his actions ineffective, eventually leading to defeat).

6.Unity of command (for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander. At all levels of war, employment of military forces in a maner that masses combat power toward a common objective requires unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command means that all the forces are under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose).

7.Security (never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts , influence or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by a commander to protect his forces. Knowledge and understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, doctrine, and staff planning improve the detailed planning of adequate security measures).

8.Surprise (strike the enemy at a time, at a place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power. By seeking surprise, forces can achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Surprise can be in tempo, size of force, direction or location of main effort and timing. Deception can aid the probability of achieving surprise).

9.Simplicity (prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Everything in war is very simple, but simple thing is difficult. To the uninitiated, military operations are not difficult. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors bing equal, parsimony is to be prefered).

2.4 The Russian principles of military art:

1. Combat readiness.

2. Surprise.

3. Aggressivnes and decisiveness.

4. Persistence and nitiative.

5. Combined arms oordination and joint operations.

6. Decisive concentration of forces.

7. Deep battle or dep operations.

8. Informatin warfare.

9. Exploitation of moral-political factors.

10. Firm and continuous command and control.

11. Comprehensive comat support.

12. Timely restoration of reserves and combat potential.

2.5 Chinese principles of military art.

Because the military doctrines of the Pople’s Liberation Army are in a state of flux, it is difficult to give a capsule summary of a single doctrine which is expounded with the PLA. Rather the PLA is currently influenced by three doctrinal schools which both conflict and complement each other. These three schools are:

1.People’s war ( derived from the Maoist notion of warfare as a war in which the entire society is mobilized.

2.Regional war (envisions future wars to be limited in scope and confined to the Chinese border).

3.Revolution in military affairs ( a school of thought which believes that technology is transforming the basis of warfare and that these technological changes present both extreme dangers and possibilities for the Chinese military.

In recent years, “local war under high-tech conditions” has been promoted.

 

Chapter 3. Staying Alive

　

There is no and there will be no such creature as the “soldier of tomorrow” loaded with computers who doesn’t have to be skillful on his own; this is a fantasy of smart idiots wasting federal money, who never have been under fire amidst the hell of actual combat. Of course, technology has changed the character of modern war, but as the insurgents in Iraq have taught us, the rest of the world doesn’t have to reach our level in military technology to fight — they can conduct urban guerilla warfare with whatever is at hand.

For a hundred years to come the best way to survive will still be to dig up a big, deep trench. The best computer is a loaded submachine gun, and the best techniques are:

- Firepower + Speed = Low Casualties

- the minor tactic of infantry: “fire and movement” — firing and moving, often in pairs, when one soldier fires to suppress or neutralize the enemy whilst the other moves either toward the enemy or to a more favorable position;

- basic drill (if you are under “effective fire”): run five-six steps, drop to the ground or into cover, crawl a few yards (or move under cover), observe, shoot identified targets within effective range, move, observe and shoot until you get another order;

- “overwatch”: one small unit supports another while they execute fire and movement patrolling: reconnaissance patrol (used to collect information by observing the enemy and working with informants, fighting patrol (to raid or ambush a specific enemy not holding the ground; you need a platoon for a fighting patrol), clearing patrol (to ensure that newly occupied defensive position is secure), standing patrol (to provide early warning, security or to piquet some geographical feature such as dead ground).

 

3.1 How to fight in :

Desert

Successful desert operations require adaptation to heat and lack of water as temperatures may vary 136 degrees Fahrenheit in the deserts of Mexico and Libya to the bitter cold of winter in the Gobi (East Asia). Terrain varies from mountain and rocky plateau to sandy or dune terrain. The key to success in desert operations is mobility, though movement can easily be detected because of sand and dust signatures left due to the loose surface material (in an actual engagement, this may not be all that bad because a unit is obscured from direct fire while advancing, but the element of surprise may be lost). Moving at night is the best choice.

Attack helicopters are extremely useful there due to their ability to maneuver and apply firepower over a large battlefield in a short time. Suppression of enemy air defense has a high priority during offensive operations. The destruction of enemy antitank capabilities must also have a high priority due to the shock potential of armor in the desert.

No panic, no smoking, no alcohol (it dehydrates the body). Don’t drink much liquid. Keep the gun clean from sand. Kill anybody for water and watch for water signs, like animal tracks and the birds’ flight patterns.

Jungle

In the jungle you’ll fight, most probably, guerrilla, not conventional forces. In general, jungle enemies can be expected to follow these tactical principles: maintain the offensive, stay close to the enemy to reduce the effects of his firepower, infiltrate at every opportunity, operate during periods of limited visibility, use surprise tactics (see Special Forces). Remember that trees and foliage reduce the effective range of your weapons.

In Latin America the most likely threat for the US are insurgent leftist movements. In Africa many of the conflicted factions struggle among themselves, due to political or ancient tribal differences, differences that may be stirred up by rival leaders in the “modern” political state, who in turn may be working (knowingly or not) in the interests of other, more developed, powers who benefit from the chaos. (These factions consist primarily of heavily armed with mortars and artillery guerrilla groups. There are active guerrilla movements in Southeast Asia, too).

The worst things (often exaggerated) in jungle combat are fear, malaria-carrying mosquitoes and snakes; also heat, thick vegetation and rugged terrain, especially for those who carry heavy weapons. If bitten by a snake, follow these steps: remain calm but act swiftly, and chances of survival are good; immobilize the affected part in a position below the level of the heart; place a lightly constricted band 5 to 10 cm (2 to 4 inches) closer to the heart than the site of the bite (reapply the constricting band ahead of the swelling if it moves up the arm or leg). The constricting band should be placed tightly enough to halt the flow of blood in surface vessels, but not so tight as to stop the pulse; do not attempt to cut open the bite or suck out venom; seek medical help (if possible, the snake’s head with 5 to 10 cm of its body should be taken to the medics for identification and a proper choice of anti venom).

The thick foliage and few rods make ambush a constant danger, and that’s why point, flank and rear security teams have to keep a force from being ambushed. These teams must be far enough away from the main body that if they make contact the whole force will not be engaged (use dogs, too). Successful jungle attacks usually combine dispersion and concentration. For example, a rifle company may move out in a dispersed formation so that it can find the enemy. Once contact is made, its platoons close on the enemy from all directions. Remember, jungle areas are ideal for infiltration because dense vegetation and rugged terrain limit the enemy’s ability to detect movement. On the other side, it’s difficult to detect the approach of an attacking enemy for the same reason. In the jungle the key weapons are infantry small arms, mortars and artillery. Do not use insect repellant when on ambush, because the enemy can smell you before he hits the killing zone. Have each soldier make field expedient aiming stakes for the ambush site – this will keep distribution of ire even throughout the killing zone. Do not wera helmets: they degrade your hearing and reduce your peripheral vision. Take listening halts at least 15 minutes every hour. Patrol 500 meters in front of the unit. Carry iodine tablets.

Due to the limited visibility of the jungle, the hasty attack is the most likely scenario. React quickly with every weapon that you can bring to bear as soon as you contact the enemy. Gain immediate fire superiority and keep it. Do not wait for a clear visual target to open fire; fire at smoke, muzzle flashes, or by sound, use grenades immediately, otherwise, the enemy will gain the superiority.

Be aware of stay-behind snipers as you approach the objective. Night raids are generally not practical.

Far North

Be ready for long hours of daylight and dust in summer, long nights and the extreme cold in winter, and the mud and morass of the transition periods of spring and autumn. The disrupting effects of natural phenomena, the scarcity of roads and railroads, the vast distances and isolation, and occasionally the lack of current maps combine to affect adversely but not totally restrict mobility, fire power, and communications.

Navigation is tricky in the Arctic. You’re near the magnetic pole,so compass readings may be erratic:take more than one, and average them out.Use the shadow tip method or use the sun and stars to show you in which direction north and other points of the compass lie. Nature gives you some clues,too:

-a solitary evergreen tree will always have more growth on its south side

- bark on poplar and birch trees will always be lighter in colour on the south-facing side

- trees and bushes will be bent in the direction that the wind normally blows, so if you know the direction of the prevailing wind you can work out north and south

- the snow on the south side of the ridges tends to be more granular than on the north

- snowdrills usually are on the downwind side of protruding objects like rocks, trees of high banks. By determining the cardinal points of the compass and from them the direction of the drifts, the angle at which you cross them will serve as a check point in maintaining a course. In the southern hemisphere the opposite polarity applies.

Crossing thin ice: one man at a time; take your hands out of the loops on your ski poles; put your equipment over one shoulder only, so you can shrug it off; loosen your bindings on your skis or snowshoes; think about distributing your weight by lying flat and crawling; bear in mind thicknesses of ice snd their corresponding loadbearing capabilities: 2 inches support 1 man, 4 inches – 2 men side by side,10 inches – a half-ton vehicle.

The most suitable time for ground operations is from midwinter to early spring before the breakup of the ice. Early winter, after the formation of ice, is also favorable. Tracks in the snow, and fog created by a heat source, complicate the camouflage of positions. The blending of terrain features, lack of navigational aids, fog and blowing snow all combine to make land navigation extremely difficult. And don’t eat the snow, and don’t put weapons on the snow (especially after shooting).

Mountains

Mountain campaigns are characterized by a series of separately fought battles for the control of dominating ridges and heights that overlook roads, trails, and other potential avenues of approach. Operations generally focus on smaller-unit tactics of squad, platoon, company, and battalion size. Attacks in extremely rugged terrain are often dismounted, with airborne and air assaults employed to seize high ground or key terrain and to encircle or block the enemy’s retreat. The mountainous terrain usually offers greater advantage to the defender and frontal attacks, even when supported by heavy direct and indirect fires, have a limited chance of success (the best thing is to use the envelopment). Infantry is the basic maneuver force in mountains. Mechanized infantry is confined to valleys and foothills, but their ability to dismount and move on foot enables them to reach almost anywhere in the area. The objective in mountainous areas of operations is normally to dominate terrain from which the enemy can be pinned down and destroyed.

If you’re not a sniper, you have nothing to do there. Use grenades carefully (in winter time there’s too much snow around). Keep in mind that low atmospheric pressure considerably increases the evaporation of water in storage batteries and vehicle cooling systems, and impairs cylinder breathing (consequently, vehicles expand more fuel and lubricant, and engine power is reduced by four to six percent for every 1,000-meters (3,300 ft) increase in elevation above sea level. You have to be used to the lack of oxygen. And don’t drink or smoke while climbing. Be always ready to shoot. Watch open places and roads. Go parallel course when you chase the enemy. Shoot first if you see cut trees on your way.

3.2 Wounds

Don’t eat before the assault; if there’s food in your system, you’ll die if wounded in the belly.

If you or another soldier is wounded, first aid must be given at once and the first step is to apply the four life-saving measures:

1. Clear the airway, check and restore breathing and heartbeat. If he is not breathing, place him on his back and kneel beside his head, clear his airway and start mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and if necessary start external heart massage.

2. Stop the bleeding. Look for both entry and exit wounds, as a bullet usually makes a smaller wound where it enters than where it exits.

3. Prevent shock. Warning signs of shock are restlessness, thirst, pale skin and rapid heartbeat. Loosen the casualty’s clothing at the neck, waist and wherever it restricts circulation. Keep him warm. Reassure him by being calm and self-confident. Put him in a comfortable position.

4. Dress and bandage the wound.

Attention: majority of the soldiers with serious wounds demonstrate the symptoms of posttraumatic stress syndrome, like re-experiencing the combat through vivid memories and flashbacks,feeling “emotionally numb”, diminished interest in performing military tasks, crying

uncontrollably, isolating himself from friends, relying increasingly on alcohol or drugs to get

through the day, feeling extremely moody, irritable, angry , suspicious or frightened, having

difficulty falling or staying asleep, sleeping too much and experiencing nightmares, feeling

guilty about surviving the combat while many other soldiers were killed, feeling fear and

sense of doom about the future. To cope with the syndrome the soldier has to recognize his

feelings about the situation and talk to others about his fears, be willing to listen to other soldiers, who coped with the syndrome, and to understand that these feelings are a normal temporary response to an abnormal situation.

 

Chapter 4. Small unit tactics

4.1 Four F’s

Find – locate the enemy

Fix – pin them down with suppressing fire

Flank – send soldiers to the enemy’s sides ( not the rear, as your troops will then fire upon each other).

Finish – eliminate all enemy combatants

4.2. Overwatch.

Overwatch is the state of one small unit or military vehicle supporting another unit, while they are executing fire and movement tactics. An overwatching or supporting unit has to take a position where it can observe the terrain ahead, especially likely enemy positions, and this allows to provide effective covering fire for advancing friendly units. An ideal overwatch position provides cover for the unit and unobstructed lines of fire. It may be on a height of the ground or at the top of a ridge, where a vehicle may be able to adopt a hull-down position. If the overwatching unit is in a position to fire over advancing friendly units, great care must be taken not to let fire fall short. The friendly units should be within tracer burnout (the range at which tracer rounds are visible). Overwatch can be performed by platoons during company fire and movement, by individual armored vehicles (especially, tanks) or infantry sections, in platoon fir and movement, or even by fireteams or individual soldiers, in the final stages of assault. Overwatch tactics and firing at the short halt were especially important in armored warfare before modern tank gun stabilizers were developed, since moving tanks were unlikely to hit any target. Even in the most modern tanks, however, the crews can locate and hit targets better when at halt.

Bounding overwatch , also known as leapfrogging or simply bounding, is the military tactic of alternating movement of coordinated units to allow, if necessary , suppressive fire in support of offensive forward movent or defensive disengagement. As members of a unit take an overwatch posture, other members advance to cover; these two groups continually switch roles as they close with the enemy. This process may be done by “leapfrogging” by fireteams, but is usually done within fireteams along a squad/platoon battle line to simulate an overwhelming movement towards the enemy and make it more difficult for the enemy to distinguish specific targets.

Example: A squad (2 fireteams) in an urban combat zone must advance to a building 100 feet away, crossing an intersection they believe might be in enemy rifle sights from elevated buildings. If the team simply made a run-for-it, they expose themselves to potential enemy fire without protection. So, one fireteam takes an overwatch position while the other team bounds ( a bond is a 3-5 second rush) to a new covered position. This way there is always an overwatch team that can react instantaneously to enemy fire (the bounding team would have to stop, take over , locate the enemy and aim before they could return fire). Once the covered position is reached by the bounding team, they take up overwatch positions and the other team then becomes the bounding team. By using bounding overwatch, this unit is able to move effectively through a hostile urban street and intersection, without unnecessary exposing themselves to enemy fire. If enemy contact is made, the overwatch team opens fire and the unit takes up a process called “fire and maneuver” which is very like bounding overwatch in that teams alternate firing and maneuvering. During fire and movement maneuver, the commander takes more direct control of team movements and positions.

4.3 Center peel

Center peel or “peel” tactic is specifically designed for situations where smaller groups of infantry withdraw from engagement of a much larger force; it’s a sloped or diagonal retreat from the enemy, a trick designed with human psychology in mind. It begins with an infantry unit facing off with a large force of enemies. Once the command is called, the soldiers implement a battle line formation facing into the enemy’s midst. The soldiers then begin to use suppressing fire to delay the enemy’s attack and advance. Depending on the direction of the retreat, the second to last soldier on the farmost end, opposite the retreating direction, calls out, “Peel 1″. Now, the infantryman next to him, on the end of the line, ceases fire, works his way behind the line towards the other side, takes a position one meter diagonally back from the farmost soldier on this side, and resumes suppressing fire. Then, the process repeats with the commands being simplified to “Peel” , the 1 only there to signify the actual start of the tactic, and continues until the party has safely disengaged the target. The slanting motion of the tactic gives the impression of increasing numbers of infantry joining the battle, a psychological move designed to demoralize the opposition. The slanting motion also has the benefit of keeping open one’s field of fire. Retreating directly backwards would put the soldier too closely behind his own men, severely limiting his field of fire.

4.4 Patrolling

Patrolling is another tactic. Small groups or individual units are deployed from a larger formation to achieve a specific objective and then return. The tactic of patrolling may be applied to ground troops, armored units and combat aircraft. The duration of a patrol will vary from few hours to several weeks depending on the nature of the objective and the type of units involved. The most common objective is to collect information by carrying out a reconnaissance patrol. Such a patrol remains covert and observe an enemy without being detected. Other reconnaissance patrols are overt, especially those that interact with the civilian population .A fighting patrol is a group with sufficient size (platoon or company) and resources to raid or ambush a specific enemy. It primarily differs from an attack in that the aim is not to hold ground.

A clearing patrol is a brief patrol around a newly occupied defensive position in order to ensure that the immediate area is secure. Clearing patrols are often undertaken on the occupation of a location and during stand to in the transition from night to day routine and vice versa.A standing patrol is a small static patrol intended to provide early warning, security or to piquet some geographical feature, such as dead ground. A reconnaissance patrol is a small patrol , whose main mission is the gathering of information.

 

Chapter 5. Sniper

Military snipers are usually deployed in two-men sniper teams consisting of a shooter and spotter – they take turns in order to avoid eye fatigue. Sniper missions include reconnaissance and surveillance, counter-sniper, killing enemy commanders, selecting targets of opportunity and destruction of military equipment.

5.1 Common mistakes

The sniper has a tendency to watch the target instead of his aiming point.

He may jerk or flinch at the moment his weapon fires because he thinks he must fire now ( this can be overcome through practice on a live-fire range).

He may hurry and thus forget to apply wind as needed.

Windage must be calculated for moving targets just as for stationary targets, and failure to do so when squiring a lead will result in a miss.

NEVER fire from the edge of a wood line – you should fire from a position inside the wood line (in the shade of shadows).

DO NOT cause overhead movement of trees, bushes or tall grasses by rubbing against them; move very slowly.

Do not use trails, roads or footpaths, avoid built-up and populated areas and areas of heavy enemy guerrilla activity.

5.2 Position selection

Your position must match the following requirements: maximum fields of fire and observation of the target area, concealment from enemy observation, covered routes into and out of the position, located no closer than 300 meters from the target area, a natural or man-made obstacle between the position and the target area. Avoid positions that are on a point or crest of prominent terrain features, close to isolated objects, at bends or ends of roads, trails or streams, in populated areas, unless it’s required. Your location must appear to the enemy to be the least likely place you are in ( under logs in a deadfall area, tunnels bored from one side of a knoll to the other, swamps, deep shadows, inside rubble piles.

Urban terrain is perfect for a sniper, and positions can range from inside attics to street-level positions in basements. Shooting through loopholes in barricaded windows are preferred. Positions in attics are also effective, and you have to remove the shingles and cuts out of loopholes in the roof. DO NOT locate positions against contrasting background or in prominent buildings that automatically draw attention. Never fire close to a loophole, always back away from the hole as far as possible to hide the muzzle flash and to scatter the sound of the weapon when it fires. You may stay in a different room than the loophole; you can make a hole through a wall to connect the rooms and fire from inside one room. Do not fire from one position, and try to construct more than one position. Inside the room cover the windows with carpets or blankets to avoid silhouetting. Make escape routes through the holes knocked into the floor or ceiling; carpet or furniture placed over escape holes or replaced ceiling tiles will conceal them until needed. Firing from inside the attic around a chimney or other structure helps prevent enemy observation and fire.

The second floor of a building is usually the best location for the position, as it presents minimal dead space but provides you more protection since passerby can’t easily locate it.

5.3 Key targets.

Snipers ( that’s your #1 target), dog tracking teams ( shoot the dog’s handler first and that confuses the dog a lot), officers, vehicle commanders and drivers, communications personnel, weapon crews, optics on vehicles, communication and radar equipment, weapon computer-guided systems.

5.4 Range estimation.

An object of regular outline, such as a house, appears closer than one of irregular outline, such as a clump of trees. A target that contrasts with its background appears to be closer than it actually is. A partly exposed target appears more distant that it actually is. Distant targets are usually overestimated. Observing over smooth terrain, such as sand, water or snow causes the observer to underestimate distant targets. Looking downhill, the target appears father away; looking uphill, the target appears closer. The more clear a target can be seen, the closer it appears. When the sun is behind you, the target appears to be closer. When the sun is behind the target, it’s more difficult to see it and it appears to be farther away.

5.5 Target indicators .

Sound . Most noticeable at night and caused by movement, equipment rattling ,or talking. Small noises may be dismissed as natural, but talking not.

Movement. Most noticeable at daytime. Quick or jerky movement will be detected faster than slow movement. The human eye is attracted to movement. Improper camouflage. Shine, outline, contrast with the ground.Disturbance of wildlife.

5.6 “Golden” rules

1. Train your muscles to snap to the standard position for shooting, to squeeze the trigger straight back with the ball of your finger to avoid jerking the gun sideways.

Train yourself to shoot while you stand, sit, lie, walk, run, jump, fall down; shoot at voices, shoot in a dark room, different weather and distance, day and night; shoot one object and a group; use one gun, two guns, gun and submachine gun (some doctrines train a sniper to breathe deeply before shooting, then hold their lungs empty while he lines up and takes his shot; other go further, teaching a sniper to shoot between heartbeats to minimize barrel motion)

2. Camouflage yourself ten times before you make a single shot. Position yourself in a building (no rooftops or churches!), which offers a long-range fields of fire and all-round observation. Don’t stay in places with heavy traffic! Use unusual angles of approach and frequent slow movement to prevent accurate counter-attacks.

3. Move slowly to prevent accurate counter-attack, don’t be a mark yourself

4. Kill officers and military leaders first (Attention, officers: don’t walk in front of your soldiers!)

5. Use suppressive fire to cover a retreat

6. Use rapid fire when the squad attempts a rescue

7. Shoot helicopters, turbine disks of parked jet fighters, missile guidance packages, tubes or wave guides of radar sets

8. At distances over 300 m attempt body shots, aiming at the chest; at lesser distances attempt head shots (the most effective range is 300 to 600 meters). Police snipers who generally engage at much shorter distances may attempt head shots to ensure the kill (in instant-death hostage situations they shoot for the cerebellum, a part of the brain that controls voluntary movement that lies at the base of the skull).

9. Shoot from flanks and rear

10. Never approach the body until you shoot it several times

11. Careful: the object could be wearing a bulletproof vest

12. It’s important to get to the place, but it’s more important to get out alive

13. Remember, in hot weather bullets travel higher, in cold — lower; a silencer reduces the maximum effective range of the weapon. Wind poses the biggest problem — the stronger the wind, the more difficult it is to hold the rifle steady and gauge how it will affect the bullet’s trajectory. (You must be able to classify the wind and the best method is to use the clock system. With you at the center of the clock and the target at 12 o’clock, the wind is assigned into three values: full, half and no value. Full value means that the force of the wind will have a full effect on the flight of the bullet, and these winds come from 3 and 9 o’clock. Half value means that a wind at the same speed, but from 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10 and 11 o’clock, will move the bullet only half as much as a full-value wind. No value means that a wind from 6 or 12 o’clock will have little or no effect on the flight of the bullet). Shooting uphill or downhill can require more adjustment due to the effects of gravity. For moving targets, the point of aim is in front of the target ( it’s called “Leading” the target, where the amount of lead depends on the speed and angle of the target’s movement. For this technique, holding over is the preferred method. Anticipating the behavior of the target is necessary to accurately place the shot).

14. If you work in terrain without any natural support, use your rucksack, sandbag, a forked stick, or you may build a field-expedient bipod or tripod. The most accurate position though is prone, with a sandbag supporting the stock, and the stock’s cheek-piece against the cheek.

15. The key to sniping is consistency, which applies to both the weapon and the shooter. While consistency does not necessarily ensure accuracy (which requires training), sniping cannot be accurately carried out without it. The need for consistency is highest when a sniper is firing the first shot against an enemy unaware of the sniper’s presence. At this point, high-priority targets such as snipers, officers and critical equipment are most prominent and can be more accurately targeted. Once the first shot has been fired, any surviving enemy will attempt to take cover or locate the sniper, and attacking strategic targets becomes more difficult or impossible.

5.6 Counter-sniper tactics

1. Active: direct observation by posts equipped with laser protective glasses and night vision devices; patrolling with military working dogs; calculating the trajectory; bullet triangulation; using decoys to lure a sniper; using another sniper; UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles); directing artillery or mortar fire onto suspected sniper positions, the use of smoke-screens; emplacing tripwire-operated munitions, mines, or other booby-traps near suspected sniper positions( you can improvise booby-traps by connecting trip-wires to fragmentation hand grenades, smoke grenades or flares. Even though these may not kill the sniper, they will reveal his location. Booby –traps devices should be placed close to likely sniper hides or along the probable routes used into and out of the sniper’s work area). If the squad is pinned down by sniper fire and still taking casualties, the order may be given to rush the sniper’s position. If the sniper is too far for a direct rush, a “rush to cover” can also be used. The squad may take casualties, but with many moving targets and a slow-firing rifle, the losses are usually small compared to holding position and being slowly picked off. If the sniper’s position is known, but direct retaliation is not possible, a pair of squads can move through concealment (cover) and drive the nipper toward the group containing the targets. This decreases the chances that the sniper will find a stealthy, quick escape route.

2. Passive: limited exposure of the personnel (use concealed routes, avoid plazas and intersections, stay away from doorways and windows, move along the side of the street and not down the center, move in the shadows, move dispersed, avoid lighted areas at night, move quickly across open areas, avoid wearing obvious badges of rank, adapt screens on windows, use armored vehicles); use Kevlar helmet and bulletproof vest.

3. Locating an enemy sniper

1. Recon by fire. If a few possible sniper positions are visible, the squad can offer limited fire into each while the sniper’s spotter watches for signs of retaliation. In situations with heavy cover, the friendly sniper can fire a tracer round into the location to direct heavier fire from the squad.

2. Mad minute. If there are too many possible positions for a recon by fire , each likely enemy position is assigned to one or more friendly soldiers, and upon receiving the signal, all simultaneously fire a specific number of rounds.

3. Reserve azimuth. If a sniper’s bullet enters a stationary object, inserting a straight rod into the hole can reveal both the direction and arc of the bullet, and can also be used to estimate range or elevation. This technique is risky without cover, as it often involves entering the sniper’s current field of fire.

4. Triangulation. Technique at two or more locations can identify more accurately identify the position of a sniper at the time of firing.

5. Sound delay (“crack-bang”). The enemy’s supersonic bullets produce a sonic boom, creating a “crack” sound as they pass by. If the enemy’s bullet speed is known, his range can be estimated by measuring the delay between the bullet’s passing and the sound of the rifle shot, then comparing it to a table of values. This is only effective at distances of up to 450 meters; beyond this, the delay continus to increase , but ar a rate too small for humans to accurately distinguish.

6. Decoys. As more shots are fired, the chances of locating or directly observing the enemy sniper increase. Decoys help to increase the number of shots without taking human losses, and may include attractive targets such as valuable (but unusable) equipment. Provocative signage (designed to offend /insult the sniper) may even work if an enemy sniper is unwise, aggressive, or does not know of the friendly presence in the area. Most trained snipers are specifically trained to take as few shots as possible, be patient and disciplined to circumvent this.

7. Detector. The sniper detector system , named Boomerang, can determine the bullet type, trajectory and point of fire of unknown shooter location. The system uses microphone sensors to detect both the muzzle blast and the sonic shock wave that emanate from a high-speed bullet. Sensors detect, classify, localize nd display the results on a map immediately after the shot.

　

Chapter 6. Military tricks

1. Use rapid dominance: technology + speed + information domination.

2. Use artillery preparation. It is the artillery fire delivered before an attack to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy’s defense and to disrupt communications and disorganize the enemy’s defense.

3. Use deception especially before the first strike (air strike + artillery). Deception plays a key part in offensive operations and has two objectives: the first objective is to weaken the local defense by drawing reserves to another part of the battlefield. This may be done by making a small force seem larger than it is. The second objective is to conceal the avenue of approach and timing of the main attack.

5. Imitate assault to make the enemy expose his positions and fire system.

6. Mines, mines, mines. There are four types of minefield : the tactical large-area minefield, usually laid by engineers, for tactical use on the battlefield(i.e. to canalize the enemy into killing areas); the protective minefield, the sort that you will plant in front of your position for defensive purposes; the nuisance minefield, designed to hamper and disrupt enemy movement ; and the dummy minefield – a wired off area suitably marked can be as effective as the real thing.

7. Don’t touch anything in the places the enemy just left — check for mines first. A minefield is a mortal surprise and you have to know how to breach and cross it: remove your helmet, rucksack, watch, belt, and anything else that may hinder movement or fall off, leave your rifle and equipment with another soldier in the team, get a wooden stick about 30 cm (12 in) long for a probe and sharpen one of the ends (do not use a metal probe), place the unsharpened end of the probe in the palm of one hand with your fingers extended and your thumb holding the probe, and probe every 5 cm (2 in) across a 1-meter area in front of you and push the probe gently into the ground at an angle less than 45 degrees, kneel (or lie down) and feel upward and forward with your free hand to find tripwires and pressure prongs before starting to probe, put enough pressure on the probe to sink it slowly into the ground and if the probe does not go into the ground, pick or chip the dirt away with the probe and remove it by hand, stop probing when a solid object is touched, remove enough dirt from around the object to find out what it is. If you found a mine, remove enough dirt around it to see what type of mine it is, mark it and report its exact location to your leader. Once a footpath has been probed and the mines marked, a security team should cross the minefield to secure the far side. After the far side is secure, the rest of the unit should cross.

8. Visual indicators. Pay attention to the following indicators : trip wires, signs of road repair (new fill or paving, road patches, ditching), dead animals, damaged vehicles, tracks that stop unexplainably, wires leading away from the side of the road (they may be firing wires that are partially buried), mounds of dirt, change of plants color,, pieces of wood or othr debris on a road. Remember, mined areas, like other obstacles are often covered by fire. Keep also in mind, that local civilians try to avoid certain (mined) areas.

9. Use phony minefields to simulate live minefields. For example, disturb the ground so that it appears that mines have been emplaced and mark boundaries with appropriate warnings.

10. Make a real minefield appear phony, or camouflage it. For example, once a real minefield is settled, a wheel or a specially made circular wooden tank track marker can be run through the field, leaving track or tire marks to lure the enemy onto live mines. Antipersonnel mines should not be sown in such a field until the track marks have been laid. Another method is to leave gaps in the mechanically laid field, run vehicles through the gaps, and then close them with hand-laid mines without disturbing the track marks.

11. Use feint attack to draw defensive action towards the point under assault (it’s usually used as a diversion and to force the enemy to concentrate more manpower in a given area so that the opposing force in another area is weaker).

12. Issue false orders over the radio, imitate a tanks’, fighters’ and bombers’ assault while preparing to retreat.

13. Use dummy units and installations, phony radio traffic, movement and suppressive fires in other areas timed to coincide with the real attack

14. Use force multiplication by using decoy vehicles and use small convoys to generate dust clouds. Move trucks into and out of the area giving it the appearance of being a storage facility or logistic base.

15. Simulate damage to induce the enemy to leave important targets alone. For example, ragged patterns can be painted on the walls and roof of a building with tar and coal dust, and covers placed over them.

16. Stack debris nearby and wire any unused portions for demolition. During an attack, covers are removed under cover of smoke generators, debris scattered and demolitions blown. Subsequent enemy air photography will disclose a building that is too badly damaged to be used.

17. Change positions at night time only.

18. Use dispersal to relocate and spread out forces to increase their chances of survival.

19. Imitate fake ballistic missiles divisions and military headquarters to entrap enemy’s intelligence and sabotage groups.

20. Use “sack” strategy (“cutting” enemy’s army into separate groups).

21. Use strategic bombing (the massive attack on cities, industries, lines of communication and supply).

22. Simulate bombing of minor objects and attack important ones.

23. Use counter-battery fire (detecting with counter-battery radars the source of incoming artillery shells and firing back), using mobile artillery pieces or vehicles with mounted rocket launchers to fire and then move before any counter-battery fire can land on the original position.

24. Use airborne operations, when helicopters transport troops into the battle and provide fire support at battle sites simultaneously with artillery fire, keeping enemy off guard.

25. Helicopters are extremely important as they can be sent everywhere: to kill tanks and other helicopters, for aerial mine laying, for electronic warfare, for naval operations (anti-submarine and anti-ship patrols), to correct artillery and tactical fighters fire, for reconnaissance, command, control and communications, to insert special forces, to evacuate casualties (this helps maintain the morale of the troops), to carry supplies (missile systems, ammunition, fuel food, to escort convoys, for navigational help, to destroy battlefield radars, communications and radio relay systems, to seal gaps and protect flanks, for rear-area security, counter — penetration, rapid reinforcement of troops under pressure, raids and assaults behind enemy lines, air assault in offensive and defensive operations, to strengthen anti-tank defenses by inserting infantry anti-tank teams. Helicopters offer a strong tactical surprise and take a ground conflict into the third dimension, making the enemy’s ground maneuvers impossible.

26. When fighting an insurgency: once you get intelligence, you have to bomb the area to “soften” insurgents and then send helicopters with special forces teams right away. Helicopters suppress and cut-off by fire insurgents trying to escape and the teams clear-up the remains. Transport helicopters must bring in troops rapidly from different bases and build-up numerically superior force which insurgents cannot match.

27. Use joint bombers/fighters flights to bomb transportation, supply, bridges, railroads, highways, antiaircraft and radar sites. To gain surprise , attack with the sun behind you. Remember, enemy will try to saturate the airspace through which the aircraft will fly with fire.

28. Watch out for tank ambushes!

Chapter 7 Storming the City

7.1 Procedure

1. Effective intelligence is 90% of success. Use sources like agents among the enemy’s high ranking officers, prisoners of war, captured documents and maps, enemy’s activity, local civilians (agents). Use intelligence and sabotage groups (through them you can deliver your fake plans and maps). You must know how the enemy usually defends a built-up area and the approaches to it, critical objectives within the built-up area that provide decisive tactical advantages, tactical characteristics of the built-up area and its structure. Information about the population will assist in determining where to attack, what firepower restrictions may be imposed, and what areas within the urban complex must be avoided to minimize destruction of life-support facilities and civilian casualties.

2. Make the enemy attack you if possible, because if you attack first the victims calculation is 5:1.

3. Train your troops to storm this certain city.

4. Blockade the city completely.

5. Attack the city from different points ( flanks and rear !) at the same time after intense artillery fire and bombing (that’s a very strong psychological blow. Its intensity is determined by the strength of defensive forces, the type of building construction, and the density of fires required to suppress observation and fires. You must destroy command posts, heavy weapons positions, communications, troop emplacements, tall structures that permit observation. Then engineers move forward under the cover of smoke and high explosives to neutralize barriers and breach minefields on routes into the city). Field artillery, attack helicopters and offense air support must disrupt the enemy command and control network and destroy his support units ( field artillery mostly creates breaches in buildings, walls and barricades. Mortars cover avenues of enemy troop movements, such as street intersections and alleys; mortars firing positions are placed behind walls or inside buildings close to their targets). A hasty attack is conducted when the enemy has not established strong defensive positions and attacking forces can exploit maneuver to overwhelm the defense – locate a weak spot or gap in enemy defenses, fix forward enemy elements, rapidly move through or around the gap or weak spot to be exploited. A deliberate attack is necessary when enemy defenses are extremely prepared, when the urban obstacle is extremely large or severely congested., or when the advantage of surprise has been lost. It’s divided into three basic phases: isolation from reinforcement and resupply by securing dominating terrain and utilizing direct and indirect fires; assault to rupture the defenses and secure a foothold on the perimeter of the built-up area from which attacks to clear the area may be launched (an envelopment, assaulting defensive weaknesses on the flanks or rear of the built-up area, is preferred, however , a penetration may be required; and clearance , a systematic building-by-building, block-by-block advance through the entire area..

6. Target vital bridges, transportation facilities that are required to sustain future combat operations, strategic industrial or vital communications facilities. Attacks against built-up areas will be avoided when the area is not required to support future operations, bypassing is tactically feasible, the built-up area has been declared an “open city” to preclude civilian casualties or to preserve cultural or historical facilities, sufficient combat forces are not available to seize and clear the built-up area.

7. Don’t use tanks on narrow streets ! Tanks can be decisive in city fighting, with the ability to demolish walls and fire medium and heavy machine guns in several directions simultaneously. However, tanks are especially vulnerable in urban combat. It’s much easier for enemy infantry to sneak behind a tank or fire at its sides, where it is vulnerable. In addition, firing down from multi-story buildings allows shots at the soft upper turret armor and even basic weapons like Molotov cocktails, if aimed at the engine air intakes, can disable a tank.

8. Use 3 groups at each point.

1st. A “dead” group plus tanks moves fast to the center, again, after intense artillery fire and bombing (otherwise you’ll have heavy casualties).

2nd. The group follows the first one and inside the city goes like a “fan” in all directions enveloping the defender’s flanks and rear.

3rd. The group is on reserve in case the enemy counterattacks.

The first phase of the attack should be conducted when visibility is poor. Troops can exploit poor visibility to cross open areas, gain access to rooftops, infiltrate enemy areas and gain a foothold. If the attack must be made when visibility is good, units should consider using smoke to conceal movement. The formation used in attack depends on the width and depth of the zone to be cleared, the character of the area, anticipated enemy resistance, and the formation adopted by the next higher command. Lead companies may have engineers attached for immediate support. Tasks given to engineers may include preparing and using explosives to breach walls and obstacles, finding and exploding mines in place or helping remove them, clearing barricades and rubble, cratering roads.

9. Use paratroopers to capture important objects (airport, government buildings, military headquarters, port, railway station).

10. Capture high buildings and place machine gunners and snipers on upper floors (buildings provide excellent sniping posts for defenders, too).

11. Get all important cross-roads to maneuver troops and tanks.

12. Block highways!

13. Watch out — there are mines everywhere (alleys and rubble-filled streets are ideal for planting booby traps). Be alert for boobytraps in doors, windows, halls, stairs, and concealed in furniture.

14. Watch underground communications — the enemy could stay in subway tunnels, sewage system.

15. Don’t waste time storming the buildings — blow up the walls and move forward.

16. Soldiers in an urban environment are faced with ground direct fire danger in three dimensions — not just all-round fire but also from above (multi-story buildings) and from below (sewers and subways) and that’s why, here, the most survivable systems, like tanks, are at great risk. Also, there are increased casualties because of shattered glass, falling debris, rubble, ricochets, urban fires and falls from heights. Difficulty in maintaining situational awareness also contributes to this problem because of increased risk of fratricide. Stress-related casualties and non-battle injuries resulting from illnesses or environmental hazards, such as contaminated water, toxic industrial materials also increase the number of casualties.

17. In the streets use artillery and mortars to “soften” the enemy up before assault.

7.2 House clearing.

Don’t spare your grenades (avoid throwing grenades at upper windows or upstairs; they may bounce back), move fast from room to room. Machinegunners from outside have to help the assault group with intense fire on upper floors. The assault group always has to enter from the top floor. Shoot ceilings and floors, furniture and other hiding places. Avoid stairways whenever possible. Use flame weapons.

7.3 Seizure of a bridge.

1. Clear the near bank. The first step in seizing the bridge is to clear the buildings on the clear bank that overwatch the bridge and the terrain on the far side. The commander must find out which buildings dominate the approaches to the bridge. Buildings that permit him to anti-tank weapons, machine guns and riflemen are cleared while supporting fire prevents the enemy from reinforcing his troops on the fart bank and keeps enemy demolition parties away from the bridge.

2. Suppress. You have to suppress enemy weapons on the far bank with direct and indirect fire (tanks, TOWs and machine guns). In suppressing the enemy’s positions on the far bank , priority is given to those positions from which the enemy can fire directly down the bridge. Use screening smoke to limit enemy observation.

3. Assault. Seize a bridgehead (buildings that overwatch and dominate the bridge) on the far bank by an assault across the bridge. The objectives of the assaulting platoons are buildings that dominate the approaches to the bridge on the far side. One or two platoons assault across the bridge using all available cover while concealed by smoke. In addition to a frontal assault across the bridge, other routes should be considered. They are supported by the rest of the company and any attached forces. Once on the other side, they call for the shifting of supporting fire and start clearing buildings. When the first buildings are cleared, supporting fire is lifted and/or shifted again and the assault continues until all the buildings in the objective area are cleared.

4. Clear the bridge. Secure a perimeter around the bridge so that the engineers can clear any obstacles and remove demolitions from the bridge. The company commander may expend his perimeter to prepare for counterattack. Once the bridge is cleared, tanks and other support vehicles are brought across to the far bank.

7.4 Seizure of a traffic circle.

A company may have to seize a traffic circle either to secure it for friendly use or to deny it top the enemy. This operation consists of seizing and clearing the buildings that control their traffic circle, and bringing direct-fire weapons into position to cover it.

 

7.5 Search.

You are not done even if the storm was a success, because right away you have to search the houses and buildings in the following way: divide the area to be searched into zones, and assign a search team to each. A team usually consists of a search element (to conduct the search), a security element (to encircle the area) and a reserve area (to assist, as required). Then search the buildings, underground and underwater areas using mine detectors. And it’s necessary to establish checkpoints and roadblocks around the area.

Building clearing assault team.

The direction each man moves in should not be preplanned unless the exact room layout is known. Each man should go in a direction opposite the man in front of him. Every team member must know the sectors and duties of erach position. The first man (rifleman) enters the room and eliminates the immediate threat. He has the option of going left or right, normally moving along the path of least resistance to one of two corners. When using a doorway as the point of entry, the path of least resistance is determined initially based on the way the door opens; if the door opens inward he plans to move away from the hinges. If the door opens outward, he plans to move toward the hinged side. Upon entering, the size of the room, enemy situation, and furniture or other obstacles that hinder or channel movement become factors that influence the number 1 soldier’s direction of movement. As the first man goes through the entry point, he can usually see into the far corner of the room. He eliminates any immediate threat and continues to move along the wall if possible and to the first corner, where he assumes a position of domination facing into the room.

The second man (team leader), entering almost simultaneously with the first, moves in the opposite direction, following the wall and staying out of the center. The second man must clear the entry point, clear the immediate threat area, clear his corner, and move to a dominating position on his side of the room.

The third man (grenadier) simply goes opposite of the second man inside the room at least one meter from the entry point and moves to a position that dominates his sector.

The fourth man (SAW gunner) moves opposite of the third man and moves to a position that dominates his sector.

Stairwells and staircases are comparable to doorways in that they create a fatal funnel; however, the danger is intensified by the three-dimensional aspect of additional landings. The ability of the squad or team to conduct the movement depends upon which direction they are travelling and the layout of the stairs. The clearing technique follows a basic format: the squad leader designates an assault element to clear the stairs; the squad or team maintains 360-degree, three-dimensional security in the vicinity of the stairs; the squad leader then directs the assault team to locate, mark, bypass and clear any obstacles or booby traps that may be blocking access to the stairs.; the assault element moves up (or down) the stairways by using either the two-, three-, or four-man flow technique, providing overwatch up and down the stairs while moving.

7.6 How to move and how to fire

Moving from building to building or between buildings present a problem to units conductive offensive operations. Most casualties can be expected during movement from building to building and down streets. You must consider which buildings must be isolated, suppressed and obscured, as well as using armored assets as shields for maneuver elements. In movement down narrow streets, or down wider streets with narrow paths through the debris, infantry should move ahead of tanks, clearing the buildings on each side. Personnel movement across open areas must be planned with specific destination in mind. Street intersections should be avoided, since they are normally used as engagement areas. Suppression of enemy positions and smoke to cover infantry movement should also be included in the fire support plan. When needed, tanks move up to places secured by the infantry to hit suitable targets. When an area is cleared, the infantry again moves forward to clear the next area. Tanks and infantry should use the traveling overwatch movement technique and communicate with tank crews by using arm-and-hand signals and radio. For movement down wider streets, infantry platoons normally have a section of attached tanks with one tank on each side of the street. Single tanks should not be employed. Other tanks of the attached tank platoon should move behind the infantry and fire at targets in upper stories of the buildings. In wide boulevards, you can employ a tank platoon secured by one or more infantry platoons. The infantry can secure the forward movement of the lead tanks, while the trailing tanks overwatch the movement of the lead units. Tanks may drive inside buildings or behind walls for protection from enemy antitank missile fire where feasible. Buildings are cleared by the infantry first. Ground floors are checked to ensure they support the tank and there is no basement into which tank could fall. When moving, all bridges and overpasses are checked for mines, booby traps and load capacity.

When moving from position to position, each soldier must be ready to cover the movement of other members of his fire team or squad. He must use his new position effectively and fire his weapon from either shoulder depending on the position. The most common errors a soldier makes when firing from a position are firing over the top of his cover and silhouetting himself against the building to his rear. Both provide the enemy an easy target. The correct technique for firing from a covered position is to fire around the side of the cover, which reduces exposure to the enemy. Another common error is for a right-handed shooter to fire from the right shoulder around the left corner of a building. Firing left-handed around the left corner of a building takes advantage of the corner afforded by the building. Right-handed and left-handed soldiers should be trained to adapt cover and concealment to fit their manual orientation. A common mistake when firing around corners is a firing from the standing position. You expose yourself at the height the enemy would expect a target to appear. When firing from behind the walls, you must fire around cover and not over it.

In an urban area , windows provide convenient firing ports. Avoid firing from the standing position since it exposes most of the body to return fire from the enemy and could silhouette you against a light-colored interior beyond the window. This is an obvious sign of the soldier’s position, especially at night when the muzzle flash can easily be observed. In using the proper method of firing from a window, be well back into the room and kneel to limit exposure. When no cover is available, reduce exposure by firing from the prone position, from shadows and by presenting no silhouette against buildings.

The area around a corner must be observed before you move. The most common mistake is allowing your weapon to extend beyond the corner exposing your position (flagging the weapon). A special clearing technique is used when speed is required (the pie-ing method) – this procedure is done by aiming the weapon beyond the corner into the direction of travel (without flagging) and side-stepping around the corner in a circular fashion with the muzzle as the pivot point.

Doorways should not be used as entrances or exits since they are normally covered by enemy fire. If you must use a doorway as an exit, you should move quickly to your next position, staying as low as possible to avoid silhouetting yourself. Pre-selection of positions, speed, a low silhouette and the use of covering fires must be emphasized in exiting doorways.

Use double tap – it is a shooting technique where two shots are fired quickly at the same target. In the double tap technique, after the first round is fired, the trigger is quickly pulled again while maintaining the same point of aim. Ideally, both rounds should strike anywhere within the centre of the target, causing two sites of trauma and maximizing shock. The technique is meant to both impose restraint and fire control on the users of any weapon while maximizing the potential of both hitting and incapacitating the target. Extensive tests show that after the third round of sustained fire, accuracy drops off sharply, as aim is thrown off by gun recoil. Using the double tap technique maintains target accuracy without wasting ammunition and decreases the probability of damage to non-targets. Furthermore, since single rounds tend to have poor terminal ballistics characteristics, a pair of bullets traversing through a target in close track (eg. the double tap) increases the probability of incapacitating a target. Also, since the center of mass is the most desirable target for a sidearm, firing two rounds helps compensate for the possibility that the first round might be deflected by heavy bone or miss a vital organ. Against armored targets, the double-tap is sometimes the only way to penetrate armored protection. While appropriate soft armor can stop almost any pistol-caliber round once, two rounds impcting the same spot will almost certainly penetrate the armor. Likewise with hard armor, two rounds from a higher-powered weapon stand a much better chance of penetrating the armor if the rounds strike closely.

7.7 Reasons for not-defending urban areas

1.The location of the urban area does not support the overall defensive plan. If the urban area is too far forward or back in a unit’s defensive sector, is isolated, or is not astride an enemy’s expected avenue of approach , the commander may choose not to defend it

2.Nearby terrain allows the enemy to bypass on covered or uncovered routes. Some urban areas, mainly smaller ones, are bypassed by main road and highway systems.

3. Structures within the urban area do not adequately protect the defenders. Extensive areas of lightly built or flammable structures offer little protection. Urban areas near flammable or hazardous industrial areas, such as refineries or chemical plants, should not be defended because of increased danger of fire to the defenders.

4. Dominating terrain is close to the urban area. If the urban area can be dominated by an enemy force occupying this terrain, the commander may choose to defend from there rather than the urban area. This applies mainly to small urban areas such as village.

5. Better fields of fire exist outside the urban area. The commander may choose to base all or part of his defense on long-range fields of fire outside an urban area. This applies mainly to armor-heavy forces defending sectors with multiple, small urban areas surrounded by open terrain, such as agricultural areas with villages.

6. The urban area has cultural, religious or historical significance. The area may have been declared an “open city” in which case by international law, it is demilitarized and must be neither defended nor attacked. The attacking force must assume civil administrative control and treat the civilians as noncombatants in an occupied country. The defender must immediately evacuate and cannot arm the civilian population. A city can be declared open only before it is attacked. The presence of large numbers of noncombatants, hospitals or wounded personnel may also affect the commander’s decision not to defend an urban area.

7.8 Reasons for defending urban areas

1. Certain urban areas contain strategic industrial, transportation or economic complexes that must be defended. Capital and cultural centers may be defended for strictly psychological or national morale purposes even when they do not offer a tactical advantage to the defender. Because of the sprawl of such areas, significant combat power is required for their defense. The decision to defend these complexes is made by political authorities or the theatre commander.

2. The defender’s need to shift and concentrate combat power, and to move large amounts of supplies over a wide battle area may require retention of vital transportation centers. Since most transportation centers serve large areas, the commander must defend the urban area to control such centers.

3. Most avenues of approach are straddled by small towns every few kilometers and must be controlled by defending forces. These areas can be used as battle positions or strongpoints. Blocked streets covered by mortar and/or artillery fire can canalize attacking armor into mined areas or zones covered by anti-armor fire. If an attacker tries to bypass an urban area, he may encounter an array of tank-killing weapons. To clear such an area, the attacker must sacrifice speed and momentum, and expend many resources. A city or town can easily become a major obstacle.

4. Aerial photography, imagery and sensory devices cannot detect forces deployed in cities.

Chapter 8. Special forces.

 

Maximum damage, minimum loss.

8.1 Special military operations have special requirements.

1. Detailed planning and coordination that allow the special unit to discern and exploit the enemy’s weakness while avoiding its strength.

2. Decentralized execution, individual and unit initiative.

3. Surprise, achieved through the unit’s ability to move by uncommon means, along unexpected routes, over rough terrain, during poor weather and reduced visibility. Survivability, achieved by rapid mission accomplishment and a prompt departure from the objective area.

4. Mobility, speed, and violence of execution (the speed at which events take place confuses and deceives the enemy as to the intent of the unit, and forces the enemy to react rather than to take the initiative).

5. Shock effect, which is a psychological advantage achieved by the combining of speed and violence. The special unit strives to apply its full combat power at he decisive time and place, and at the point of the greatest enemy weakness.

6. Multiple methods of insertion and attack, trying not to repeat operations thus decreasing the chance the enemy will detect a pattern. Deception, achieved by feints, false insertions, electronic countermeasures, and dummy transmissions.

7. Audacity, achieved by a willingness to accept a risk.

Any special team member has to have experience in sniping, underwater swimming, conducting high-altitude, low-opening parachute operations, demolition, using all kinds of weapons, including man-portable air-defense system weapons. And there are some limitations, like limited capability against armored or motorized units in open terrain and no casualty evacuation capability.

8.2 Use special forces for:

a) establishing a credible American presence in any part of the world

b) conducting limited combat operations under conditions of chemical, nuclear or biological contamination

c) surveillance and intelligence gathering using recruited agents too (local citizens who support your war or just work for money). To get to the area you have to use infiltration, the movement into the territory occupied by enemy troops, the contact is avoided.

d) raids on the enemy’s defense system

Raids are normally conducted in the following phases: the team inserts or infiltrates into the objective area; the objective area is sealed off from outside support or reinforcement, to include the enemy air threat; any enemy force at or near the objective is overcome by surprise and violent attack, using all available firepower for shock effect; the mission is accomplished quickly before any surviving enemy can recover or be reinforced; the ranger force quickly withdraws from the objective area and is extracted. (The team can land on or near the objective and seize it before the enemy can react. Thus you avoid forced marches over land carrying heavy combat loads. If there is no suitable landing area near the objective, or the enemy has a strong reaction force nearby, the team has to land unseen far from the objective. It then assembles and moves to the objective).

e) ambush.

Depending on terrain ambushes are divided into near (less than 50 meters, in jungle or heavy woods) and far (beyond 50 meters, in open terrain).

Raids consist of clandestine insertion, brief violent combat, rapid disengagement, swift deceptive withdrawal. The raid is used mostly to destroy command posts, communication centers and supply dumps, shipyards, electrical generation facilities, water pumping stations, phone lines, oil or natural gas pipelines, radio and TV stations, mountain passes or routes in restricted terrain, capture supplies and personnel, rescue friendly forces, distract attention from other operations, steal plans and code books, rescue prisoners of war, create havoc in the enemy’s rear areas, blow railroads and bridges. By blowing bridges you block and delay the movement of personnel and supplies and by making railroads and certain routes temporary useless you change enemy’s movement on to a small number of major roads and railway lines where it is more vulnerable to attack by other forces (especially air strikes).

Stages of an ambush:

1. Planning. You have to identify a suitable killing zone (a place where the ambush will be laid). It’s a place where enemy units are expected to pass and which gives reasonable cover for the deployment execution and extraction phases of the ambush patrol. Ambush includes 3 main elements: surprise, coordinated fire of all weapons to isolate the killing zone and to inflict maximum damage and control (early warning of target approach, opening fire at the proper time, timely and orderly withdrawal). You can also plan a mechanical ambush, which consists of the mines set in series. Preparation. You have to deploy into the area covertly, preferably at night and establish secure and covert positions overlooking the killing zone. Then you send two or more cut off groups a short distance from the main ambushing group into similarly covert positions — they have to give you early warning of approaching enemy by radio and, when the ambush is initiated, to prevent any enemy from escaping. Another group will cover the rear of the ambush position and thus give all-round defense to the ambush patrol. No smoking! Attention: you have to occupy the ambush site as late as possible — this reduces the risk of discovery. (While choosing and ambush site pay attention to natural cover and concealment for your team, routes of entry and withdrawal, good observation and fields of fire, harmless-looking terrain, few enemy escape routes, terrain that will canalize enemy into the killing zone, and natural obstacles to keep him there).

2. Execution. You must give a clear instruction for initiating the ambush. It should be initiated with a mass casualty producing weapon (mortars and machine guns) to produce a maximum shock effect and break the enemy’s spirit to fight back (shock effect can cover unexpected defects in ambush, like ambushing a much larger force that expected). Then, after the firefight has been won, the ambush patrol has to clear the zone by checking bodies for intelligence and taking prisoners. After that you have to leave the area as soon as possible, by a pre-determined route.

3. Disruption of the government functions: recruitment of informants; terror and murders of political leaders and federal and local government chiefs, provoking strikes and mass disobedience; publishing illegal newspapers and literature; anti-government propaganda through illegal radio stations; involving locals in the guerrilla campaign.

4.Counter-guerrilla.

Chapter 9. Guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla warfare is the unconventional warfare and combat with which a small group use mobile tactics (ambushes, raids, etc) to fight a larger and less mobile regular army. THIS IS ABSOLUTELY WRONG – they sabotage the rear ! Same mistake Soviet guerrillas did during World War II , though Chechnya is an example.

Guerrilla tactics are based on intelligence , ambush, deception, sabotage, undermining an authority through long, low-intensity confrontation. A guerrilla army may increase the cost of maintaining an occupation above what the foreign power may wish to bear. Against a local regime, the guerrillas may make governance impossible with terror strikes and sabotage, and even combination of forces to depose their local enemies in conventional battle. These tactics are useful in demoralizing an enemy, while raising the morale of the guerrillas. In many cases, a small force holds off a much larger and better equipped army for a long time, as in Russia’s Second Chechen War.

Guerrilla operations include attacks on transportation routes, individual groups of police and military, installations and structures, economic enterprises and targeted civilians, politicians included. Attacking in small groups, using camouflage and captured weapons of that enemy, the guerrilla force can constantly keep pressure on its foes and diminish its numbers, while still allowing escape with relatively few casualties. The intention of such attacks is not only military but political, aiming to demoralize target populations or governments, or goading an overreaction that forces the population to take sides for or against the guerrillas. Ambushes on key transportation routes are a hallmark of guerrilla operations, causing both economic and political disruption.

Whatever the particular tactics used, the guerrillas primarily fight to preserve his forces and political support, not capture or hold specific territory as a conventional force would.

Guerrilla warfare resembles rebellion, yet it is a different concept. Guerrilla organization ranges from small, local, rebel groups of a few dozen guerrillas , to thousands of fighters, deploying from cells to regiments. In most cases, the leaders have clear political aims for the warfare they wage. Typically, the organization has political and military wings, to allow the political leaders “plausible denial” for military attacks. Guerrillas operate with a smaller logistical footprint compared to conventional formations. A primary consideration is to avoid dependence on fixed bases and depots which are comparatively easy for conventional units to locate and destroy. Mobility and speed are the keys and wherever possible, the guerrilla must live off the land, or draw support from the civilian population in which he is embedded. Financing of operations ranges from direct individual contributions (voluntary or not), and actual operation of business enterprises by insurgent operatives, to bank robberies, kidnappings and complex financial networks based on kin, ethnic and religious affiliation (such as used by Jihad organizations). Permanent and semi-permanent bases form part of the guerilla logistical structure, usually located in remote areas or in cross-border sanctuaries sheltered by friendly regimes.

Guerrilla warfare is often associated with a rural setting (mujahedeen and Taliban in Afghanistan, the Contras of Nicaragua). Guerrillas however successfully operate in urban settings (as in Jerusalem, Israel or Baghdad, Iraq). Rural guerrillas prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of cover and concealment, especially heavily forested and mountainous areas. Urban guerrillas blend into the population and are also dependent on a support base among the people.

Intelligence is very important; collaborators and sympathizers will usually provide a steady flow of information.

Public sources of information and Internet serve very well, too. Intelligence is concerned also with political factors such as occurrence of an election or the impact of the potential operation on civilian and enemy morale.

Able to choose the time and place to strike, guerrillas possess the tactical initiative. Many guerrilla strikes are not undertaken unless clear numerical superiority can be achieved in the target area. Individual suicide bomb attacks offer another pattern, involving only one individual bomber and his support team. Whatever approach is, guerrillas hold the initiative and can prolong their survival through varying the intensity of combat. This means that attacks are spread out over quite a range of time, from weeks to years. During interim periods, the guerrilla can rebuild, resupply, train, provide propaganda indoctrination, gather intelligence, infiltrate into army, police, political parties and community organizations,

Relationships with civil population are influenced by whether the guerrillas operate among a hostile or friendly population. A friendly population is of huge importance to guerrillas, providing shelter, supplies, financing, intelligence and recruits. Popular mass support in a confined local area or country however is not always strictly necessary. Guerrillas can still operate using the protection of a friendly regime, drawing supplies, weapons, intelligence, local security and diplomatic cover. The Al-Qaeda is an example of the latter type, drawing sympathizers and support primarily from the wide-ranging Arab world.

Foreign support (soldiers, weapons, sanctuary or statements of sympathy for the guerrillas can greatly increase the chances of an insurgent victory. Foreign diplomatic support may bring the guerrilla cause to international attention, putting pressure on local opponents to make concessions, or garnering sympathetic support and material assistance. Foreign sanctuaries can add heavily to guerrilla chances, furnishing weapons, supplies, materials and training bases. Such shelter can benefit from international law, particularly if the sponsoring government is successful in concealing its support and in claiming “plausible denial” for attacks by operatives based on its territory. Al-Qaeda , for example, made effective use of remote territories, such as Afghanistan under the Taliban regime , to plan and execute its operations.

Terror is used by guerrillas to focus international attention on the guerrilla cause, kill opposition leaders, extort money from targets, intimidate the general population, create economic losses, and keep followers and potential defectors in line. Such tactics may backfire and cause the civil population to withdraw its support, or to back countervailing forces against the guerrillas. Such situations occurred in Israel, where suicide bombings encouraged most Israeli opinion to take a harsh stand against Palestinian attackers, including general approval of “targeted killings” to kill enemy cells and leaders. Civilians may be attacked or killed for alleged collaboration, or as a policy of intimidation and coercion – operations are sanctioned by the guerrilla leaders if they see a political benefit. Attacks may be aimed to weaken civilian morale so that support for the guerrilla opponents decreases. The use of attacks against civilians to create atmosphere of chaos ( and thus political advantage where the atmosphere causes foreign occupiers to withdraw or offer concessions), is well established in guerrilla and national liberation struggles.

Examples of successful guerrilla warfare against a native regime include the Cuban Revolution, Chinese Civil War, Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua. Many coups and rebellions in Africa reflect guerrilla warfare, with various groups having clear political objectives and using the above mentioned tactics (Uganda, Liberia). In Asia, native or local regimes have been overthrown by guerrilla warfare (Vietnam, China, Cambodia). Unsuccessful examples include Portuguese Africa (Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau), Malaysia (then Malaya), Bolivia, Argentina and the Philippines. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, fighting for an independent homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka, achieved significant military successes against the Sri Lankan military and the government itself for twenty years. It was even able to use these tactics effectively against the peace keeping force sent by India .

 

INSURGENCY

1.Leadership

Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, guidance, coordination and organizational coherence. The leaders of the insurgency must make their cause known to people. They must gain popular support, and their key tasks are to break the ties between the people and the government and to establish their movement’s credibility. They must replace the government’s legitimacy with that of their own. Their education, background, family, social connections and experience shape how they think, what they want , and how they fulfill their goals. Leadership is both a function of organization and of personality. Some organizations de-emphasize individual personalities and provide mechanisms for rebundancy and replacement in decision making; these mechanisms produce collective power and do not depend on specific leaders or personalities to be effective. They are easier to penetrate but more resilient to change. Other organizations may depend on a charismatic personality to provide cohesion, motivation, and a rallying point for the movement. Leadership organized in this way can produce decisions and initiate new actions rapidly, nut it is vulnerable to disruption if key personalities are removed or co-opted.

2. Ideology.

To win, insurgency must have a program that justifies its actions and explains what is wrong with society. It must promise great improvement after the government is overthrown. Ideology guides the insurgents in offering society a goal. The insurgents often express this goal in simple terms for ease of focus. The insurgent leader can use ideology to justify the use of violence and extralegal action in challenging the current social order, and to form a framework of the program for the future. Ideology identifies those sectors of society which the insurgency targets. Ideology may suggest probable objectives and tactics. It greatly influences the insurgent’s perception of his environment. The combination of the insurgent’s ideology and his perception of his environment shapes the movement’s organizational and operational methods.

3.Objectives.

The strategic objective is the insurgent’s desired end state – that is , how the insurgent will use power once he has it.

Operational objectives are those which the insurgents pursue as part of the overall process of destroying government legitimacy and progressively establishing their desired end state. The following are examples of operational objectives:

-isolation of the government from diplomatic and material support, and increased international support for the insurgency

-destruction of the self-confidence of the government’s leaders, cadre and armed forces, causing them to abdicate or withdraw

-establishment of civil cervices and administration ion areas under insurgent control

-capture of the support (or neutrality) of critical segments of the population

Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts, for example, the dissemination of a psychological operation product or the attack and seizure of a key facility. These actions accomplish tactical objectives which lead to operational goals.

4.External support.

There are four types of external support:

- moral – acknowledgement of the insurgent cause as just and admirable

- political – active promotion of the insurgents strategic goals in international forums

- resources – money, weapons, food, advisors, training

- sanctuary – secure training, operational and logistic bases

5.Organizational and operational patterns.

a)Subversive.

Subversive insurgents penetrate the political structure to control it and use it for their own purposes. They seek elective and appointed offices. They employ violence selectively to coerce voters, intimidate officials, disrupt and discredit the government. Violence shows the system is incompetent. It may also provoke the government to an excessively violent response which further undermines its legitimacy. A subversive insurgency most often appears in a permissive political environment in which insurgents can use both legal and illegal methods. The typical subversive organization consists of a legal party supported by a clandestine element operating outside the law. Subversive insurgencies can quickly shift to the “critical-cell” pattern when conditions dictate. The Nazi rise to power in the 1930s is an example of this model. Subversive insurgencies primarily present a problem for police and counter-intelligence.

b)Critical-cell.

In the critical-cell, the insurgents also infiltrate government institutions. Their object is to destroy system from within. The “moles” operate both covertly and overtly. Normally, the insurgents do not reveal their affiliation or program. They seek to undermine institutional legitimacy and convince or coerce others to assist them. Their violence remains covert until the institutions are so weakened that the insurgency’s superior organization seizes power, supported by armed force. The Russian October, 1917 revolution followed this pattern.

There are variations of the critical-cell pattern, too. The first is the co-opting of an essentially leaderless, mass popular revolution. The Sandinistas’ takeover of the Nicaraguan revolution is a case of point. The insurgent leadership permits the popular revolution to destroy the existing government. The insurgent movement then emerges, activating its cells to guide reconstruction under its direction. It provides a disciplined structure to control the former bureaucracy. The mass popular revolution then coalesces around the structure.

A second variation of the critical-cell pattern is the foco (or Cuban model) insurgency. A foco is a single, armed cell which emerges from hidden strong holds in an atmosphere of disintegrating legitimacy. In theory, this cell is the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents erect new institutions and establish control on the basis of that support. The foco insurgencies are often made up predominantly of guerrilla fighters operating initially from remote enclaves. The Cuban revolution occurred in this manner. The Cuban experience spawned over 200 subsequent imitative revolutionary attempts patterned on it, principally in Latin America and Africa – they all failed, but that does not discredit foco theory. It does emphasize the importance of a particular set of circumstances to this model. Legitimacy must be near total collapse, timing is critical. The Nicaraguan insurgency for example, combined the foco with a broad-front political coalition.

c)Mass oriented.

The mass-oriented insurgency aims to achieve the political and armed mobilization of a large popular movement. They emphasize creating a political and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. They challenge that system and then destroy or supplant it. These insurgents patiently build a large armed force of regular and irregular guerrillas. They also construct a base of active and passive political supporters. They plan a protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the governments and its institutions from the outside. They organize in detail. Their political leadership normally is distinct from their military leadership. Their movement establishes a rival government which openly proclaims its own legitimacy. They have a well-developed ideology and decide on their own objectives only after careful analysis. Highly organized and using propaganda and guerrilla action, they mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the government. Once established, mass-oriented insurgencies are extremely resilient because of their great depth of organization. Examples of this model include the communist revolution in China, the Vietcong insurgency, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru.

d)Traditional.

The traditional insurgency normally grows from very specific grievances and initially has limited aims. It springs from tribal, radical, religious or other similarly identifiable groups. These insurgents perceive that the government has denied the rights and interests of their group and work to establish or restore them. The frequently seek withdrawal from government control through autonomy or semi-autonomy. They seldom seek specifically to overthrow the government or to control the whole society. They generally respond in kind to government violence. Their use of violence can range from strikes and street demonstrations to terrorism or guerrilla warfare. These insurgencies may cease if the government accedes to the insurgents’ demands. The concessions of insurgents’ demands , however, are usually so great that the government concedes its legitimacy along with them. Examples of this model include the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the Ibo revolt in Nigeria (Biafra), the Tami separatists in Sri Lanka.

No insurgency follows one pattern exclusively.

Typical missions which guerrillas conduct to accomplish their goals include: destroying or damaging vital installations, equipment or supplies; capturing supplies, equipment, or key governmental or military personnel; diverting government forces from other operations; creating confusion and weakening government morale. Remember: guerrilla is a political war, and asymmetric warfare.

Guerrillas are not normally organized or equipped for stand-and-fight type defensive operations. They prefer to defend themselves by moving, by dispersing into small groups, or by diverting the opponent’s attention while they withdraw. Whenever possible, these operations are accomplished by offensive operations against the opponent’s flank or rear. One of the most important needs of guerrilla forces is support, which can come from different sources — food can be stolen or supplied by political sympathizers, weapons can be gathered from raids on government installations or provided by a foreign power (as well as secret training and indoctrination).

Guerrillas strength:

- highly motivated leadership and simple organization.The basic guerrilla organization is an independent three- to five-men cell. The cells can be brought together for larger operations and dispersed later. Guerrillas are organized into cells for two reasons: first, it’s security, second, it’s for support (guerrillas must live off the land to a large degree, and small cells easier support themselves).

- strong belief in a political, religious, or social cause (most of them are fanatics)

- ability to blend with local population and perfect knowledge of environment

- strong discipline

- effective intelligence through penetration into the government agencies

- limited responsibilities (the guerrillas usually don’t have the responsibility to maintain normal governmental obligations toward society)

- the ability to utilize a broad range of tactics, from terror and sabotage through conventional warfare. They don’t hesitate to use bombings, kidnappings, murders, torture, blackmail to press local authorities or provoke overreaction on the part of the government forces, so that the population will be alienated by the government forces actions (it happens when they target government leaders). In cities guerrillas can disrupt public utilities and services by sabotage and the government may lose control of the situation; they can widely use snipers and explosives there. They can generate widespread disturbances, attack government offices, create incidents or massing crowds in order to lure the government forces into a trap.

- mobility. Guerrillas usually disperse during their movements and unite near the target area. The most common techniques employed by them are the ambush, raid and small-scale attacks against security posts, small forces, facilities and lines of communication, using mining, booby trapping and sniping. Targets are selected by the guerrilla based on an analysis of how much the elimination of the target will disrupt the government, what the effect on the populace will be, the risk of being killed or captured, and the amount of weapons or supplies which can be used (this analysis calls for timely intelligence, which is gained by active patrolling).

Guerrilla Weaknesses:

- mental and physical stress, caused by long periods of isolation in an unstable environment

- fear of criminal prosecution by the government, or of reprisals against friends and family

- feeling of numerical and technological inferiority of counter-guerrilla forces

- limited personnel and resources, and uncertain public base of support

- security problems about their base camps (they are usually not more than one day march from a village or town). If guerrillas receive support from external sources, they are faced with a problem of security for supply lines, transport means and storage facilities. Besides, you have to know their organization and plans, resources (arms, ammunition, food and medicine supply), leaders and their personalities, lines of communications, relations with civilian population, vulnerabilities. (Again, recruit, recruit and recruit!). You have to evaluate also the effects of terrain (including landing and pickup zones) and the weather effect on men, weapons, equipment, visibility and mobility.

Urban guerrilla warfare has its own peculiarities. Cities and towns are vulnerable to urban guerrilla because they are the focus of economic and political power. In many cases, public utilities can be disrupted and the government may appear to have lost control of the situation. The concentration of a large number of people in a relatively small area provides cover for the guerrilla. However, the insurgent may find support only in a certain areas of a town or a city. Anyway, the urban guerrilla lives in a community that is friendly to him or is too frightened to withhold its support or betray him. In a city the snipers and explosive devices can be placed everywhere. The availability of large numbers of people ensures that crowds can be assembled and demonstrations manipulated easily. The presence of women and children restricts counter-guerrilla force reactions, and excessive force may ensure a major incident that provides the guerrilla with propaganda. Publicity is easily achieved in an urban area because no major incident can be concealed from the local population even if it is not widely reported by the news media. Every explosion may be exploited to discredit the ability of the government to provide protection and control.

Urban guerrilla tactics:

- disrupting industry and public services by strikes and sabotage

- generating widespread disturbances designed to stretch the resources of the counter-guerrilla force

- creating incidents or massing crowds in order to lure the counter-guerrilla into a trap

- provoking the counter-guerrilla force in the hope that it may overreact (to provide hostile propaganda after that)

- fomenting interfactional strife

- sniping at roadblocks, outposts and sentries

- attacking buildings with rockets and mortars

- planting explosive devices, either against specific targets or indiscriminately, to cause confusion and destruction, and to lower public morale

-ambushing patrols and firing on helicopters

 

COUNTER-GUERRILLA WARFARE

1.Since many insurgents rely on the population for recruits, food, shelter, financing, you must focus your efforts on providing physical and economic security for that population and defending it against insurgent attacks and propaganda.

2. There must be a clear political program that can neutralize the guerrilla program – this can range from granting political autonomy to economic development measures in the affected region + an aggressive media campaign.

3. You have to “clean” and re-build all levels of the government structure – usually insurgents talk about corrupted politicians a lot and that’s why they have support from population.

4. You don’t have to overreact to guerrilla actions , because this is what they are looking for.

5. Use big military operations only to break up significant guerrilla concentrations and split them into small groups.

6. Keep insurgents on run constantly with aggressive patrols, raids, ambushes, sweeps, cordons, roadblocks, prisoner snatches. Intelligence and recruitment of informants is the key to success. (KGB in post WWII period used bogus guerrilla groups in Western Ukraine that helped reveal real insurgents).

7. An “ink spot” clear and hold strategy must be used to divide the conflict area into sectors and assign priorities between them. Control must expand outward like an ink spot on paper, systematically neutralizing and eliminating the insurgents in one sector of the grid, before proceeding to the next. It may be necessary to pursue holding or defensive actions elsewhere , while priority areas are cleared and held.

8. Mass forces, including village self-defense groups and citizen militias organized for community defense can be useful in providing civic mobilization and local security.

9. Use special units and “hunter-killer” patrols.

10. The limits of foreign assistance must be clearly defined and carefully used. Such aid should be limited either by time , or as to material and technical, and personnel support, or both. While outside aid or even troops can be helpful, lack of clear limits, in terms of either a realistic plan for victory or exit strategy, may find the foreign helper “taking over” the local war, and being sucked into a lengthy commitment , thus providing the guerrillas with valuable propaganda opportunities as the stream of dead foreigners mounts. Such scenario occurred with United States in Vietnam and since 2003 – in Iraq.

11. A key factor in guerrilla strategy is a drawn-out, protracted conflict, which wears down the will of the opposing counter-insurgent forces. Democracies are especially vulnerable to the factor of time , but the counter-insurgent force must allow enough time to get the job done.

 

TACTICAL COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

1.Encirclement, which is designed to cut off all ground routes for escape and reinforcement of the encircled force (darkness recommended) combined with combined with air assault, artillery and airborne troops. And — it’s good to divide the enemy while encircling.

Encirclement offers the best chance to fix guerrilla forces in position and achieve decisive results. The battalion and larger units will usually plan and conduct encirclements. The company and smaller units normally do not have the manpower and command and control capability to execute encirclements except as part of a larger force. Encirclements require accurate intelligence on the location of guerrilla elements. Since it requires a major portion of the counterguerrilla force to execute this maneuver, it is usually targeted against large guerrilla forces or guerrilla base complexes, a series of smaller base camps clustered within area. Planning, preparation and execution are aimed at encircling the guerrilla force rapidly. Maximum security and surprise can be gained by occupying the initial encirlclement positions during darkness. In large operations, air assault and airborne troops add speed and surprise to the operation. Positions are occupied simultaneously in order to block escape. If simultaneous occupation is not possible, probable escape routes are covered first. Initial occupation is the most critical period of the operation. When the guerrillas become aware that they are being encircled, they will probably probe for gaps or attack weak points and attempt to break out.

Encircling units provide strong combat patrols far to their front to give early warning of attempted breakouts. Mobile reserves are positioned to counter a breakout and to reinforce difficult areas such as broken terrain or areas with caves, tunnels or fortification complexes. Indirect fire support can serve to cloak an encirclement by gaining and holding the guerrillas’ attention. Fires are planned in detail to support the encirclement. Following completion of the encirclement, the circle is contracted to capture or destroy the guerrilla force. AS the circle is contracted, units may be removed from the line and added to the reserve. Against small guerrilla forces, the encircled area may be cleared by contraction and a final sweep. Against larger guerrilla forces, however, at some point, some action other than contraction will be required. One technique consists of driving a wedge through the guerrilla force to divide it and then destroying the guerrillas in each subarea. Another technique, employed after some degree of contraction, is to employ a blocking force on one or more sides of the perimeter while the remainder of the encircling force drives the guerrillas against blocking force. Either element may accomplish the actual destruction. The technique is effective when the blocking force can be located on, or immediately in the rear of, a natural terrain obstacle.

2. Search (of a village), which might be done in different ways:

- assemble inhabitants in a central location (if they are hostile) and then start the operation

- restrict inhabitants to their homes or control the heads of households (and take other family members to a central location) and then start the convoy security operation, which is one of your top priorities.

Think about ambushes and mines on the route all the time and place a strong attack element at the rear of the convoy where it has maximum flexibility in moving forward to attack guerrillas attempting to ambush the head or center of the convoy. At the first indication of an ambush vehicles have to move out of the killing zone (do not drive to roadsides or shoulders, which may be mined). A security team immediately returns fire from inside vehicles to cover dismounting personnel (if you have to stop) and then dismounts last under cover of the fire by those who dismounted first. Upon dismounting, personnel caught in a killing zone open fire and immediately assault toward the ambush force. Any movements of the troops and supplies are planned and conducted as tactical operations with effective front, flank and rear security.

Search techniques in built-up areas are required when you search either a few isolated huts or buildings , or for searching well-developed urban sections. Procedure :

a)divide the area to be searched into zones, and assign a search party to each. A search party consists of a search element (to conduct the search), a security element (to encircle the area and prevent entrance and exit, and to secure open areas), and a reserve element (to assist , as required). Then the search element conducts the mission assigned for the operation. Normally it is organized into special teams. The security element surrounds the area while the search element moves in. Members of the security element orient primarily upon evaders from the populated area; however, they can cut off any insurgents trying to reinforce. Checkpoints and roadblocks are established. Subsurface routes of escape, such as subways and sewers, must be considered when operating in cities. The reserve element is a mobile force within a nearby area. Its specific mission is to assist the other two elements should they meet resistance they cannot handler. In addition, it is capable of replacing or reinforcing either of the other two elements should the need arise.

b)consider any enemy material found, including propaganda signs and leaflets, to be booby-trapped until inspection proves it is safe.

c) thoroughly search underground and underwater areas. Any freshly excavated ground can be a hiding place. Use mine detectors to locate metal objects underground and underwater.

d) deploy rapidly, especially when a guerrilla force is still in the area to be searched. The entire area to be searched is surrounded simultaneously. If this is not possible, observed fire must cover that portion not covered by soldiers.

3.Ambush.

An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position upon a moving or temporary halted target. Ambushes give the counter-guerrilla force several advantages:

a) an ambush does not require ground to be seized or held

b) smaller forces with limited weapons and equipment can harass or destroy larger, better armed forces

c) guerrillas can be forced to engage in decisive combat at unfavorable times and places

d) guerrillas can be denied freedom of movement and deprived of weapons and equipment that are difficult to replace.

Well-planned and well-executed ambushes is the most successful operational technique employed against guerrillas. It is an effective technique to interdict movement guerrilla forces within an area. Selection of the site is a key step in developing a well-organized ambush.

Ambushes are executed to reduce the guerrilla’s overall combat effectiveness. Destruction is the primary purpose of an ambush since guerrillas killed or captured, and equipment and supplies destroyed or captured, critically affect the guerrilla force. Harassment, the secondary purpose, diverts guerrillas from other missions. A series of successful ambushes causes the guerrilla force to be less aggressive and more defensive, to be apprehensive and overly cautious, and to be reluctant to go on patrols and move in convoys or in small groups.

There are two types of ambushes. A point ambush involves patrol elements deployed to support the attack of a single killing zone. An area ambush involves patrol elements deployed as multiple, related, point ambushes. An ambush is categorized as either hasty or deliberate. A hasty ambush is an immediate action drill, an action of a combat patrol with little or no information. When information does not permit detailed planning required for a deliberate ambush, a hasty ambush is planned. In this case, ambush patrol plans and prepares to attack the first suitable guerrilla force. A deliberate ambush is planned as a specific action against a specific target. Detailed information of the guerrilla force is required: size, nature, organization, armament, equipment, route and direction of movement, and time the force will reach or pass certain points on its route. Deliberate ambushes are planned when reliable information is received on the intended movement of a specific force; patrols, convoys, carrying parties or similar forces establish patterns of size, time and movement sufficient to permit detailed planning for the ambush.

Basic elements of an ambush are:

1.Surprise. It has to be achieved or else the attack is not an ambush. Surprise, which distinguishes an ambush from other forms of attack, allows the ambush force to seize and retain control of the situation. Surprise is achieved by careful planning, preparation and execution. Guerrillas are attacked in a manner they least expect.

2.Coordinated fires. All weapons, including mines and demolitions, are positioned, and all direct and indirect fires are coordinated to achieve isolation of the kill zone to prevent escape or reinforcement; surprise delivery of a large volume of concentrated fires into the kill zone to inflict maximum damage so the target can be assaulted and destroyed.

3.Control. Close control is maintained during movement to, occupation of, and withdrawal from the ambush site. The ambush commander’s control of all elements is critical at the time of target approach. Control measures provide for early warning of target approach, withholding fire until the target moves into the kill zone, opening fire a the proper time, initiating appropriate actions if the ambush is prematurely detected, lifting or shifting supporting fires when the ambush includes assault of the target, timely and orderly withdrawal to an easily recognized rallying point.

Planning.

Planning provides for simplicity, type of ambush and deployment. The attack may be by fire only (harassing ambush) or may include assault of the target (destruction ambush). The force is tailored for its mission. Two men may be adequate for a harassing ambush. A destruction ambush may require the entire unit (squad, platoon, company).

An ambush patrol is organized in the same manner as other combat patrols to include headquarters, an assault element, a support element and a security element. The assault and support are the attack force; the security element is the security force. When appropriate, the attack force is further organized to provide a reserve force. When an ambush site is to be occupied for an extended period, double ambush forces may be organized. One ambush force occupies the site while the other rests, eats and tends to personal needs at the objective rallying point or other concealed location. They alternate after a given time, which is usually 8 hours. If the waiting period is over 24 hours, three ambush forces may be organized.

The unit moves into the ambush site from the rear. Security elements are positioned first to prevent surprise while the ambush is being established. Automatic weapons are then positioned so that each can fire along the entire killing zone. If this is not possible, they are given overlapping sectors of fire so the entire killing zone is covered. The unit leader then selects his position, located where he can see when to initiate the ambush. Claymore mines, explosives and grenade launchers may be used to cover any dead space left by the automatic weapons. All weapons are assigned sectors of fire to provide mutual support. The unit leader sets a time by which positions are to be prepared. The degree of preparation depends on the time allowed. All men work at top speed during the allotted time. Camouflage is very important – each soldier must be hidden from the target and each one has to secure his equipment to prevent noise. At the ambush site, positions are prepared with minimal change in the natural appearance of the site. All debris resulting from preparation of positions is concealed. Movement is kept to a minimum and the number of men moving at a time is closely controlled. Light discipline is rigidly enforced at night.

Point ambush

A point ambush, whether independent or part of an area ambush, is positioned along the expected route of approach of the guerrilla force. Formation is important because, to a great extent, it determines whether a point ambush can deliver the heavy volume of highly concentrated fire necessary to isolate, trap and destroy the guerrillas. The formation to be used is determined by carefully considering possible formations and the advantages and disadvantages of each in relation to terrain, conditions of visibility, forces, weapons and equipment ease or difficulty of control, force to be attacked and overall combat situation.

1.Line formation.

The attack element is deployed generally parallel to the guerrilla force’s route of movement (road, trail, stream). This positions the attack element parallel to the long axis of the killing zone and subjects the guerrilla force to heavy flanking fire. The size of the force that can be trapped in the killing zone is limited by the area which the attack element can effectively cover with highly concentrated fire. The force is trapped in the killing zone by natural obstacles, mines, demolitions, and direct and indirect fires. A disadvantage of the line formation is the chance that lateral dispersion of the force may be too big for effective coverage. The line formation is appropriate in close terrain that restricts guerrilla maneuver and in open terrain where one flank is restricted by mines, demolitions or mantraps. Similar obstacles can be placed between the attack element and the killing zone to provide protection from guerrilla counter-ambush measures. When a destruction ambush is deployed in this manner, access lanes are left so that the force in the killing zone can be assaulted. The line formation can be effectively used by a “rise from the ground ambush” in terrain seemingly unsuitable for ambush. An advantage of the line formation is its relative ease of control under all conditions of visibility.

2.L-formation.

The L-formation is a variation of the line formation. The long side of the attack element is parallel to the killing zone and delivers flanking fire. The short side of the attack element is at the end of, and at right angles to, the killing zone and delivers enfilading fire that interlocks with fire from the other leg. This formation is flexible. It can be established on a straight stretch of a trail or stream or at a sharp bend in a trail or stream. When appropriate, fire from the short leg can be shifted to parallel the long leg if the guerrilla force attempts to assault or escape in the opposite direction. In addition, the short leg prevents escape in that direction or reinforcement from that direction.

3.Z-formation.

The Z-shaped formation is another variation of the L-formation. The attack force is deployed as in the L-formation but with an additional side so that the formation resembles the letter Z. The additional side may serve to engage a force attempting to relieve or reinforce the guerrillas, restrict a flank, prevent envelopment (of the ambush force), seal the end of the killing zone.

4.T-formation.

The attack element is deployed across, and at right angles to, the route of movement of the hostile force so that the attack element and the target form the letter T. This formation can be used day or night to establish a purely harassing ambush, and at night to establish an ambush to interdict movement through open, hard-to-seal areas (such as rice paddies). A small unit can use the T-formation to harass, slow and disorganize a larger force. When the lead guerrilla elements are engaged, they will normally attempt to maneuver right or left to close with the ambush force. Mines, mantraps and other obstacles placed to the flanks of the killing zone slow the guerrilla’s movement and permit the unit to deliver heavy fire and then withdraw without becoming decisively engaged. The T-formation can be used to interdict small groups attempting night movement across open areas. For example, the attack element may be deployed along a rice paddy dike with every second member facing in the opposite direction. The attack of a force approaching from either direction requires only that every second member shift to the opposite side of the dike. Each member fires only to his front and only when the target is at a close range. Attack is by fire only, and each member keeps the guerrilla force under fire as long as it remains to his front. If the force attempts to escape in either direction along the dike, each member takes it under fire as it comes into his vicinity. The T-formation is effective at halting infiltration. It has one chief disadvantage: there is a possibility that while spread out the ambush will engage a superior force. Use of this formation must, therefore, fit the local enemy situation.

5.V-formation.

The V-shaped attack element is deployed along both sides of the guerrilla route of movement so that it forms a V. Care is taken to ensure that neither group (or leg) fires into the other. This formation subjects the guerrilla to both enfilading and interlocking fire. The V-formation is suited for fairly open terrain but can also be used in the jungle. When established in the jungle, the legs of the V close in as the lead elements of the guerrilla force approach the apex of the V, elements then open fire from close range. Here, even more than in open terrain, all movement and fire is carefully coordinated and controlled to ensure that the fire of one leg does not endanger the other. Wider separation of the elements makes this formation difficult to control, and there are fewer sites that favor its use. Its main advantage is that it is difficult for the guerrilla to detect the ambush until well into the killing zone.

6.Triangle formation.

Closed triangle. The attack element is deployed in 3 groups, positioned so they form a triangle (or closed V). An automatic weapon is placed at each point of the triangle and positioned so that it can be shifted quickly to interlock with either of the others. Elements are positioned so that their fields of fire overlap. Mortars may be positioned inside the triangle . When deployed in this manner, the triangle ambush becomes a small unit strongpoint which is used to interdict night movement through open areas, when guerrilla approach is likely to be from any direction. The formation provides all-round security, and security elements are deployed only when they can be positioned so that, if detected by an approaching target, they will not compromise the ambush. Attack is by fire only, and the target is allowed to approach within close range before the ambush force opens fire. Advantages include ease of control, all-round security, and guerrillas approaching from any direction can be fired on by at least two automatic weapons. Disadvantages include the requirement for an ambush force of platoon size or larger to reduce the danger of being overturn by a guerrilla force; one or more legs of the triangle may come under guerrilla enfilade fire; and lack of dispersion, particularly at the points, increases danger from guerrilla mortar fire.

Open triangle (harassing ambush). This variation of the triangle ambush is designed to enable a small unit to harass, slow, and inflict heavy casualties upon a larger force without being decisively engaged. The attack group is deployed in 3 elements, positioned so that each element becomes a corner of a triangle containing the killing zone. When the guerrillas enter the killing zone, the element to the guerrillas’ front opens fire on the lead guerrillas. When the guerrillas counterattack, the element withdraws and an assault element to the flank opens fire. When this group is attacked, the element to the opposite flank opens fire. This process is repeated until the guerrillas are pulled apart. Each element reoccupies its position, if possible, and continues to inflict maximum damage without becoming decisively engaged.

Open triangle (destruction ambush). The attack group is again deployed in 3 elements , positioned so that each element is a point of the triangle, 200 to 300 meters apart. The killing zone is the area within the triangle. The guerrillas are allowed to enter the killing zone; the nearest element attacks by fire. As the guerrillas attempt to maneuver or withdraw, the other elements open fire. One or more assault elements, as directed, assault or maneuver to envelop or destroy the guerrillas. As a destruction ambush, this formation is suitable for platoon-size or larger units; a unit smaller than a platoon would be in danger of being overrun. Also, control in assaulting or maneuvering is difficult. Close coordination and control are necessary to ensure that assaulting or maneuvering elements are not fired by another party; and the ambush site must be a fairly level, open area that provides (around its border) concealment for the ambush elements (unless it is a “rise” from the ground” ambush).

7.Box formation.

This formation is similar in purpose to the open triangle ambush. The unit is deployed in 4 elements positioned so that each element becomes a corner of a square or rectangle containing the killing zone. It can be used as a harassing ambush or a destruction ambush in the same manner as the two variations of the open triangle ambush.

Area ambush

Killing zone. A point ambush is established at a site having several trails or other escape routes leading away from it. The site may be a water hole, guerrilla campsite, or known rendezvous point, or a frequently traveled trail. This site is the central killing zone.

Area ambush” multiple point.

Point ambushes are established along the trails or other escape routes leading away from the central killing zone. The guerrilla force, whether a single group or several parties approaching from different directions, is permitted to move to the central killing zone. Outlying ambushes do not attack (unless discovered). The ambush is initiated when the guerrillas move into the central killing zone. When the guerrillas break contact and attempt to disperse, escaping portions are intercepted and destroyed by the outlying ambushes. The multiple point ambush increases casualties and harassment and produces confusion.

This version of the area ambush is best suited in terrain where movement is largely restricted to trails. It provides best results when established as a deliberate ambush. When there is not sufficient intelligence for a deliberate ambush, an area ambush of opportunity (hasty ambush) may be established. The outlying ambushes are permitted to attack guerrillas approaching the central killing zone, if the guerrilla force is small. If it is too large for the particular outlying ambush, the guerrillas are allowed to continue and they are attacked in the central killing zone.

Area ambush: “baited trap”.

A variation of the area ambush. A central killing zone is established along the guerrilla’s route of approach. Point ambushes are established along the routes over which units relieving or reinforcing the guerrilla will have to approach. The guerrilla force in the central killing zone serves as a “bait” to lure relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units into the kill zones of the outlying ambushes. A friendly force can also be used as the “bait”. The outlying point ambushes need not be strong enough to destroy their targets. They may be small harassing ambushes that delay, disorganize and cause casualties by successive contacts.

This version can be varied by using a fixed installation as “bait” to lure relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units into the killing zone to overcome the installation or may use it as a ruse. These variations are best suited for situations where routes of approach for relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units are limited to those favorable for ambush.

Unusual ambush techniques

Spider hole ambush. This point ambush is designed for open areas that lack cover and concealment and other features normally desirable in a “good” ambush site. The attack element is deployed in the formation best suited to the overall situation. The attack element is concealed in the “spider hole” type of covered foxhole. Soil is carefully removed and positions camouflaged. When the ambush is initiated, the attack element members throw back the covers and rise from the ground to attack. This ambush takes advantage of the tendency of patrols and other units, to relax in areas that do not appear to favor ambush. The chief advantage is that the ambush element is vulnerable if detected prematurely.

Demolition ambush. Dual primed, electrically detonated mines or demolition charges are planted in the area over which a guerrilla force is expected to pass. This may be a portion of as road or trail, an open field, or any area that can be observed from a distance. Activating wires are run to a concealed observation point sufficiently distant to ensure safety of the ambush element. As large a force as desired or necessary can be used to mine the area. The ambush element remains to fire the charges, other personnel return to the unit. When a guerrilla force enters the mined area (killing zone), the element on site detonates the explosives and withdraws immediately to avoid detection and pursuit.

Special ambush situation. Attacks against columns protected by armored vehicles depend on the type and location of armored vehicles in a column, and the weapons of the ambush force. If possible, armored vehicles are destroyed or disabled by fire or antitank weapons, landmines and Molotov cocktails, or by throwing hand grenades into open hatches. An effort is made to immobilize armored vehicles at a point where they are unable to give protection to the rest of the convoy and where they will block the route of other supporting vehicles. In alternate bounds, all except the first two vehicles keep their relative places in the column. The first two vehicles alternate as lead vehicles on each bound. Each covers the bound of the other. This method provides more rapid advance than movement by successive bounds but is less secure’ it doers not allow soldiers in the second vehicle enough time to thoroughly observe the terrain to the front before passing the first vehicle. Security is obtained by the vehicle commander who assigns each soldier a direction of observation: to the front, flank(s) or rear. This provides each vehicle with some security against surprise fire from every direction and provides visual contact with vehicles to the front and rear. For maximum observation, all canvas is removed from the vehicles.

Action at danger areas. The commander of the leading vehicle immediately notifies the unit leader when he encounters an obstacle or other danger area. Designated soldiers reconnoiter these places under cover of the weapons in the vehicle. Obstacles are bypassed, if possible. When they cannot be bypassed, they are cautiously removed. Side roads intersecting the route of advance are investigated. Soldiers from one vehicle secure the road junction; one or two vehicles investigate the side road. The amount of reconnaissance of side roads is determined by the patrol leader’s knowledge of the situation. Men investigating side roads do not, however, move past supporting distance of the main body of the patrol. Bridges, road junctions, defiles and curves (that deny observation beyond the turn) are danger areas. Soldiers dismount and take advantage of available cover and concealment to investigate these areas. The vehicle is moved off the road into a covered or concealed position; weapons from the vehicle cover the advance of the investigating personnel.

 

Ambush during darkness is difficult to control, bur darkness increases the security of the ambush party and the confusion of those being ambushed.

4. Roadblocks and checkpoints. Element of the checkpoint force has to be positioned and concealed at appropriate distance from the checkpoint to prevent the escape of any vehicle or person attempting to turn back.

It’s necessary to maintain a continuous check on road movement to apprehend suspects and to prevent smuggling of controlled items. Since checkpoints cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, it’s important that the civil population understands that checkpoints are a preventive and not a punitive measure. Checkpoints may be deliberate or hasty. The deliberate checkpoint is positioned in a town or in the open country, often on a main road. It acts as a useful deterrent to unlawful movement. The hasty checkpoint is highly mobile and is quickly positioned in a town or in the open country. The actual location of the hasty checkpoint is designed to achieve quick success.

Concealment of a checkpoint is desirable, but often impossible. The location should make it difficult for a person to turn back or reverse a vehicle without being observed. Culverts, bridges or deep cuts may be suitable locations. Positions beyond sharp curves have the advantage that drivers do not see the checkpoint in sufficient time to avoid inspection. Safety disadvantages may outweight the advantages of such positions. A scarcity of good roads increases the effect of a well-placed checkpoint. A checkpoint requires adequate troops to prevent ambush and surprise by a guerrilla force.

5. Patrols. Used to saturate areas of suspected guerrilla activity, control critical roads, maintain contact between villages and units, interdict guerrilla routes of supply and communication, provide internal security in rural and urban areas, locate guerrilla units and base camps. A patrol is a detachment sent out by a larger unit to conduct a combat or reconnaissance operation. Patrolling is used when limited (or no) intelligence on guerrilla activity is available. Routes are planned carefully and coordinated with higher, lower and adjacent units, to include air and ground fire support elements and reserve forces. There are three key principles to successful patrolling: detailed planning, thorough reconnaissance, all-round security.. It often happens that the patrol has to break the contact with a larger enemy (to break contact use the clock system . the direction the patrol moves is always 12 o’clock. When contact is made, the leader shouts a direction and distance to move (such as “7 o’clock, 400 meters”. The leader can also use the system to shift or direct fire at a certain location).

Saturation patrolling is extremely effective – patrols are conducted by many lightly armed, small, fast-moving units and provide thorough area coverage. Patrols move over planned and coordinated routes which are engaged frequently to avoid establishing patterns. Use of saturation patrolling results in the sustained denial of an area to guerrilla forces as they seek to avoid contact with the counter-guerrilla units. In addition to harassment and discovery of guerrilla tactical forces, this technique provides an opportunity to gain an intimate knowledge of the area of operations; a form of reassurance to the local population that the government is concerned about their protection and security; a means by which information about the guerrilla can be obtained.

Watch out: guerillas usually try to cut the lines of communications by mining roads, waterways and railways, or by ambushes located adjacent to them, blow up bridges and tunnels.

Tracking

Footprints. You can “read” the following by footprints:

- the direction and rate of movement of a party

- the number of persons in a party

- whether or not heavy loads are carried

- the sex of the members of the party

- whether the members of a party know they are being followed

If the footprints are deep and the pace is long , the party is moving rapidly. Very long strides and deep prints, with toe prints deeper than heel prints, indicate the party is running. If the prints are deep, short and widely spaced, with signs of scuffing or shuffling, a heavy load is probably being carried by the parson who left the prints. You can also determine a person’s sex by studying the size and position of the footprints. Women generally tend to be pigeon-toed, while men usually walk with their feet pointed straight ahead or slightly to the outside. Women’s prints are usually smaller than men’s, and their strides usually shorter. If a party knows it is being followed, it may attempt to hide its tracks. Persons walking backward have a short, irregular stride. The prints have and unusually deep toe. The soil will be kicked in the direction of movement. The last person in a group usually leaves the clearest footprints. Therefore, use his prints as the key set.

Use the box method to count the number of persons in the group. Up to 18 persons can be counted. Use it when the key prints can be determined. To use this method, identify a key print on a trail and draw line from its heel across the trail. Then move forward to the key print of the opposite foot and draw a line through its instep. This should form a box with the edges of the trail forming two sides, and the drawn lines forming the other two sides. Next, count every print of partial print inside the box to determine the number of persons. Any person walking normally would have stepped in the box at least one time. Count the key prints as one.

Also, you can track paying attention to such things as foliage, moss, vines, sticks or rocks moved from their original places; stones and sticks that are turned over; grass that is bent or broken in the direction of movement.

Staining. A good example of staining is the mark left by blood from a bleeding wound. You can determine the location of a wound on a man being followed by studying the bloodstains. If the blood seems to be dripping steadily, it probably came from a wound on his trunk. A wound in the lungs will deposit bloodstains that are pink, bubbly, frothy. A bloodstain deposited from a head wound will appear heavy, wet and slimy, like gelatin. Abdominal wounds often mix blood with digestive juices so that the deposit will have an odor, and the stains will be light in color.

Water in footprints in swampy ground may be muddy if the tracks are recent. In time, however, the mud will settle and the water is clear. The clarity of the water can be used to estimate the age of the prints. Normally, the mud will clear in 1 hour, but that will vary with terrain.

If a party knows that you are tracking it, it will probably use camouflage to conceal its movements and to slow and confuse you. Remember: a well-defined approach that leads to the enemy will probably be mined, ambushed or covered by snipers.

6. Aerial search. This technique has little value in areas of dense vegetation. Use of search units mounted in armed helicopters should be limited to those operations in which sufficient intelligence exists to justify their use and then normally in conjunction with ground operations. In ground search operations, helicopters drop off troops in an area suspected of containing guerrillas. With the helicopters overmatching from the air, troops search the area. Troops are then picked up and the process is repeated in other areas.

7.Raid. It is an operation involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, harass the guerrilla or destroy the guerrilla force and its installation. Raids are usually targeted against single, isolated guerrilla base camps. To assist in attaining surprise, the raiding force uses inclement weather, limited visibility, or terrain normally considered impassable. If night airborne or air assault raids are conducted, the force must be accurately inserted and oriented on the ground. Air assault forces supported by armed helicopters offer infinite possibilities for conducting raids. This type of force can move in, strike the objective and withdraw without extensive preparation or support from other sources.

8. Crowd dispersal.

9. Assassination of the guerrilla leader.

10. Taking hostages to press guerrillas.

11. Organization of false guerrilla units.

 

Meanwhile the enemy will attempt to engage you in locations where your fire would endanger civilians or damage their property. You have to match the size of the guerrilla unit. Employing a large force to counter a smaller one is inefficient because it compromises the chance of achieving surprise.

Psychological Operations

Psychological operations (PSYOP) in foreign internal defense include propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups to support the achievement of national objectives. There are 5 major target groups for PSYOP:

1. Insurgents. The major PSYOP objective here is to discredit the insurgents and isolate them from he population. The most important direction of attack is against their morale. Themes should publicize and exploit differences between cadre, recruits, supporters, and the local population. Other themes might stress lack of support, isolation, homesickness, and hardship. Amnesty programs are often useful in neutralizing insurgents, and they are most effective when they are well publicized, directed against lower ranking members of the insurgency, and offer sufficient reason and benefits for quitting the unit. These programs do, however, have several disadvantages: they recognize the insurgents as a legitimate political force, they forgo punishment of anyone accepting amnesty, and they increase the image of the insurgents’ threat.

2. The population supporting the insurgents. You have to achieve withdrawal of support for the insurgents and a total defection. Propaganda should highlight the insurgents shortcomings, ultimate government victory, government successes, and the practical advantages of surrendering or of accepting amnesty. Sometimes, displays of military might are used; invading forces may assemble and parade through the streets of conquered towns, attempting to demonstrate the futility of any further fighting. These displays may also include public executions of enemy soldiers, resistance fighters, and other conspirators. Particularly in antiquity, the death or imprisonment of a popular leader was sometimes enough to bring about a quick surrender. However, this has often had the unintended effect of creating martyrs around which popular resistance can rally.

3. The uncommitted population. The major mission here is to build national morale, unity, and confidence in the government. There should also be a major effort to win popular acceptance of the government force, and convince the people that government programs serve their interests, the government forces can protect them, ultimate government victory is assured. This may be accomplished through re-education, allowing conquered citizens to participate in their government, or, especially in impoverished or besieged areas, simply by providing food, water and shelter.

4. Government personnel. When targeting government personnel, seek to maintain loyalties and develop policies and attitudes which will result in group members who will realize the importance of popular support, promote public welfare and justice, take action to eliminate the basic causes of the subversive insurgency, and protect the population. You have to indoctrinate the host country security and military forces regarding the importance of the civilian population support. When government personnel interact with neutral and non-hostile elements of the population, the emphasis should be positive and constructive.

5. Foreign audiences. There are two major groups to be addressed: neutral nations and hostile nations. For neutral nations, the purpose of psychological operations is to achieve friendly neutrality or active support for your side. For hostile powers, the major objective of these operations is to influence public opinion against involvement in supporting the insurgency. Besides, you have to use psychological operations to establish and maintain a favorable image of our country. The themes most useful in establishing that image are that the US presence is requested by the host country government, it is legal and necessary, it is temporary, and it is advisory. Intelligence operations are facilitated by employing psychological operation media to inform the people that they should report to the proper authority information pertaining to strangers, suspicious persons, and guerrilla activities. Posters and leaflets provide definite instruction as to persons and places that are available to receive the information (indicate what rewards are available).

　

Vietnam

The Viet Cong used “hit and run” attacks involving a small group , usually hiding in ambush and attacking a larger force, only to retreat seconds later. This reduced the advantages of the conventional force’s advanced weapon systems. It gave an ambushed squad no time to call in artillery or air strike. Booby traps ( like simple spikes, incorporated into various types of traps , for example, in camouflaged pit into which a man might fall) were another common tactic among guerrillas. Grenade traps (poised with the pin removed) were also used. Moving them would take the pressure off the lever, causing the grenades to explode. Camouflage was very important, and fighters travelled in small groups, often wearing civilian clothes to make it difficult for American soldiers to know who they were. Often, they would in tunnels underground. Tunnels and “spider holes” were often used to spring ambushes on American troops. The Vietcong would wait for part of American formation to pass before coming out of the ground and opening fire. Before the Americans had a chance to realize where the fire came from, the Vietcong would duck back into the trenches. This often caused fratricide (friendly fire incident) because soldiers who were ambushed would fire back behind them, hitting other American patrols. American troops, usually assigned to Vietnam for a one-year tour of duty, found themselves ill-trained to wage a war against a mostly invisible enemy.

Afghanistan

When the Stinger missile was introduced to Mujahideen, they began to ambush Soviet helicopters and fixed wing aircraft at airfields. The Stinger was effective only up to 15,000 feet (4,600 m), so Mujahideen would attack aircraft as they were landing or taking off. Soviets modified their tactics: helicopters stayed over friendly forces, fixed wing aircraft began flying higher, and armor and electronic defense systems were added to aircraft to help protect them from Stinger. Also, Spetsnaz ( Special Forces) were used extensively. They would be flown into areas where Mujahideen often passed, had been seen or were ambushing someone. Tanks and aircraft were of comparatively little use. The only technology with a significant impact on Mujahideen were land mines and helicopters. As the Soviets got stalled , they began punishing the local population for supporting Mujahideen. It was not uncommon for Soviet helicopters to raze an Afghan village in retaliation for an attack against Soviet soldiers. They also dropped mines from aircraft in fields and pastures and shot livestock with machineguns. Another common tactic was to cordon off and search villages for Mujahideen.

Chechnya (Russia)

The conflict between Russia and Chechen terrorists has been mostly a guerilla war. Most fighting was done with the support of armored vehicles, artillery and aircraft, rather than infantry. Russian soldiers were not prepared for urban warfare in Grozny (the capital of Chechnya). Terrorists would hide on the top floors and basements of buildings armed with small arms and anti-tank weapons. The Russians came in with convoys of armored vehicles which were unprepared for the tactics the terrorists would use. Chechen ambush tactics were planned, and involved destroying the first and the last vehicle (armored personnel carrier or a tank) in the column. This was done by either rocket propelled grenade(RPG) or improvised explosive device. If the initial attack was successful, the rest of the convoy would be trapped in between. Later Russians used artillery and airstrikes more extensively. Terrorists changed their urban combat tactics and used fire-teams of three fighters : a machine gunner, a sniper and a fighter armed with rocket propelled grenade. As a result, a very small and mobile fire-team could meet any potential sizable threat with great effectiveness. Chechen snipers used to wound Russian soldiers and pick off their rescuers. They also shot off antennas from the moving armored personnel carriers – since this was often the only means of communication with the command center, the troops inside would end up isolated and attacked with RPG or by the sniper as they tried to repair the antenna. As Russia controlled more area, ambushes gave place to roadside bombings, and these usually involved modified mines and improvised explosive devices.

U.S. – Iraq war (2003-present)

Suicide bombers attack American soldiers at checkpoints, on patrols, on their bases and in convoys. Iraqis used the same tactics Chechen terrorists used against convoys.

　

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

Abwehr , a German intelligence organization from 1921 to 1944).

 

One of the known Abwehr’s successful actions was “Operation Nordpol”, which was an operation against the Dutch underground network, which at the time was supported by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). In March 1941, Abwehr forced a captured SOE radio operator to transmit messages to Britain in a code that the Germans had obtained. Even though the operator gave every indication that he was compromised, the receiver in Britain did not notice that. Thus the Germans had been able to penetrate the Dutch operation and for two years, capturing agents that were sent and sending false intelligence and sabotage reports until the British caught on.

But in general Abwehr was not an effective organization, because much of its intelligence deemed politically unacceptable to the German leadership. Then, Wilhelm Canaris, the Abwehr Chief, was anti-Nazi – he personally gave false information which discouraged Hitler from invading Switzerland and persuaded Francisco Franco not to allow German forces to pass through Spain to invade Gibraltar; he was involved in July 20,1944 assassination attempt on Hitler.

The incident which eventually resulted in the dissolution of the Abwehr is known as the “Frau Solf Tea Party”, which took place on September 10,1943. Frau Johanna Solf, the widow of Dr.Wilhelm Solf, a former Colonial Minister and ex-Ambassador to Japan, had been involved in the anti-Nazi intellectual movement in Berlin. At a tea party hosted by her, a new member was included ith circle, an attractive young Swiss doctor named Reckse (the Gestapo agent), who reported to Gestapo on the tea party and turned over several incriminating documents. The Solf circle was tipped off and had to flee fo their lives, but they were all rounded up on January 12, 1944 and executed, except Frau Solf and her daughter, the Countess Lagi Graffin von Ballestrem. One of those executed was Otto Kiep, an official in the Foreign Office, who had friends in the Abwehr, among whom were Erich Vermehren and his wife, the former Countess Elizabeth von Pettenberg, who were stationed as agents in Istanbul. Both were summoned to Berlin by the Gestapo in connection with the Kiep case. Fearing for their lives, they contacted British and defected. It was mistakenly believed in Berlin that the Vermehrens absconded with Abwehr’s secret codes and turned them over to the British. Despite the efforts of the Abwehr to shift the blame to the RSHA or even to the Foreign Ministry, Hitler had had enough of Canaris and he told so Himmler twice. He summoned Canaris for a final interview and accused him of allowing the Abwehr to “fall into bits” – Canaris agreed that it was “not surprising” as Germany was already losing the war. On February 18,1944 Hitler signed a decree that abolished the Abwehr – it’s functions were taken over by the RSHA. This action deprived the army of an intelligence service of its own and strengthened Himmler’s control over the generals.

GRU ( Russian Army General Staff MAIN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY), Russia

The undercover residency is one of the basic forms of intelligence set-up for the GRU abroad. The minimum number of staff for residency is two – the resident and a radio/cipher officer. The resident is the senior representative of the GRU in any given place and answerable to the head of GRU only. He has the right to send any officer, including his own deputies, out of the country immediately. He must have a minimum of three to five years of successful work as an operational officer and three to five years as the deputy resident before his appointment. A resident in a large residency will hold the military rank of major-general, in small residences that of colonel. In some very large residencies, and also where there is big activity on the part of GRU illegals, there is a position called deputy resident for illegals (the undercover residency and the illegal residency are completely separate, but often the undercover residency is used to rescue illegals.

An illegal residency is an intelligence organization comprising a minimum of two illegals, usually the resident and a wireless operator, and a small number of agents (at least one) working for them. Gradually, as a result of recruiting new agents, the residency may increase in size. More illegals may be sent out to the resident, one of whom may become his assistant. The GRU does not have large residences. Five illegals and eight to ten agents are considered the maximum, but usually the residencies are much smaller than this. In cases where the recruitment of new agents has gone well the GRU divides the residency in two parts. Thereafter any contact between the two new residencies is forbidden, so that if one residency is discovered the other does not suffer.

Defense Intelligense Agency (DIA), USA

DIA is a major producer and manager of military intelligence for the Pentagon, with about 8000 people working worldwide. DIA has major operational activities at the Pentagon, the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling Air Force Base in Washington,D.C., the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center in Fort Detrick, Maryland, and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center in Huntsville, Alabama. The DIA’s mission is to provide timely and objective military intelligence to warfighters, policymakers, and force planners. To help weapon systems planners and the Defense community, DIA plays a major role in providing intelligence on foreign weapon systems.

Structure.

Directorate for Human Intelligence

Defense Attache System

Strategic Support Branch (linguists, field analysts, case officers, interrogation experts, technical specialists, special forces). Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld created it to bypass the limitations of the CIA after 9/11

Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection

Collects measurements and signature intelligence which is any intelligence that does not fit within the definitions of Signals Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence, and Human Intelligence. This includes radar intelligence, acoustic intelligence, nuclear intelligence, and chemical and biological intelligence.

Directorate for Analysis.

Analyzes and disseminates finalized intelligence products for the DIA from all sources as well as from partner Intelligence Community agencies. Analysts focus on the military issues that may arise from political or economic events in foreign countries and also analyze foreign military capabilities, transportation systems, weapons of mass destruction, and missile systems, and contribute to National Intelligence Estimates and to the President’s daily briefing. Analysts serve DIA in all of the agency’s facilities as well as in the field.

Directorate for Intelligence Joint Staff.

Advises and supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff with foreign military intelligence for defense policy and war planning.

 

　

WHAT AND TO WHOM WE SOLD IN 2007

The United Arab Emirates, $10.4 billion

•288 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile interceptors

•9 Patriot Fire Units, including 10 phased array radar sets, 10 engagement control stations on trailers, and 37 launching stations.

•216 Guidance Enhanced Missile-T (GEM-T)

•224 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles

•200 Guided Bomb Unit Joint Direct Attack Munition Tail Kits

•More than 1,100 2,000-pound and 500-pound bombs.

Iraq ,$4.9 billion

•980 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles

•123,544 M-16A4 rifles and various ammunition

•Upgrades for 30 UH-1 Huey helicopters, various armored vehicles, and trucks

•Logistics support for three C-130E aircraft

•Various medical supplies, equipment, and training

•Miscellaneous spare parts and ammunition

Australia ,$3.76 billion

•24 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets

•Armaments for F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, including 47 AIM-9X SIDEWINDER missiles

Taiwan ,$3.72 billion

•Upgrades and refurbishments for three existing Patriot anti-missile fire units

•144 SM-2 Block IIIA STANDARD ship-based missiles

•12 P-3C anti-submarine aircraft with T-56 engines

•60 AGM-84L HARPOON Block II missiles

•218 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles and 235 AGM-65G2 Maverick missiles

Morocco $2.89 billion

•24 T-6B Texan aircraft

•24 F-16C/D Block 50/52 combat aircraft with engines

•60 M109A5 155mm self-propelled howitzers

Israel , $2.5 billion

•2,000 Radio Frequency TOW 2A anti-tank missiles

•1,700 HELLFIRE missiles of various types

•100 Patriot Guided Enhanced Missiles Plus (GEM+)

•90,000,000 gallons of JP-8 aviation fuel and 42,000,000 gallons of diesel fuel

•200 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles

•500 AIM-9M SIDEWINDER missiles

•30 RGM-84L HARPOON Block II missiles

•3,500 MK-84 general purpose bomb units