Natural gas as a feature of Putin's war

At the very start of Putin’s war, I asked: What plans does Little Volodya have for his [natural] gas weapon?  (day one, 24.02.22)  Well, to his utter astonishment – and mine – we in Europe have managed a whole (exceptionally warm) winter without it, and gas turned out to be not the crucial geo-political trump card he quite fairly assumed (even if this is partly down to the ignorant nonsense that we don’t actually need gas, peddled by greens and swallowed by many).   We went on:

Ol’ Uncle Joe Biden said something at the weekend rather bellicose about Nord Stream 2 but I kinda doubt he has in mind blowing it up, easy and rather satisfying though this would be (there’s a James Bond film involving a Russian gas pipeline, as I recall) … Which leads us to consider a Big Accident. If there’s too much high-explosive shit flying about in Ukraine, well, all that infrastructure is really quite fragile (although not too difficult to repair). Quite a big chunk of Russian exports still transit Ukraine, albeit NS2 is designed to put paid to that. Who knows what any number of rogue actors might think of doing in that very large country, in the fog of war? There are plenty of people who could profit handsomely from a Big Accident…

So now we have a new Nord Stream theory being widely bruited about: it was Ukrainians wot did it!  Let’s see what evidence transpires – we’ve had enough quite evidence-free echo-chamber speculation for my liking already.  As you’ll gather from the 24 February 2022 quote above, I’m not averse to a Rogue Actor hypothesis.  There are plenty of rogues, with plenty of money and complicated interests, in the world of Big Gas.

One thing I will tell you: there’s almost no chance of anyone finding a smoking gun irrefutably in the hands of the Kyiv government.  With 100% certainty, we may be sure that Rule No.1 laid down to Zelensky by Joe Biden 12 months ago, will have been No Surprises.  And – can Zelensky get by without US aid?  I don’t need to answer that.  So, let the wild speculation continue.  On the stopped clock principle, somebody’s guess will turn out to have been correct (my money has switched from Soros to the military wing of Greta & the Greens). 

On the subject of Big Gas actors, they don’t come much bigger than my old friends at Gazprom.  We hear that Gazprom is being encouraged to set up a ‘private military company’ on the Wagner model, but inevitably on much more Kremlin-friendly lines.  

Why?  Easy: Putin needs to harness all the local competence he can find; and Gazprom has plenty of competent people, well versed in mustering big efforts for big projects.  And, needless to say, they are part of the Kremlin elite (indeed, one of its paymasters).  If you’re simply thinking like, perhaps a Shell or a BP – engineer-heavy companies stuffed with men-of-the-world with global experience of managing complex affair – well, that’s a fair starting point: but Gazprom has traditionally engaged in the practical world with even broader scope.  Not only do they have their own bakeries,  as I described here some years ago, they have schools and hospitals, AND an armed service, complete with AFVs.  

How come?  Because Russia is a big place (until 1990 it was even bigger) and the further you get from Moscow, the more you need to deal with local warlords of the Kadryov variety.  And Gazprom has always needed to do business far and wide.  Collecting money from a distant райо́н is often as difficult for the Big G as it was for the Tsar’s tax farmers in earlier years, or the Golden Horde’s tribute-gatherers before them.  The arrival of the men from Gazprom in a small armoured column is often how the matter is handled (as noted here 15 years ago). 

And would you rather be on the payroll of a Gazprom motor rifle regiment, or one of Wagner’s cannon-fodder ‘musicians’?

ND