Three Dhows Freed by Somali Pirates

With the latest captures and releases now still at least 24 seized foreign vessels (26 sea-related hostage cases since yacht SY LYNN RIVAL was abandoned and taken by the British Navy) with a total of not less than 358crew members (incl. the British sailing couple) plus at least 9 crew of the lorries held for an exchange with imprisoned pirates, are accounted for. The cases are monitored on our actual case-list, while several other cases of ships, which were observed off the coast of Somalia and have been reported or had reportedly disappeared without trace or information, are still being followed too. Over 134 incidences (including attempted attacks, averted attacks and successful sea-jackings) had been recorded for 2008 with 49 fully documented, factual sea-jacking cases for Somalia and the mistaken sinking of one sea-jacked fishing vessel and killing of her crew by the Indian naval force. For 2009 the account closed with 228 incidences (incl. averted or abandoned attacks) with 68 vessels seized for different reasons on the Somali/Yemeni captor side as well as at least TWELVE wrongful attacks (incl. one friendly fire incident) on the side of the naval forces. 
For 2010 the recorded account stands at 59 attacks resulting in 28 sea-jackings and the sinking of one merchant vessel (MV AL ABI) by fire from the Seychelles’s coastguard boat TOPAZ.
The naval alliances had since August 2008 and until March 2010 apprehended 826 suspected pirates, detained and kept or transferred for prosecution 419,  killed at least 53 and wounded over 22 Somalis. (Actual independent update see: http://bruxelles2.over-blog.com/pages/_Bilan_antipiraterie_Atalanta_CTF_Otan_Russie_Exclusif-1169128.html). 
Not fully documented cases of absconded vessels are not listed in the sea-jack count until clarification. Several other vessels with unclear fate (although not in the actual count), who were reported missing over the last ten years in this area, are still kept on our watch-list, though in some cases it is presumed that they sunk due to bad weather or being unfit to sail – like the S/Y Serenity, MV Indian Ocean Explorer.Present multi-factorial risk assessment code: GoA: RED / IO: RED  (Red = Very much likely, high season; Orange = Reduced risk, but very likely, Yellow = significantly reduced risk, but still likely, Blue = possible, Green = unlikely). Piracy incidents usually degrade during the monsoon season and rise gradually by the end of the monsoon. Starting from mid February until early April every year an increase in piracy cases can be expected. 
If you have any additional information concerning the cases, please send to office[at]ecoterra-international.org – if required we guarantee 100% confidentiality.
For further details and regional information see the Somali Marine and Coastal Monitor at www.australia.to and the map of the PIRACY COASTS OF SOMALIA.


—————- directly piracy, abduction, mariner or naval upsurge related reports ——————–

UAE dhows switch ports to avoid pirates by Joseph George (EmiratesBusiness)

Traders now sail to Berbera and Bender Cassim in the Gulf of Aden. 
Traders and dhow owners in the UAE say more and more vessels are sailing to the Somalian ports of Berbera and Bender Cassim in the Gulf of Aden to avoid pirate attacks. 
According to industry officials, freight charges could increase if dhows owners decided to stop operating to the Somalian ports located on the Indian Ocean. 
Meanwhile, pirates have released one of the dhows that was hijacked last week and released 15 sailors. 
Last week ship owners and businessmen decided to halt for 10 days all dhow movement to the port of Chisimayo and Mogadishu on the Indian Ocean side of Somalia, following a series of pirate attacks resulting in the hijacking of more than seven dhows with 97 to 110 people on board. 
On average, 30 to 40 dhows transport cargo to Somalia from Dubai every month. 
Almost 70 per cent of dhows from the UAE operate to Kisimayo and Mogadishu as they can then transport back loads of charcoal. One ship owner yesterday told Emirates Business that opting for the much safer ports of Berbera and Bender Cassim would mean ships return empty thereby transferring the additional cost to customers. 
According to Younis Mohammed of Al Sabba, a medium-sized vessel returning empty would result in a loss of Dh300,000 per voyage. 
Meanwhile, even as another meeting is scheduled this week to discuss the issue further, a couple of dhows scheduled to start the journey from Dubai to Kisimayo next week were continuing to load goods. 
When asked why they continued to load when there was a ban, one representative of Somali traders said they expect some negotiated settlement within the next week or two. “Right now we are loading sugar. We have already loaded 900 tonnes of sugar and we are filling diesel,” said the official who did not want to be identified. 
According to him, on an average 30 to 40 dhows transport cargo to Somalia from Dubai every month. A majority would opt for the Kisimayo port. 
“Dhow owners usually preferred to go to Kisimayo, which is a 11 to 13 days voyage, compared to seven days it takes to reach Bender Cassim because of the additional revenue they can earn from transporting charcoal,” said the representative. 
While presently about 30 per cent of the dhows operate to Berbera and Bender Cassim, the number is expected to increase. 
Mohammed, whose Al Sabba is presently loading to travel to Berbera, said a decision on whether to resume operations to the ports located on the Indian Ocean side of Somalia would be taken within the next four days. 
“We are scheduled to hold a second meeting soon. If the problem worsens, I am sure traders and ship owners would completely stop going to Chisimayo and Mogadishu. We will be left with no other option but to undergo a loss by returning empty or trasfer the cost on to our customers,” he added. 
Al Sabah, which has a capacity to load 1,600 tonnes of cargo, used to operate between Dubai and Kisimayo until January. “We decided to move to Berbera and Bender Cassim due to better security. We have a good naval escort in the Gulf of Aden. Although there is a threat of piracy even there, the chances of getting hit is much less, compared to the Indian Ocean,” he added. 
Meanwhile, according to reports pirates have released one of the ships that was hijacked last week. The ship, Krishna Jyot, with 15 sailors was released some time back, said media reports quoting the ship owner. 
Andrew Mwangura, co-ordinator of the East Africa Seafarers Assistance Program, yesterday said efforts are being made to ensure the release of the other vessels. 
“It usually takes time. Some times they take several weeks to establish contact,” said Mwangura. 
According to him, dhows from the UAE mainly opt to carry charcoal despite a ban on export of the commodity. 
“The government of Somalia had banned the export of charcoal back in the nineties. However, trade continues with the support of certain warlords. Traders encourage it, as it is profitable for them,” he added. 
Mwangura also said that transporting goods to Berbera and Bender Cassim has another disadvantage as the land route between Mogadishu and the northern region is even more dangerous. 
The US last week warned that Somali pirates are expected to step up attacks on merchant vessels as better weather allows them to operate more easily at sea. 
“Vessel operators should anticipate an increase in piracy attacks from March through May… when calmer weather favourable for small boat activity will prevail,” said a Reuters report quoting the US Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration. “Despite the increase in presence and effectiveness of naval forces in the region, as well as the effectiveness of defensive and protective measures, pirate activity has continued,” the Maritime Administration said in an advisory. 
Senior US Admiral Mark Fitzgerald also told Reuters Somali pirates have extended their range.
[N.B.: Also with this report it becomes clear that the illegal export of charcoal from Somalia is not only a lucrative criminal business in itself but a criminal activity which serves as cover also for other illegal activities like the smuggling of ivory, diamonds and other gems and undermines the TFG and UN imposed sanctions, blockades and control mechanisms. 
These crimes are driven by greedy shipowners, who continue with impunity, because the authorities in the Gulf States have been so far completely impotent to stop the illegal imports from Somalia and thereby are guilty to contribute to a situation whereby Somalia is bleeding to death.  Gulf State leaders like formerly "green" Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said of Oman or UAE ruler Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan had been informed officially at least since 1992 about these criminal activities and the charcoal export ban, but  have done nothing against vessels who break the law and thereby are actually accessory to the crime. 
A praise therefore must go out to the Indian government for stopping the Indian-flagged vessels now in total from going to Somalia until proper control mechanism can safeguard that no further criminal sea-trade occurs and the piracy scourge has been overcome. This serves also the purpose that poor, innocent sailors on board of vessels run by unscrupulous owners and captains fall as hostages into the hands of Somali pirates. The hint by thereby questionable news website EmiratesBusiness (see above) that the vessels could go now to Berbera and Bosaaso (Bandar Qassim) is certainly wrong for the Indian-flagged vessels since the restriction notification is at least for Indian-flagged vessels drawn between Saalalah in Oman and Malé in the Maledives. The Indian government therefore would be wise to foresee also the re-flagging of some of these dhows and protect their seafarers by not allowing any Indian seafarer to go to Somalia until the situation there improves. Just a month ago 7 Indian seafarers had to be freed with a major effort from Berbera after they were held together with three Sri Lankans and two Pakistanis in a hostage-like situation because their shipowner abandoned them and let them suffer for over half a year due to a legal quarrel with Somali cargo owners and just yesterday a livestock-carrier was sea-jacked just outside Berbera.]

Pirates sink Sh100m hole in Kenya’s State purse by Githua Kihara (DailyNation)

Dale McFeatters: When pirates get shanghaied by Dale McFeatters
Given the disdain for dogs in the Muslim world, it’s quite possible Somali pirates are unfamiliar with a canine conundrum often cited in the West: 
When a dog is chasing a car, what would he do if he caught it? 
Somewhere around midnight the other day, at sea between Kenya and the Seychelles, a band of Somali pirates spied a ship whose silhouette in the gloom promised great size and thus great ransom. 
The three pirates in the raiding skiff set off after the ship and opened fire preparatory to boarding it. The ship was indeed large and would have been worth much ransom, but, alas, it was thoroughly unsuitable for these particular pirates, because what this particular ship was doing was hunting these particular pirates. 
The ship was the USS Nichols, a guided-missile frigate, and it quickly captured the three pirates and sank their skiff. Then it hunted down their mother ship and sank that, too, after first taking into custody two more pirates. 
Why would the pirates take on a ship with enough fire-power aboard to take out a small country? A piracy expert consulted by the Associated Press speculated that the pirates were young, unsophisticated and greedy. Big ship equals big money. And, except for the three pirates killed after they had the bad judgement to tangle with the USS Bainbridge, piracy has been rather an easy racket. 
Customarily, the five pirates would be turned over to Kenya for trial, but Kenya says its court system is swamped and that it’s time for other countries to share the burden. So now we’re confronted with a variation of the car-and-dog dilemma: 
Now that the five pirates have caught the warship, what do we do with them? 
[N.B.: While ShangHai means "by the sea," from Shang = "on, above" + hai = "sea.", one didn't get shanghaied in Shanghai. One got shanghaied in one of the port cities on the Pacific Coast of the U.S. (Portland or San Francisco) and ended up in Shanghai. To "shanghai" is "to drug a man unconscious and ship him as a sailor" - from the practice of kidnapping workers to fill the crews of ships making extended voyages, such as to the Chinese seaport of Shanghai.]

On 30 March 2010, the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea adopted revised guidelines for the conduct of its work. The guidelines were revised to take account of the provisions contained in resolution 1907 (2009), which imposed an arms embargo, a travel ban and an assets freeze on Eritrea. 
The revised guidelines will be transmitted to all States for their information and use, as necessary, and will be posted on the Committee’s webpage: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/index.shtml.

India bans its boats beyond southern Oman, Maldives (HaveeruNewsService)
India has officially declared the south and west of Salalah in Oman and Maldives as a pirate-threatened area.
The decision was made, in the wake of Somali pirates capturing around 74 Indian sailors off the western coast of Somalia, after hijacking the vessels.
A notification was issued last Tuesday with immediate effect, instructing Indian vessels to avoid “sailing to the south and south-west of Salalah, and the Maldives.”
India is currently attempting to file the case with the International Maritime Organisation and the United Nations and is coordinating action with other navies to protect the seafarers, The Hindu reported. 
Tuesday’s ban order would be among several measures by India to prevent further pirate attacks, said Nautical Adviser to the Government of India M.M. Saggi on Wednesday, The Hindu said.
It is estimated that pirates take around 10-15 minutes to attack a ship. It takes yet another 15-20 minutes to take the sailors on board under control. If the ship sends an alert message, the nearest naval ship present in the region would take around half an hour to reach the vessel in distress for rescue operations.
Addressing the issue, Maldives Foreign Minister Ahmed Shaheed said Maldives was also threatened by pirate activities in the region.
“It has been a few months since we have started talking [in public] about the issue. But some people took the issue lightly, claiming that we were talking about a country [Somalia] too far from us,” he said. 
“Actually Somalia is not so far from us, considering the activities of Somalian pirates and our location.”
Shaheed revealed Maldives would raise concerns over the issue seeking protection to sailors, at the UN Conference on Security of Sailors next month.
Maldives would also work with US and Indian authorities, he added.

Somali Minster for Humanitarian Affairs and resettlement held a press conference by Mohammed Omar Hussein (Somaliweyn)
The Minister for Humanitarian Affairs  of the Somali transitional federal government held on Wednesday the 31st of March a press conference in the Somali capital Mogadishu.
The Minister talked at length about the humanitarian situation in Somalia and several other related issues. Somaliweyn website which was one of the media present at the venue asked the Minister several questions concerning the humanitarian situation in Somalia.
On the current Humanitarian situation in Somalia the minister stated:
“There is an urgent need of humanitarian aid in Somalia. Somalis have been in absolute need since the collapse of the late President Mohammed Siyad Barre from power in 1991 said the Minister for Humanitarian Affairs and Resettlement.
Somaliweyn has as well asked the Minister about the different humanitarian situations the Somalis had yo endure.
“Some of these grave situations are displacements caused either by the day-to-day clashes in the country particularly in the city and some climatically related changes such as drought. As you are aware Al-Shabab has recently announced that the World Food Programme which is one of the major Aid Agencies assisting the needy Somalis cannot operate in the territories under their command despite the inadequate aid which it provides. On top of that the places where the majority of the needy people are dwelling are located in the areas which are under the control of Al-Shabab” added the Minister.
On a different subject the Minister talked about the recent hijacking by Somali pirates of private commercial boats owned by Somali traders.
“We are strongly condemning the recent hijacking of commercial, private boats which were laden with goods coming to Somalia. This situation can be termed as mass torment against the Somali people in general, and instantly after the hijacking of these commercial boats the immediate result was that the food prices in the city and the fare of the public service vehicles have sky-rocketed. We are advising these pirates who are holding these commercial boats to immediately release them without any condition” said the Minister.
Ultimately the Minister has said that in the aftermath of hijacking the commercial boats coming to the Somalis will result in a reprisal from the entire Somali population. “No pardon to pirates wherever they are in the world be it in Somalia or elsewhere – they must face trials also for crimes against humanity.” 


——— ecology , ecosystems, marine environment, IUU fishing and dumping, UNCLOS, humanities ———— 

RING-NET FISHING - THE MENACE IN THE MURKY WATERS OF KENYA (ecop-marine)
What the disastrous purse-seiners do on the high seas, the detrimental ring-net fishing is causing at the coasts: Wiping out the fish in total !
The ring-net fishery in Kenya started in Vanga at the south coast. After a few years of operation the fish catches dropped significantly forcing the ring-net operators to look for not yet depleted areas. 
The next target was Mayungu in Malindi. Fayaz Bakery operated the ring-net at Mayungu but was banned by the District Commissioner and Deputy Provincial Commissioner in 2005 due to persistent resource use conflicts. Fayaz Bakery enjoyed a special license from the Fisheries Department until the ban came into effect.
Ring-net fishing again started to gain momentum from mid 2008 when the Assistant Director of Coastal Fisheries, a Mrs Martha Mukira, changed her stand and became pro ring-net fishing, urging the Beach Management Units (BMUs) and local fishing enterprises to engage in the detrimental fishing method to increase the fish landings. She openly promoted ring-net fishing which resulted in the resurgence of ring-nets in Mayungu near Malindi, while also in other areas new ring-net fishing groups sprung up – like in Uyombo, Watamu and Ngomeni in Malindi. Other areas affected are Takaungu, Kilifi and Kipini in Tana River District. 
It is interesting to note that NO licenses were issued by the Fisheries Department but simply the misused BMUs were indirectly allowed ring-netting without any license by just looking the other way and not stopping it..
The Marine Protected areas, where NO COMMERCIAL fishing is allowed at all Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) according to the KWS-charter, are particularly affected by ring-net fisheries, but the Fisheries Department has been acting as a BIG brother of KWS, frustrating any efforts to reprimand ring-net operators. Only due to public outcry and pressure, the Assistant Director Fisheries (coast) banned the ring-net fishing in Kenya through a circular, but already three days later she lifted the ban verbally during a World Fisheries Day in the south coast. 
Since then the ring-net fishing has continued to operate defying the local peoples will.
The following ring nets have now been licensed to fish until April 2010 pending further directives.
(A) KIPINI 
The two ring-net operating owners are :
(1)Abbass Lalli form Watamu using Tanzanians from Pemba and a few locals as crew.
(2) Said Ali. He is an agent for the ring-net owner from Tanzania (Tanga). This is the biggest ring-net in length and depth normally referred to as Most feared Mama. They are using Tanzanian crew members from Pemba.
(B) WATAMU 
Two ring-nets are operated inside the Marine Protected areas of Watamu and Malindi reserves, decimating the Watamu reef banks. This has destroyed the main fishing area in Watamu. Even birds such as sea gulls and other sea-birds are NO longer seen on the banks. The banks always had sea gulls feeding on reef fish, which also are attracting the sportfishers and small scale fishermen from Malindi and Watamu.This has changed since the ring-nets started operating in Watamu. The catches too have continued to decline and the ring-net operators have started now migrating to other areas. Only one ring-net is remaining in Watamu and the catches are very low, indicating already depleted fish stocks.
The owners of the ring-nets in Watamu are:
(1) Jamal Lalli is an agent for the owner who is in Tanzania (Tanga) and a very wealthy businessman sponsoring the ring-net operation through a local agent.
(2) Athman Shaibu – a local person using a local leader (Aboud Hassan) as an agent.
The Watamu ring-net is most defiant of any orders and has protectionist gangs backstopping them. They are paid by fish catches distributed to protectionists.
(C) KILIFI
Two ring nets operate in Kilifi. One at Kilifi town and one at Takaungu village. The owners are:
(1) Harun Mbwana – a local agent for the rich man from Tanga in Tanzania
(2) Abdulaziz – formerly working for Fayaz but now has his own ring-net
All are using Tanzanian crew from Pemba who have no working permits but only visitors passes and their employment is prohibited. NO action is taken by Immigration and Fisheries Departments despite reports, which werefiled with these two offices.
(D) NGOMENI
The ring-netting stopped after non payment of staff and the Tanzanian crew has gone back to Pemba.
Due to reduced catches, the ring-net fishers now moved to Lamu where they were arrested two weeks ago by the Fisheries Department and their nets were confiscated.
PUBLIC APPEAL
ECOP-Marine and other nature protection organizations have repeatedly called on businesses and consumers to not purchase any fish from these detrimental and rogue ring-net fisheries, but to support those fishing communities along the Kenya coast, which abstain from the detrimental practice of ring-net fishing, are at the core of sustainable pole&line fishing for tuna, use otherwise the prescibed nets and are signatories to the following memorandum, which was sent to the Kenyan government:
MEMORANDUM AGAINST RING-NET FISHERY 
Fishing in Malindi District is the primary livelihood to over 2000 small scale fishermen whose livelihood has been impacted negatively by commercial ring-net fishery due to the following reasons:

• Large scale extraction of fish stocks in a short period of time typical of ring-net fishery disrupts the food chain and is highly unsustainable leading to overfishing and depletion of fish stocks that will take generations to regenerate. Commercial ring-net fishery takes place in a common fishing ground where over 2000 fishermen also depend on for their livelihood creating a resource use conflict.
• The granting of user rights to the rich few ring-net operators is infringing on the rights of over 2000 poor fishermen to earn a living from their traditional livelihood. The long term negative effect of ring-net fishery is the depletion of fish stock and destruction of marine environment in the common fishing ground while the short term negative impact is reduced fish catches by small scale fishers and reduced market prices occasioned by over supplying of fish in the market by ring-net operators. Besides 2000 poor fishermen in Malindi district, the activities for over 200 fish dealers are negatively affected as well due to the sudden disruption of market forces of supply and demand extending well into the urban market of Malindi, Kilifi and Mombasa amongst others. The main issue is the interests of four rich individuals versus the interests of thousands of poor small scale traditional fishermen. The status quo will widen the gap between the rich and the poor, transgressing on the rights of the poor fishermen to earn a descent living and deliberately marginalize the poor. ring-net fishery has been banned in its own country of origin [Spain] due to its destructive tendencies and resource use conflicts that lead to disruption of social harmony.
• The matter is aggravated by the Malindi District Fisheries Officer (DFO) and the persistent refusal to engage into any meaningful dialogue with local leaders including fishermen, fish dealers and marine conservation organizations. Instead he has opted for authoritarian orders and derogatory remarks towards poor fishermen who are the absolute majority. The lack of moderation by the DFO to diffuse the tension is disrupting social harmony prompting the need for the provincial administration to intervene. The same resource use conflict was reported to the then Malindi DC (Mr Z. Mogaka) leading to a ring-net ban imposed by the then Deputy PC Coast Mr Ayonga who accompanied the then Minister for livestock and fisheries development during a visit at the District Fisheries office in Malindi. Correspondences on the ring-net issues were copied to the District commissioner’s office in Malindi. Attached please find minutes of a joint ring-net meeting chaired Mr Z. Mogaka the then DC Malindi and the subsequent ban imposed by the Deputy PC coast for ease of your reference.
• The same ring-net operators recurred three years later prompting a serious conflict in Mayungu resulting in a ban imposed by the KWS Malindi Marine Park Warden ( a copy of the letter is attached for ease of your reference). Yet again the conflict has recurred once again. Why should The DFO continue to make poor fishermen fight and refuse to listen to the poor people’s plight? I would like to believe that there is no corruption but the unequivocal support given to ring-net operators by The DFO is a clear indication of how money can move mountains. Investigations into this matter will surely reveal incriminating evidence. Kindly treat the cause of the conflict and not the symptoms for a lasting solution.
• The Assistant Director of fisheries suspended ring-net fishing in the entire coast line of Kenya vide a letter, but the DFO Malindi refused to enforce the suspension despite repeated requests and went ahead to grant absolute user rights to rich ring-net operators trampling on the rights of thousands of poor fishermen. Poor fishermen in Kenya have no rights to earn a descent traditional living?  .
• All this time ring-nets have been operating illegally as they do not have a special license as required by law ( Any fishing net below 50 mm mesh size is illegal unless given a special license by the Director of fisheries). The ring-nets used are very much below 50 mm in mesh size, making it an illegal fishing gear.
• The fishermen operating on ring-net boats are not Kenyans but from a neighboring country and do not have work permits to engage in gainful employment as required by law.
• Furthermore, ring-netters illegally use scuba diving equipment contrary to the fisheries act. The DFO turns a blind eye and refuses to listen to these open facts that can be verified in the fisheries act governing fishing in Kenyan waters.
• Ring-nets are not targeting migratory fish but are targeting resident reef fish such as Top sail drummer (kusi), Unicorn fish (puju), Cat fish (fume), Grunf fish (tangu ndomo), White Snappers (Cheusi), Red snappers (Shogo) amongst others – posing a danger of fish stock depletion.
• The District Fisheries office has NO monitoring control and surveillance (MCS) capacity yet it gives permission to ring-net fishers that continue to decimate our marine ecosystems without any checks and balances in place. The new multi million shillings Fisheries boat in Malindi has never been used and is not in a serviceable condition due to gross negligence incapacitating MCS capability of the district fisheries office. This is a blatant waste of public funds. There is no will to rectify the situation as interested parties continue to reap benefits of the confusion resulting in poor accountability to the general public. Any attempt to correct the situation is met with hostile reaction by the DFO in Malindi.
• ring-net operators engage in commercial ring-net fishing well into the Malindi and Watamu Marine Reserves where no commercial fishing is allowed yet No action is taken. How long will the injustice continue. Arresting fishermen representatives and environmental lobby groups will not silence the peoples cry for good governance and sensible use of marine resources for the benefit of the current and future generations.
• The situation is very similar to one individual harvesting grass from a communal grazing area. Just imagine what a Maasai, Nandi or Somali pastoralist would do to safeguard their livelihood in such a situation. We are compelled to simplify this by giving a terrestrial example as coastal fishing is alien to most of our upcountry brothers and sisters.
• The District Fisheries Office received about 6 million Kenya Shillings for the construction of a cold storage facility that has never stored even a kilo of fish since its completion. The entire construction was handled single handedly under dubious and suspicious circumstances. The outcome is an under-size cold room that is gradually slipping into a state and disrepair giving birth to another white elephant and waste of public funds. The cold storage facilities at Vanga received the same funding and it is much bigger, professionally done and is in use. Why should mismanagement of public funds go unquestioned?. 
  

By a copy of this letter we humbly request the anti-corruption and public-complaints committee to initiate investigations to promote accountability of public funds in question. The cold storage facility is highly over priced leading to the impression of corrupt deals. As indigenous Kenyan citizens actively advocated for an ice plant and openly opposed the construction of a cold storage facility,  the DFO - as usual - turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to logical suggestions. As stakeholders and development conscious leaders we appeal to the Ministry of Fisheries to replace the DFO in the interest of promoting social harmony and promotion of coastal fishery as well as paving the way for accountability of public funds.
For and on behalf of the affected small scale fishermen, fish dealers and their family members we humbly appeal for your intervention to prevent recurrence of community outbursts and to promote social harmony.
- see also: Investigative reporting into the murky waters of East-African sea-fisheries

Prosecution dilemma means Western navies are arresting pirates and letting them go by Margot Kiser (TheEastAfrican)
Thanks to bad luck and a handy mobile phone, police off the northern coast of Kenya were able to arrest 11 unarmed Somali nationals last week.

The DUTCH PROPAGANDA channelled through the EU naval headquarters reminds us of a bad joke from the Dutch instituted Apartheid days of South Africa: “Having been called to a spot where a black African with 23 bullet wounds lay dead in a puddle of blood Officer van der Merwe only shook his head, murmuring: “Horrible suicide!”

Desperate Pirates stopped by EUNAVFOR Warship HNLMS TROMP (EU NAVFOR PR)
On Friday, the 2nd of April, a new Pirate Action Group (PAG) made a fast approach on EUNAVFOR Warship HNLMS Tromp and were stopped in their tracks. 
The operation started when a slow moving surface object was discovered by EUNAVFOR Warship HNLMS TROMP who  launched her Lynx helicopter to identify the target. The Lynx helicopter visually detected  a Pirate Action Group (PAG) consisting of one mother skiff and two attack skiffs. In one of the attack skiffs a ladder was sighted. 
When TROMP was spotted by the PAG, the suspected pirates, in the two attack skiffs, started to approach her at high speed. As they closed to a distance of 3 nautical miles two bursts of heavy machine gun warning shots were fired by HNLMS TROMP. The two attack skiffs stopped their approach, attempted to flee and and threw several undefined objects into the water. Afterwards, TROMP boarding team found 12 suspected pirates and 12 barrels gasoline (200 litres). No fire arms or piracy related goods were found. The mother skiff was destroyed.

Atrocities in the making? – Dutch get Maltese snipers on board.
The anti-piracy job by Kurt Sansone (TimesOfMalta)
Four soldiers who form part of the 12-member contingent of the Armed Forces of Malta EU anti-piracy operation off Somalia talk to Kurt Sansone about their mission. 
Captain Darren Micallef will not be reading about pirates to his two children. Instead he is on a mission to fight them when he boards a Dutch military ship as part of the EU’s anti-piracy operation off the Somali coast. 
He is the leader of a 12-member team from the Armed Forces that will be flying to The Netherlands this morning as part of Malta’s contribution to the UN-mandated EU mission to patrol the pirate-infested high seas off Somalia. 
Pirates are villains-turned-heroes in most children’s books, but Capt. Micallef knows full well the armed bandits that harass and hijack merchant ships off the Horn of Africa are anything but innocent cartoon characters. 
“It is hard to leave young children behind but my wife and I take decisions together and that gives me peace of mind,” he said. 
He served for six months at the EU’s operational headquarters in the UK where the anti-piracy effort is coordinated and knows the intricacies and dangers of such an operation. 
On the Dutch warship, Capt. Micallef will be the national contingent commander. His job is to coordinate the Maltese soldiers’ work with their Dutch counterparts and liaise with the military authorities in Malta. He makes it clear the AFM soldiers will be taking orders from Maltese superiors.
“I have responsibility for the whole contingent but I am confident we will do a good job because I have a group of competent and knowledgeable people,” he said, explaining the team had undergone five months of intensive training to be prepared for every eventuality. 
The tactical commander, Lieutenant Joseph Degiorgio, who will be responsible for the operations on the ground, said the training also focused on building strong interpersonal relations. 
“We will be operating in a confined space at sea for four months and it is important to have good team spirit in these situations,” he said. 
Having got married just seven months ago, Lt Degiorgio insists he is looking forward to serve his country abroad even if it means sacrificing time with his family. 
“I am honoured to serve my country and although my wife may have been irked, she fully understands what my job entails,” he said. 
Sergeant Jonathan Galdes, the father of a four-month-old child, also speaks of “honour” when talking about his motivation to participate in this mission. 
A qualified sniper, Sgt Galdes admits that if his wife was not four-square behind him he would not be where he is today. 
“Obviously, leaving a baby behind is hard. My body and mind will be on the ship but my heart will still be here in Malta,” he said. 
Sgt Galdes has 17 years of service with the army under his belt and had formed part of the team that participated in the humanitarian mission in Kosovo 10 years ago. He will be heading one of the two five-man teams on board the Dutch warship. 
The other team will be headed by Sergeant Alan Harvey, who had also participated in the Kosovo mission. 
With a smile, Sgt Harvey said he had been postponing his marriage for a long time but insisted his family were accustomed to his absence. 
“I have been on a number of training courses abroad. They understand the situation and know I am serving my country. It is satisfying for me to participate in this mission because it is frustrating to train and rarely use acquired skills in live operations,” he said, pointing proudly to the insignia of the Maltese flag on his arm. 
The 12 soldiers, some of whom have training experience with the US Marine Corps, are selected from the army’s C Special Duties Company, and participation is on a voluntary basis.

12 Maltese soldiers deployed to Somali coast (TheIndependent-Malta)

[N.B.: Many people of Malta are of the oppinion the  island state should opt out of the EU again and regain its status with the non-alligned movement of  independent states.]
 
Puntland Somali state vows to intensify war against piracy (APA)
The Somali semi-autonomous regional state of Puntland on Saturday announced it will strengthen its combat operations against the notorious pirates off the coast of Somalia. 
The Regional Security Minister General Yusuf Ahmed Kheyr said in a press conference in the port town of Bosasso, about 1,500 kilometres north-east of the capital that his administration lost patience, because he said the pirates have started to strangle the Somali people. 
“We are going to start big anti-pirate operations in the waters under our control and we will do our utmost to defeat the buccaneers,” Puntland’s Security Minister stated during his Saturday’s press conference in Bosaaso. 
“Your know they have abducted many commercial boats loaded with goods for Somalia, and that is what caused us to take the hard decision against the pirates whom we know are going to cause more problems on the vulnerable Somalis who have already been fed up with the endless civil war, poverty and insecurity” the minister angrily stated. 
He however denied speculations that some of the Puntland authorities have close relations with the pirates, saying that Puntlanders, including government officials and ordinary people will all take part in the major combat against piracy off its coast. 
He called on the international community to help his regional state defeat the rampant piracy off the coast of Somalia and especially in the north-eastern Somali waters. 
Meanwhile, the Somali Deputy Speaker has accused the foreign warships off the coast of Somalia of doing nothing in the field of fighting piracy, saying that instead they are engaged in illegal fishing. 
“There are more than a hundred submarines in the Gulf of Aden and in Somali waters and they could already defeat the pirates if they are true to what they claim,” the Somalia Deputy Speaker Professor Mohamed Omar Dalha said in a press conference in Mogadishu this weekend.

Nugaal Governor Reach Eyl, meet residents (garoweonline)
A delegation led by the governor of Somalia’s Nugal region under the Puntland State has reached the coastal town of Eyl, where they held talks with the town’s elite and residents. 
Accompanied by security forces and journalists, the delegation departed from Garowe, the administrative capital of Puntland on the night of April 1.    
Reporters from Radio Garowe are among the journalists, who will cover the trip of the governor. Nugal administration is said to be focused on how best to maintain the security in the region with more focus on Eyl that has been used by the Somali pirates as safe haven . 
Past few years Eyl used to be a den by the pirates to keep the ships hijacked in the high seas while waiting for ransom. But initiatives by the local residents uprooted any pirate legacy. 
Puntland government has put in place mechanism to distribute its security apparatus along the coastal areas including Eyl in a bid to bar sea-bandits to use as a base to carry out their illegal activities.

Infusion of new technologies can bring an end to the piracy menace by Pauline Wangui (TheEastAfrican)

————– no real peace in sight yet ————–

Artillery exchanges in the Somali capital Mogadishu during clashes between Islamist militants and government forces have killed at least 11 civilians, witnesses and medical sources said.
Both sides exchanged artillery fire during the fighting, which broke out Friday in the south and the north of the city.
“Eleven civilians including children were killed in the clashes, which ended in the evening,” Ali Muse, head of Mogadishu ambulance services, told AFP.
“The ambulances also collected 26 others who were injured,” he added.
“Seven of them died in northern Mogadishu while the other four died in Bakara,” the city’s biggest market, which is in the south.
Most of the seven civilians killed in northern Mogadishu came from the same family, said local resident Farah Abdulahi Jumale.
“A mortar struck a house in Manbolyon neighbourhood killing six family members,” Jumale said.
“It was (a) terrible incident and everybody was shocked.”
In another significant development, members of the moderate Sufi Ahlusuna sect said they had fought alongside government troops.
Their fighters had given “unforgettable lessons to the enemy who characterized to harm our society,” Nur Sheik Ali, spokesman for the group said.
Although the group has previously fought the hardline Shebab militia in the central Galgudud region, if confirmed, this would be the first time they had cooperated directly with government forces.
Several Somali government officials reached by AFP, while confirming the fighting, would not confirm the participation of the Ahlusuna.
The Ahlusuna (“Companions of the Prophet”) sect was founded in 1991 to defend the interests of Somalian Sufis from the growing influence of Wahabism, a more radical strain of Islam from the Gulf states.
The sect took up arms in 2009 after the Shebab destroyed a number of mausoleums housing celebrated sufis.

Somali gov’t says top Islamist rebel commanders killed (FOCUS News Agency)
The Somali government said on Saturday that its forces had killed 12 Islamist rebel fighters including three senior commanders in brief clashes in the Somali capital Mogadishu late on Friday, Xinhua informs.
The fighting erupted in the south of Mogadishu after Islamist fighters from the two rebel insurgent movements, Hezbul Islam and al Shabaab, attacked the Somali government checkpoint, causing the death of the three rebel commanders, senior government official said. “Six (fighters) from the Hezbul Islam were killed including two commanders while six more also died from Al Shabaab group including a middle rank commander,” Sheikh Yusuf Siyad Indha Adde, the minister of state for defense told reporters in the Somali capital Mogadishu.
The state minister also said that several assault rifles had also seized following the brief confrontation between the two sides.
The Islamist rebel movements wage nearly daily attacks on targets of the Somali government and the peacekeepers from the African Union (AU) based in the restive capital.
Islamist groups who control much of south and center of Somalia including large parts of the coastal city have not so far comment on the Somali government’s claims.

Al-Shabab bans tobacco chewing in Gedo region by Mohammed Omar Hussein (Somaliweyn)
Al-Shabab an armed rival Islamist group which controls most of the regions in south and central Somalia has on Saturday issued a decree to ban the  chewing of tobacco in Gedo region – northwest of the Somali capital Mogadishu. In the decree it is not stated what will be the punishment for those tobacco chewers who go against this verdict.
Gedo region is one of the leading regions in Somalia where the majority of the inhabitants are addicted to tobacco chewing.
A similar decree was previously imposed by the Islamic Courts Union which was once in control of most of the regions in south and central Somalia.
Al-Shabab has likewise banned Khat a narcotic plant grown in Kenya, which daily comes by plane to the towns in almost the entire Somalia to be chewed usually in the suburbs.

Italy gives radio station equipment to Somali information ministry (Mareeg)
The Italian government donated broadcast radio equipment to the information ministry of the Somali government, which will be used by Radio Mogadishu.
The Italian ambassador to Somali, who is based in Nairobi / Kenya, handed the equipment containing cassette players and radio equipment to Somalia’s ambassador to Kenya Mohamed Ali.
Mohamed Ali took it to Mogadishu and handed the equipment to the information minister of the Somali government, Dahir Mohamud Gelle.
Dahir Gelle said the equipment was important for Radio Mogadishu at this crucial time and thanked the Italian government for the donation.
He added that the Italian government established Radio Mogadishu, which has been working now for more than half a century.
Radio Mogadishu was launched in 1950s when the country was under colonial rule.

Mogadishu Media Houses Ordered to End Broadcasting Music and Songs (NUSOJ)
The Somali Insurgent group, Hisbul Islam, has on Saturday April 3, 2010 imposed oppressive orders on the radio stations in Mogadishu, especially those based in the areas under their control.
The orders include; not to air music and songs, not to name the foreign fighters as foreigners, but rather to name them “Muhaajiriin”.
In a press conference held on Saturday in Mogadishu, Moalim Hashi Mohamed Farah, the man in charge of Mogadishu for Hisbul Islam said that any station that fails to act in accordance with these instructions will face serious consequences. “These rules will come into effect within 10 days beginning from today.” Moalim Hashi Mohamed Farah said in his press conference.
This is the first time the media stations in Mogadishu are publicly imposed on such orders. Six of the eight radio stations under the Hisbul Islam and Al-Shabaab held neighbourhoods of Mogadishu, of which five of them are based in Bakaro, will be directly effected by these oppressive rules.
Similar orders has been imposed on the media stations in the southern Somali regions controlled by Al-Shabaab already, causing the journalists to flee or to become Al-Shabaab hostages.  
This is a further indication that the media freedom of Somalia is completely under siege.

“Salaam Aleikum,” she says, greeting a man who has called in to the radio station. 
“Yes, hello,” he replies anxiously. “I want to talk about pirates. These guys aren’t being treated fairly.”
This is a typical day at Radio Mogadishu, the only relatively free radio station in south central Somalia where journalists can broadcast what they like — without immediately worrying about being beheaded. 
The station’s 90ft antennas, which rise above the rubble of the neighbourhood, have become a beacon of freedom. 
Though the callers enjoy the safety of their anonymity, Radio Mogadishu’s 100 staff are still considered legitimate targets by the Shabab insurgent group which associates them with the government. The journalists eat and sleep here, in very primitive conditions, rarely venturing out. Most get paid a few hundred pounds a month. 
Some, like the station’s senior political correspondent, Abdi Aziz Mahamoud Africa, strut around the compound in baggy jeans and Western-style jerseys, a dress style that could get them killed in other parts of town. 
The country is in the hands of a weak but internationally recognised transitional government that does not have a grip on the capital but is ensconced in the hilltop neighbourhood where the station sits. 
Few people even live here anymore. 
Somalia has become one of the most dangerous places in the world to practise journalism, with more than 20 journalists assassinated in the past four years alone. 
“We miss them,” Africa said about his fallen colleagues. 
He cracked an embarrassed smile when asked about his name. “It’s because I’m dark, really dark,” he said. 
Africa used to work at one of the city’s other ten radio stations but decided to move on after fighters with the Shabab dropped by and threatened to kill the reporters if they did not broadcast pro-Shabab news. Africa called the Shabab meddlers “secret editors” and now carries a gun. 
“I tried to get the other journalists to buy pistols,” Africa remembered. “But nobody listened to me.” 
Another reporter, Musa Osman, said that his real home was only about a mile away. “But I haven’t seen my kids for months,” he said. 
He drew his finger across his throat and laughed a sharp, bitter laugh when asked what would happen if he went home. 
The station is a crumbling, bullet-scarred reflection of this entire nation, which has been essentially without government for nearly two decades. 
One of the buildings on the compound is a heap of pulverised rubble with a blown-out ceiling. “Black Hawk Down,” one young journalist explained, almost proudly. The building was apparently bombed in 1993, when the station was run by General Mohammed Farah Aideed, a notorious Somali warlord whose militiamen fought against American troops in a vicious street battle, later immortalised by the book and film, Black Hawk Down. 
Indeed, Radio Mogadishu may be one of the last surviving repositories of Somali history. 
In a shadowy back room, past ancient turntables and gutted speakers with wires shooting out, are miles and miles of reel-to-reel tapes stacked floor to ceiling in 10ft-high racks. They are carefully labelled in fading ink: old speeches, cultural songs, patriotic songs, interviews with nomads and other mementoes of a vanishing culture. The United Nations is trying to help the Somalis convert the vintage tapes to compact discs before humidity and time overtake them.
“This place is a cultural treasure, believe it or not,” said Mukhtar Ainashe, a presidential adviser.

Government denounces Hizbul-Islam’s orders against the Press by Mohammed Omar Hussein (Somaliweyn)
The Somali transitional federal government has strongly condemned instructions given out by Hizbul-Islam an armed rival Islamist faction in Somalia.
Sheikh Abdirizak Mohammed Qeylow the spokesman of the Ministry of information of the Somali transitional federal government has strongly condemned the instructions released by Hizbul-Islam against the local radio stations operating in Mogadishu.
“The so called Hizbul-Islam is now like a drowning man who clinches to straw, they are having no other options other than oppressing the media, they are ordering the radio stations not to air any sort of song may it be the national anthem I know very well what they want to fill the gap of the songs they are bringing the songs of Al-Qaida, and why they are doing all this is just because they are envious of Al-Shabab” said Qeylow.
Qeylow added that this is a way of eliminating the pious Somali traditional, and a way of convincing Al-shabab by saying that the foreigner fighters on the ground cannot be called foreigners, but brothers in Islam.
Eventually Qeylow has said that the statements from Hizbul-Islam will have no effects on the Somali media.

Hizbul Islam spokesman invites bin Laden to Somalia by Bill Roggio (longwarjournal)

… or is it the headlights of the oncoming bully-train from the West?
Light at the end of the tunnel by Ibrahim Megag Samater (*)
Light At the End of the Tunnel: Some Reflections on the Struggle of the Somali National Movement 
I. Prologue 
What follows is not a narrative account of the activities of the Somali National Movement (SNM) since the start of its struggle against the military regime of Siyad Barre. Nor is it an impartial academic evaluation of its performance and impact on Somali politics. It is not an analysis of the Siyad Barre regime or an examination of the role of external players in the Somali debacle. It is none of these and yet it is all of them. It is none of the above because it does not deal with each aspect with the necessary and sufficient depth and extent required for full treatment. It is all of these because these aspects of the Somali tragedy are touched upon in one way or the other. 
This presentation is as its title says: reflections. And reflections by their very nature are untidy. They go back and forth in time and cross-sectionally across topics without any predesigned order. In this respect many aspects of the Somali problem are discussed. The zigzags in international policy towards Somalia, together with many false starts, are described. The experience and development of the Republic of Somaliland and its essential difference from the rest of Somalia is brought out. After a digression on the problems of politico-economic processes in Africa, a return is made to critical evaluation of the struggle of the SNM. 
But there is method in the madness. In reviewing topics, the connecting thread is to seek those factors that were causal in the decay and destruction of the Somali state and the effect of that destruction on civil society. The seeking for causal factors itself means the identification of those elements essential for revival. In this search for casual factors, the torch light focuses on several dualities: dependence v. delving inward; authoritarian state power v. participatory democracy and traditional structure v. “modern” institutions. Even though all these dualities are interconnected, there is a contradiction — complementary spectrum within each duality: in other words, a dialectical struggle. 
There is a parable in Somali children’s folklore about a race between a fox and a tortoise. Both finally reached home. But the fast fox, in its hurry, met with many obstacles, difficulties, and twists and turns. We may say that the fox’s situation was a case of more haste and less speed. The tortoise, on the other hand, was definitely slow, but it reached home with steady and sure steps and with less damage. Can we take this parable as an illustration of the choices available to us in social change: depending on tradition itself for continuity (tortoise) or throwing the old overboard and welcoming the new with gusto? Or is a dialectical intermix better than the either/or? 
The discussion of such matters in the text is conducted with specific reference to the practical struggle of the SNM — as well as its vision. It is therefore neither a theoretical evaluation nor a practical account. It has a little of both, but it aims to sum up the experience in an introductory way! 
Finally, I am not impartial. As one of the leaders of the SNM itself, I cannot be impartial. Irrespective of whether we in the SNM made mistakes or not, I cannot be impartial to the cause of liberation against dictatorial despotism and injustice. But this does not mean lack of objectivity. A partisan for liberty cannot do without a merciless search for truth. Impartiality is required of a judge in a judicial case. But historical causes require partisanship with objectivity. 
II. Predilections of Policy 
A cursory glance at the confusion and tragic complexity of Somali politics today may convince the observer — and sometimes the participants — of the impossibility of a solution. Many are persuaded to throw up their hands in despair. At the same time, many players plunged into the deep water of Somali politics with undue haste, only to pop up again and get out without giving the swim a try. 
The pessimist has many points stacked in his favor. 
1. The United States, the major power in post-cold war politics, led the international community — that was moved by pictures of starving children — into the quick plunge of Operation Restore Hope. The amassed technology, the number of troops, the apparent resolve, the pomp of the military machine, and the glitter of the media — it was a big show, marvelous to watch. Nation after nation joined the bandwagon and declared its willingness to send troops to Somalia. For the general public of world opinion and specifically that of the United States — uninitiated in the history and slippery politics of our small nation — it was as if the international community had at last come of age. The cold war is over and peace is no longer endangered by superpower rivalry. As for local conflicts, the world can act, in a collective, multilateral fashion led by the only remaining superpower, to resolve them or at least contain them and prevent them from spreading and disturbing the larger prevalent peace. The humanitarian consequences of these local conflicts can simultaneously be dealt with in a resolute manner. Thus, the stage was set and Somalia became the prime test of the new interventionist mission I
–a contradiction in terms or the first installment of newspeak phrases of an Orwellian age — which became mired in a local civil war, shooting and killing the people it was supposed to save, and destroying their homes. The interventionists just added a new name — UNIUS — to the long list of the contesting so-called “Warlords.” Finally, Operation Restore Hope ended up — via UNOSOM II — in debacle, as “Operation Despair Rescue. ” 
2. The United Nations Organization, as the depository of the international community’s collective wisdom and systems of action, has been bungling the Somali crisis from beginning to end. The day Siyad Barre was defeated, the UN bodies and staff fled as if they were part of his regime,2 rather than staying and performing their expected duty of serving the people. If evacuation was dictated by reasons of staff security, a rationale not wholly acceptable, then at least a stop-gap measure and a plan of return should have been put in place. 
In lieu of a consistent policy and line of action, what we have witnessed on the part of these international organizations led by the UN is a mass of ad hoc activities moving like a pendulum from extreme to extreme. From the extreme of total neglect and abandonment there was a sudden move again to a position of over-involvement and domination. The mandate was no longer confined to the traditional functions of the UN and its related agencies, such as the delivery of humanitarian aid and peacekeeping. It now included forced disarmament of the factions involved in the civil war (in other words, direct intervention which, evidently, cannot be neutral), “guiding” or, to tell the truth, running the process of reconciliation and attempting to determine the shape and form of its end product — a government of “national unity.” The new concept of peacemaking was coined and the Secretary-General had to work hard to obtain new resolutions from the Security Council in order to obtain the empowerment necessary to implement these new burdens. In the meantime, the UN has to create its own special bureaucracy — United Nations Operation for Somalia or UNOSOM — to carry on administrative as well as judicial functions, because there is no “government.” In other words, the UN put itself in the position of a new outside or colonial administrator after the collapse of the Siyad dictatorship until such time as a government of “national unity” is created. This aggressive interventionism on the part of the UN apparatus has been given a jolt by the withdrawal of American — and later other western) troops early in
1994. But despite this shock, up to now, we see no sign of the UN apparatus abandoning its political-interventionism. We see no indication of a broader and wiser policy with a long-term vision to replace the current ad hocism.
3. Last, but not least, the pessimist would point to the abysmal record of the Somalis themselves. For twenty-one long years, they have acquiesced to one of history’s most horrible tyrannies. After the first few years of Siyad Barre’s “revolutionary honeymoon,” the nature of his regime became clear to all. By the end of the Somali-Ethiopian war of 1977 -78, it became evident to all who could think clearly that the continued existence of this regime undermined the future existence of the nation itself. Somalis with conscience foresaw that if the regime were allowed to continue to pursue its policies unchecked, that by the time it is overthrown or it just comes to its natural end, there may be nothing left to save. They were, like the prophet Noah, crying at the deaf ears of their countrymen and the rest of the world, that the monster should be stopped and the monstrosity put to an end. 
Yet the reaction of their Somali countrymen was to cooperate in the continuation of their own oppression. They have allowed Siyad Barre to play on the characteristic rivalry of the clans so well that they were wiIling to be hoodwinked into bribery, cajolement and blackmail, even to bear arms against a so-called hostile clan. The fervent competition for the regime’s favor reached such a pitch that any man of integrity who resisted the co-option risked imprisonment, the loss of life and property, or being labeled as a madman. Likewise, any group, clan, or region, attempting to safeguard its rights, protect itself or voice opinions for the better running of the nation’s affairs risked genocide by the regime…with the apparently willing cooperation by the rest of the Somali community. It somehow escaped the attention of Somalis that the acquiescence — if not downright approval and collaboration — by the rest of the community in singling out a single section, clan, or region for persecution and genocide spelled the same fate for the rest.
Nonetheless, the end of the regime came through a combination of a number of factors. The persistence, to the point of death, of the minority that was leading the armed struggle against it, at last proved that the dictator can be opposed, resisted and finally defeated. The defeat of his army by the militants of the Somali National Movement and the total collapse of the governmental machinery in the North after 1988 encouraged the incipient opposition in the South to be braver. With some help from the SNM, the United Somali Congress (USC), representing the bulk of the population of the center from Galkacayo to Mogadishu and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) of the Kismayo area were able to fan the flames of the armed struggle against Siyad Barre in the south. They were joined by the normally silent, but very large population, west of Mogadishu and all the way down to Kismayo. These people in the southwest, who were under-represented throughout all the regimes, now had the chance to participate in some real action determining their destiny through their organizations — the newly formed Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and a southern wing ofthe Somali National Movement (SNM). 
By this time, the Siyad regime was near collapse. True to its nature, the dictatorship was unable to compromise. Whatever carrots it offered were either wrongly delivered, insufficient, or offered too late. Instead, it continued to alienate and antagonize ever newer elements of the society. The clever manipulation of the divisive clan structure of Somali society paid its final dividend of reducing the manipulator to what he really was — a lonely madman. The international press, at this time, dubbed him the “Mayor of Mogadishu.” The loss of the North, and the closure of Berbera port, the main exit port for Somali exports of livestock, put the regime in financial bankruptcy. At this time also, with the horrible massacres of Hargeisa and Burao becoming evident to the whole international community, those governments supporting the dictatorship could no longer do so brazenly and had to terminate their aid to him.
4. Whatever the cause may be, the pessimist would continue arguing — whether through the sole action of the opposition, whether through erosion of internal and external support, or whether through old age and madness, the dictator was finally pushed out. But did the Somalis seize this long-awaited opportunity to engage, now that Siyad Barre was out of the picture? Did genuine reconciliation efforts pick up the pieces, rebuild the tom social fabric of their society, heal the wounds, and put their nation back on the road? The pessimist would give a clear and resounding NO. He would point to the horrible bloodletting that ensued after Siyad Barre, to the senseless fratricidal war of clans, to the unending victimization of the weakest, that finally led to the international intervention mentioned earlier. . He would point to the inability of present Somali leaders and the so-called movements they represent, despite all the pushing and promoting of international organizations and friendly 1) neighbors, to come to any sensible working arrangement of their affairs so far. He would point to the adamant refusal earlier in 1989 of the SNM, the use, and the SPM — the three movements who were conducting the at;1′J100 struggle against the regime at the time — of any and all initiatives ah:ease fire and dialogue between them and the Siyad Barre regime. 
These movements, in those days, indicated the futility of any dialogue with Siyad Barre, their unwillingness to grant him on the table what he has. already lost in the field, and argued instead the appropriateness of conducting any dialogue, compromise, and rearrangement of their future by the Somalis themselves outside the framework of the Siyad Barre regime. This looked like more than an empty promise when the three movements made a formal agreement in mid-I990 among themselves on the modalities of their cooperation during the struggle against the regime and after. Specifically, the agreement envisioned that after the overthrow the dictator, the movement(s) responsible for the victory will form a government of national unity led by, but not necessarily confined to, them Despite the glimmer of hope provided by this agreement, the actual behavior of the signatory movements at the hour of victory – the pessimist’s argument continues — was quite contrary to the letter and spirit (1)the agreement. Whatever the politics and internal pressures acting upon them, separately or concurrently, a faction of the use formed a “government” of its own without consulting its partners and even parts of its most active wings. The SNM declared the separation of the North -the former British Somaliland — from the rest of the country and formed the Republic of Somaliland. The SPM, for a short while, fought against its former ally, the USC. The description of the subsequent melee need not detain us here. 
The pessimists themselves can be considered to be of three types: 
Those who have given up hope that the Somalis can make their own history, and can come up with a solution to the crisis. This view looks for an outside solution and, in a nutshell, is calling for recolonization, with all the consequences this entails not only for Somalis, but also for the rest of Africa and other Third World countries wherever and whenever local conflicts become intractable. 
(b) Those who despair of any solution from outside. This point of view considers the Somali clan structure, the political chess game that goes along with it, and the enigmatic nomadic psychology of the Somalis as too much of a puzzle for non-Somalis to tackle. Non Somalis can play only a secondary, complementary role, but the initiatives have to be taken by the Somalis. 
(c) Those who despair of both internal and external solutions. This point of view u the most dismal — waits for a miracle to happen. Well, “miracles” n in the sense of the improbable — do happen. But when they do, they demand as their prerequisite somebody who is willing to take the initiative, and who. despite the tremendous odds, perseveres with an unshakable faith in the pursuance of the vision. “Faith” as the old adage maintains “moves mountains.”
Ironically, policy options recommended by the pessimist of the first type are the same as those preferred by the enthusiasts of the new global interventionism. Similarly, policy recommendations resulting from the pessimism of the second type more often than not coincide with isolationist views — a sort of unrealistic laissez-faire attitude toward international relations. Since one or the other of these attitudes was predominant at anyone time in international circles (as well as in sections of the Somali elites), we should not be surprised at seeing involvement alternating quickly between policy extremes of over-involvement to total neglect that made many of us giddy. 
III. False Starts 
In this presentation, we differ with all of the above conceptions and viewpoints as well as the lines of action that flow from them. We believe the Somali clan structure, and the politics it reflects, to be no more mysterious than other more or less “ethnic” systems pertaining elsewhere in Africa and Asia. It is a structure that can be studied (and has been studied), analyzed, and understood. As such, it is amendable to policy-making, though not totally malleable as some may think. The cultural, linguistic, and religious homogeneity of the Somali people is not a guarantee against conflict, but helps in understanding and facilitates matters of policy-making. Such analyses and understanding are not a monopoly of Somalis alone. Outsiders, unhampered by clan affiliation, can give objective and impartial analysis and recommendations, provided they have no axe to grind. 
Useful foreign contributions to the present Somali crisis in the form of arbitration, encouragement of productive local processes, and material and humanitarian assistance are not only possible, but necessary at this critical stage in which Somali institutions either have broken down or are in an incapacitated state. Foreign players will range from private volunteer organizations, foreign governments, and international bodies acting either in concert or separately, though coordination will always be essential. 
Yet despite this need for foreign involvement, the argument that Somalis themselves should provide the key to the solution of their problems is basically correct, simplistic as it appears. Here, the pessimist’s second argument — those who despair of outside contribution — have more potency than the other pessimist’s view — giving up on Somalis to make their own history. If it is true — which we hold to be the case — that Somalis are primarily responsible for their debacle, with some foreign muddling and intervention of course, then the converse must also be true. In other words, the Somalis must also be responsible for the remaking of their society, with some foreign help along the way. Indeed, we would go beyond the “should” and assert that they are capable of doing so. 
It is the main import of this article that the Somalis not only are” capable of shouldering this responsibility, but are actually doing so even 1 now. The very process of remaking Somali society is going on before our eyes if only we care to look. The tragedy itself and the debacle of the last few years give renewed opportunities for tackling many issues that were’ either missed or mishandled in the recent history of the nation. . 
Needless to say, the availability of an opportunity does not guarantee its correct utilization or that the attempt to do so would be successful. This would depend on many factors foremost among which are the attitudes adopted, and actions taken or not taken, by the actors concerned, both domestic and foreign. The point here is that the opportunity exists. If full advantage is taken of this opportunity, chances are that Somali society would be reconstituted for the better and may provide lessons for other societies where “ethnic” conflict threatens the existence of their nations as presently constituted. 
The swift alternation between over-involvement and abandonment by the international community creates its own events that in turn produce their own effects and so on. By the time a chain of events plays itself out we are so far removed from the original positions with so much damage done and opportunities lost. Thus, a new drama is played over an already ongoing tragedy, with the result that the deeper undercurrents of the original tragedy are sometimes overshadowed by the new fanfare. It is . this atmosphere that creates the present tendency to overrate what is happening in Mogadishu and its surroundings, and generalize it to the rest of the country. The scriptwriters and the dramatist personae of the new drama concentrate on their own scenarios and subplots to the almost total neglect of the themes of the major play. If the overt playing out of certain themes (or scenes) of the original play seem to contradict or threaten their performance, the danger has to be met either by elimination or assuming its non-existence. 
Viewed in this light, the total silence on the causes of the Somali tragedy may be understood. The majority of Somali leaders and intellectuals, especially in the South, are not willing to deal with the present crisis as primarily a consequence of the past and, therefore, partly a consequence of their own actions and attitudes. The crisis is viewed simply as a conflict of clans and a struggle of so-called “war lords” over power, after the collapse of central authority and the departure of Siyad Barre. Similarly in the international arena, only the present conflict is discussed as if the genie suddenly popped out of the bottle and can suddenly be put back again if only these “leaders” could be brought together to reach an agreement. Nothing is said about the long years of stifling dictatorship in which the Somali state, social values, and the institutions based upon them were being gradually undermined, a process of destruction in which foreigners wittingly or unwittingly had their share. Nothing is also said about the equally long resistance to this nihilistic rule in which alternative options of organizing society were being tested. 
Such questions as to why conflict among the various clans which throughout history was confined to particular localities at particular times, now took this form of gigantic national catastrophe, or why the political factions now existing are purely clan-based, whereas the political parties prior to the 1969 military coup were on the whole built on alliances across clans, are rarely raised, let alone investigated. Somali intellectuals who, on the whole, contributed little to the struggle against the dictatorship, show scarce interest, if any, in investigating the relationship between traditional clan structures and overall political development, or the consequences of politicized clanism. Such investigation would, hopefully, enable us to see whether, and how, the traditional structure can help reshape future institutions of the nation as well as being itself reshaped. Instead, they continue to bemoan the so-called overwhelming role of clanism while their actual behavior is more “clannish” in the political sense, than their ordinary nomadic clansmen. And to their final shame, they advocate shifting the responsibility of reconstructing their society to the international community, a recommendation which is only a measure of their own bankruptcy as a group. 
This lack of seriousness breeds animosity to radical departures from the beaten path. We have mentioned earlier that during the reign of the Siyad Barre dictatorship any group raising opinions for the better running of the nation’s affairs were marked out for persecution, while the rest of the population either acquiesced or cooperated in that persecution. The international community also adjusted itself to that atmosphere and cooperated accordingly. The present unwillingness to dissect the legacy of that regime or the hostile attitude adopted towards those who refuse to go along with the conspiracy of silence may be considered as a continuation of those previous attitudes. The road of self-analysis and self-correction was never paved with roses. It is always easier to repress painful matters and avoid going along uncharted territory, even though the correct path may be staring us in the face. 
IV. The Unique Case of Somaliland 
A most revealing illustration of this suppression of relevant matters is the almost total omission by the Secretary-General of the UN in his reports to the Security Council of the Republic of Somaliland and what is happening there, as if it did not exist. On the contrary, understanding the almost lonely and heroic efforts of the people of Somaliland at reconstruction as well as the reasons for the break away holds a major key to the larger riddle of Somalia. Several impartial observers have pointed to the relative stability of Somaliland. Inheriting a totally destroyed country, with almost nothing to build on, the people of Somaliland began literally to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. They avoided. major internal conflicts and man-made famines. Today, they feed themselves, have one of the lowest malnutrition rates in Africa, and are putting in place the future edifices of a viable system of governance. 
In the south, in contrast, the major destruction took place after Siyad Barre fled and not in the struggle against him. Attempts at reconciliation most often give way to renewed waves of conflict, and famine, mainly man-made, reached the huge proportions that “justified” the intervention. Here, in this contrasting situations of two parts of the same previous country, may lie a lesson. Instead of studying the relevant success of Somaliland, encouraging it and drawing conclusions that may be of use to the south, as well as to the future of the whole, we find, on the part of both the southern elite and international bureaucracy, an unreasonable animosity towards Somaliland. Instead of giving a helping hand, the UN bureaucracy is bent on destroying Somaliland and nullifying the efforts of its people, as if a cancerous growth has to be eradicated. The southern elite, on their part, repeat phrases on the sacredness of Somali unity and the inviolability of the territorial integrity of the former Somalia, while their own backyard is burning. 
Be that as it may, being misunderstood, isolated, or persecuted is nothing new to the Somali National Movement (SNM) and its leaders.
As the political movement which bore the brunt of the struggle against Siyad Barre, it has learned how to deal with persecution, vilification, and isolation. As the political organ that gave birth to the democratic experimentation in Somaliland, and is still guiding it in more ways than one, it has learned how to forgive, how to compromise and accommodate, and how to relinquish state power when this is dictated by the principles for which it Was struggling, even at the temporary cost of its own internal unity. While the so-called “war lords” in the South are at each others throats, the Somali National Movement (SNM) did not find it difficult to transfer state power even prior to the disarmament of its liberation forces and the armed militia of other clans who opposed it during its guerrilla’ warfare against the military dictatorship. 
I can recall no other example of a liberation movement which won power through the barrel of the gun and which was simultaneously so uninterested in ruling with its gun. Even in those cases where the movement concerned was serious about the democratic transformation of society, elaborate measures were taken after victory to ensure that the victor in the armed struggle also remained so in the peace. This was done as if the accomplishment of the required social change could only be performed by that particular organization and no other. The result of this type of political engineering is the ossification of the revolutionary movement and the gradual loss of its originally genuine support. A good example of this type of development is the FLN in Algeria. In other cases, the victor in the revolutionary armed struggle refuses the participation as partners of other actors who were in the field -irrespective of whether they were acting in parallel for the same goal or in opposition. 
Sometimes it so happens that some sections of the society are unorganized during the struggle and support neither side. The victorious revolutionary movement then interprets that dormancy as tacit support to the enemy who now lost. This section now comes under suspicion and is prevented from acting as partners in the new democracy; The result in the two latter cases is an invitation to a new round of civil war either in the early stages of the victory itself or in the ensuing later years as a reaction to the increasing monopolization of power by the victorious group. In countries .where political organizations are more or less coterminus with ethnic groups, the explosiveness of this kind of situation needs no emphasis. Such may be said to be the case in Mozambique and Angola, where the ruling groups and the opposition are now in the different stages of learning the process of conflict resolution through dialogue after a lengthy period of painful fratricide. 
The new experiment in South Africa, where the leading liberation movement, the African National Congress, came to power through a process of dialogue and reconciliation with its former enemy, is a promising, though untested, development. It augurs well for the future as a promising, less violent means of achieving freedom, justice and democracy. All men of goodwill cannot but congratulate and wish well the leaders of the ANC and others involved in this new experiment. Certainly, the ANC is not a newcomer in the struggle for justice. It is almost a century old and certainly much older than many liberation movements that came to power before it did. It therefore has accumulated plenty of experience, both of its own unique struggle and that of others, that can allow it to chart a new road. Specifically, the pitfalls suffered by the peoples of Africa who, after gaining freedom from colonial rulers did not realize true liberation but slipped back into the darkness of dictatorships and misery, are very instructive. That the monopolization of power by the successful movements played a critical role in the retrogression to the abyss cannot escape the attention of the newcomers. 
I have no intention of putting the SNM on the same pedestal as the African National Congress. Certainly in terms of age, the long accumulated experience, the complexity of the issues involved in its past and present struggle, the importance of the country and theater in which it is operating, as well as the stature of its leadership, the ANC is a giant. Moreover, a lot of political organizations (liberation movements as well as established political parties) are eclipsed into dwarfs. In a comparison of this sort, the SNM would appear as the dwarf of the dwarfs. It belongs not only to a small country, but its support can be considered to be based mainly on one clan of that small country. It has no particular ideology that can, despite the smallness, give it luster. And in terms of
leadership, it is a listless movement. 
Some may even go further and accuse the SNM of being a visionless movement, without a program, without a disciplined cadre, and thus incapable of forming a cohesive administration that would fill the void. These critics would point to the record of its administration after liberation. From 1991-93, the paralysis and the civil strife caused the people to lose patience. They replaced the SNM’s administration in early 1993, despite the wishes of the then existing leaders of the SNM. 
Such criticism, we maintain, takes a superficial stand. It confuses the personalities of the leadership with the organic nature of the movement. On the contrary, we are here arguing that in these seemingly negative qualities lie the greatness of the SNM. As a movement that primarily drew its support from the narrow base of a clan it succeeded in bringing down the strong edifice of the national dictatorship. The so-called lack of ideology gave it independence and resilience. The absence of “charismatic” leaders and disciplined cadre is one of the ways in which it avoided the build-up of dictatorial tendencies within itself. If the Republic of Somaliland today enjoys relative stability within the context of conditions in the Horn of Africa, then we need to try to understand why. If the people of that small country are surviving through selfreliance, despite international boycotts and deliberate sabotage, then one should try to determine how they are doing it. And if the Somalilanders have found ways to reconcile their differences and reconstruct their society, then perhaps the rest of Somalia would benefit from knowing how it has been done. 
The two parts of the former Somali Republic, i.e., the former British Somaliland and the former Trusteeship territory of Somalia, have had the same historical experience since their independence and union in 1960 until the overthrow of the last government of Siyad Barre. Could the different reactions of the two parts to the breakdown of the United Somali state be due to their different colonial experiences under the British and the Italians? Maybe, for the differential impact of the two colonial systems on the underlying traditional structure could have had different consequences. Could the different reactions be due to differences in the underlying traditional structure and cultural values? Unlikely, since the points of similarities in the Somali cultural milieu, irrespective of geographical location, overwhelm points of differences. But before one delves into that distant past, it is certainly more fruitful to look into the most recent past which just merges into the present. 
While we do not deny whatever influences the above-mentioned factors may have, we maintain that the relative success of the Republic of Somaliland, as well as its weaknesses, are primarily due to the experience of the SNM in the struggle against the Siyad Barre dictatorship. How it handled (or mishandled) issues at hand; how it utilized or missed opportunities; and how obstacles either enriched or obscured that experience are all part of the essential record of achievement. If self-reliance, internal democracy, and resolution of problems through dialogue and compromise are the characteristics that today differentiate Somaliland from Somalia, it is because these qualities were learned and practiced by the SNM in the heat of the struggle for liberation. If it were not so, it would not have been easy for the movement to offer the hand of reconciliation to those who did not support it even prior to total victory. Nay, it would not have been easy for the militants of the movement to give safe passage to those Somali exrefugees from Ethiopia who, through an ironical mutation of history, became part and parcel of the apparatus of the dictatorial regime and who,” for all intents and purposes, replaced their former hosts. 
V. Perspectives on African Development 
In order to understand the experiences gained by the SNM during the struggle and to put these experiences in broader perspective it may be more useful to consider some issues fundamental to the crisis of underdevelopment in African countries. These broader issues impinge upon both economic policies and the system of governance at large. The failure of most African regimes, after the euphoria of the first few years following independence, in both economic performance and the democratic governance of their peoples, compel re-thinking these issues. For our purposes, these issues can be formulated as: 
I. What is the most appropriate way to forge a nation? Is it through forcing a centralized state machinery or through the voluntary associations of the existing components of civil society?
2. What is the interplay between “modern” national institutions, such as political parties and state bureaucracy and traditional structures such as clan (ethnic) systems?
3. To what extent should one look inward or outward for the solution of one’s problems?
In order to understand the experiences gained by the SNM during the struggle and to put these experiences in broader perspective it may be more useful to consider some issues fundamental to the crisis of ” underdevelopment in African countries. These broader issues impinge !if!.
Upon both economic policies and the system of governance at large. The failure of most African regimes, after the euphoria of the first few years fol1owing independence, in both economic performance and the democratic governance of their peoples, compel re-thinking these issues. For our purposes, these issues can be formulated as:
These issues can be restated as the questions of dictatorship vs. democratic development, centralization vs. autonomy and self-reliance vs. dependency. No matter how they are phrased the essence remains the same; and the answering of one issue in a certain manner sets the pattern . for the rest and forecloses other paths of development.
It is a well-known story that in the early decades after independence African governments pursued a statist approach in politico-development matters which relied heavily on foreign borrowing, not only capital and technical help, but even ideas and sometimes wholesale institutions. Since economic growth, as such, was perceived to be the magic key to the problems of development and since Africa lacked an experienced capitalist class with the wherewithal to carry on the process, the initiative was shifted to the state. The attraction of this approach to the new ruling elites was further increased by the example of the Soviet model where an apparently former backward country has succeeded in transforming itself through utilizing the state machinery. 
The very words used, and naturally still in use, such as “development” “modernization,” and “progress” assume moving from one stage to another. For the development experts of the time, and their African pupils, who were molded by the same educational process, this meant, implicitly if not explicitly, the attempt to emulate the attributes of the “developed” West. The attributes to be emulated include, of course, the political institutions, to the extent possible. The consequent development strategy thus gave scant attention to the real complexities of the societies that were to be developed. It goes without saying that, according to this attitude, African indigenous values and institutions are inimical to “development” as they are rooted in “backward” conditions. The corollary that development policy should be pursued, in spite of the people, follows immediately. The result of this attitude is the transformation of development policy into, in the words of a famous African writer, “an epic struggle, of the very few who know, to manipulate or coerce the many who are ignorant into a new and better mode of being in spite of themselves.” Needless to say, all this obviates the essential in development, which is the learning process of the majority of the people. The sustainability of the development process in the longer run can be ensured through the commitment of the people to, their participation in, and their internalization of the requirements of that process. 
But the state machinery available to Africans on the eve of independence was a colonial product, born out of a long history of oppression and ill-suited to purposes of genuine self-development. This colonial state was viewed by our people with suspicion, and rightly so. 
They took refuge in strengthening communal and kinship systems. Hence the divergence between the interests of the state and its machinery on the one hand and that of civil society on the other. We know too well that during the early years ~f the euphoria of independence we did not question the relevance of the inherited state machine to our goals. Thus, we did not attempt to qualitatively transform it, but simply adopted it wholesale. Lacking the experience of its predecessor and burdened with an ever-increasing role, the new African state tried to fill the lacunae through expansion. Unable to deliver the goods and thus obtain compliance through meeting the genuine demands of the people, it tried to elicit such compliance through compulsion. With the degeneration of the early democracies into empty shells, authoritarian methods, one party systems, and military dictatorships became the rule. Because their authority is not based on the consent of the governed, these authoritarian regimes are, in fact, less authoritative. They, therefore, become increasingly concerned with short-term security matters rather than long-term development. Is there any wonder, then that the situation today in Africa is generally characterized by stagnation, corruption, repression, resistance, civil wars, and mass starvation? 
The challenge to all Africans for the last decade and a half has been to pioneer an alternative path of development that leads away from this impasse and opens the door to real progress. Among the clear lessons is the realization that the present crisis in Africa is not only about economic matters but, on the contrary, involves larger political and moral issues. Overcoming the inhibiting legacy of the colonial state compels an inward looking perspective that examines the present society and its mores for ways of transforming it. The first requirement in this self-examination for an alternative path is to find creative political initiatives for eliciting the necessary participation of the people. We have already seen the limits of elitist forms of democracy, i.e., those who imitate the West, as well as coerced forms of “mass mobilization” that only endorse what has already been decided by an authoritarian state. In fact, these are not two different and opposing forms of organizing society. On the contrary, they finally converge in the form of the authoritarian African state. This is not surprising since the content of both types is the dictatorial way of deciding for the people. 
Both forms, i.e., elitist corruption of democracy and “socialist” coerced “mass mobilization,” breed cynicism, further alienation from the state, and withdrawal into pre-colonial communal and kinship ties. These traditional structures themselves, have been affected by their long relationship with the colonial authorities. They cannot be considered pure. Yet they still command loyalty and respect. What is therefore required is an approach that integrates this cultural heritage into the formal political structure of the state. The state and civil society need not be hostile and juxtaposed entities. Instead democracy must be planted on the African soil. The specific forms of this democratic regeneration and the specific pathways to it — whether peaceful or violent — will vary according to the situation and the circumstances, but the need and necessity for it is clear. 
Also certain broad features — common to all working democracies -can be outlined. First, there must be a limit to the arbitrary authority of the all-powerful state. Second, economic and political power must be shared and diffused throughout society, both horizontally and vertically. Third, the rule of law must be paramount and replace the whims of the holder of power. If these features appear to be the tenets of Western liberal democracy whose imitation by Africans we have considered to have failed, this should not be surprising. Indeed, we consider these broad features to be the essential contents of any democracy. It is the forms and the specific working details that differ according to the existing social context. It is easily forgotten, though Africanists all the time remind us, that precolonial Africa, surviving today somewhat in communal traditions, was rich in these broad features of a democratic society. After all, the all-powerful dictator, equipped with an impersonal machinery presides over the fate of society is a post colonial product. In precolonial Africa, councils of elders, chosen through lineage hierarchy or other means of popular suffrage, prescribed the powers of the ruler -king or paramount chief, where there was one. Rules elaborated through wide discussions and codified in cultural heritage, religion, custom, and laws circumscribed the conduct of all — young and old, rulers and ruled. 
The integration of these democratic practices and values into the institutions of the modern state must start at the lowest rung. It is at the village level (where normal administration, social services, development programs and political matters can hardly be distinguished) that the training of the common people as citizens should begin. Freely chosen representatives at this level could form the first steps of a pyramid culminating at the national level. It is at the village, district and provincial levels that the communal, clan, ethnic interests can be coordinated, reconciled and combined with that of the nation at large. Traditional leadership structure goes down to the roots and can tap grass roots support. But if not corrected or complemented by crosssectional political organization — in other words where leadership does not depend on ethnic/clan loyalty alone — then it is likely to give way to divisive and centrifugal forces. 
The above general remarks apply with particular force in the case of the Somali Republic. Inheriting two disparate colonial experiences, great — and commendable — energy was spent in the early years in integrating the different political, legal, administrative and educational systems. A liberal constitutional parliamentary democracy was adopted. However, this attempt at creating the new nation was based not only on the inherited centralized structures of the colonial state but strenuous efforts’ were applied to transplant all the institutions associated with liberal, democracy and move away from the traditional clan structure. The latter as a precolonial institution, was considered primitive, anarchic, divisive, with potential for savage clan-based fratricidal wars. As such the traditional system was perceived to be the number one enemy of the goals “‘l of national independence, i.e., social and economic progress, freeing the individual from the shackles of the ascriptive bonds of tradition, and’ fostering instead the foundations of. the institutions of “modern” nationhood with which free individuals can identify. (I recall, as an active member of that special “tribe” of high school students, how in those days we despised everything that had anything to do with “clanism” and how emotional we were about matters of “nationalism” and “independence.”) 
Indeed, attack on tradition was an integral part of the independence movement. Despite the veneer of seeking freedom from the colonial yoke and its consequent domination of many aspects of social life, the independence movement imbibed more values from its colonial metropolitan adversaries than it rejected or wished to change. This should not be surprising. Aside from whatever brainwashing there was as a result of educational molding, nationalism, as an historical movement, was a European phenomenon. Moreover, the concept of nation-building, prevalent in those days and paraded as the quintessence of research by political theorists, is the ideological heritage of Western post enlightenment. 
The Somali Republic like many others in the African continent, failed in transplanting the liberal state. With the benefit of hindsight, this is also not surprising. Traditions die hard, no matter what strenuous efforts are “1 expended in creating the new. After all, the cultural heritage of a people ~i cannot suddenly be revamped. Institutions that have served a purpose for :i1 generations cannot just be outlived unless and until an alternative is found: that better serves those same social needs. Otherwise they will continue to exist, albeit sometimes in a corrupted and destructive form. The new laws and institutions of the liberal state could not easily and quickly replace all traditional ones. Implicit in the concept of the liberal state and its laws is the assumption that society consists of free individuals, with basic rights and endowed with different talents. This assumption underlies the rules of equality and even the ballot, the sine quo non of a liberal democracy, is based on that assumption. 
One need not quarrel with these assumptions of liberal democracy. They are indeed necessary, but not sufficient for full democratic expression in African countries. 
The missing link between the state and the individual is an intermediate category where the bonds of solidarity and human fraternity, so much neglected by liberalism but indeed essential for human survival and welfare, are nurtured. If in the industrial world this warmth of human solidarity and fraternal bonds is sought in organizations based on class, in the less developed world, specially in Africa, they are easily provided in ready-made form by ethnicity in the Somali case by “clanism.” The extended family in the Somali case is the basic economic unit, adopted and adapted throughout the ages for the survival of its members. One family member may be a skilled worker in town, another a merchant, a third abroad in Europe or oil-rich Arabia, and another left to tend livestock in the hinterland. All their incomes buttress one another. As such the Somali extended family is a versatile system that is self-reliant, internally balanced and autocentric. 
The Somali clan structure is a complicated pyramid with the extended family at its lowest form and a large, more or less political group claiming to originate from a single ancient ancestor at its pinnacle. Subclans in the middle echelons of the pyramid are most often more important for questions of survival and interest. I have no intention to go into a treatise about Somali clan organization and its functions. The simple point being raised here is that sometimes the extended family system may not have the carrying capacity to fully provide for the needs of its members in terms of security (economic and otherwise), emotional support and simple social interaction. Upper rungs in the pyramid are therefore called upon to supplement the efforts and resources of the extended family. The more difficult the problem to be solved in both extent and intensity, the higher the rung called upon. Most often the most important rung in these matters is the diya-paying unit of the clan. This is the unit that is responsible for injuries caused unto others by its other members. The other layers of the clan structure, most often dormant, are activated at times of stress, civil wars, famines or liberation struggles. In urban areas services that are normally provided in industrial countries by the state, municipalities, trade unions, cooperatives, etc., now become the function of the extended family and/or the clan in African countries. The need for clan solidarity, although assaulted in many ways by urbanization, becomes strengthened by it. 
The consequence of these contradictory forces — the inherited colonial state and the liberal laws adopted wholesale on the one hand, and the continuing need for clan support and solidarity on the other — is a bifurcated society, with a non-integrated personality. This bifurcation is a breeding ground for corruption, misuse of power, manipulation of clan loyalty, mistrust among the clans themselves, and hence instability. The resulting disillusionment, right on the heels of the euphoria of independence, provided the fertile soil for the African coups. Whether, given sufficient time, these contradictions could have been overcome peacefully and democracy could have been workable is one of the “ifs” of history. The fact remains that in the case of Somalia the Siyad Barre military dictatorship came and completed the job of total disintegration. How it did so is an important subject by itself and need not detain us here. 
VI. The Experience of the Somali National Movement Reviewed 
The resistance to the dictatorship was affected by this historical background in more ways than one. The terror unleashed by the regime, the abolition of national representative institutions, and the transformation of the remaining state bodies into instruments of oppression and spying, left the extended family and the related clan network the only relatively safe haven. While this clan network had already, prior to the regime, built-in advantages for political organization, the behavior of the terroristic regime made it the only avenue for any opposition to it. Further, the clandestine nature of any opposition to the police state of Siyad Barre and the latter’s manipulation of the clan structure, setting one clan against another, not only inhibited the building of bridges between incipient opposition groups, but succeeded in the displacement of any resentments against the regime into aggressions against other clans. 
Those who criticize the SNM for not starting off with a broader clan base, minimize this factor. There is no need here to recount in detail the efforts of the SNM to do so. These efforts did not materialize in substantial success in the early stages and are witness to the depth of the disintegration process wrought by the regime. Several factors are at play: the smaller bases of support in the center and the south of the country opened by the SNM in the early years; the modus vivendi with the SSDF before the latter’s slip into dormancy; the active coordination and subsequent alliance with the use and SPM; and finally the reconciliation process embarked upon on the eve of victory with those northern clans who opposed it all speak with eloquence of the sincerity of these early . SNM efforts to broaden its base, despite the odds. 
In the meantime the movement had to continue its work where it was most effective vis-a-vis the north of the country. The single-minded support given to the SNM by the Isaaq clan speaks only of the unevenness of the regime’s oppression and its singling out of this clan in the mid and later 80s for particular persecution. The numerical strength of their support, and the uninterrupted nature of their habitat in the North, provided the SNM with ample opportunity not only to continue the valiant struggle with tenacity but also to experiment with ideas and forms that could lay the basis for alternative paths of governance and development. These forms and ideas, needless to say, were not ideological recipes, prepared by elites in the ivory tower, and experimented on an unsuspecting population. Rather they grew out of the practical needs of the struggle itself. 
This does not mean that the struggle was visionless. Vision, there has to be. Otherwise it is almost impossible to move great numbers of human beings into action. The tremendous odds against which the SNM operated and the sacrifice it demanded from its supporters over an extended period of time could only be sustained by a vision of the future in which they believed. Some cynics maintain that hate also can move masses of people into action. They point to the Nazi movement, whose effectiveness has threatened the world for sometime, and the ever-present ethnic massacres in today’s world. But, evidently, this cynical argument cannot be taken seriously. For one thing, occasional jacqueries should not be confused with sustainable movements. And those sustainable movements that have a large element of hate in their arsenal show it in their expressions and actions. The SNM definitely passes that test. As the saying goes, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. 
The vision itself (from which programs of action are formed) is a mixture of ideal and the antithesis of the system one is attempting to change. Certainly hatred of the oppressive system and those who actively and willingly maintain it forms part of the driving motives of the fighter for change. But this is quite different from the kind of hatred alluded to by the cynic, for it is not directed against a particular ethnic group of tribe/clan or section of humanity. It is directed against an oppressive social structure whose removal is a milestone towards realizing justice. For this to be achieved it has to be accompanied by the articulation of the l . alternative, even if that articulation does not fall into any of the known ideological molds. 
We have seen, in the preceding pages, that the oppressive system that evolved in Somalia –and the rest of Africa in various different ways -was characterized by an excessively centralized, dictatorial state, divorced from the traditions and historical continuity of the people it ruled. We have also touched upon the outlines of an alternative form of governance; one that integrates the state with civil society, is democratic and auto centric and decentralizes the arenas of action as much as possible. 
This, precisely, is the vision which the Somali National Movement presented from its inception in its programs of action and which it attempted to practice while still conducting the armed struggle against the military regime. If this alternative vision was not very well-known ~, outside its ranks, it speaks less of the limited ability of the SNM to propagate this vision than of the blinders inhibiting outsiders to see the actual truth. I say this with confidence, because even if we lacked the resources with which we could compete with the government in the propagation of our ideas, our actions and activities were an open book for” anyone taking the pains look. Let us now take some of the main elements” of the alternative path, discussed earlier, and which also inform SNM’s vision and see what role these ideas played in the praxis of the SNM during the phase of the armed struggle. 
If one were to single out a phenomenon in which the SNM is unique among liberation movements, past and present, it is the extent of its self reliance. To be sure, all genuine liberation struggles have to strive for a measure of self-reliance if they are to achieve success. But, more often than not, it is almost impossible to do without some form of external support in terms of moral and material assistance. Specifically it is the material support that becomes a sine qua non in the case of armed struggles. To mobilize, train, supply, replenish and maintain fighting units is a very expensive affair. Expensive also, if only slightly less so, is the political wing with its far-flung cadres, internally and externally. A liberation movement, conducting an armed struggle, can hardly meet the total of these financial burdens from its own coffers. But the more it relies on external support for the sustenance of its operations and organization, the more it sacrifices its autonomy and independent decision-making. The tendency to be autonomous and independent and the need to seek outside support and allies and thus be part of a larger block is a contradiction that has plagued liberation movements throughout history. Rare is the movement that has found a judicious balance. 
The SNM solved this dilemma by tilting towards total autonomy and facing the consequent risk. To be sure the SNM received assistance from Ethiopia in the form of sanctuary for its leadership, training bases for its fighters, and ammunition and fuel. Financial assistance from Ethiopia was next to nothing and even the ammunition and fuel were token contributions. Although this assistance was vital, especially in the early stages, in the long term it was small. The more valuable assistance from Ethiopia was the provision of sanctuary, not the material aspect. This help itself was not a one-way street. The presence of Somali opposition to the Siyad Barre regime in Ethiopia preempted the converse, while at the same time weakening the main threat to Ethiopia from the east. This mutual advantage had the additional strength of sowing the seeds of future peaceful cooperation between the two countries, instead of the then existing antagonism. Sensing this advantage, the Ethiopian regime was wise enough to avoid alienating the SNM by manipulation as much as the latter was careful in insulating its decision-making to itself. 
In that Ethiopia was the only source of external assistance, the movement had to provide its own resources or perish. There was, of course, no lack of potential helpers. But the premium put on independence was such that the movement chose to eschew any and all aid that seriously affected its independent decision-making. The harm caused by Libyan cash to the sister and older movement — The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) — was a clear enough warning. This choice of self-reliance by the SNM paid its dividends. It was compelled to raise cash from supporters abroad and inside the country. The fighting units were to be sustained by supporters in the areas where they operated. Foreign branches engaged in propaganda and diplomatic activity had to rely on their own resources. 
All this meant that the rank and file as well as ordinary supporters could no longer be passive sympathizers. Instead, they were transformed into active participants. Thus the path of self-reliance easily led to the road of democratic decentralization. The people whom the movement were trying to recruit and commit to the struggle were already rebelling against a suffocating dictatorship. If they are to be convinced to give the best they have, even their lives, to the cause, they cannot be denied the freedom of choice within the movement. The people have to “own” their movement. One cannot claim to struggle for liberty and deny that liberty itself within their own ranks. 
In the context of the struggle conducted by the SNM, the democratic practice expressed itself on two levels: (I) at the top organizational level : (1) at the top where the higher leadership — the Chairman, Vice Chairman and the Central Committee — were elected in broadly representative Congresses, and (2) at the local level where branches in foreign countries and in the field put forth their own leadership. The most pressing matter is the relationship between the center and the localities. The centralization/decentralization paradox bedevils not only liberation movements but most Third World governments as well. Central authority is a must if a nation has to exist as one. But how much power and responsibility should be devolved to lower bodies, outlying regions and the private sector, and how much power should be retained by central authorities, in order to attain a measure of both democracy and unity is a question not easily resolved. In the case of the SNM struggle, the wide geographic distances 
involving branches in many countries and field operations across the width and breadth of the country as well as reliance on own resources dictated autonomous activity and decision-making. This left for the center tasks such as broad policy formulation, overall coordination of the implementation, and contact with foreign bodies. 
Since particular areas were more often than not occupied by particular clans or subclans, the policy of the movement’s autonomous activity in reality translated itself into clan autonomous activity. We have seen in the earlier sections of this article that the post-colonial state failed to integrate traditional authority positively into the modem institutions of society. We have also briefly argued that this divorce between the state and civil society reached an extreme form in the former Somali Republic. Here, the solution to this dilemma of modem versus traditional authority presented itself before the movement in clear form by the exigencies of ,the struggle. Ironically, the clan organizational form became the vehicle for a revolutionary process of restructuring society. First, the solidarity it ‘naturally provides became a safe haven for members from the state terror. Second, self-reliance itself means that the movement, instead of relying on outside supporters, relies on its people and hence on their local leaders and ways of doing things. There is a mutual feedback here between the movement and the ordinary peoples. The movement brought urban cadres — the teacher, the army officer, the student, the medical doctor, the politician — into the rural areas who then interact with the clans and their elders. Here, at the level of the fighting unit, the SNM found the opportunity of integrating traditional authority and methods into the democratic practices and needs of the movement. 
These factors created opportunity to correct the mistakes of the past, make use of existing structures, and correct the divorce between civil society and the state. One of the tentative ideas that came about then was a greater role for the elders of the clans as autonomous decision-makers, and participants at various levels of the clan pyramid, parallel with and interacting with the various levels of the formal organization of the movement. The experimentation with the role of the elders was finally formalized in the form of the “Guurti,” that is, the senate or the council of elders, which is co-equal with the Central Committee, the legislative organ of the SNM. This parallel co-participation stretched from the lowest units all the way up to the highest level. We see, then, that the vision of an alternative path of governance replaced the centralized, dictatorial regime. The SNM provided an alternative system whose hallmark is participatory democracy from top to bottom. It was thus possible for it to carry over this tradition to a national level after victory, providing avenues for dialogue and compromise while state structures were still weak, culminating in the fora for consensus building such as the Borama Conference. And it is this that makes the vital difference between Somali land and the rest of Somalia. 
If there is any weakness in the performance so far, it is that the insistence on free decision-making and participation at all levels has sacrificed the need for discipline and obedience. This has weakened the formal organization of the SNM as a political organ. If this choice has enabled it to escape the appearance of dictatorial tendencies and “warlordism,” it has allowed the formal structures of the movement, as a political organ, to be diluted and absorbed by the traditional structures. Admittedly then, the experimentation for new forms has gone to the other extreme, tending to open the door for centrifugal forces since traditional structures by themselves cannot form the basis for a modern state. But this danger is not as great as it may appear to those who are not familiar with the depth of the changes wrought by the SNM struggle. It is precisely the decentralized forms and the actual democratic participation, especially that of clan elders, opened by the SNM that have minimized conflict within the SNM — supporting Isaaq clans and between them and the others in the North by institutionalizing dialogue and compromise. Unlike the SNM, the other political factions in the south claiming legitimacy neither opened up such avenue s of activity (at least on a stage comparable to that of the SNM) for the people they claim to represent, nor even conducted formal democratic congresses to legitimate their own leadership. Hence their inability to contain the situation after the breakdown of the Siyad Barre regime, let alone move it forward. 
Moreover, those of us who are still optimistic enough to believe in progress also know that trends are never on a smooth, straight line. Like the business cycle, there are troughs and peaks, but the trend is upward with today’s trough possibly higher than yesterday’s low. If the abhorrence of the dictatorial centralized post-colonial state created in those who thought it a tendency toward too much freedom and reliance on the informal networks, I say proudly that this is good. There was need to restore these networks and legitimize them formally just as freedom was essential. With these firmly established the pendulum will swing back towards formal cross-sectional organizations. Reactivation of the SNM organization is a relatively easy matter and together with those other political organizations that are bound to come up in the present free atmosphere, political alliances across clans will be formed. The need is there and the ground work of dialogue and compromise has already been laid by the struggle of the SNM. VII. Epilogue 
The reader may be struck by the fact that I have said nothing about the important issue of dialogue and reconciliation between the north and the rest of the country, or more precisely, between the Republic of Somaliland and the original Somalia (i.e. the Trusteeship Territory before independence). It is not an oversight, but a deliberate omission, the 1 ~asons for which are simple.
First, if by reconciliation, we mean a return to the original union between the two parts, I am afraid it is now counterproductive to harp1at tune. Every problem, like an organism, goes through certain stages of a life cycle. There is the stage of early detection and prevention. . There is the long middle stage of curative treatment, and there is the last stage of death and burial. A Somali friend once aptly remarked to a group that “the eggshell of Somali unity is now broken. We may talk about making a scrambled egg or an omelet out of it, but we cannot reconstitute the original broken shell!” Treating the problems that led to the separation was possible during the early and middle stages, but not now. 
Second, this separation is not the result of manipulation by few politicians. Some people confuse the declaration of the Republic of Somaliland by the SNM in Burao on May 18, 1991 with the fact of separation itself. Separation was a political reality long before that. It is consequence of an historical process whose two protagonists were the cruel persecution by the regime and the stubborn resistance of the persecuted. It is the culmination of the victory of that lonely struggle by 1e SNM for an extended period. Siyad Barre himself effectively sanctioned the separation and put the last nail on the coffin of the union y his bombardment of the cities of the north and the mass murder of their citizens which led to the fleeing of terrorized civilians into Ethiopia. 
To ignore the victory, which to them is not only the downfall of the Siyad Barre regime, but also includes the separation itself, won by the people of the north with such superhuman sacrifice, or to treat it as non-existent, is foolhardy and borders on the callous. The Burao declaration only put the final touches on an already existing reality. 
Third, the present use of “Somali unity” is a misnomer. The original ~! leaning of unity for the Post World War n Somali independence movement was the liberation of the five parts into which the Somali speaking peoples were divided by the colonial owers and their eventual inclusion under one nation state. When the Somaliland Protectorate gained its independence from Britain it had closer and more advantageous links with Djibouti and eastern Ethiopia than it did with Mogadishu. But it chose to sacrifice its newly won statehood and join the Trusteeship 
territory, without conditions, in order to lay the basis of the united state which the remaining three parts could later join. It is a well-known story how that Somali irredentism collided with the then existing international order, specifically how the neighboring countries and the Organization of African Unity, with the support of the rest of the international system, resisted any notion of revision of African boundaries on the basis of ethnicity. It is common knowledge how the pursuit of their goal of unity by the Somalis and the resistance of their neighbors to that goal caused instability in the Horn, including two major wars between the Somali Republic and Ethiopia, and the introduction of superpower competition and the arms race into the area, to the detriment of their peoples, especially the Somali people who, on all sides, bore the greater brunt of the havoc. 
The upshot was the frustration of Somali unity, with Djibouti opting for its separate statehood and the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya remaining intact as left by the colonial powers. The marriage between the two original parts had became unworkable, Some of the reasons were touched upon in this presentation. Rather, the marriage had lost its raison d’etre. After great suffering and with Herculean efforts the people of Somaliland have restored the statehood which they both won and sacrificed in 1960. Moreover, they are willing to go about it through the internationally agreed methods of elections and plebiscites, even though they are by all logic entitled to it. What is indeed strange is that the international community — as represented by the UN and other regional organizations — which originally frustrated the Somali unity project, is now opposing the exercise of this legitimate right of self-determination and attempting to maintain and enforce an unworkable marriage and reconciliation and a now non-existent Somali unity. 
Fourth, any process of reconciliation requires negotiation and dialogue between existing entities. The state of Somaliland, even though weak and not yet recognized by the international system is a de facto entity brought into existence by its own people. There is no such comparable entity in the south, i.e., the former Trusteeship territory, with which it can negotiate. Even the many factions have no legitimate standing (at least the majority of them) vis-a-vis the peoples they claim to represent in terms of democratic procedure. The proper course, dictated both by logic and justice, is to accept and assist the correct process of political development in Somaliland, while at the same time, encourage similar processes in the south until such time that a comparable entity appears with whom proper negotiations can take place. But, alas, we know this is not the policy at present pursued by the UN. Instead, it is following a policy of strangling Somaliland and enforcing the: establishment of an artificial so-called” government of unity.” It is a dead- end with more negative consequences and precious time lost. 
In this analysis, I did not follow that beaten path with no exit. Instead, I chose to go beyond and beneath these superficial formulae. There is a Somali proverb — “Haani guntay ka tolantaa” – which literally means “a vessel is mended from the base upwards,” but which can be roughly translated as “charity begins at home.” In the spirit of this proverb, my approach was to understand what happened to the Somali way of living. The research and analysis required to reach this understanding is tremendous and lies before all of us. Yet from these simple reflections, one reaches the inescapable conclusion: that what happened is not a matter of an enigmatic primitive society gone astray. Neither is it a question of “warlord” versus chiefs. It is a matter of a system of governance that has gotten off on an early false start since the colonial days and ended up awry with the military dictatorship. The antidote to that system is its antithesis: an antithesis that can only be found through the practical activity of the people, enlightened by some vision. 
I have tried to show the contents of that antithesis as well as the vision in the struggle of the SNM. What we need most urgently is to find ways of resewing the tom fabric of Somali society. Whether that resewn fabric is reconstituted under a single, two, or several states is for a free people to decide. But let us first build that freedom, not on shifting sand, but on solid ground. This is the road for sound reconciliation. And in this respect, the struggle of the SNM, and the present democratic experimentation in Somaliland, have something to offer. We are also willing to learn. But I doubt whether many in the arrogance-ridden UN system and the parrot-like singers of so-called unity in the south are really listening. 
Endnotes 
I. During the visit by President Bush to Somalia to raise the morale of American soldiers on Thanksgiving Day and to present the olive branch of the new humanitarian mission to the starving Somalis, some American newspapers printed a story of the appearance of Jesus Christ (to both American soldiers and Somalis!) above a cloud of dust over the small town of Wanlawein. The authenticity of the story is not as important as the timing of the apparition. Have we reached the limits of propaganda gimmicks? 
2. Whether or not, and how much, international organizations contributed to the longevity of the dictatorial regime, and to the misery of Somalis, is another topic outside the scope of our present story. 
(*) Ibrahim Megag Samater was a Cabinet member of the Siyad Barre regime for nine years and then his Ambassador in Bonn for one year. He eventually defected and sought asylum in the United States. He eventually joined the SNM and became the chairman of their Central Committee. Article first published in Somalilandpress.com

————  reports, news and views from the global village with an impact on Somalia ——————- 

Dramatic Arab Appeal for a Nuclear-Free World by Fareed Mahdy (IDN-InDepth NewsAnalysis)
Call it perfect timing or a sheer historical coincidence; be it because they feel caught between the Israeli nuclear hammer and the Iranian might-be atomic anvil or just because they truly want it, the fact is that the leaders of 22 Arab countries have launched an unprecedented massive and pressing call to free the world from nuclear weapons.
During their summit in Sirt, Libya, Arab leaders had to deal with a heavy agenda centred on the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, Tel Aviv’s ongoing challenges to the world community and its progressive violation of international law by further building colonies on occupied territories and East Jerusalem as well as the Darfur conflict, the threatening instability in Yemen, the Somali drama and, above all, the need for more coherent, collective Arab policies, among other key issues.
Nevertheless, they devoted an important chapter to nuclear concerns. In fact, the rulers of some 350 million people living in the oil wealthiest and most conflictive region on Earth have issued a clarion call at the end of their 22nd summit in Libya, for a nuclear free world.
NUCLEAR FREE, NOW
Specifically, in their final declaration on March 28, 2010 following the two-day meeting, the Arab leaders “reaffirmed that all Arab countries that are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) demand the international community to undertake immediate actions to free the world from nuclear weapons.”
The summit declaration stressed the need “to translate international initiatives aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons from the world into concrete, binding and time-tabled programmes”.
The Arab leaders also underscored that progress towards achieving this goal “requires, as a first step, the ‘universalisation’ of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty”. 
This strong Arab stand was spelt out few days after the announcement of U.S.-Russia agreement to reduce their nuclear arsenal by 30 percent, which is due to be sealed on April 8 in Prague, and shortly ahead of the Nuclear Security Summit, scheduled on April 12-13 in Washington, as well as the NPT review conference May 3-28 in New York.
With an eye on the later, the Arab declaration reaffirms “the importance of respecting the rights of NPT member states to posses and develop nuclear technologies for peaceful use, rejecting any restrictions to these rights under any argument”.
ATOMS FOR PEACE
This position is in line with that of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which in a nutshell tantamounts to: Nuclear Power ‘Yes’ – Nuclear Proliferation ‘No’.
It also fits in the growing interest shown by several Arab countries, including the oil-rich ones, in developing nuclear power for peaceful use. The U.S., UK, France, and Russia, among other industrialised countries, have been encouraging this trend in Arab countries and some of them have already signed substantial commercial deals to install nuclear plants in a number of Arab states.
The oil-rich United Arab Emirates, for instance, announced in October 2009 its decision to build nuclear reactors on its soil. This unleashed a frenetic, politically backed competition between giant corporations from France, U.S., Japan and South Korea, to win the 40 billion dollar bid for this project.
At the same time, the French government has reportedly promised assistance to Qatar and Morocco, to launch their own nuclear programmes. Egypt and Jordan were reported to be heading for building nuclear plants. Also Saudi Arabia announced plans to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes.
NUCLEAR ISRAEL
Back to the Arab declaration, the Arab leaders demanded that the NPT review conference “adopt clear decisions and build up practical measures to make the Middle East a nuclear-free region”.
Israel, the sole nuclear power in the Middle East with reported 200 nuclear weapons, has systematically refused to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. 
On this issue, the Arab leaders warned that “Israel insistence on refusing to join non-proliferation treaty and submitting its nuclear facilities to the full guarantees system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, will lead the region to an arms race of dramatic consequences”.
In this regard, and coinciding with the Arab declaration, the Jerusalem Post daily reported on the same day, March 28, that the Israeli government will present “no concessions” at the nuclear security summit in Washington in April regarding its policy of maintaining “ambiguity” around its nuclear weapons, according to an Israel military official.
ARAB AND WORLD CAMPAIGNING
The issue of achieving a nuclear-free Middle East is not new. In fact, Egypt launched 36 years ago an active campaign aiming at the establishment of a “nuclear free Middle East”. 
In 1990, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak revitalised the Egyptian initiative through a new, larger plan to declare the Middle East a “weapons of mass destruction free region”, including nuclear weapons.
The Egyptian initiative has drawn support from most Arab countries and has been reaffirmed by Amre Musa, Secretary General of the League of Arab States, representing all the 22 Arab countries, who continue to repeat: “It is a must to free the Middle East of nuclear weapons.”
The Arab support for the nuclear free Middle East initiative has gathered added strength particularly in the Gulf Arab countries in the wake of the U.S., Israel, and Europe alleging that Iran intends to build nuclear weapons.
Moreover, during a Washington summit between Mubarak and U.S. President Barack Obama in August 2009, Egypt categorically rejected a U.S. offer to guarantee defence of the region against atomic weapons through an extended ‘nuclear umbrella’ and as part of a comprehensive Middle East peace plan.
The plan did not specify whether Israel would dismantle its nuclear arsenals.
On the other hand, 10 Arab countries situated in Africa, who are members of both the League of Arab States and The African Union, are parties to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, which entered into force in July 2009. 
These are: Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, and Tunisia.
In addition, some outstanding Arab personalities have joined the worldwide campaign launched by 100 international figures for the abolition of nuclear weapons, known as ‘Global Zero, for a World Without Nuclear Weapons’.
Queen Noor of Jordan, for instance, has been actively campaigning for the abolition of nuclear weapons, within the Global Zero initiative.
In this regard, the Jordanian queen affirmed: “The sheer folly of trying to defend a nation by destroying all life on the planet must be apparent to anyone capable of rational thought. Nuclear capability must be reduced to zero, globally, permanently. There is no other option.”
GLOBAL CHORUS
Meanwhile, the world has been witnessing a growing number of active international campaigning for the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth. 
The initiatives range from civil society and grassroots organisations to Nobel Laureates and city mayors – such as Tadatoshi Akiba, Mayor of the City of Hiroshima, which together with Nagasaki continues to suffer the atrocious consequences of U.S. nuclear bombs during World War II – as well as world religious leaders among so many others.
One of these is the Soka Gakkai International – a Japanese Buddhist organisation with 12 million members around the world – that promotes peace and has launched an active international campaign aimed at abolishing nuclear weapons. 
Among numerous international personalities campaigning for a nuclear-free world is Jayantha Dhanapala who presided over the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and was UN under-secretary-general for Disarmament Affairs from 1998-2003. 

Topic: Torture
What Intelligence? by John Kozy (NolanChart)
If the huge intelligence gathering service works effectively, why is the torture necessary? And if torture is necessary, doesn’t it mean that the huge intelligence gathering service doesn’t work?
Have you ever though about the meaning of the word, “insurgent”? Calling the people in Afghanistan who are attacking U.S. and NATO troops insurgents has become common. “Insurge” means to rush or surge in, but the Taliban didn’t rush into Afghanistan; they are natives who have always lived there. It was American and NATO troops who surged into Afghanistan; in Iraq, Americans even called one such going in “a surge.” 
And what about “intelligence” as in intelligence agency? Properly speaking, intelligence is a attribute of human beings. As such, organizations cannot be intelligent. Intelligence is distinguished from intellect by being applied to concrete or individual exhibitions of the powers ascribed to the intellect. People are animals endowed with intellect, not intelligence; intelligence refers to the extent to which a person is able to use his intellect. An organization cannot use its intellect, because it has none. 
America has a vast “intelligence” conglomerate of organizations. The NSA, CIA, FBI, various branches of the military have “intelligence” groups, and other agencies, too, are involved in so called intelligence. This conglomerate is likely the largest the world has ever known, and its costs are huge, the total cost of which is a deeply held secret. It has vast technical apparatuses used to watch people, see what they do, hear what they say, read what they write. And yet, all of the money spent, all of the people employed, all of the apparatuses used are insufficient. These agencies have shown, over and over again, that they rarely learn what they seek. 
The information gathered is derived from many sources. Much is speculative, some is contradictory. It often amounts to little more than hunches. Some is correct, much is not. 
In Afghanistan, NATO and US forces grossly underestimated the Taliban’s capacity to mount a vicious counteroffensive. No one predicted the use of suicide bombings. In Somalia, the U.S. backed warlords that had ruled Mogadishu for two decades were suddenly overthrown by a bunch of lightly armed mullahs called the Islamic Courts Union. Few in the State Department seemed to have heard of this grassroots movement before it took over the country. The United States also failed to predict that Uzbekistan would close down the American base that had been there since 2001, downgrade relations with Washington and tilt decisively toward China and Russia. After the Palestinian elections, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stammered that the victory of Hamas came as a complete surprise to her. The mother of all intelligence failures, of course, was the CIA’s inaccurate prediction that Saddam Hussein’s regime would be found to have weapons of mass destruction. One of the main charges against the CIA and FBI post-9/11 is that they failed to join up the dots beforehand. The killings at Ft. Hood resulted from an intelligence failure. The FBI had information about Hasan’s extremism, but didn’t investigate enough. Intelligence agencies apparently cannot make connections between bits of information to make a coherent whole. But who can blame them. Bits of information scattered here and there can be likened to needles in multiple haystacks. Too much information is as impossible to deal with as none. 
So what’s wrong with this picture:

1. The United States of America, in all likelihood, has the largest and most expensive intelligence gathering service the world has ever known. We can assume it operates everywhere, even Timbuktu.
2. The United States of America tortures prisoners to acquire intelligence.

If the huge intelligence gathering service works effectively, why is the torture necessary? And if torture is necessary, doesn’t it mean that the huge intelligence gathering service doesn’t work? One or the other has to be unnecessary. Which one? 
People who believe, as our leaders seem to, that both are necessary are involved in contradictory thinking which distorts every rational thought process. Is it any wonder that American policies are ineffective? Only insane people think this way! Intelligence gathering does not produce intelligence. As the results mentioned above show, only ignorance is produced. Given all the means 21st century snoops have for gathering information, why do they have to resort to medieval methods? The only possible answer is that the practices employed by the agencies don’t work. But history has shown that torture doesn’t either. The Grand Masters of the Inquisition immolated many who were completely innocent. 
When a nation as powerful as the United States goes to war on the basis of bad information, where does that leave the world? “We have squandered thousands of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, we have projected force without intelligence—and that is folly. . . . That is how nations fall and that is how nations lose power.”

The Inhumanity of War by Doug Bandow (HuffingtonPost)
The American military has been constantly engaged since the end of the Cold War. Washington has initiated conflict against Serbia, Iraq (twice), and Afghanistan. U.S. forces have occupied Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans. There has been much talk of attacking Iran and North Korea. The Bush administration apparently even considered striking Russian forces during Moscow’s battle against the country of Georgia. 
Most of these wars, interventions, and potential actions were justified as being in America’s security interest. When that argument was implausible to start (Kosovo) or collapsed on the ground (Iraq) U.S. policymakers quickly played the humanitarian card. The U.S. military was killing and destroying to promote moral ends. 
Unfortunately, war is rarely humane. It certainly has not been humanitarian in either Iraq or Afghanistan. 
In fact, we should be ashamed of the horror that the U.S. government has loosed in our name. In Iraq, for instance, estimates of Iraqi deaths since 2003 start at 100,000 and race upward. The number of maimed or injured almost certainly is far greater. Murders, kidnappings, beatings, and theft reached epidemic proportions. 
Millions of Iraqis have fled their homes and many their country. The indigenous Christian community has been devastated. The disruption of lives and families has been pervasive. It behooves American hawks to think carefully before extolling their beatific works from the safety of their offices in Washington. 
Afghan casualties are fewer, but rising. Estimates of civilians killed start in the low thousands and approach 10,000. Many more have been wounded and social dislocations are widespread. Coalition commanders and Afghan officials routinely call for greater care in military operations to reduce civilian casualties. 
None of this is surprising. By its nature war is horrible. Even the best efforts to limit harm to civilians–and the U.S. military does a much better job than the armed forces of other nations in past wars–cannot prevent the innocent from suffering. 
And one cannot blame American military personnel. If their government is going to send them into combat, then they must be allowed to protect themselves, even when that means noncombatants will be caught in the crossfire. 
But the cost of war, especially for those on whose behalf we supposedly are fighting, requires asking whether the conflict can be justified. Consider Afghanistan, where the president’s escalation inevitably will result in more civilian deaths. 
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, recently made an astonishing admission of civilian deaths, so often euphemistically referred to as “collateral damage.” At a meeting with U.S. personnel in Afghanistan, Gen. McChrystal discussed the problem of shootings at checkpoints: “We’ve shot an amazing number of people and killed a number and, to my knowledge, none has proven to have been a real threat to the force.” He added that he knew of no case when “we have engaged in an escalation of force incident and hurt someone has it turned out that the vehicle had a suicide bomb or weapons in it.” 
Just what are we doing in Afghanistan? 
Yes, the Taliban are bad news, as was Saddam Hussein. Taliban guerrillas, like Iraqi insurgents, also kill innocents; terrorists have killed indiscriminately in both nations. But it was the U.S. invasions which triggered or spread the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively; it is the continuing American presence which results in shooting “an amazing number of people” in Afghanistan. And that doesn’t count the “collateral damage” from bombing missions, drone strikes, and other military actions. 
War is sometimes necessary despite its costs. Ousting the Taliban was imperative after the Kabul government provided hospitality to Osama bin-Laden and al-Qaeda as the group trained to attack Americans. 
But that is where America’s vital interests end. Attempting to build a strong central state allied with the West is a quixotic venture and would offer little value even if achieved. There is no more benefit for the U.S. to wage war, killing partisans and innocents alike, in order to deliver control of Afghanistan to Hamid Karzai and his warlord allies rather than to the Taliban and other warlords. 
A resurgent Taliban is unlikely to again host a terrorist organization whose activities could bring down the wrath of the American military. Moreover, anti-American terrorists can operate from anywhere–not just failed states like Somalia or weak nations like Pakistan and Yemen, but also countries throughout Western Europe. 
These days Afghanistan has little to do with U.S. security in any form. If anything, the conflict exacerbates the problem of terrorism by reinforcing the terrorist meme of Washington warring against devout Muslims. 
Finally, the war cannot be justified as a form of humanitarian intervention. The conflict is horrid. It will be horrid without the U.S., as fighting likely would continue. But it would be less horrid for America if U.S. personnel no longer were being killed or shooting “an amazing number of people,” none of whom had “proven to have been a real threat.”
The Obama administration should be withdrawing U.S. troops, not expanding America’s force presence in Afghanistan. When considering war officials should bear in mind the Hippocratic Oath: first do no harm. We are failing to meet that obligation in Afghanistan.
(*) Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute

Israel will be compelled to attack Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities by this November unless the U.S. and its allies enact “crippling sanctions that will undermine the regime in Tehran,” former deputy defense minister Brig. Gen. Ephraim Sneh said on Wednesday in Tel Aviv.
The sanctions currently being discussed with Russia, China, and other major powers at the United Nations are likely to be a slightly-enhanced version of the U.N. sanctions already in place, which have had no impact on the Iranian regime.
And despite unanimous passage of the Iran Petroleum Sanctions Act in January, the Obama administration continues to resist efforts by Congress to impose mandatory sanctions on companies selling refined petroleum products to Iran.
In an Op-Ed in the Israeli left-wing daily, Haaretz, Sneh argues that Iran will probably have “a nuclear bomb or two” by 2011.
“An Israeli military campaign against Iran’s nuclear installations is likely to cripple that country’s nuclear project for a number of years. The retaliation against Israel would be painful, but bearable.”
Sneh believes that the “acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran during Obama’s term would do him a great deal of political damage,” but that the damage to Obama resulting from an Israeli strike on Iran “would be devastating.”
Nevertheless, he writes, “for practical reasons, in the absence of genuine sanctions, Israel will not be able to wait until the end of next winter, which means it would have to act around the congressional elections in November, thereby sealing Obama’s fate as president.”
Sneh does not foresee any U.S. military strikes on Iran, an analysis that is shared by most observers in Washington, who see the Obama administration moving toward containment as opposed to confrontation with Iran.
In a recent report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), military analyst Anthony Cordesman concluded that Israel will have to use low-yield earth-penetrating nuclear weapons if it wants to take out deeply-buried nuclear sites in Iran.
“Israel is reported to possess a 200 kilogram nuclear warhead containing 6 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium that could be mounted on the sea launched cruise missiles and producing a Yield of 20 kilo tons,” Cordesman writes in the CSIS study he co-authored by Abdullah Toukan.
Russia has acknowledged making a contract with Iran for the supply of the same advance missiles, alarming Israel and its allies, who believe the Islamic state could use the systems to guard against a potential strike on its nuclear installations. 
The United States and Israel worry that Iran’s civilian nuclear energy programme, including a power plant Russia is helping build at Bushehr, is a cover for ambitions to build an atomic bomb. Tehran has long denied such plans. 
First deployed by the USSR in 1979, the S-300, nicknamed “the favorite” by Russians, is still seen as one of the most powerful anti-aircraft missiles on the market. It can simultaneously track up to 100 targets and engage 12.
 

The Pakistan Water Movement organised seminars, conferences and public meetings across the country during the last week to highlight the Indian water aggression against the country. 
The speakers at these events briefed the participants about the Indian efforts to convert fertile land of the country into a desert by building dams and changing the course of rivers originating from Kashmir. 
Convener PWM Saif Ullah Mansoor vowed to continue the countrywide public awareness campaign, saying that every effort would be made to convince the people to come out against India’s nefarious plans of turning Pakistan into a kind of Somalia.
[N.B.: Many believe that without Kashmir, Pakistan is incomplete and say: “Kashmir is indeed the Jugular Vein of Pakistan”]

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We do not send pictures with these reports, because of the volume, but picture this emetic scene with your inner eye:
A dying Somali child in the macerated arms of her mother besides their bombed shelter with Islamic graffiti looks at a fat trader, who discusses with a local militia chief and a UN representative at a harbour while USAID provided GM food from subsidised production is off-loaded by WFP into the hands of local “distributors” and dealers – and in the background a western warship and a foreign fishing trawler ply the waters of a once sovereign, prosper and proud nation, which was a role model for honesty and development in the Horn of Africa. (If you feel that this is overdrawn – talk to people who lived in Somalia in the 70s and 80s and come with us into Somalia and see the even more cruel reality today for yourself!) 
- and if you need lively stills or video material on Somalia, please do contact us.   

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