Childish, Revisionist History in Wall Street Journal by Henry Kissinger on a "New World Order"

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The Wall Street Journal has allowed the subversive war criminal Henry Kissinger to publish what can only be described as a childish, revisionist historical account of modern era world events in light of the global crises unfolding. It proceeds to discuss the visible consequences of hidden manipulation in the most simplistic manner possible in order to reach the engineered conclusion that the world needs a new mechanism for global governance. This is the same man revered by the ignorant for his “leadership”, yet the many quotes attributed to him are appalling in terms of general humanity. Wikileaks released a trove of documents that confirm a very different story than most are familiar with (full text search here).

Via Salon In an early teaser of the documents’ contents, WikiLeaks drew attention to a chilling comment made by Kissinger in 1975 during a conversation with the then-U.S. ambassador to Turkey and two Turkish and Cypriot diplomats. Kissinger quipped: “Before the Freedom of Information Act, I used to say at meetings, ‘The illegal we do immediately; the unconstitutional takes a little longer.’ [laughter] But since the Freedom of Information Act, I’m afraid to say things like that.”

For a glimpse at the doublespeak, review our Libya archive and a portion of a summary on ISIS below, as those are the first two things mentioned by Kissinger.

Brandon Smith at Alt-Market.com

The foremost current threat and most useful scapegoat is, of course, the ISIS insurgency in the Middle East. If one’s source of information was the mainstream media alone, one might be inclined to believe that ISIS has materialized out of nowhere to become a menace so organized and effective it has eclipsed Al-Qaeda as the hot button boogeyman used by the establishment. ISIS is certainly a disturbing militant group that goes out of its way to play the villain, complete with scary Muslim clothing and beards, not to mention the severed heads and indiscriminate genocide. Where is Jack Bauer when you need him, right?

The cartoonish nature of ISIS is not accidental, but I can see why they frighten a subset of the American population; if I didn’t know that they were funded by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, with military aid from Israel, then I might find them a terrifying enigma as well.

ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was held at a U.S. run detention facility called Camp Bucca from 2005 until 2009. Before his imprisonment, Baghdadi’s friends and family reported him to be a “quiet, studious fellow who was also a talented soccer player”. Only one year after being released from U.S. detention, however, he was a fanatical Islamic extremist who would go on to command the ISIS caliphate. In 2011, the U.S. State Department listed Bagdhadi as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” with a bounty of $10 million. There is no public record as to why Baghdadi was originally detained.

Former U.S. Air Force security officer, James Skylar Gerrond, served at Camp Bucca while Bagdhadi was held there, and is quoted as saying “Many of us at Camp Bucca were concerned that instead of just holding detainees, we had created a pressure cooker for extremism.” Indeed…

Let’s look at the culmination of events that led to the current incarnation that is ISIS:

George W. Bush signed and Barack Obama enforced (sorry politifact cultists, but they are BOTH to blame) a new foreign policy framework which allowed the release of numerous (and now somehow radicalized) prisoners from facilities like Camp Bucca in 2009.

The Libyan civil war erupts, as “rebels” are aided by the CIA and multiple foreign governments. These are the same rebels who would ultimately participate in the Benghazi raid on a U.S. consulate/CIA complex.

Libyan agents along with CIA operatives move into Jordan, where they have been training Syrian insurgents for over a year (officially – much longer unofficially), and still train them to this day, despite the apprehensions of the Jordanian government.

Libyan insurgents along with newly trained operatives have also shifted into Syria, turning general civil unrest into outright war.

ISIS recently gave praise to one of its commanders, a man from Libya, who had fought in the Libyan civil war, and in Syria, and in Iraq.

The U.S. has been secretly arming and training ISIS extremists in Syria for years, but only at the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014 did it begin a more open campaign to provide support.

The Israeli government also aided insurgent groups in Syria using airstrikes to cripple Syrian Government regional command centers. It is also currently providing medical aid to Syrian rebels.

It was insurgent Sunni majority groups, trained in Jordan and funded by Saudi Arabia that have linked with Saudi funded groups in Iraq to form what we now know as ISIS. These are NOT separate groups acting autonomously. These are U.S. backed organizations acting in concert, and coalescing into a single movement – ISIS.

Violent genocidal actions, mass executions, as well as torture have become the common calling card of the establishment organized Islamic insurgent groups. Despite this horrifying development, Barack Obama is STILL seeking over $500 million in aid to Syrian rebels, though the rhetoric now specifies that funds and arms will only go to “moderate and well-vetted” insurgents. As far as I can tell, there are no “moderate” insurgents in Syria; insurgents that are now moving into Iraq and bringing their distinct brand of barbarism with them.

On the Council On Foreign Relations website, the globalist think-tank argued that the inclusion of extremist Al-Qaeda elements in the Syrian insurgency “improved the moral” of the movement, stating that the “Free Syrian Army needs Al-Qaeda now”. The CFR acknowledges that the goal of Al-Qaeda operatives in Syria is not necessarily to overthrow Assad, but to establish an Islamic state. Despite this, the CFR still continues its support of the strategy to overthrow Assad.

In an absurd display of forced schizophrenia, globalist organizations along with the puppet White House now argue that the existence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the same ISIS insurgency THEY CREATED, requires the U.S. to execute air strikes and military intervention in the region. Of course, to remain “fair and balanced”, the White House proposes to strike Syrian Government targets as well in order to avoid “strengthening Assad”. Yeah, read that twice, folks…

Remember the Syrian crisis at the end of last year? Remember how the U.S. and Russia were on the verge of conflict over Obama’s funding of the insurgency as well as his proposal to provide air support? Well, now the plan is to utilize air strikes against the same insurgents we had originally planned to help with air strikes.

Now, I have asked this question in the past, and I’ll ask it again – Is it merely irony that the White House is going to war with the covert militant group it gave birth to?

No, it is not irony. It is planned. ISIS is the new and improved Al-Qaeda. All of the terrorist disaster scenarios showcased in propaganda shows like ’24′ that seem rather ridiculous to many Americans if plotted by Al-Qaeda goat herders hiding in caves in Afghanistan and Pakistan now become believable if plotted by highly organized and savvy ISIS operatives.

The full remarks of Kissinger

The context of the world today is done no justice by the following full rhetoric from Kissinger posted in the Wall Street Journal.

Wall Street Journal Libya is in civil war, fundamentalist armies are building a self-declared caliphate across Syria and Iraq and Afghanistan’s young democracy is on the verge of paralysis. To these troubles are added a resurgence of tensions with Russia and a relationship with China divided between pledges of cooperation and public recrimination. The concept of order that has underpinned the modern era is in crisis. The search for world order has long been defined almost exclusively by the concepts of Western societies. In the decades following World War II, the U.S.—strengthened in its economy and national confidence—began to take up the torch of international leadership and added a new dimension. A nation founded explicitly on an idea of free and representative governance, the U.S. identified its own rise with the spread of liberty and democracy and credited these forces with an ability to achieve just and lasting peace. The traditional European approach to order had viewed peoples and states as inherently competitive; to constrain the effects of their clashing ambitions, it relied on a balance of power and a concert of enlightened statesmen. The prevalent American view considered people inherently reasonable and inclined toward peaceful compromise and common sense; the spread of democracy was therefore the overarching goal for international order. Free markets would uplift individuals, enrich societies and substitute economic interdependence for traditional international rivalries. This effort to establish world order has in many ways come to fruition. A plethora of independent sovereign states govern most of the world’s territory. The spread of democracy and participatory governance has become a shared aspiration if not a universal reality; global communications and financial networks operate in real time. The years from perhaps 1948 to the turn of the century marked a brief moment in human history when one could speak of an incipient global world order composed of an amalgam of American idealism and traditional European concepts of statehood and balance of power. But vast regions of the world have never shared and only acquiesced in the Western concept of order. These reservations are now becoming explicit, for example, in the Ukraine crisis and the South China Sea. The order established and proclaimed by the West stands at a turning point. First, the nature of the state itself—the basic formal unit of international life—has been subjected to a multitude of pressures. Europe has set out to transcend the state and craft a foreign policy based primarily on the principles of soft power. But it is doubtful that claims to legitimacy separated from a concept of strategy can sustain a world order. And Europe has not yet given itself attributes of statehood, tempting a vacuum of authority internally and an imbalance of power along its borders. At the same time, parts of the Middle East have dissolved into sectarian and ethnic components in conflict with each other; religious militias and the powers backing them violate borders and sovereignty at will, producing the phenomenon of failed states not controlling their own territory. The challenge in Asia is the opposite of Europe’s: Balance-of-power principles prevail unrelated to an agreed concept of legitimacy, driving some disagreements to the edge of confrontation. The clash between the international economy and the political institutions that ostensibly govern it also weakens the sense of common purpose necessary for world order. The economic system has become global, while the political structure of the world remains based on the nation-state. Economic globalization, in its essence, ignores national frontiers. Foreign policy affirms them, even as it seeks to reconcile conflicting national aims or ideals of world order. This dynamic has produced decades of sustained economic growth punctuated by periodic financial crises of seemingly escalating intensity: in Latin America in the 1980s; in Asia in 1997; in Russia in 1998; in the U.S. in 2001 and again starting in 2007; in Europe after 2010. The winners have few reservations about the system. But the losers—such as those stuck in structural misdesigns, as has been the case with the European Union’s southern tier—seek their remedies by solutions that negate, or at least obstruct, the functioning of the global economic system. The international order thus faces a paradox: Its prosperity is dependent on the success of globalization, but the process produces a political reaction that often works counter to its aspirations. A third failing of the current world order, such as it exists, is the absence of an effective mechanism for the great powers to consult and possibly cooperate on the most consequential issues. This may seem an odd criticism in light of the many multilateral forums that exist—more by far than at any other time in history. Yet the nature and frequency of these meetings work against the elaboration of long-range strategy. This process permits little beyond, at best, a discussion of pending tactical issues and, at worst, a new form of summitry as “social media” event. A contemporary structure of international rules and norms, if it is to prove relevant, cannot merely be affirmed by joint declarations; it must be fostered as a matter of common conviction. The penalty for failing will be not so much a major war between states (though in some regions this remains possible) as an evolution into spheres of influence identified with particular domestic structures and forms of governance. At its edges, each sphere would be tempted to test its strength against other entities deemed illegitimate. A struggle between regions could be even more debilitating than the struggle between nations has been. The contemporary quest for world order will require a coherent strategy to establish a concept of order within the various regions and to relate these regional orders to one another. These goals are not necessarily self-reconciling: The triumph of a radical movement might bring order to one region while setting the stage for turmoil in and with all others. The domination of a region by one country militarily, even if it brings the appearance of order, could produce a crisis for the rest of the world. A world order of states affirming individual dignity and participatory governance, and cooperating internationally in accordance with agreed-upon rules, can be our hope and should be our inspiration. But progress toward it will need to be sustained through a series of intermediary stages. To play a responsible role in the evolution of a 21st-century world order, the U.S. must be prepared to answer a number of questions for itself: What do we seek to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if necessary alone? What do we seek to achieve, even if not supported by any multilateral effort? What do we seek to achieve, or prevent, only if supported by an alliance? What should we not engage in, even if urged on by a multilateral group or an alliance? What is the nature of the values that we seek to advance? And how much does the application of these values depend on circumstance? For the U.S., this will require thinking on two seemingly contradictory levels. The celebration of universal principles needs to be paired with recognition of the reality of other regions’ histories, cultures and views of their security. Even as the lessons of challenging decades are examined, the affirmation of America’s exceptional nature must be sustained. History offers no respite to countries that set aside their sense of identity in favor of a seemingly less arduous course. But nor does it assure success for the most elevated convictions in the absence of a comprehensive geopolitical strategy. —Dr. Kissinger served as national security adviser and secretary of state under Presidents Nixon and Ford. Adapted from his book “World Order,” to be published Sept. 9 by the Penguin Press.