Did the Enlighteners Reject Aristotle?

In his book, The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness 1680-1790, Ritchie Robertson uses the term “Enlighteners” to describe the proponents of the Enlightenment. I will briefly describe Robertson’s book before explaining how my reading of it has caused me to consider the question posed above.

 

The Enlightenment is monumental in terms of its discussion of the contributions of numerous Enlighteners and its detailed coverage of topics including science, religion, ethics, government, philosophy and revolution, as well as its length (983 pages, including references and index). The author has done well to make his tome interesting to read.

Robertson has a positive attitude toward the Enlighteners. He suggests that “the Enlightenment stands for the endeavours of thinkers, writers and practical administrators in many countries to increase the well-being of humanity”. In the Preface, he attempts to summarise what the Enlighteners sought to do:

“For them, to enlighten humanity is to clear away the false beliefs which have blinded people to their own interests; to oppose the power of institutions, especially the organized Churches, which have encouraged such blindness; to arrive at a true understanding of human nature, and of the political and economic societies in which people live; to increase people’s well-being and happiness; and to do so by close attention to empirical facts and the use of reason.”

In his concluding chapter, Robertson notes that critics of the Enlightenment sometimes refer to it as ‘the Enlightenment project” to imply that it can be reduced to a single model that is responsible for all the ills of modernity. The author aimed to provide a “fine-grained” presentation of “a rich and complex historical period, and a diverse body of thought”. Despite the criticism I offer below, I believe that Robertson has achieved that objective.

 Robertson’s book has been the subject of several extensive reviews since its first publication in 2020. Rather than attempting to provide a comprehensive review of The Enlightenment, I refer readers to a review by Gary Saul Morson entitled “Daring to Know” (Morson, 2021).

What prompted my question?

Chapter 1, entitled “Happiness, Reason and Passion”, opens with the following sentence:

“The Enlightenment declared the conviction that the goal of life was happiness, and that if this goal could be attained at all, it was to be found in the here and now.”

As I read that, the thought crossed my mind that Aristotle got there first. A few pages later, I thought the author was about to acknowledge the debt that the Enlighteners owed to Aristotle when he writes:

“The belief that the purpose of human life is the attainment of happiness is called ‘eudaemonism’.”

However, Aristotle doesn’t rate a mention. Instead, attention is focused on Epicurus, the bad odour that had surrounded that philosopher during the Middle Ages and the caution his admirers needed to display during that period.

I accept that there are grounds to argue that the beliefs that most Enlighteners had about happiness may have been closer to those of Epicurus than to those of Aristotle. As Darrin McMahon has observed, most Enlightenment thinkers tended to put greater emphasis on pleasure and good feeling than did Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics (McMahon, 2005, p.209).

Nevertheless, when I was reading Robertson’s book I expected that he would have mentioned Aristotle in his discussion of the Enlighteners’ views on happiness. Does that make me guilty of presentism – a tendency to see the past from a present day perspective?

From a present day perspective, it is not difficult to consider Aristotle’s views on their merits, disentangling them from the religious dogma of the Middle Ages. Perhaps it was more difficult for the Enlighteners to do that.

Did the Enlighteners reject Aristotle? That is a big question. I will confine myself to considering three relevant aspects:

 Did the Scientific Revolution discredit Aristotle?

Did any of the Enlighteners see merit in Aristotle’s views?

Would it make sense to view any of the influential Enlighteners as Neo-Aristotelians?

The Scientific Revolution

Francis Bacon and Galileo Galilei played major roles in the Scientific Revolution which preceded the Enlightenment.

Robertson notes that Bacon “rejected the empty abstractions of scholastics who immersed themselves in Aristotle and ignored the world around them”. He also notes: “Bacon’s dismissal of Aristotelian abstractions was supported by such hands-on experimenters as Robert Boyle.”

Although Robertson discusses Galileo’s contributions, he doesn’t mention his view of Aristotle. John Sellars has pointed out that although Galileo mocked those who adhered slavishly to the letter of Aristotle’s works regardless of what new evidence might be presented, he suggested that “if Aristotle were now alive, he would change his opinion”. Aristotle would not have held on to beliefs that conflicted with new evidence. Sellars notes that Jacopo Zabarella and Alessandro Piccolomini had previously suggested that a true Aristotelian would embrace Aristotle’s spirit of inquiry. Piccolomini asserted that he would rely first and foremost on experience and observation, even if that meant disagreeing with Aristotle from time to time (Sellars, 2023, pp. 106-7).

If the Enlighteners felt inclined, it was possible for them to discuss Aristotle without being seen to endorse everything he wrote.

Enlighteners who saw merit in Aristotle’s views

Francis Hutcheson and Adam Smith saw some merit in Aristotle’s views.

Hutcheson was one of the most influential figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. Robertson notes that a central point in Hutcheson’s moral philosophy was that moral goodness denotes “a quality in actions which makes us approve the action, and love the actor, even though it does not serve our advantage”. By suggesting that humans possess a moral sense, Hutcheson was differing from the view of Epicureans that humans are motivated only to avoid pain and seek pleasure.

In developing his own philosophy, Hutcheson referred to Aristotle’s view of happiness:

“Thus according to the just observation of Aristotle, “The chief happiness of active beings must arise from action; and that not from action of every sort, but from that sort to which their nature is adapted, and which is recommended by nature.” When we gratify the bodily appetites, there is an immediate sense of pleasure, such as the brutes enjoy, but no further satisfaction; no sense of dignity upon reflection, no good-liking of others for their being thus employed. There is an exercise of some other bodily powers which seems more manly and graceful. There is a manifest gradation; some fine tastes in the ingenious arts are still more agreeable; the exercise is delightful; the works are pleasant to the spectator, and reputable to the artist. The exercise of the higher powers of the understanding, in discovery of truth, and just reasoning, is more esteemable, when the subjects are important. But the noblest of all are the virtuous affections and actions, the objects of the moral sense” (Hutcheson, 1755, Ch.ii).

In A System of Moral Philosophy, Hutcheson made many favourable references to Aristotle. The main point on which he expressed opposition was in respect of Aristotle’s view that some people are “natural” slaves.

Adam Smith considered the views of Aristotle, along with those of Plato, Zeno and Epicurus, in Theory of Moral Sentiments. His discussion of Aristotle’s moral philosophy is respectful of the idea that virtue is a middle state between extremes of excess and deficiency. One example he cites is that magnanimity lies between “the excess of arrogance and the defect of pusillanimity, of which the one consists in too extravagant, the other in too weak a sentiment of our own worth and dignity”. Smith goes on to note Aristotle’s emphasis on the development of good habits (Smith, 1984/1759, VII.ii.1, para.11-14).

Smith suggested that the moral philosophy of Epicurus “is, no doubt, altogether inconsistent” with that which he had been endeavouring to establish” (Smith, 1984/1759, VII.ii.1.2. para.13). He noted that for Epicurus virtue was only to be pursued to prevent pain and to procure ease and pleasure. By contrast, Plato, Aristotle and Zeno had a different view:

“Man, they thought, being born for action, his happiness must consist, not merely in the agreeableness of his passive sensations, but also in the propriety of his active exertions” (Smith, 1984/1759, VII.ii.1.2. para.17).

Immanuel Kant was another Enlightenment philosopher who saw merit in some of Aristotle’s views. In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant said formal logic had not been able to advance a single step since Aristotle established it, “and, thus, to all appearance has reached its completion” (Kant, 1787). The field of formal logic is somewhat removed from happiness and virtue ethics, but it is worth noting that Kant treats Aristotle as having essentially perfected an entire field of inquiry.

Neo-Aristotelian Enlighteners?

It is probably fair to say that few of the influential Enlightenment philosophers would have been comfortable being labelled as Aristotelians. When we look at the writings of some of them through modern eyes, however, the influence of Aristotle seems striking. Aristotelian ideas about human flourishing as reason-guided and connected to human nature seems to have been thoroughly absorbed into the natural law tradition (partly through Aquinas and the scholastics) that some Enlighteners could apparently express an Aristotelian viewpoint without feeling any need to invoke Aristotle by name.

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) is one of the main characters in Robertson’s book. Unfortunately, however, Robertson doesn’t draw out the parallels between the viewpoints of Aristotle and Herder.

Herder’s philosophy of history has an Aristotelian flavor because it was founded on the study of human nature. Herder’s concept of humanität – the goal toward which individuals are striving – seems to have a lot in common with Aristotle’s concept of ergon, and the idea that exercising reason and virtue defines what it means to be a human. Herder treats reason and humanity’s distinctive powers as central to human flourishing.

In Herder’s view, each culture has its own centre and specific form of happiness within itself – a conception of happiness as the actualisation of a being’s specific nature and capacities, which is structurally very close to Aristotle’s eudaimonia. In that respect, Herder’s account seems similar to that of modern Neo-Aristotelian classical liberals who emphasize that individuals may flourish in different ways in different communities and cultures.

I am indebted to Robertson for also bringing Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (1694-1748) to my attention. Burlamaqui was a Genevan legal and political theorist. The passage in the epigraph at the beginning of this essay is taken from his book, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law. The longer quote from that book below serves to illustrate that it might be appropriate to view him as a Neo-Aristotelian Enlightener – his views certainly have much in common with those of some modern Neo-Aristotelians:  

“Happiness is that internal satisfaction of the soul which arises from the possession of good; good is whatever is agreeable to man for his preservation, perfection, entertainment, and pleasure. Evil is the opposite of good.

Man incessantly experiences, that there are some things convenient, and others inconvenient to him; that the former are not all equally convenient, but some more than others; in fine, that this conveniency depends, for the most part, on the use he knows how to make of things, and that the same thing which may suit him, using it after a certain manner and measure, becomes unsuitable when this use exceeds its limits. It is only therefore by investigating the nature of things, as also the relations they have between themselves and with us, that we are capable of discovering their fitness or disagreement with our felicity, of discerning good from evil, of ranging every thing in its proper order, of setting a right value upon each, and of regulating consequently our researches and desires.

But is there any other method of acquiring this discernment, but by forming just ideas of things and their relations, and by deducing from these first ideas the consequences that flow from thence by exact and close argumentations? Now it is reason alone that directs all these operations. Yet this is not all: for as in order to arrive at happiness, it is not sufficient to form just ideas of the nature and state of things, but it is also necessary that the will should be directed by those ideas and judgments in the series of our conduct; so it is certain, that nothing but reason can communicate and support in man the necessary strength for making a right use of liberty, and for determining in all cases according to the light of his understanding, in spite of all the impressions and motions that may lead him to a contrary pursuit.

Reason is therefore the only means, in every respect, that man has left to attain to happiness, and the principal end for which he has received it” (Burlamaqui,2006 /1763, Ch.V). 

Robertson notes that Burlamaqui’s book was a prescribed text at Harvard and Princeton universities and “helped to shape the minds of many later protagonists of the American Revolution”. He suggests that the influence of Burlamaqui’s views might help account for presence of the right to pursue happiness in the American Declaration of Independence.

I concluded a previous essay entitled,‘Why did the US Declaration of Independence specify an unalienable right to the pursuit of happiness?’ by suggesting that, in the American colonies at the time of the Declaration, pursuit of happiness “was widely perceived in terms that have a great deal in common with the activity of human flourishing, as perceived by Aristotle and his followers”.

Unfortunately, while drawing attention to Burlamaqui’s influence on Jefferson’s “pursuit of happiness”, Robertson fails to point out that Burlamaqui’s conception of happiness is thoroughly Aristotelian in structure. 

Conclusion

While reading Ritchie Robertson’s tome, The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness 1680-1790, I was struck by the absence of any reference to Aristotle in the author’s discussion of eudaimonia. That made me wonder whether I was guilty of presentism – perhaps I was reading the Enlightenment through modern eyes shaped by a renewed interest in Aristotelian ethics. On reflection, I do not think that charge holds. The resources for separating Aristotle from scholastic dogma were available to the Enlighteners themselves. Zabarella, Piccolomini and Galileo had already articulated the distinction between the letter and the spirit of Aristotle’s work before the Enlightenment properly began. It was open to any serious thinker of the period to engage with Aristotle on his merits.

Did the Enlighteners reject Aristotle? Some prominent Enlighteners were explicitly opposed to Aristotle – Locke’s version of the blank slate idea, Hume’s empiricist scepticism, and Bentham’s utilitarian calculus all represent deliberate departures from Aristotelian foundations. But as this essay has tried to show, that is far from the whole story. Hutcheson and Smith engaged respectfully and substantively with Aristotle’s ethics. Kant credited him with having essentially completed an entire field of inquiry. And figures like Herder and Burlamaqui reproduced recognizably Aristotelian structures of thought about happiness and human flourishing, apparently without feeling the need to acknowledge the debt.

That last point is perhaps the most interesting one. Robertson himself draws attention to Burlamaqui’s influence on Jefferson’s “pursuit of happiness,” yet does not notice that Burlamaqui’s account of happiness – reason as the indispensable guide to the good life, directed toward the perfection of human nature – is thoroughly Aristotelian in character. A more Aristotle-aware reading of the Enlightenment would not diminish Robertson’s achievement in mapping a rich and complex period. It would, however, complicate the familiar narrative in which the Enlightenment broke cleanly from ancient authority. The pursuit of happiness that Robertson places at the heart of the Enlightenment had stronger Aristotelian roots than he acknowledges.

References

Burlamaqui, Jean-Jacques, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, trans. Thomas Nugent, ed. and with an Introduction by Peter Korkman (Liberty Fund, 2006/1763).

Hutcheson, Francis, A System of Moral Philosophy, Edited and with an Introduction by Knud Haakonssen and Christian Maurer (Liberty Fund, first published posthumously in 1755).

Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn (Project Gutenberg Ebook,1787).

McMahon, Darrin M., Happiness: A History (Grove Press, 2006).

Morson, Gary Saul, “Daring to Know” (Claremont Review of Books, Fall 2021).

Robertson, Ritchie, The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness 1680-1790 (Penguin Books, 2022).

Sellars, John, Aristotle: Understanding the World’s Greatest Philosopher (Penguin Books, 2023).

Smith, Adam, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (Liberty Fund, 1984/1759).

Source: https://www.freedomandflourishing.com/2026/07/did-enlighteners-reject-aristotle.html