Domestic Efforts to Combat Cyberterrorism

In this section, I evaluate whether government agencies and the private sector are for implementing counterterrorism measures to combat cyberterrorism.

Government Agencies and the Private Sector

Information Sharing. Within a year after September 11, 2001 (9/11), security expert Sharon Gaudin (2002) said, “In the cyber area, companies are the most common victims of attacks. Government can’t analyze that information and determine what the trends are or if this is telling of a larger attack coming, if private companies don’t share information about their attacks…There’s still the thought that companies that have been attacked should keep the information about it internal, rather than share that information with law enforcement and government agencies…If they don’t have a good relationship with the government, they won’t get the threat information they need and their ability to respond is going to be limited”(Gaudin, 2002).  Since 2002, things have improved with sharing of private sector information with the government. However, sharing among government agencies, such as among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Defense (DoD), and other agencies, still remained a problem. Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in November 2002 attempted to improve information sharing.

Private Sector is Key to Solution. Although governments administer only a minority of the nation’s critical infrastructure computer systems, government at all levels perform essential services in the agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, social welfare, information and telecommunications, defense, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemicals, and postal shipping sectors that depend on cyberspace for their delivery. Governments can lead by example in cyberspace security including fostering a marketplace for more secure technologies through their procurement (Bullock, Haddow, Coppola, Ergin, Westerman, & Yeletaysi, 2006).  However, government cannot solve the cyber security problem for the private sector. The solution must come from the private sector.

Reforms Needed. As late as the fall of 2006, Evan Kohlmann (2006) wrote, “The United States is gradually losing the online war against terrorists. To combat terrorists, we must monitor terrorist activities online in the same way the U.S. keeps tabs of terrorists in the real world. Doing so will require a realignment of U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, which lag behind terrorists organizations in adopting information technologies. At present, unfortunately, senior counterterrorism officials refuse even to pay lip service to the need for such reforms. That must change – and fast. One of the most important ways in which terrorists use the Internet is as a medium for propaganda” (Kohlmann, 2006).  The officials’ refusal to implement reforms is a sad state of affairs.

Air Force Cyber Command. As late as September 2007, the U.S. Air Force had established a provisional Cyber Command as part of an expanding mission to prepare for wars in cyberspace. The move comes amid concerns over the vulnerability of the U.S. communications and computer networks to cyber attack in a conflict, as well as the military’s desire to exploit the new medium. Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne announced the creation of the new command at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, where the Air Force’s existing cyberwarfare operations are centered. Officials said the provisional command will pave the way within a year for the creation of the Air Force’s first major command devoted to cyberwarfare operations (Anonymous, 2007).  It was about time the government acted to prepare us for cyberwarfare.

Key Cyber Security Activities. The FBI estimated that computer-related crimes cost U.S. businesses $67 billion per year (Wagner, 2007a).  Consequently, the U.S. government places an especially high priority on protecting our cyber infrastructure from terrorist attack by unifying and focusing the key cyber security activities performed by the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (formerly part of the Department of Commerce) and the National Infrastructure Protection Center (FBI). The Directorate augments those capabilities with the response functions of the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) and United States Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) (Sweet, 2006).

Public Access to the Internet. It is interesting to note that there is an inverse relationship between public access to the Internet and the inability of governments and institutions to control information flow and, hence, state allegiance, ideology, public opinion, and policy formulation. Increase in public access to the Internet results in an equivalent decrease in government and institutional power. Indeed, after September 11, 2001, Internet traffic statistics show that many millions of Americans have connected to alternative news sources outside the continental United States (CONUS). The information they consume can be and often is contrary to U.S. government statements and U.S. mainstream media reporting. Recognizing this, terrorists will coordinate their assaults and cleverly use cyberspace for manipulating perceptions, opinion, and the political and socioeconomic direction of many nation-states (Stanton, 2002).

Cybercrime Threatens Everyone. In conclusion, the government and private sector alike recognize that cybercrime threatens everyone. This thinking has prompted both sides to forge partnerships and increase information sharing. The DHS has collaborated with private firms when it wrote a computer breach scenario in the National Response Plan (NRP). As mentioned earlier, the Air Force has reached out to the private sector as it develops its new Cyber Command, the service’s future focal point for computer warfare. The AF has also signaled a desire to work with the private sector to train airmen in cyber security. Despite these collaborative efforts to protect against computer incursions, the government and private sector face significant operational problems, wrote the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in a June 2007 report. The GAO criticized both sides for not always detecting or reporting Internet-based crimes and says that law enforcement organizations have difficulty retaining personnel with such expertise (Wagner, 2007b).

U.S. Legal Requirements and Computer Forensics

In this section, I analyze the practicality of U.S. legal requirements and computer forensics in addressing cyberterrorism.

Digital Technologies. The advent of digital technology and the convergence of computing and communications change the way we live. These trends create unprecedented opportunities for crime. Criminal activities unforeseen two decades ago are facts of life today. Digital technologies provide ordinary citizens, even juveniles, with the capacity to inflict massive harm. Public prosecutors must possess the knowledge that permits an effective response. The continued advancement of digital technology creates new opportunities for criminal exploitation (Grobsky, 2007).

Computer Forensics. Forensics use technology and science to investigate and recover facts to resolve criminal matters. Computer forensics applies technology in discovering evidence to use in criminal or civil courts of law. The process involves recovering damaged and deleted files. In particular, some cases use computer forensics as evidence to indict criminal offenders or to locate a missing person (Philpott, n.d.).

Cybercrimes. Traditional law enforcement ends at national borders; whereas, cybercrime does not. The perpetrators may be located anywhere in the world, and unless there is international cooperation, it is very difficult to arrest and prosecute the attackers. Unfortunately, in most countries, there is no clear basis in law for prosecuting cyber-criminals and no basis for extradition (Cordesman, 2002).

Cyber Attacks. America’s cyberspace links the United States to the rest of the world. A network-of-networks spans the planet, thereby, allowing malicious actors on one continent to act on systems thousands of miles away. Cyber attacks penetrate borders at light speed; hence, discerning the source of malicious activity is difficult. America must be capable of safeguarding and defending its critical systems and networks. Enabling the ability to do so requires a system of international cooperation to facilitate information sharing, reduce vulnerabilities, and deter malicious actors (Bullock, et al, 2006).

Cyberterror. Today, most of cyberterror is plagued by very fuzzy definitional boundaries. For instance, would a cyber attack on a country’s stock market be a form of cyberterror because it would involve no immediate, tangible violence? Additionally, could we reach universal agreement on the essential nature of the stock market to the survival of those living in the system? What about an attempt to corrupt information within a system such as that pertaining to blood types in a hospital? If the only result is additional costs in terms of time delay/effort and not lives lost or medical emergencies, is this still terrorism (Combs, 2006)?  If we cannot reach consensus on answers to these questions, how could we effectively discuss cyberterror in a meaningful way?

Digital Evidence. Whether the crime is a new one, like phishing (Krone, 2005), or a more conventional fraud committed with new technology, the intangible nature of digital evidence is also a challenge for prosecutors. Assembling evidence, preserving its integrity, and presenting it in a comprehensible manner to a court has always been the prosecutor’s role. However, judges and juries who are unfamiliar with high technology may be uncomfortable with evidence in digital form. Furthermore, skilled defense counsel may seek to sow the seeds of doubt by suggesting that computer malfunction or human intervention contaminated the evidence in question. The accused, moreover, may argue that it was not he or she who committed the criminal act, but rather someone else with either direct or remote access to the computer. One recognizes that capacity building is important in advanced industrial nations as well as to those on the other side of the digital divide (Grobsky, 2007).

Prosecuting Internet Crimes. The GAO suggests that law enforcement personnel struggle to prosecute Internet crimes because there is a limited pool of highly trained specialists. Additionally, they report that law enforcement efforts are hampered by the cross-border nature of such crime. Officials have a difficult time figuring out the laws and legal procedures of multiple jurisdictions (Wagner, 2007b).

Increased Funding. In May 2007, Congress introduced new legislation that would increase funds for law enforcement and allow the Department of Justice to impose stricter penalties for computer criminals. The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property introduced the Cybercrime Enhancement Act of 2007. If passed, the law would allocate $10 million per year to federal law enforcement through 2011. The money would be given to the U.S. Secret Service, the Attorney General’s office, and the FBI to combat identity theft and other cybercrimes (Wagner, 2007a).  The main question begged is this: Is $10 million per year enough to solve this problem? This amount seems to be a mere pittance.

Persisting Problems. In conclusion, enforcing the law across borders is a real problem…particularly since cyberterrorism can be committed worldwide from any location on earth. Pinpointing the source is a real challenge for cyber-cops. Definitional boundaries present another hurdle to overcome. How do we communicate with other nationals if we cannot agree on the terminology we use to discuss cyberterrorism? The intangible nature of digital evidence is also a challenge for prosecutors, judges, and juries. Another area of weakness is that we just do not have enough people trained and knowledgeable in sufficient depth to deal with the legal requirements, computer forensics, and cyberterrorism. Congress is working to provide more funds to deal with these problems; however, it just may be too little too late. What we need is a more concerted effort to deal with this cyberterror problem on a more global, systematic approach.

References

Anonymous (2007, September 18). US Air Force sets up Cyber Command. Breitbart.com. Retrieved from www.breitbart.com/print.php?id=070918201110.nyigxaco&show_article=1.

Bullock, J. A., Haddow, G. D., Coppola, D., Ergin, E., Westerman, L., & Yeletaysi, S. (2006). Introduction to Homeland Security, Second Edition. Oxford, United Kingdom: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann.

Combs, C.C. (2006). Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice-Hall.

Cordesman, A. H. (2002). Cyber-threats, Information Warfare, and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Defending the US Homeland. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers.

Gaudin, S. (2002, July 19). Security expert: US companies unprepared for cyberterror. IT Management Security. Retrieved from itmanagement.earthweb.com/secu/print.php/1429851.

Grobsky, P. (2007, October 13). Requirements of prosecution services to deal with cybercrime. Crime Law Soc Change, 47, 201-223.

Kohlmann, E. F. (2006, September/October). The real online terrorist threat. Foreign Affairs, 85(5), p. 115.

Krone, T. (2005). Phishing, High Tech Crime Brief No. 9. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. Retrieved from www.aic.gov.au/publications/htch/htch009.html.  Phishing is transmitting a form of Spam containing links to Web pages that are designed to appear to be legitimate commercial sites. They seek to fool users into submitting personal, financial, or password data. Clicking on the link may also lead to infection of one’s computer by a virus or may allow access to one’s computer by a hacker.

Philpott, D. (n.d.). Special report: Computer forensics and cyber security. Homeland Defense Journal, 12 pp.

Stanton, J. J. (2002, February). Terror in cyberspace: Terrorists will exploit and widen the gap between governing structures and the public. The American Behavioral Scientist, 45(6), 1017-1032.

Sweet, K. M. (2006). Transportation and Cargo Security: Threats and Solutions. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: PEARSON Prentice Hall.

Wagner, B. (2007a, July). Electronic jihad: Experts downplay imminent threat of cyberterrorism. National Defense, pp 34-36.

Wagner, B. (2007b, October). Electronic attackers: Computer crimes keep government and industry on the defensive. National Defense, pp 24-26.

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