Pakistan, Iran and the Limits of Haqqani’s Sanctions Narrative

Foreign policy analysis becomes persuasive when geography, trade volumes and operational realities reinforce the argument. When they do not, an impressive narrative can quickly begin to unravel. Hussain Haqqani’s recent Hudson Institute commentary, Multiple Trade Routes Help Iran Evade Sanctions, raises legitimate questions about Iran’s attempts to maintain external commerce under sanctions. Yet its treatment of Pakistan stretches several observations much further than the available evidence appears to justify.

The article identifies Russia, China and Pakistan as important partners helping Iran withstand economic pressure and subsequently gives Pakistan a surprisingly prominent role in Tehran’s alternative trade architecture. That emphasis deserves scrutiny. Iran undoubtedly trades with Pakistan, and informal cross-border commerce is a longstanding reality. But normal bilateral trade, border livelihoods and formally established transit arrangements are not automatically evidence that Pakistan has become a central mechanism for circumventing international sanctions.

The $3.13 Billion Problem

Perhaps the clearest problem is numerical. Haqqani writes that Iranian-Pakistani commerce “in March 2025 alone” reached $3.13 billion. Available reporting based on Iranian official figures says something considerably different. The $3.13 billion represents bilateral trade during the entire Iranian year running from March 20, 2024 to March 20, 2025, not a single month. Iranian exports reportedly accounted for about $2.42 billion and imports from Pakistan approximately $700 million. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry has similarly described current bilateral trade as approximately $3 billion, while the two governments aspire to raise it to $10 billion.

This distinction is hardly minor. Presenting an annual figure as one month’s commerce radically changes the apparent scale of the economic relationship. It also matters when Pakistan is being presented as an important economic lifeline for Iran. Even the Hudson article acknowledges far larger Iranian commercial relationships elsewhere, citing roughly $32 billion in oil purchases by China, about $10 billion in trade with Iraq and $5 billion with Türkiye. In that regional context, Pakistan-Iran commerce is real and important to border economies, but its scale should not be exaggerated.

Geography Cannot Be Written Out of the Argument

The second weakness concerns Central Asia. The article argues that Iran is developing resilient transport corridors “through Pakistan and into Central Asia.” On a map, however, Pakistan has no direct border with any Central Asian republic. Overland traffic moving north from Pakistan normally requires access through Afghanistan or considerably more complicated alternative routing.

That fact becomes particularly important because Pakistan’s principal commercial crossings with Afghanistan have faced prolonged closure since the security crisis of October 2025. Reuters reported the shutdown of border crossings and suspension of trade after the October clashes. By September 2026, the Khyber Chamber of Commerce was still demanding that Torkham be reopened, saying the crossing had remained closed for almost a year. Earlier reporting similarly described commercial activity at Torkham as suspended for around ten months.

Against that operational background, describing Pakistan as the foundation of a functioning Iranian corridor into Central Asia requires considerably more evidence. Policy ambitions for regional connectivity certainly exist. Functioning trade corridors, however, are measured by cargo flows, accessible borders, transport capacity, customs throughput and reliable infrastructure, not merely by agreements or strategic aspirations.

The China Argument Raises More Questions

The Hudson commentary goes further by claiming that “many” transport links between Iran and China pass through Pakistan and that Pakistan therefore plays a key role in deepening Iran-China economic relations. Yet the article itself identifies the principal China-Iran land links as rail corridors running from China through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan into Iran. That is the geographically direct Central Asian route.

A Pakistan-based China-Iran land movement would instead require cargo to enter Pakistan through the Khunjerab Pass in the Karakoram mountains, travel south across Pakistan and then move west through Balochistan towards Iran. Khunjerab is an important and growing Pakistan-China trade gateway, but its scale should remain in perspective. Officially cited figures showed just over 11,000 inbound and outbound vehicles at the crossing during the first ten months of 2024, with approximately 40,900 tonnes of cargo. Trade has expanded since the crossing became operational year-round, and Pakistan Customs reported record revenues in FY2025-26. That demonstrates growing bilateral connectivity. It does not by itself establish Khunjerab as a major Iran-China sanctions-evasion artery.

Indeed, the Hudson article itself notes that direct China-Iran rail connections through Central Asia can move cargo between the two countries in less than two weeks. Economically, therefore, any argument that Iran would routinely divert significant China-bound commerce through Pakistan needs evidence showing why such a lengthy mountainous and road-dependent route would be preferable to established rail and maritime alternatives.

Trade With Iran Is Not Automatically Sanctions Evasion

There is also an analytical distinction that should not be lost. Pakistan and Iran are neighboring states with legitimate economic requirements, particularly in food, electricity, agriculture and border commerce. Pakistan and Iran have maintained a preferential trade agreement since 2006, while both governments have publicly discussed barter arrangements, border markets and expanded legal commerce. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry stated in January 2026 that its trade with Iran follows relevant international trade regulations and international law.

None of this proves that illicit activity never occurs. Smuggling along the Pakistan-Iran frontier is a documented challenge. But sanctions analysis requires distinguishing legal trade, informal border commerce, smuggling and deliberate state-facilitated sanctions circumvention. Blurring those categories may produce a dramatic narrative, but it does not produce a sufficiently precise assessment.

The broader issue, therefore, is not whether Iran uses alternative commercial networks. It clearly does. The real question is how important Pakistan actually is within those networks. On that point, trade volumes, geography, the prolonged disruption of the Afghan route and Iran’s established direct connections with China, Russia, Türkiye and Central Asia suggest a much more qualified picture than the Hudson commentary presents.

Pakistan can reasonably be described as one of Iran’s neighboring commercial partners and a potentially important future connectivity state. Describing it as a pivotal existing bridge connecting Iran simultaneously with China and Central Asia is a much larger proposition. That proposition requires stronger evidence than the article currently provides. Geography is stubborn, border closures have consequences, and trade statistics cannot be made larger simply by framing them differently.