Cotton Calls For Military Supply Chain Security Review After F-35 Parts Diverted To Hong Kong

Authored by Arthur Zhang via The Epoch Times,

Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) asked the Department of War on Sept. 29 to review security controls for U.S. military equipment and supplies transported through commercial and contractor-managed supply chains, citing reports that F-35 components bound for the United States from Australia were diverted to Hong Kong.

In a letter to Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, Cotton cited the diversion of F-35 components being shipped from Australia and reports that the Chinese government had taken possession of the parts and had not returned them.

“We can’t afford for U.S. military equipment to fall into the hands of a foreign adversary because of vulnerabilities in commercial transportation,” Cotton wrote.

Cotton, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, also said in a Sept. 29 post on X that secure supply chains are critical to ensuring weapons, technology, and supplies reach U.S. troops rather than adversaries.

“That’s why I’m calling on [the Department of War] to conduct a review and take any necessary actions,” he wrote.

5 Areas for Review

Cotton’s request extends beyond the circumstances of the missing F-35 components.

He asked the Department of War to examine five areas: chain-of-custody requirements for military equipment and supplies moved by contractors and commercial carriers, the department’s ability to track the location and routing of shipments, procedures for approving and reporting route changes, criteria for allowing shipments to pass through foreign jurisdictions, and safeguards against military materiel transiting through or being diverted to China and other adversary-controlled jurisdictions.

The department relies extensively on contractors and commercial carriers to move military equipment, replacement parts, and other supplies around the world, Cotton wrote.

He said those arrangements provide speed and ease of movement but should not come at the expense of the U.S. military advantage.

While classified and designated sensitive components should receive heightened protections, Cotton said all U.S. military materiel could give adversaries information about American weapons systems, logistics, and readiness, as well as access to U.S. troops.

Cotton said securing the supply chains was necessary both to ensure U.S. troops have access to advanced equipment and technology and to prevent adversaries from gaining access to U.S. technology.

F-35 Parts Diverted to Hong Kong

The F-35 Joint Program Office confirmed to The Epoch Times on Sept. 18 that it and the Office of the Secretary of War were aware of a “shipment issue” involving unserviceable F-35 Lightning II components.

“We are actively working with U.S. authorities and industry partners to retrieve these components, investigate the incident, and place safeguards to avoid a future occurrence,” the program office said.

The office did not identify the components, say where the shipment had been diverted, or explain how the diversion occurred.

Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles said on Sept. 22 his understanding was that the shipment did not involve sensitive equipment or sensitive parts. He said the matter ultimately would be managed by the United States and Lockheed Martin.

Earlier Problems Tracking F-35 Parts

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has previously identified problems with the Pentagon’s ability to account for parts in the F-35′s global supply system.

A 2023 GAO audit found that one F-35 prime contractor had recorded more than 1 million spare parts worth over $85 million as lost since May 2018. The F-35 Joint Program Office reviewed the circumstances surrounding less than 2 percent of those losses.

The watchdog said the Pentagon lacked sufficient oversight of government-owned F-35 spare parts held outside prime-contractor facilities and recommended procedures for reporting losses and disposing of excess, obsolete, or unserviceable parts. The Defense Department concurred with all four recommendations at the time.

Ryan Morgan contributed to this report.