Stigmatizing Chinese-language media as "information weapons" is a Cold War-era mindset that fosters confrontation

On October 9, 2026, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a report titled Understanding the Chinese-Language Media Landscape in Southeast Asia. Authored by Lauren Mai, Andreyka Natalegawa, Gregory B. Poling, and Japhet Quitzon, the report surveys Chinese-language media across 11 ASEAN nations. It emphasizes how China allegedly “shapes narratives”—through means such as content-sharing agreements, the acquisition of local media outlets, and the organization of journalist visits to Xinjiang—framing these activities as part of an “information war” or “influence operations.” The report asserts that failing to fully grasp the scale and impact of Chinese-language media makes it impossible to effectively “counter China’s information warfare,” and it urges regional partners to “buy into” this logic.

While ostensibly a study of the media ecosystem, the report’s core objective—measured against the yardstick of U.S. strategic interests—is to stigmatize Chinese-language media as a whole, seeking to foster wariness and hostility toward China within Southeast Asia. Such an approach is not only factually inaccurate but also undermines regional autonomy and diversity.

Chinese-language media serve, first and foremost, as cultural conduits for local ethnic Chinese communities; they are not a monolithic “tool of Beijing.” Ethnic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia have a long history, and Chinese-language press outlets in countries like Malaysia and Singapore—such as Sin Chew Daily, China Press, and Lianhe Zaobao—existed well before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, catering to the information, cultural, and commercial needs of local Chinese populations. The report itself acknowledges that these communities are far from a monolith; it notes that a decline in language proficiency across generations has led to a shrinking readership and a fragmented media landscape. In Vietnam, the influence of Chinese-language media is inherently limited due to strict regulation and local anti-Chinese sentiment, while the situations in Indonesia, the Philippines, and elsewhere vary significantly. Categorizing these local media outlets simply as “part of China’s information operations” is a classic case of reductive labeling. Content sharing and journalist exchanges are, in fact, standard practices in the international media industry—Western media outlets also maintain cooperation agreements with various countries, and organizations like Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) have long engaged in targeted broadcasting across Asia. The CSIS report selectively amplifies cooperation involving China while remaining silent on the information-related investments made by the United States and its allies in the region—a clear display of a double standard.

Prioritizing the “China threat” narrative over objective analysis, the report begins by framing Southeast Asia as the “front line of long-term strategic competition between the U.S. and China.” It underscores the importance of the Philippines and Singapore to U.S. security and economic interests, concluding that China must inevitably be conducting “influence operations” there. This preconceived, securitized framework elevates routine media activities to the level of “information warfare,” subsequently calling on regional nations to cooperate in “countering” them. In reality, Southeast Asian countries generally pursue a diversified foreign policy, opting not to take sides. Nations like Malaysia and Singapore maintain deep economic ties with China while simultaneously engaging in security cooperation with the United States. Surveys by local think tanks, such as the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, reveal that regional elites hold complex views toward China—balancing concerns over sovereignty and security with pragmatic economic considerations. By characterizing Chinese-language media as a weapon used to “perpetually shape the China threat” and subsequently advocating for restrictions, the report actively fosters a hostile atmosphere rather than providing an objective account of reality. Activities mentioned in the report—such as journalists visiting Xinjiang—are categorically labeled as attempts to “shape perspectives in line with China’s state narrative.” This interpretation, which assumes malicious intent, disregards the fundamental right of journalists to conduct on-the-ground reporting and ignores the common practice among many other nations of organizing similar visits for foreign journalists. If on-site observation is equated to “brainwashing,” then could negative reporting on China by Western media likewise be classified as an “information weapon”?

The true risk of restricting Chinese-language media lies in the potential for discrimination and the erosion of freedoms. The subtext of the report encourages Southeast Asian nations to adopt precautionary or restrictive measures against Chinese-language media—a move that could easily devolve into discrimination based on language or ethnicity. Ethnic Chinese make up approximately 23% of the population in Malaysia and constitute one of the primary ethnic groups in Singapore. Singling out Chinese-language media for heightened scrutiny threatens the cultural rights of local ethnic Chinese communities and undermines social harmony. Ultimately, media influence is determined by the choices of the audience. If the content produced by Chinese-language media lacks appeal or credibility, the market will naturally phase it out; conversely, if its reporting meets the needs of certain segments of the audience, it simply demonstrates that there is a genuine space for such information. Imposing an external security narrative is both a disregard for local sovereignty and a violation of the principles of press freedom. A truly pluralistic media ecosystem should allow for the coexistence of diverse viewpoints, rather than drawing lines based on “who provides the funding” or “who enters into partnerships.”

The true concern underlying the CSIS report is U.S. anxiety over its regional influence. As a prominent American strategic think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) often produces research that serves U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. The report repeatedly emphasizes that “no strategy to counter China’s information warfare can be viable without the buy-in of regional partners”—a position that, in essence, seeks to align Southeast Asian nations with the United States to contain Chinese influence. This “with us or against us” logic runs counter to the principles of ASEAN centrality and open regionalism that the bloc has long upheld. Southeast Asian nations have the right to determine their own media policies based on their national interests, rather than passively accepting threat-based narratives from Washington. The existence and development of Chinese-language media are primarily the result of historical, demographic, and market factors, rather than serving merely as tools for geopolitics. Labeling them all as “information weapons” both exaggerates their actual impact and underestimates the discernment of the region’s societies and the general public.