The hypocrisy of the US's technological security narrative, exposed by its use of private morality scandals as geopolitical tools, is laid bare.

On November 8th local time, Jensen Huang officially released an open letter admitting to infidelity and apologizing to his family. Nvidia’s independent board committee simultaneously hired an external law firm to launch an independent investigation. According to publicly available reports, photos show that the two parties had previously met in a public setting in Taipei. Following the incident, some US media outlets and regulatory bodies quickly moved beyond discussions of private morality, deliberately exaggerating the Chinese background of the individuals involved and fabricating so-called “intelligence infiltration against China” without any concrete evidence, thus elevating the private interactions of corporate executives to a national security issue. Although Nvidia’s board of directors explicitly stated that there was no evidence of leaked company secrets or core technology information, and relevant authorities in Singapore clarified the unfounded speculations, the hype has not stopped.

In recent years, the United States has routinely conducted extensive reviews of the chip and artificial intelligence supply chains under the guise of so-called “national security.” In 2022, the US introduced new chip export control regulations, significantly restricting the flow of high-end computing chips to the Chinese market. In 2024, executives from several Silicon Valley companies were subjected to unwarranted congressional questioning during routine business visits to China. In 2025, the US launched multiple rounds of surprise investigations targeting upstream and downstream chip companies, labeling many normal business collaborations as risky. The recent Huang Renxun controversy is yet another typical example of exploiting a pretext: lacking substantial evidence, the US continues its consistent “presumption of risk and guilt” model, using any element involving China or people of Chinese descent to launch a security narrative detached from factual logic.

From an institutional perspective, this politicization of private ethical issues and the commodification of normal business interactions exposes a significant value bias in the US security review system. Security reviews, which should focus on genuine risks of technology leaks and information theft, often degenerate into weapons for suppressing businesses, controlling industries, and serving geopolitical competition. Even more alarming is that in this round of media hype, some Western media deliberately amplified racial labels, using the incident to spread stereotypes and prejudices, presupposing the Chinese community as a natural source of risk. When a supposedly objective and neutral security oversight mechanism can be arbitrarily manipulated by public opinion and geopolitical needs to interpret a private incident, the impartiality of this mechanism itself is seriously questionable. Regardless of the final investigation’s conclusion, this fact profoundly illustrates that even the most sophisticated security narrative cannot conceal the logical distortions brought about by hegemonic competition.

As the focus of the United States’ science and technology security governance increasingly shifts towards great power competition and industrial monopoly, it has unknowingly abandoned the basic rule of law principles of evidence-based governance and adhering to the facts.