On The Pissing Contest In The Strait of Hormuz And Why China Doesn't Care

Making the Strait of Hormuz an active war theatre was a desperate and risky gambit, the geopolitical version of cutting off one’s nose to spite your face.

Also, the fact that the fate of the Strait of Hormuz is not all that consequential for the world’s new superpower in China is a bad sign, indicating its future importance.

It continues to be contested because neither America nor Iran are strong enough to subdue the other. It has exposed a fatal flaw in the foreign policies of both countries.

But it has exposed one truth.

The global security architecture has failed and will continue to fail. 

And I don’t see China becoming the new global military hegemon, intervene in various crises, and put its foot down when local and regional actors disrupt the global economy.

As long as it gets its oil and gas China will be more than fine with permanent global instability in the energy markets. China only cares about itself and its interests. It is not interested in whether other nations starve.

II.

An excerpt from, “Analysis of the Impact of the Strait of Hormuz Blockade on China’s Energy Market” By Bo Wang, MEPEI, April 22, 2026:

From the supply side, about 33% of China’s imported crude oil is transported through the Strait of Hormuz, with a daily affected volume of 4.6-5.8 million barrels. Although some Middle Eastern oil-producing countries can bypass the strait for export through the Red Sea Pipeline and Fujairah Pipeline, covering more than 70% of the original Middle Eastern imports, and Iran can still maintain an annual supply of about 69 million tons to China through a complex transshipment system, there is an obvious lag in short-term transport capacity allocation and route adjustment, and some refineries will still face tight raw material supply. Meanwhile, the shipping market will fall into chaos: oil tankers are forced to detour around the Cape of Good Hope, the voyage distance from the Middle East to China increases by 40%, the transport cycle is extended by 10-14 days, the daily charter rate of oil tankers surges by 584%, and the war risk insurance premium soars by 50%, further exacerbating the risk of supply delay. Notably, Goldman Sachs analysis shows that only about 6% of China’s energy consumption is directly exposed to the risk of a Strait of Hormuz disruption, which means the short-term supply impact has not reached a systemic crisis level.

Diversification of import sources becomes the core response path. In recent years, China has continuously optimized its energy import landscape. In 2025, the proportion of crude oil imported from the Middle East dropped to 42.3%, a decrease of 10 percentage points compared with a decade ago. Russia, with an annual import volume of 101 million tons, has remained China’s largest crude oil supplier for three consecutive years, and the proportion of imports from non-Middle Eastern regions such as Angola, Brazil and Canada rose to 57.7%. After the strait blockade, Russia can increase crude oil supply by 50 million tons per year through the Far East Pipeline, covering 27% of the gap; African and American oil-producing countries can provide short-term incremental supply to cover the remaining gap. Calculations by the National Energy Administration show that if the strait is completely blocked, alternative channels such as Russia, the Americas and Africa can increase supply by a total of 130 million tons per year, basically covering the gap.

. . .First, remarkable results have been achieved in the diversification of import sources. China’s crude oil import sources cover 49 countries, and none of the top five source countries accounts for more than 20%, avoiding systemic risks caused by supply disruptions in a single region. Dai Houliang, Chairman of PetroChina, clearly stated in 2026 that the company’s imports through the Strait of Hormuz account for only about 10% of its total operation volume, and risk diversification at the enterprise

. . .The impact of the Strait of Hormuz blockade on China’s energy market presents a stepwise characteristic of “short-term violent volatility, medium-term orderly hedging, long-term transformation and upgrading”. Although the short-term impact will bring supply disruption and cost pressure, relying on diversified import layout, three-dimensional transportation corridors, large-scale strategic reserves and precise policy regulation, China has successfully downgraded the strait blockade from a single vulnerability point that may trigger a “systemic crisis” to a manageable “local disturbance”, which can effectively resist risks and avoid overall crises. In the medium and long term, the continuous risk of the Strait of Hormuz will transform into a strong driving force for the transformation of China’s energy market, promoting a more complete energy security system, a greener energy structure and a more balanced global layout.

An excerpt from, “Analysis: Solar overtakes gas power in Asia for first time ever” By Ho Woo Nam and Josh Gabbatiss, CarbonBrief, June 12, 2026:

Solar has overtaken gas power in Asia to become the continent’s third-largest source of electricity, according to new analysis by Carbon Brief.

The rapid expansion of solar power in nations such as China, India and Pakistan has seen its annual output increase nearly fourfold since 2020.

Asia accounts for around 60% of the world’s solar-power growth in this period, putting the continent at the heart of the global solar boom.

An excerpt from, “Iran’s Pivot to the East Meets China’s Eurasian Connectivity Push” By Lucio Blanco Pitlo III, China-US Focus, June 18, 2026:

Iran’s neighbors have all deepened strategic and economic relations with China, offering lessons for Tehran. The massive China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a key piece of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, will upgrade Pakistan’s infrastructure, industry, and energy sectors and position it as a bridge linking China’s autonomous western Xinjiang region to the Arabian Sea. Turkmenistan is supplying gas to China via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan also sends oil to China through a pipeline. Russia exports gas to China from Siberia, with plans to build another pipeline that will pass through Mongolia. A pipeline that will bring gas from the Russian Far East is expected to be operational by next year. Russian gas via pipelines may reduce demand for liquefied natural gas shipments by sea, which are exposed to disruptions or threats in global chokepoints from the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb to Malacca. This can enhance China’s energy security. Iran may join the fray, diversifying China’s pool of gas suppliers. 

A turn to the East will make Iran an active shaper in the evolving Eurasian geopolitics fueled by new transcontinental pipelines, railways, and roads. Membership in BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and warm ties with China and Russia can facilitate greater Iranian participation in the remaking of this vast, resource-rich, and strategic mega-region. Like Pakistan, Iran can provide sea access for western China, landlocked Afghanistan, and Central Asia. The surge in cargo traffic at Pakistan’s Gwadar port could inspire Iran to engage China to develop its ports in Bandar Abbas or Jask. 

Iran’s turn to the East may manifest in more active involvement in transformative cross-border projects. This includes the Five Nations Railway Corridor linking Khaf in northwestern Iran and Kashgar in western China via Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Feasibility studies on the Afghan section of the rail line were already completed, with designs and financing getting traction. Stability in Afghanistan may bode well for Tehran’s desire to grow its transit options to reach the Chinese market. Last October, Iran began exporting diesel by train to Afghanistan for the first time via the Khaf-Herat track. Iran’s rail diplomacy may focus on activating the Southern Corridor. This can serve as an alternative to Russia’s Northern Corridor, beset by disruptions due to the war in Ukraine, and the complications from the sea-rail linkages offered by the Middle Corridor via the Caspian Sea. The Southern route is a 9,000 kilometer full rail track, corresponding to the ancient Silk Road, which can reduce China-Europe logistics by three weeks compared to the longer sea voyage. U.S.-Iran negotiations brokered by Islamabad may also give fresh impetus to the stalled Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline.