The 'evolution' of the Russian petrochemical industry

Wind the clock back to 2022 and Russia has the biggest oil and gas infrastructure in the world: the country is sometimes referred to sarcastically as a nuclear-armed gas station.  It’s fully functional, although not very sophisticated – the amount of wasteful flaring that goes on is legendary (of gas at oil production facilities, and of oil at gas producing locations); and there are few conventional sophistications such as accurate metering and non-return valves.  Nonetheless, it’s the primary pillar of the Russian economy.

What a target!

Well, Ukraine started setting about it seriously in 2024.  To start with, their offensive means being rather slight at that stage, they went for plant in the neighbouring oblasts.  Right from the word go, these pinpricks revealed huge, structural vulnerabilities.

Vulnerable …

Russia immediately realised just how serious it might be, and set about devising counter-measures.  They encouraged oil enterprises to invest in small arms (requiring a change in the law) for local defence[1], and experimented with wire cages and steel gantries to create physical barriers – an utterly futile effort because, even if a drone hits a cable ten metres away from its target, it stands a very good chance of rupturing it anyway.  We know all this because helpful Russian locals are keen on home videos and social media – and of course good old Google Earth provides astonishingly detailed coverage of most of western Russia, filmed closer to sensitive facilities than is allowed in Western countries! 

Then, there’s that lack of non-return valves, meaning that a single blazing tank can burn for ten days – there’s no way of cutting it off from the pipeline network which then gaily feeds the flames.   Oh, and effecting repairs ain’t so easy: any component even vaguely sophisticated comes only from western manufacturers and is under embargo – meaning costly and time-consuming black market procurement. 

Other palliative measures have been tried.  Initially, officials would simply lie about the damage done.   There are strict Russian injunctions against publishing photos of these goings-on – hah!  To this day, every strike is broadcast to the www in realtime.  Then, there are missions by the Orthodox Church, variously to bless oil facilities, to pray for their safety, and to send clerics to attend upon the fire-fighting efforts[2].  Evidently this approach has its limits.[3]

Well.  As Ukraine develops ever longer-range strike capabilities, the list of potential targets gets bigger and bigger.  And of course their location is known rather exactly, and they can’t be moved!  Nor, in practical terms, can they be defended.  They are being picked off, one by one – the three most noteworthy being perhaps successive raids on the main Moscow City refinery and one close to St Petersberg, plus Omsk.  The first two of these prime targets bring the war rather close to home for everyone in those cities with a pair of eyes (and a nose); the third sets distance records (getting on for 3,000 km).  And of course, there are serious fuel shortages – in Russia! – to the point where exports have been banned and very large-scale imports are being sought; but the harvest is still under threat, industry is feeling the pinch, and ordinary Russians, particularly in the south and west, are really stuck.

Notwithstanding the Deputy PM’s classically euphemistic description of this, (“interruptions in the supply of fuel caused by changes in logistics“) even Putin – who likes to keep his hands clean from disasters of all kinds – has been forced to pronounce.  Here are his dicta of yesterday: 

He called the difficulties with fuel “temporary” and associated, among other things, with “the enemy’s attempts to disrupt the vacation season“.  (Oh yes, the Russian vacation season is uppermost in Kyiv’s strategic thinking.)  

“The safety margin of the Russian energy system is one of the highest in the world.” (Measured by reserves in the ground, presumably.) 

“The enemy is trying to create a nervous situation in Russian society.”  (Trying?) 

He called for a speedy decision to subsidize fuel purchases  (Not clear where the money will come from for that, but let’s see.) 

He instructed the speedy deployment of “the capabilities of small and medium-sized businesses in the production of petroleum products“. 

This last one is very interesting.  Sure enough, for a country in dire straits, it’s a feasible approach to squeeze a few more drops from what’s available.  We know from how ISIS conducted its affairs in the areas of Iraq and Syria it once controlled, that home-made micro-refineries are a Thing.  And of course Russians are pretty well versed in home-based distillation!  All this said, at the end of the day a big economy, and certainly one with a huge defence-industrial base on a war footing and trying to ramp up as fast as possible, needs massive quantities of high-grade fuel that only large-scale, uninterrupted, fully industrial production processes can provide – as 1944-45 Germany discovered.