A Rather Convenient Trap

This post A Rather Convenient Trap appeared first on Daily Reckoning.

Just an hour or so to go! I can’t wait to watch Jim, Byron, Adam, Dan, Zach, Matt B., and the rest of the awesome Paradigm peeps at RickardsLive.com. Just click this link today at 1:00 p.m. ET, and you’ll be magically transported to America’s cheesesteak capital for a ticker-filled chat with the Paradigm’s celebrated macro mavens.

Now onto today’s edition.

Xi Jinping stood at a Seattle podium in 2015 and said, with a straight face, that the Thucydides Trap doesn’t exist. Then he spent the next 10 years building the world’s largest navy, the world’s largest army, and a hypersonic missile program designed specifically to kill American aircraft carriers.

That’s not a contradiction. That’s a magic trick.

And the beauty of it is that our side does the same thing from the other direction.

The Thucydides Trap has become the Swiss Army knife of international relations. Everyone picks it up, opens the blade they need, and puts it back down. Hawk or dove, Washington or Beijing, it doesn’t matter. The trap is infinitely useful precisely because it means something different to everyone who mentions it.

What Thucydides Actually Said

Thucydides wrote his history of the Peloponnesian War around 400 BC. His diagnosis of why Athens and Sparta went to war is the foundation of everything that follows. In his words, growing Athenian power and Sparta’s fear of it were the real cause of the war.

Harvard professor Graham Allison picked that up and ran with it. He looked at 500 years of history and found 16 cases where a rising power challenged a ruling one. In 12 of those, war followed. In 4, it did not. He called this structural tendency the Thucydides Trap and wrote a book asking whether America and China could escape it.

Note what Allison actually claims. He says the odds of serious conflict go up sharply. He doesn’t say war is inevitable. In fact, his book title ends with a question mark.

Xi quoted Allison’s concept to dismiss it. But if the concept were truly nonsense, why bother dismissing it at a state visit? You don’t waste a Seattle podium on things that don’t matter.

How the Trap Became a Tool

Here is where it gets useful for your personal BS detector.

Any partisan can use the Thucydides Trap to justify almost any policy position imaginable. Watch how this works.

The American hawk picks it up and says, “History shows that when a rising power threatens a ruling one, war follows.” We must arm. We must contain. We mustn’t be caught unprepared the way Sparta was. The trap demands we act.

The American dove picks it up and says, “History shows that miscalculation leads to catastrophe.” We must talk. We must de-escalate. We mustn’t blunder into a war nobody wants. The trap demands that we restrain ourselves.

Xi picks it up and says, “The trap only springs if you panic.” We are rising peacefully. Your fear is the problem, not our growth. The trap demands you calm down.

The European diplomat picks it up and says, “We are the wise adults in the room who can prevent great-power miscalculation. The trap demands that you both need us.”

The same historical framework justifies every single position. That isn’t a coincidence. That’s the sign of a concept that has been stretched so thin it covers everything… and therefore explains nothing.

The Domestic Sleight of Hand

Invoked constantly, the Thucydides Trap gives both parties a reason to spend money abroad and avoid the hard conversation at home.

Consider what Sparta actually looked like during its war with Athens. It was a rigid society held together by a warrior caste sitting on top of a population of enslaved people called Helots. Sparta won the war and then collapsed anyway from its own internal rot. The thing that made Sparta powerful was also the thing that made it brittle.

Athens had its own problems. The democracy that fought the war was the same democracy that voted to execute Socrates, launched a catastrophic invasion of Sicily on a whim, and purged its best generals at the worst possible moments.

Both powers destroyed themselves. External pressure was the occasion. Internal failure was the cause.

The lesson Thucydides actually teaches is about what happens when institutions rot from within, fear replaces judgment, and political short-termism overrides strategic patience. Unfortunately, that all sounds eerily familiar.

We can’t solve these problems by building more aircraft carriers. We solve them by fixing the bridges, schools, and supply chains that make a nation worth defending in the first place.

The Selectorate Problem

The uncomfortable truth is that leaders optimize for staying in power rather than for the national interest. The smaller the group whose loyalty you need to survive politically — your selectorate — the more you can ignore everyone else.

Apply that to the Thucydides Trap debate in Washington. Who benefits from a sustained China threat narrative? Defense contractors. Intelligence agencies. Think tanks funded by both. Congressional members with bases in their districts that need budget justification. Consultants who get called on television to explain the threat.

None of those people benefit from a quiet, boring conversation about road maintenance, hospital infrastructure, or why American kids score below average in math and science compared to their counterparts in Singapore, South Korea, and yes, China.

The trap is convenient. The domestic rot is inconvenient. We know which one gets the airtime.

What Taleb Would Say

As Allison presents it, the Thucydides Trap is a probabilistic model: 12 out of 16 cases ended in war. That sounds precise.

But how do you distinguish between a structural tendency and a narrative that makes historians feel clever in retrospect?

The honest answer is that nobody knows whether America and China are in one of the 12 or one of the 4. Anyone who tells you otherwise is selling something.

What we do know is that every war in human history has been expensive, deadly, and bad for the people who had to fight it. Even when the political class that launched it walked away fine. That fact requires no Greek historian to explain.

Wrap Up

The Thucydides Trap is real as a concept. Allison’s research is serious work, even if it is debated. The structural pressure between a rising China and an established America is real. None of that is fabricated.

What is fabricated is the idea that invoking Thucydides settles any argument about what we should do. It’s merely a framework that justifies any position, in any direction, for any audience. That makes it rhetorically powerful and analytically weak.

More importantly, the trap gives the political class a permanent excuse to ignore the domestic considerations in the name of the “national interest,” as if that even exists.

Rome didn’t fall to the barbarians. She fell to centuries of currency debasement, institutional corruption, and a tax burden that drove productive citizens off the land long before any barbarian showed up at the gate.

Your leaders aren’t evil for using the Thucydides Trap as cover. Most of them genuinely believe it. But they also genuinely benefit from believing it. Those two things are not mutually exclusive.

The bridges need fixing. The schools need fixing. The debt needs fixing. Can we compete with China? Maybe. But the real question is whether we can compete with our past selves?

Thucydides wrote about what happens when powerful societies choose fear over wisdom. He wasn’t writing about China. He was writing about us.

The post A Rather Convenient Trap appeared first on Daily Reckoning.

This story originally appeared in the Daily Reckoning . The Daily Reckoning, offers a uniquely refreshing, perspective on the global economy, investing, gold, stocks and today’s markets. Its been called “the most entertaining read of the day.

Source: https://dailyreckoning.com/a-rather-convenient-trap/