S. Ct. Suspends District Court's Injunction Blocking Border Barrier Building

From today’s Supreme Court unsigned opinion in Mullin v. Friends of the Ruidosa Church (with Justice Jackson essentially dissenting):

Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) grants the Secretary of Homeland Security broad authority to construct border barriers and roads “to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United States.” The same section expressly authorizes the Secretary “‘to waive all legal requirements’” as “‘necessary to ensure expeditious construction’” of those barriers and roads, and sharply limits judicial review of all claims arising from such waiver determinations. Specifically, the statute provides that “‘[a] cause of action or claim may only be brought alleging a violation of the Constitution of the United States’” and courts “‘shall not have jurisdiction’” over nonconstitutional claims. §102(c)(2)(A).

Earlier this year, the Secretary invoked Section 102′s waiver authority to initiate a border-construction project at the U.S.–Mexico border, in a region that U.S. Customs and Border Protection has designated the “Big Bend Sector.” The Secretary found that the Big Bend Sector “is an area of high illegal entry” requiring additional border barriers, and waived the application of a variety of environmental and conservation laws to facilitate expeditious construction.

Shortly thereafter, respondents—an individual river guide, an environmental nonprofit, and a nonprofit organization dedicated to preserving a historic church in Ruidosa, Texas—challenged those waiver determinations by filing suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Respondents claimed, among other things, that the Secretary’s waiver determinations “violat[ed] the major questions doctrine under the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 1.” Although styled as constitutional, that claim simply alleged that the Secretary exceeded his statutory authority in issuing the waivers.

On October 2, 2026, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction blocking the Secretary’s waivers and halting all associated construction. The District Court acknowledged that its jurisdiction was limited to constitutional claims. But it nonetheless concluded that respondents’ “major questions doctrine claim” qualified because, in its view, the “major questions doctrine is a constitutional clear statement rule grounded in separation of powers.” The court further held that respondents’ “major questions doctrine claim” was likely to succeed on the merits because the Secretary lacked “‘clear congressional authorization’ to issue” the waivers. Because the Fifth Circuit lacks jurisdiction to hear this case, IIRIRA §102(c)(2)(C), the Solicitor General filed an application requesting either summary reversal or a stay of the District Court’s preliminary injunction.

We grant the requested stay. The Government is exceedingly likely to prevail on its argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate respondents’ so-called major-questions-doctrine claim. However it is labeled, respondents’ claim does not “‘alleg[e] a violation of the Constitution of the United States,’” the only type of claim the statute permits district courts to adjudicate. IIRIRA §102(c)(2)(A). It alleges instead that the Secretary exceeded his statutory authority. And we have long recognized that “claims simply alleging” that the Executive Branch has exceeded its “statutory authority are not ‘constitutional’ claims.” Dalton v. Specter (1994).

That conclusion does not change where, as here, a plaintiff invokes the major-questions doctrine. Many canons and rules of statutory interpretation reflect constitutional principles, including “constitutional avoidance, the clear-statement federalism rules, and the presumption against retroactivity.” When courts invoke those canons, however, they do so in service of adjudicating statutory claims, not constitutional ones. The same is true when a court invokes “the major questions canon of statutory interpretation.” There is no such thing as a “constitutional” major-questions claim….

Respondents claim that construction in the Big Bend Sector will diminish their ability to use and enjoy the area. But Congress’s enactment of IIRIRA §102(c)—which permits the Secretary to waive the requirements of environmental-protection and other conservation laws—reflects a clear preference for expeditious border construction over the very harms respondents assert. And courts “of equity cannot, in their discretion, reject the balance that Congress has struck in a statute.” The Government’s interest therefore outweighs any aesthetic, recreational, and environmental harm alleged by respondents….

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