Israel Navy Expands Long-Range Ops

Israel Navy Expands Long-Range Ops
March 5 Raid Was Just ‘Tip of The Iceberg’
Apr. 6, 2014 – 01:33PM | By BARBARA OPALL-ROME

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140406/DEFREG04/304060013/Israel-Navy-=

Expands-Long-Range-Ops

TEL AVIV =97 Last month=92s capture of an Iranian arms cache in internation=
al =

waters south of the Red Sea=92s Port Sudan is just =93the tip of the iceber=
g=94 of =

Israeli maritime black operations conducted far beyond the horizons of =

hostile shores, according to a top Navy officer here.

An after-action investigation of Operation Full Disclosure =97 the months-l=
ong =

effort that culminated in the bloodless March 5 raid of a Panamanian-flagge=
d =

freighter some 1,500 kilometers from Israel=92s Red Sea port =97 is still i=
n =

progress.

But Rear Adm. Yaron Levi, Israel Navy chief of staff, said preliminary =

findings reaffirm the service=92s tactic of choice for tackling contraband =
on =

the high seas: force prevention through force projection.

=93The big lesson was to come in with lots of force so we wouldn=92t have t=
o use =

force,=94 Levi said.

=93That and our decision to engage in daylight and not under cover of night=
, =

which added enormous value=94 to the force projection/prevention approach, =
he =

added.

In a late March interview, Levi, his chief of intelligence and other =

officers described the tactics, technologies and procedures employed in the =

capture of 40 M-302 heavy rockets and other munitions hidden in the hold of =

the Klos C that Israel claims was destined for militants in Gaza.

The operation was the latest and most challenging of only four officially =

publicized interdictions conducted by the Navy over the past 12 years.

It demanded many more months of coordinated intelligence than the =

Mediterranean Sea captures of the Victoria and Francop in 2011 and 2009, an=
d =

the 2002 Red Sea seizure of the Karin A, experts here said, due to the =

extraordinarily circuitous route plied by the Klos C.

According to Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya=92alon, the Klos C and its =

cargo of =93strategic significance=94 sailed from Bandar Abbas, Iran, up an=
d =

down the length of the Arabian Gulf, then around Oman and Yemen and up =

through the Red Sea. The Navy engaged the ship some 40 nautical miles south =

of Port Sudan, a range some three to six times longer than the three =

previously publicized missions.

=93Operation Full Transparency is the tip of the iceberg in terms of what w=
e =

do. =85 We are doing thousands of hours [of complex, long-range missions] i=
n =

the Mediterranean and Red seas,=94 said Levi, the Navy=92s second in comman=
d.

=93It=92s one of the few examples we can talk about that reflects our abili=
ty to =

deploy forces effectively over very long ranges on missions that are =

measured by bottom-line results … that clearly and directly strengthen th=
e =

security of our state.=94

Stealth Sailing in Plain View

With a front-line missile boat inventory of just three Sa=92ar-5 corvettes =
and =

six smaller Sa=92ar-4.5 missile boats, the corvette Hanit and missile boat =

Hetz tasked for the mission constituted a third of its top-tier surface shi=
p =

assets.

The decision to transfer such a considerable force from its primary =

operational theater in the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal for =

protracted deployment in the Red Sea was not trivial, officers here said.

Hosted on the missile boats was a separate force package of specialty =

equipment and US-built Morena-class rigid-hulled inflatable boats needed to =

support elite Flotilla 13 commandos hand-picked for the mission.

Vice Adm. Ram Rothberg, head of the Israel Navy and a former Flotilla 13 =

commander, managed the entire operation from the bridge of the Hanit.

Departing Eilat, the vessels made their way through the Gulf of Aqaba and =

through the Strait of Tiran, knowing full well they would be seen by =

Egyptian radar.

Once out in the Red Sea, the force spent days hiding in plain view as it =

navigated through myriad reefs, many hundreds of commercial and private =

craft, and the occasional warship traversing the congested seaway.

Complicating matters, officers here said, were rapidly changing Red Sea =

conditions that can transform flat waters into 4-meter waves and the thick, =

total darkness that descends with night.

=93When you operate in the Mediterranean at 40 to 50 nautical miles, the =

beaches are well lit. But when you=92re in the Red Sea, you literally can=
=92t =

see your hand. The darkness there is like the shadow of death: black, thick =

and moist like Turkish coffee,=94 the Navy intelligence officer said.

=93From the time we set out from Eilat to the point of engagement was a few =

days. Obviously, before we even got to the phase of deploying our commando =

force, we had to get to that point undetected,=94 Levi said.

They did this through what Levi called =93deceptive sailing maneuvers,=94 a=
nd =93a =

fantastic, continuously fortified operational picture=94 built from onboard =

electronic, signals, optical and other intelligence sensors.

The Hanit=92s Eurocopter AS565 Panther and Rafael-built Topelite payload =

streamed electro-optical imagery directly into the C4I network shared by th=
e =

two ships and the Navy=92s war room in Tel Aviv.

=93The air component is an integral part of our force,=94 Levi said. =93We =
saw =

everything the helicopter saw in real time. From the intel we generated =

ourselves and all the intel from other organizations, we were able to =

maneuver well in this very congested, potentially high-threat area.=94

Officers here credited upgraded versions of the service=92s in-house develo=
ped =

C4I network for =93flawless connectivity=94 among commandos on the Klos C, =

Rothberg and all supporting elements at sea and leaders back home.

No Second Chance

Deciding where, precisely, to engage was absolutely critical, officers here =

said.

=93We knew it would be one shot; no second chances if we missed something,=
=94 =

Levi said.

Navy brass preferred to intercept the ship farther south near the =

Sudan-Eritrean border. It would have given them another day to decide where =

to engage. But farther south, they risked sudden 3- to 4-meter waves that =

would have seriously hampered commando operations.

=93We decided to engage less than 50 nautical miles south of the port of =

Sudan. The sea was relatively comfortable and because we were confident of =

the picture we built, we felt conditions were most favorable there for =

success,=94 Levi said.

Next came decision time for when and how to engage.

Officers here said commandos spent hundreds of hours training on models =

built for multiple scenarios, depending on whether the ship was fortified =

and its captain and crew were likely to resist.

=93Keep in mind, this area between Sudan and Eritrea is a danger zone for =

pirates. Ships tend to be more aware and prepared with boarded-up windows =

and gates, water cannon and other kinds of countermeasures,=94 the =

intelligence officer explained.

There are advantages and disadvantages to intercepting in a pirate zone, th=
e =

officer added.

=93Obviously, the downside is they=92re more prepared and most likely armed=
. But =

the upside is that if the operation fails, they=92ll think they were attack=
ed =

by pirates.=94

Based on prior intelligence and close surveillance of the ship, war fighter=
s =

concluded with high certainty that the Klos C was unarmed and its Turkish =

captain and international crew were most likely innocent and ready to =

cooperate.

=93We based this assumption =97 which was later verified =97 on our experie=
nce =

with the Francop and Victoria,=94 the intelligence officer said.

When asked why, he replied: =93You need to be criminal or crazy to pass =

through these waters with weapons.

=93Aside from [the prospective threat of Israel Navy action], the US 5th Fl=
eet =

is very proactive in boarding suspected ships. If the captain or crew are =

found to be smuggling, they=92ll be thrown in jail and their licenses will =
be =

permanently revoked.=94

On that assumption, the Navy opted not to seize the ship as it did in the =

2002 capture of the Karin A and in the unrelated, but diplomatically =

damaging, 2010 assault on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara that attempted to =

break Israel=92s blockade of Gaza.

Instead, it opted to peacefully board.

Under the cover of darkness, the naval force moved into position: the Hanit =

at a safe but actionable distance to the right, the Hetz to the left.

Several commando-carrying Morenas deployed from the host missile boats =

maneuvered silently within meters of the oblivious Klos C. The Panther =

helicopter was hovering in the distance, waiting for orders to move in.

At the break of day =97 Wednesday, about 5:30 a.m. =97 officers recounted t=
he =

non-kinetic shock and awe when an amplified voice bellowed out in =

American-accented English: =93Good morning. Please stop your ship.=94

Email: [email protected]. =

________________________________________
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