Modi’s Bishkek Doctrine Should Begin at Home

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek, Narendra Modi offered a principle few reasonable governments would dispute. Terrorism, he argued, must be confronted without double standards. Its financing, recruitment, radicalisation and safe havens must be dismantled, while states that use terrorism as an instrument of policy should face a firm response. The language was sweeping and deliberately universal. That universality, however, creates an uncomfortable question for New Delhi. If the standard is genuinely universal, why should scrutiny stop at India’s borders? Modi may have intended his words for India’s adversaries, but the principles he articulated inevitably invite scrutiny of India itself. 

This is where Modi’s argument begins to turn back on India. Pakistan has long accused New Delhi of sponsoring subversion and violence on Pakistani soil, most prominently through the case of Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav. The International Court of Justice records that Jadhav, an Indian national and former naval officer, has been in Pakistani custody since March 2016. Pakistan maintains that he was arrested in Balochistan near the Iranian border while engaged in espionage and terrorism on India’s behalf. India disputes the circumstances of his apprehension and says he was abducted from Iran. Pakistan’s military court convicted him in April 2017 of espionage, sabotage and terrorism. 

It is important to be precise about what followed. The ICJ did not determine whether Pakistan’s terrorism and espionage allegations against Jadhav were true. Its judgment focused on Pakistan’s obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and ordered effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence. That distinction should not be blurred. Yet neither can the underlying case simply be erased from discussions about allegations of cross-border covert activity. If Modi believes every terrorism ecosystem should be scrutinised, Pakistan’s allegations deserve examination according to evidence rather than being dismissed simply because they originate in Islamabad. 

The more difficult challenge for India now comes from developments outside South Asia because they cannot easily be portrayed as another chapter in the India-Pakistan rivalry. In the United States, federal prosecutors pursued a murder-for-hire case involving an alleged plot to assassinate Sikh separatist activist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun in New York. In February 2026, Indian national Nikhil Gupta pleaded guilty to murder-for-hire, conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The US Justice Department says Gupta worked at the direction of Vikash Yadav, who at the relevant time was an employee of the Indian government’s Cabinet Secretariat, where India’s foreign intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing, is housed. Prosecutors say the agreed price for the killing was $100,000, with a $15,000 advance delivered to an undercover operative. 

This is considerably more serious than political accusations exchanged at diplomatic podiums. Gupta has entered a guilty plea in a US federal court. Yadav, by contrast, remains charged rather than convicted, and India has denied responsibility for the alleged operation. Those legal distinctions must be respected. But they do not make the episode politically insignificant. Modi’s own Bishkek doctrine demands that allegations involving government employees, cross-border assassination plots, covert networks and foreign territory receive serious examination regardless of which country is implicated. A doctrine of “zero tolerance” loses much of its meaning if it becomes a weapon used only against strategic competitors.

Canada presents another troubling dimension. Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Canadian citizen and prominent Khalistan advocate, was shot dead outside a Sikh gurdwara in Surrey, British Columbia, on June 18, 2023. Four Indian nationals were subsequently charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Former Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau publicly stated that Canadian authorities were investigating credible allegations concerning the involvement of Indian government agents, allegations New Delhi strongly rejected. 

Recent developments also require careful qualification. Canadian police reporting in 2026 indicated that charges emerging through Operation Hard Ball had not produced evidence linking Indian government officials to those specific investigations. That qualification matters. Accountability cannot mean treating every allegation as established fact. Yet the absence of evidence through one particular investigation does not make the broader questions surrounding transnational violence irrelevant. Indeed, serious states should welcome independent investigation precisely because it separates substantiated evidence from political accusation. 

The wider picture became more complicated when Canada designated the Bishnoi Gang a terrorist entity in September 2025. Ottawa said the group had targeted communities through violence and intimidation and provided authorities with expanded powers to freeze assets and investigate terrorist offences. Then, in July 2026, the US Justice Department announced Operation Hard Ball, an international crackdown on India-based transnational criminal organisations. Federal prosecutors alleged that Lawrence Bishnoi presided over an enterprise involved in political assassinations, murders, extortion, kidnappings and drug trafficking across several countries. An indictment further alleges that Bishnoi and Satinderjeet Singh, known as Goldy Brar, ordered the June 2023 assassination of a Sikh political and religious figure identified in court documents by the initials H.S.N. in Surrey. These remain allegations against defendants and do not by themselves establish Indian state responsibility. 

That distinction actually strengthens rather than weakens the central argument. The issue is not that India should be pronounced guilty because its critics demand it. The issue is that India cannot demand uncompromising international scrutiny of everyone else while treating comparable scrutiny of itself as illegitimate.

This is why Modi’s words in Bishkek deserve to be taken seriously. “No double standards” cannot mean no double standards only when India is pointing towards Pakistan. It must also mean no selective outrage when allegations concern Indian citizens, officials or networks. The real test of a principle comes when applying it becomes politically uncomfortable.

India has every right to demand accountability for terrorism directed against its citizens. Pakistan possesses exactly the same right. So do Canada, the United States and every other sovereign state. No country should be convicted through rhetoric alone, and allegations should never replace evidence. But geopolitical influence, economic power and diplomatic partnerships cannot become shields against legitimate investigation.

Modi therefore made a powerful case in Bishkek, perhaps a broader one than he intended. If terrorism must be confronted across borders, if financing and safe-haven networks must be dismantled, and if countries associated with such activities must face scrutiny, then the rule must apply universally. India cannot credibly ask the world to embrace that standard while expecting exemption from its consequences. By Modi’s own principle, accountability must begin wherever credible evidence leads, including, when necessary, at India’s own door.