Unconstitutional Secret Government Mass Surveillance and Spying Operations. Targeting Extremists and Domestic Terrorists (They Refuse to Define How They Decide who Is or Why)

Unconstitutional Secret Government Mass Surveillance and Spying Operations.

Targeting Extremists and Domestic Terrorists

(They Refuse to Define How They Decide Who Is a Spy, or Why)

The US Government has Granted Themselves the Powers of a Dictatorship, without Bother to Ask for Permission or even Tell us.

These Subject are Very Rarely Spoken About Publicly, and they are Extremely Eye Opening

EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW,

HOW OUR GOVERNMENT IS SPYING ON EVERYONE…

 

Benjamin Franklin famously said: “They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.” 

(The War on Terror was a Complete Farce from the Beginning. It is Really A War Of Terror). 

The Freedoms, Liberties and Privacy that has been Stolen From us has not been Restored, Even after the War On Terror Has Fizzled Out. 

On the Contrary, our Government has become FAR WORSE.

 THEY DO NOT EVEN BOTHER TO FOLLOW THE RULE OF LAW OR THE CONSTITUTION ANYMORE AT ALL…

@OratorBlog   11-6-2021

Human Rights Watch is also concerned about the methods and criteria the government may be using to define and identify “homegrown violent extremists,” and particularly about the risk that people who are exercising their legitimate free-expression rights will be targeted for monitoring in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner. As an example of “homegrown violent extremists,” the Defense Department official who commented to Human Rights Watch pointed to individuals who “may be self-radicalized via the internet, social media, etc., and then plan or execute terrorist acts in furtherance of the ideology or goals of a foreign terrorist group.” However, the official did not respond to a question about the criteria the executive branch uses when designating a US person, a “homegrown violent extremist” for the purposes of this policy.

 

Five programs (which are commonly known by their code names):

• DISHFIRE, an initiative through which the US collects hundreds of millions of private text messages worldwide every day;

• CO-TRAVELER, through which the US captures billions of location updates daily from mobile phones around the world;

• MUSCULAR, which entails the US’ interception of all data transmitted between certain data centers operated by Yahoo! and Google outside of US territory; 

• MYSTIC, a US program that collects all telephone call details in five sovereign countries other than the US, as well as the full content of all phone calls in two of those countries; and

• QUANTUM, a US program that listens in real-time to traffic on the Internet’s most fundamental infrastructure and can respond based on certain triggering information with active attacks, including the delivery of malicious software to the end-user’s device.  (Key Loggers?) (PC-PHONE DATA ATTACK)

(See: Secret Surveillance:  Five Large-Scale Global Programs)

 

I have some Negative Views on Edward Snowden, but His Info can be quite Insightful.
“This Is CLASSIFIED Information, They Don’t Want This Out” Edward Snowden WARNING. Sept. 25, 2021

Edward Snowden explains how the government is taking advantage of its people, stealing their information and storing it in a secret data center. Edward Snowden tells all about his experience working at the CIA, NSA, FBI and the government as a contractor. Edward Snowden further explains that we need to take action against mass surveillance against the American people. This is a motivational and educational video which will give you different perspective about many things, You will listen to incredible advice that is very important. Check it out!

Edward Snowden – Domestic Surveillance is Not About Terrorism. Jan 11, 2021

Whistleblower Edward Snowden explains why mass domestic surveillance is a useless tool in the fight against terrorism. However, he does not dispute that it has its own utility. 

 

SHADOW GATE – FULL FILM BY MILLIE WEAVER – 2020

SHADOW GATE EXPOSES JUST HOW CORRUPT US INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES REALLY ARE

In a shocking piece of news, investigative reporter Millie Weaver and her husband were arrested at their home. The arrest comes in the wake of her documentary release on the topic of the US “shadow government” which was all set to be screened on You…

 

SHADOWGATE 2.0 (THE FAKE NEWS INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX)
The first installment of Shadow Gate demonstrated that the shadow government consists of government contractors; …

 

“PRISM, AN ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROGRAM OF DRAGNET ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE.”

“INADVERTENTLY ACQUIRED” COMMUNICATIONS CAN STILL BE RETAINED AND ANALYZED FOR UP TO FIVE YEARS”

What we know about PRISM, the NSA’s data goldmine
The agency’s powerful data-scooping tool exists, and it isn’t supposed to read your emails

We now know a lot more about PRISM, the top-secret National Security Agency program that apparently allows the U.S. government to mine all sorts of electronic communications

What does PRISM do? The do? The Washington Post says PRISM allows the NSA and FBI to tap “directly into the central servers of nine leading U.S. internet companies, extracting audio and video chats, photographs, emails, documents, and connection logs that enable analysts to track foreign targets.”

The nine companies (in the order they allegedly joined the program) are Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, and Apple. In other words, says the Post, “most of the dominant global players of Silicon Valley.” The type of data the NSA can access “varies by provider,” one PowerPoint slide notes.

“From inside a company’s data stream the NSA is capable of pulling out anything it likes, but under current rules the agency does not try to collect it all.” And the Post’s leaker says the program is so powerful, “they quite literally can watch your ideas form as you type.”

Sources describe PRISM as “a ‘front end’ system, or software, that allows an NSA analyst to search through the data and pull-out items of significance, which are then stored in any number of databases.” The NSA wants this, he says, because given the different ways information travels across the internet, it needs a system that can “handle several different types of data streams using different basic encryption methods.” PRISM can do that.

“The idea is to create a mosaic,” one official tells Ambinder. “We get a tip. We vet it. Then we mine the data for intelligence.” In all, as many as 50 companies including credit card companies and major phone providers participate in providing real-time user data to the NSA, Ambinder says.

“A pox on all the three houses of government,” he tells The New York Times. “On Congress, for legislating such powers, on the FISA court for being such a paper tiger and rubber stamp, and on the Obama administration for not being true to its values.”

Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said Thursday that the NSA’s phone-metadata collection program — part of which Clapper just declassified — helped prevent a “significant domestic terrorist attack” within “the last few years,” for example, but said the specifics are classified so he can’t elaborate.
What’s clear is that PRISM is highly valued by the intelligence community. 

Civil libertarians believe the program is an unconscionable — perhaps even unconstitutional — intrusion on privacy, and that the government can’t be trusted to monitor itself. Most members of Congress so far have said PRISM and the NSA’s other tools are worth it to protect American from terrorism.

(The US Government ARE the Terrorists)

 

Everything you need to know about PRISM
A cheat sheet for the NSA’s unprecedented surveillance programs

What does the NSA collect? (META DATA Alone, Can Reveal almost Everything About You)
While PRISM has been the most talked-about story to come out of Snowden’s leaks, the disclosures have shed light on a vast array of NSA surveillance programs. Broadly speaking, these can be split into two categories: “upstream” wiretaps, which pull data directly from undersea telecommunications cables, and efforts like PRISM, which acquire communications from US service providers. One of the slides in the leaked PRISM presentation instructs that analyst “should use both” of these sources.

NSA programs collect two kinds of data: metadata and content. Metadata is the sensitive byproduct of communications, such as phone records that reveal the participants, times, and durations of calls; the communications collected by PRISM include the contents of emails, chats, VoIP calls, cloud-stored files, and more. US officials have tried to allay fears about the NSA’s indiscriminate metadata collection by pointing out that it doesn’t reveal the contents of conversations. But metadata can be just as revealing as content — internet metadata includes information such as email logs, geolocation data (IP addresses), and web search histories. Because of a decades-old law, metadata is also far less well-protected than content in the US.

NSA PROGRAMS COLLECT TWO KINDS OF DATA: METADATA AND CONTENT

A leaked court order provided by Snowden showed that Verizon is handing over the calling records and telephony metadata of all its customers to the NSA on an “ongoing, daily basis.” Mass collection of internet metadata began under a Bush-era program called “Stellarwind,” which was first revealed by NSA whistleblower William Binney. The program was continued for two years under the Obama administration, but has since been discontinued and replaced with a host of similar programs with names like “EvilOlive” and “ShellTrumpet.”

 

United States Customs and Border Protection Attn: FOIA

Following former Booz Allen Hamilton contractor Edward Snowden’s disclosure of materials concerning NSA surveillance, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 

(“PCLOB”) confirmed and described, in a public report whose contents are entirely unclassified, two types of surveillance activity the executive branch conducts pursuant to Section 702. Through the first of these two activities, “PRISM collection,” the executive branch “sends a selector, such as an email address, to a United States-based electronic communications service provider”; the provider is then “compelled to give the communications sent to or from that selector to the government.”
8
Through the second Section 702 surveillance activity described by PCLOB, “upstream collection,” the government compels communications companies to search the telephone and Internet communications that flow over certain basic pieces of communications infrastructure (including the circuits that are known as the “Internet backbone”).9

After the NSA or FBI has acquired data through Section 702 surveillance, these agencies have the ability to “query” (i.e., search) the data in a manner that is similar to searches an Internet user conduct using a search engine, including by using terms such as “a key word or phrase.”

10 Although individuals may only view unminimized data acquired through Section 702 surveillance if the government has authorized them to do so, the relevant PCLOB report and other documents indicate that individuals without such authorization may nevertheless query databases that contain Section 702 data, and that these databases will indicate (in response to the query) that such data exists.11 The individual conducting the search may then ask someone with the appropriate authorization to reveal the Section 702 data itself.12 Applicable policies that have been declassified permit elements of the Intelligence Community to query Section 702 data using identifiers associated with United States persons under some circumstances.”
13
Where the dissemination of US domestic communications acquired through Section 702 surveillance is concerned, the NSA’s minimization procedures allow the Agency to share with “appropriate Federal law enforcement authorities” any such communication that “is reasonably believed to contain evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed.”
14 Meanwhile, the FBI’s minimization procedures generally grant the Bureau broad powers to disseminate “information that is assessed to be evidence of a crime.”
15
19“Procedures for the Availability or Dissemination of Raw Signals Intelligence Information by the National Security Agency under Section 2.3 of Executive Order 12333 (Raw SIGINT Availability Procedures),” undated, available at

of Executive Order 12333 (Raw SIGINT Availability Procedures)

 

US: New Evidence Suggests Monitoring of Americans

Documents Point to Warrantless Surveillance

Newly released documents reveal a US Defense Department policy that appears to authorize warrantless monitoring of US citizens and green-card holders whom the executive branch regards as “homegrown violent extremists,” Human Rights Watch said today. Separately, the documents also reinforce concerns that the government may be gathering very large amounts of data about US citizens and others without warrants. Both issues relate to a longstanding executive order that is shrouded in secrecy and should be a focus of congressional inquiry.

The new materials, which Human Rights Watch obtained through a freedom of information request, are training modules that primarily concern Executive Order 12333 (EO 12333). That order broadly governs the US intelligence agencies’ activities, and includes provisions allowing the agencies to collect information on US persons – meaning US citizens and lawful permanent residents, as well as some corporations and associations – in a manner the government has never fully explained to the public. The training slides largely summarize Defense Department procedures concerning EO 12333 that were released in 2016, updating a 1982 version. Using plain language to demystify the procedures’ phrasing, the slides offer hints about Defense Department intelligence practices that require further inquiry and exposure.

A separate problem to which some of the newly released materials point is the potential volume of data collection – including collection affecting US persons – under EO 12333. The 2016 procedures created the category of “special circumstances collection” to encourage the authorities to consider whether surveillance activities “raise special circumstances” and merit extra safeguards based on “the volume, proportion, and sensitivity” of US-person information the government is likely to obtain. (The category itself does not authorize any surveillance that could not otherwise take place under the order.) However, the training documents use the informal term “big data” to describe “special circumstances collection,” raising the possibility that the government may be carrying out or contemplating surveillance on a massive scale. (Continued Below, See References)

 

Secret Surveillance:  Five Large-Scale Global Programs

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  (This is VERY INTERESTING)

Joint Submission to the United Nations
Twenty-Second Session of the Universal Periodic Review Working Group
Human Rights Council. May 2015

Secret Surveillance:  Five Large-Scale Global Programs
Submitted by: American Civil Liberties Union and Center for Democracy & Technology  
(12 Pages)

The Center for Democracy & Technology is a champion of global online civil liberties and human rights, driving policy outcomes that keep the Internet open, innovative and free

Secret Surveillance: Five Large-Scale Global Programs

I. Introduction and Executive Summary

1. The Center for Democracy & Technology and the American Civil Liberties Union are pleased to make this submission to the Human Rights Council in preparation for the 2015 Universal Periodic Review (“UPR”) of the United States of America. With an awareness that the UPR will encompass the US’ compliance with all of its human rights obligations, we write to draw attention to several specific US secret surveillance programs that have been disclosed since the most recent UPR of the United States in 2010. These programs are conducted by US intelligence agencies, primarily the National Security Agency (“NSA”).

2. Our submission explains the legal basis, methods of operation, and human rights consequences of ‘

III. Programs that Include Indiscriminate Collection of, or Other Interference with, Private Electronic Data
Five programs (which are commonly known by their code names):

• DISHFIRE, an initiative through which the US collects hundreds of millions of private text messages worldwide every day;

A. DISHFIRE
29. Revealed in January 2013 by two British media outlets, DISHFIRE is a massive US-controlled database of text messages. 21 While it remains unclear exactly how the US collects this information, the relevant disclosures suggest that the intelligence authorities are able to capture hundreds of millions of text messages per day. The US subsequently mines these messages for personal data including location information, contacts, travel activity, and financial transactions (including credit card numbers); it also engages in what is known as “contact chaining,” i.e., the creation of a map of an individual’s social network through the examination of his or her patterns of communication. In other words, the United States secretly collects private text messages and uses certain basic data contained in them to build a picture of individuals’ private and professional lives without their knowledge or consent.

30. The US’ collection of this private personal data is not based on any individualized suspicion or targeting, nor is the collection itself subject to any judicial oversight. 

31. The Guardian has reported that documents it has reviewed show that the US selectively purges communications related to US telephone numbers from the database. However, there are no indications that the US plans to stop collecting any of these data, or purge any communications related to non-US telephone numbers.

• CO-TRAVELER, through which the US captures billions of location updates daily from mobile phones around the world;

B. CO-TRAVELER
32. The CO-TRAVELER program is similar to DISHFIRE in that it entails the US’ indiscriminate interception of personal data. CO-TRAVELER, however, focuses on mobile phone location information with the goal of being able to discover previously unknown associates of persons of interest. In collaboration with an unknown industry partner, the US intelligence authorities collect billions of location updates from hundreds of millions of devices each day.
22
33. Mobile phones regularly send “registration” messages to nearby cellular towers so that the carrier can route phone calls efficiently to the phone. In addition, when a mobile-phone user crosses national boundaries, a roaming message is often sent that informs the user of the current rates for using data and voice in the new country.

34. By collecting and combining registration updates and roaming messages, the US intelligence authorities can map, with reasonable precision, the whereabouts of any mobile-phone user in the world. To discover a target’s associates, the authorities can analyze over time how many other mobile phones remain physically close to that targeted device

35. As under DISHFIRE, the US “incidentally” intercepts and retains US persons’ location data as part of CO-TRAVELER, although it does not deliberately target US persons. Meanwhile, the lack of limits on the interception, retention, use, or dissemination of location data concerning non-US persons mirrors the lack of limits under DISHFIRE

 

• MUSCULAR, which entails the US’ interception of all data transmitted between certain data centers operated by Yahoo! and Google outside of US territory; 

C. MUSCULAR
36. In October 2013, The Washington Post reported that through a program code-named 
MUSCULAR, the US intelligence authorities have been collecting all of the data traffic that flows between certain data centers operated by Yahoo! and Google outside of US territory.23 

Both Yahoo! and Google maintain such data centers in order to keep data closer to the end-user, a practice that improves the speed and responsiveness of the companies’ communications services. 

The various data centers owned by the companies regularly exchange data in order to distribute those data more efficiently, create back-up records, and deliver the companies’ services. 

37. The networks that connect these data centers employ fiber-optic data cables that the companies own or lease, and that are not directly connected to the public Internet. The US intelligence authorities have reportedly tapped into these private networks in order to get access to the raw, unencrypted bulk transfers of data between the data centers. The amount of private data collected in this fashion can be extremely large: for example, if a Yahoo! e-mail user relocates, and Yahoo! decides that it would be more efficient for that user’s data to be stored and processed in a different data center, it is possible that the US intelligence authorities could intercept the entire contents of that user’s email history

• MYSTIC, a US program that collects all telephone call details in five sovereign countries other than the US, as well as the full content of all phone calls in two of those countries; and

D. MYSTIC
39. In March 2014, The Washington Post described a secret surveillance program called MYSTIC, through which the US collects telephone calling details from five countries—later revealed by The Intercept to be the Bahamas, Mexico, Kenya, the Philippines, and one undisclosed country.
24
Through MYSTIC, the US indiscriminately collects comprehensive calling details for all calls in these five countries. This information includes, at minimum, the date and time when a call was placed, the telephone numbers of the caller and recipient.
40. For the Bahamas and the undisclosed country, the US is recording (or has recorded) the full audio content of every single mobile telephone call placed to, from, or within these countries.
25
41. The Intercept estimates that this program collects call details and full conversation content from 250 million people across these five countries, encompassing nearly 100 million calls every day

 

• QUANTUM, a US program that listens in real-time to traffic on the Internet’s most fundamental infrastructure and can respond based on certain triggering information with active attacks, including the delivery of malicious software to the end-user’s device.  (Key Loggers?) (PC-PHONE DATA ATTACK)

E. QUANTUM
42. In October 2013, The Guardian reported that the US intelligence authorities, under a program code-named QUANTUM, have the ability to “shoot” any Internet user in real-time, essentially targeting the delivery of malicious software to the individual as his or her traffic passes by on the Internet.26 

43. To conduct this program, the US intelligence authorities install equipment on the Internet backbones, i.e., the infrastructure that makes Internet activity possible. This equipment can monitor Internet traffic and make exceedingly quick, automated decisions about possible “triggers” seen in the data passing by. If the system sees a target (or “selector”) of interest, it can respond quickly and mount malicious attacks against the user. These attacks range from active “man-in-the-middle” attacks—where the system does just enough to eavesdrop on encrypted traffic—to the delivery of malware, which can compromise the user’s computing device and establish a presence on that device. Once it has established such a presence inside the device, the US can deliver additional malicious software, such as key-logger tools (which record every key typed on a device, including sensitive information such as passwords).
27

44. QUANTUM is often used to defeat certain anonymity tools such as Tor, which facilitates Internet activity that cannot be traced to a particular user. Anonymity tools are used by a wide variety of human rights activists for whom privacy, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly are critical. This means that the invasiveness of QUANTUM has especially grave implications for the human rights addressed in this submission.
45. QUANTUM, like each of the other programs described above, does not appear to be subject to any form of judicial oversight.

IV. Failure of These Programs to Comply with Human Rights Obligations
46. Regardless of the extent to which the US may be legally bound under the relevant human rights treaties to respect the fundamental rights of individuals within or outside of its territory and jurisdiction, we believe that the five surveillance programs described above are grossly inconsistent with the right to freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference in privacy and

3. Our human rights concerns in the context of the US’ surveillance extend beyond these five
programs; however, we believe these programs merit special attention from the Human Rights Council, as their implications for human rights are particularly grave. We have sought to use our technological expertise to help ensure that the Council and all stakeholders enjoy a complete understanding of these highly complex programs and their enormous detrimental impact on privacy and related rights.

4. At the outset, we wish to make the practical consequences of these five programs clear: on a daily basis, US authorities are intercepting the private communications and other personal 
electronic data of hundreds of millions of people across the globe, the vast majority of whom are not suspected of any wrongdoing. The intercepted data includes information about where those hundreds of millions of people are, with whom they correspond, and what they say in their correspondence. In the aggregate, the data allow the agencies to create a detailed picture of an individual’s personal life, even where that individual has no connection with any criminal investigation.

5. It is our view that the five programs are grossly inconsistent with the obligation to refrain from interfering arbitrarily with individuals’ privacy and correspondence, as provided in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). 

6. We are also gravely concerned about the negative implications of these programs for the right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed in Article 19 of the UDHR and Article 19 of the ICCPR, as well as the right of peaceful assembly, established at Article 20 of the UDHR and Article 21 of the ICCPR

25. As a basis for the US’ bulk (i.e., indiscriminate) collection of private communications, PPD-28 asserts the protection of US national security interests. In respect of this bulk collection, PPD-28 states that the US authorities shall use the intercepted data “only for the purposes of detecting and countering (1) espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign powers or their intelligence services against the United States and its interests; (2) threats to the United States and its interests from terrorism; (3) threats to the United States and its interests from the development, possession, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; (4) cybersecurity threats; (5) threats to U.S. or allied Armed Forces or other U.S or allied personnel; and (6) transnational criminal threats…” 

26. Notwithstanding these restrictions on the use of intercepted data, the declassified portion of PPD28 does not impose any restrictions on the collection of that data. 

27. Pursuant to PPD-28, the US may retain an item of intercepted data for up to five years, or for a longer period if the Director of National Intelligence determines that continued retention is “in the national security interests of the United States.” 

28. As a policy, PPD-28 applies to each of the programs described below. However, to the extent that the directive contains limitations on the conduct of the programs, these limitations do not impose any enforceable legal obligations upon any US entity.

21 James Ball, NSA collects millions of text messages daily in ‘untargeted’ global sweep, GUARDIAN, Jan. 16, 2014, 
available at

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargetedglobal-sweep

(Last accessed Sept. 9, 2014). 22 Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, NSA tracking cellphone locations worldwide, Snowden documents show,

WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2013, available at

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-trackingcellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-

c6ca94801fac_story.html (last accessed Sept. 9, 2014
23Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, NSA infiltrates links to Yahoo, Google data centers worldwide, Snowden 
documents say, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, available at

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documentssay/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html

(Last accessed Sept. 9, 2014). 24 Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, NSA surveillance program reaches ‘into the past’ to retrieve, replay phone 

calls, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsasurveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e76adc9210f19_story.html (last accessed Sept. 12, 2014); Ryan Devereaux et al., Data Pirates of the Caribbean: The 
NSA Is Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas, INTERCEPT, May 19, 2014, available at

https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/

(Last accessed Sept. 12, 2014
25 Devereaux et al., supra n. 24. 26James Ball et al., NSA and GCHQ target Tor network that protects anonymity of web users, GUARDIAN, Oct. 4, 2013, available at

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption

(Last accessed Sept. 9, 2014); Nicholas Weaver, Our Government Has Weaponized the Internet. Here’s How They Did It, WIRED, Nov. 13, 2013, available at

Our Government Has Weaponized the Internet. Here’s How They Did It,

(Last accessed Sept. 9, 2014). 27 Bruce Schneier, Attacking Tor: how the NSA targets users’ online anonymity, GUARDIAN, Oct. 4, 2013, available at

Attacking Tor: how the NSA targets users’ online anonymity, GUARDIAN, Oct. 4, 2013, available

(Last accessed Sept. 11, 2014)

REFERENCES
Human Rights Watch Asks US about Use of Secret Surveillance for Drug, Immigration Purposes
Freedom of Information Act Requests Seek Records from 22 Federal Agencies

https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/23/human-rights-watch-asks-us-about-use-secret-surveillance-drug-immigration-purposes

In January 2017, Human Rights Watch submitted requests to twenty-two United States federal agencies pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.  The requests seek legal, policy, and other documents addressing any use of two of the country’s main intelligence surveillance laws for counter-drug or immigration purposes, including in a manner that may affect people in the United States and US citizens abroad.  The laws include Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which underpins the PRISM program as well as “upstream” surveillance activities, and Executive Order 12333, which allegedly serves as the basis for large-scale US surveillance programs worldwide.  Both of these laws are described further in Human Rights Watch’s 2014 report With Liberty to Monitor All.

With Liberty to Monitor All
(Even though this Document is from 2014, IT IS VERY INTERESTING)

How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy
 

CONTENTS:
Summary
Revelations of Large-Scale Surveillance
Impact of Surveillance on Journalists
Impact of Surveillance on Lawyers
Uncertainty and Secrecy
Methodology
I. Background: US Surveillance, Secrecy, and Crackdown on Leaks
Legal Authorities Governing Surveillance
Surveillance under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act
Surveillance under Section 702 of FISA
Surveillance under Executive Order 12,333
Privacy Protections under Existing US Surveillance Programs
Minimization Procedures
The Current Surveillance Debate
The Broader Context: Government Secrecy and the Crackdown on Leaks
Over-Classification
“Insider Threats”
Limiting Intelligence Officials’ Contact with the Media
II. The Impact of Surveillance on Journalists
Losing Sources
Changing Journalistic Practices
Advanced Privacy and Security Technology
Decreasing Reliance on Digital Technology
Other Strategies to Protect Sources
Ongoing Uncertainty about Security
Impact on News Coverage, Public Accountability, and the Quality of Democratic Debate
Impact on News Coverage
Impact on the Press’s Ability to Serve as a Check on Government Abuse
III. The Impact of Surveillance on Lawyers and Their Clients
Uncertainty and Confusion among Lawyers over How to Respond to Large-Scale US Surveillance
The Implications of Surveillance for the Professional Responsibilities of Lawyers
Damage to Attorney-Client Trust
Impact on Attorneys’ Ability to Effectively Represent Clients
Changing Legal Practices
IV. The Government’s Rationale for Surveillance
The Lawfulness of Current Surveillance Programs
Whether the Programs Are Necessary for National Security and Sufficiently Targeted
Whether the Programs Have a Chilling Effect on the Rights of Journalists, Lawyers, or Others
The Impact on Journalists
The Impact on Lawyers and Their Clients
What the Government Should Do
V. The Rights at Stake
Rights Affected by Surveillance’s Impact on Journalists
International Human Rights Law and Standards on Freedom of Expression, Association, and Access to Information
US Constitutional Law
Rights Implicated by Surveillance’s Impact on Attorneys
International Human Rights Law and Standards
US Constitutional Law
Recommendations
Narrow the Scope of Surveillance Authorities:
Strengthen the Protections Provided by Targeting and Minimization Procedures:
Disclose Additional Information about Surveillance Programs to the Public:
Reduce Government Secrecy and Restrictions on Official Contact with the Media:
Enhance Protections for National-Security Whistleblowers:
Acknowledgments
Appendix

Executive Order 12333 16 Page pdf

United States Intelligence Activities
(As amended by Executive Orders 13284 (2003), 13355 (2004) and 13470 (2008))
 

50 U.S. Code § 1881a – Procedures for targeting certain persons outside the United States other than United States persons. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1881a

DOD MANUAL 5240.01

PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF DOD INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 56 Page pdf

 

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (10 Pages)

(Another Very Interesting Document)
Brendan Henry
FOIA Officer/Public Liaison
Office of Intelligence and Analysis
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528
January 18, 2017
Dear Mr. Henry:

Through this letter, Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) requests copies of documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.

We request these documents on an expedited basis; we also seek a public interest fee waiver and news media fee status.

As explained below, our request concerns policy and other final or working documents that relate to the ability of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (“I&A”) to obtain access to communications and related data that the US government has acquired under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (also known as Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, “FISA”) or Executive Order 12333 (“EO 12333”). In the context of this request, “related data,” also commonly known as “metadata,” refers to data that describe a communication: for example, the date, time, and duration of a telephone conversation, or the date, time, sender, and recipients of an email. For our purposes, “related data” also includes location data. 
Below, we list our specific requests, followed by an explanation of the relevant laws. We also provide details regarding our requests for expedited processing, a public interest fee waiver, and news media fee status.
I. Requested records Human Rights Watch respectfully requests copies of the following documents, preferably in electronic format and on a rolling basis as I&A locates them:
1. Formal, final, or implemented legal opinions and determinations, procedures, policies, training materials, memoranda of agreement, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) materials (including, e.g., submissions, opinions, orders, and petitions), that meaningfully discuss or address the acquisition or collection of communications or related data 
under Section 702 or Executive Order 12333 by I&A as part of efforts to:
a. counter threats to border security;
b. counter threats to cyber security; or
c. conduct “countering violent extremism” initiatives.
Please note that some materials may refer to Section 702 simply as the “FISA Amendments Act” (or “FAA”), of which it was a part.
2. Formal, final, or implemented legal opinions and determinations, procedures, policies, training materials, memoranda of agreement, and FISC materials that meaningfully discuss or address I&A’s ability to receive, disseminate, retain, query, or obtain or grant authorization to query communications or related data the US government has originally obtained pursuant to Section 702 or Executive Order 12333. 

a. This request includes (but is not limited to) records meaningfully discussing or addressing I&A’s treatment of data accessible or made available to it by fusion centers, joint task forces, and databases.
b. It also includes records meaningfully discussing or addressing I&A’s dissemination of communications or related data the US government has originally obtained pursuant to Section 702 or Executive Order 12333 to other federal agencies or state, local, tribal, or private entities.

Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan rule that lets the NSA spy on Americans
Posted on December 12, 2014 

“Incidental” collection may sound insignificant, but it is a legal loophole that can be stretched very wide. Remember that the NSA is building a data center in Utah five times the size of the U.S. Capitol building, with its own power plant that will reportedly burn $40 million a year in electricity.
“Incidental collection” might need its own power plant
Issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 to authorize foreign intelligence investigations, 12333 is not a statute and has never been subject to meaningful oversight from Congress or any court. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has said that the committee has not been able to “sufficiently” oversee activities conducted under 12333.
Unlike Section 215, the executive order authorizes collection of the content of communications, not just metadata, even for U.S. persons. Such persons cannot be individually targeted under 12333 without a court order. However, if the contents of a U.S. person’s communications are “incidentally” collected (an NSA term of art) in the course of a lawful overseas foreign intelligence investigation, then Section 2.3(c) of the executive order explicitly authorizes their retention. It does not require that the affected U.S. persons be suspected of wrongdoing and places no limits on the volume of communications by U.S. persons that may be collected and retained.
Even after all the reforms President Obama has announced, some intelligence practices remain so secret, even from members of Congress, that there is no opportunity for our democracy to change them.
Public debate about the bulk collection of U.S. citizens’ data by the NSA has focused largely on Section 215 of the Patriot Act, through which the government obtains court orders to compel American telecommunications companies to turn over phone data. But Section 215 is a small part of the picture and does not include the universe of collection and storage of communications by U.S. persons authorized under Executive Order 12333.
From 2011 until April of this year, I worked on global Internet freedom policy as a civil servant at the State Department. In that capacity, I was cleared to receive top-secret and “sensitive compartmented” information. Based in part on classified facts that I am prohibited by law from publishing, I believe that Americans should be even more concerned about the collection and storage of their communications under Executive Order 12333 than under Section 215.
Bulk data collection that occurs inside the United States contains built-in protections for U.S. persons, defined as U.S. citizens, permanent residents and companies. Such collection must be authorized by statute and is subject to oversight from Congress and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. The statutes set a high bar for collecting the content of communications by U.S. persons. For example, Section 215 permits the bulk collection only of U.S. telephone metadata — lists of incoming and outgoing phone numbers — but not audio of the calls.
Executive Order 12333 contains no such protections for U.S. persons if the collection occurs outside U.S. borders.”

 

Exclusive: U.S. directs agents to cover up program used to investigate Americans